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Abstract 
There is an extensive literature that points to the importance of understanding teacher-
student relationships in ameliorating a systemic pattern of exclusion of young people 
with mental disorders from educational settings. This research highlights the 
importance of reflexively and iteratively understanding the role of the local context 
and interaction in the young person’s practices. This in turn raises the question as to 
the limits to local understanding generated by the institutional context of these 
settings.  In addressing this question this thesis makes a contribution to knowledge 
about the nature and conditions of efficacy for in situ knowledge construction and 
application associated with everyday inclusive practice.   
 
This contribution is based upon an intensive examination of an incident of violent 
‘blowing up’, within an alternative school setting, that ends with school exclusion of a 
young person diagnosed with a mental disorder. Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field 
and practice provide a theoretical framework to raise questions about, and analyse the 
relationship between, the young person’s practice and the local context.  Interaction 
order methods are applied to the teacher’s and young person’s accounts to reveal the 
nature of, and institutional conditions for, in situ knowledge construction and 
application practices associated with exclusion.   
 
The data analysis identifies the way that ‘blowing up’ arises from interactional 
relationships of moral collision, contradiction and imposition.  A critical feature of 
this collision was the imposition of an institutional symbolic order upon a ‘smartarse’ 
symbolic order through everyday language practices of symbolic violence.  The study 
consequently showed that ‘blowing up’ amounted to a triumph of misrecognition 
 vii 
despite any good intentions to ‘understand where this kid was coming from’. This 
triumph was underwritten by institutionally recognised knowledge construction 
practices, tied to professional competency, which came over the top of any good 
intentions to understand the young person’s practice. The thesis concludes by 
identifying some of the institutional conditions and local knowledge construction 
practices necessary for inclusion suggested by these findings.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.0 Contribution of the Thesis 
In the early 2000s, a young person aged 12 years was attending an alternative 
education setting for students with ‘mental disorders’.  He had previously been 
diagnosed with ‘Comorbid Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and 
Serious Conduct Disorder (CD)’.  A critical incident occurred in the alternative setting 
associated with this diagnosis, which resulted in school exclusion.  Some of the 
intensity of this episode is captured in the young person’s account: 
‘So he sent me into this room and we got the signature things, where, like, you get so 
many signatures you get a reward?  Half an hour break in the morning and shit like 
that.   Well, he started fucking rubbing them out!  This teacher started going: “Oh 
I’ll get the white out if you don’t stop doing that.”   I said, “Get fucked” and he 
started whiting them out.   
So I went to talk to this chick, names Stevie.  I walked in there and went, “Well, 
yeah, Stevie, look he’s rubbing out the signatures. What a cunt, eh?” and he’s in 
there and goes: “Oh, Aaron, get out of this classroom.”   I said, “Get fucked you 
cunt. I’ll smash ya,” and I walked out into this other room, but this teacher wouldn’t 
let me out of the classroom.  So I jumped over the table and this body builder, his 
name – he’s fuckn huge – his name’s Phil.  Phil went and grabbed me and I went: 
“No, get fucked” and smashed him into the fucking wall.  
My friends jumped up then and they said, “Don’t do that to Aaron” and smashed and 
tackled the teacher.  And I jumped up and started swinging, pushing him [the 
teacher] in the cupboard and started swinging at them all and it fucking took five of 
them to hold me down.  Fuck, I was still getting rammed into the walls when the cop 
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comes.  The cop goes, like: “What are you gonna do if I let you up?”  I said, “I’m 
gonna fucking swing at you, dumb cunt.” 
His teacher reported that the young person had spit frothing from his mouth.  His 
teacher said the young person’s anger was so intense that it required three male 
teachers to restrain him while he continued to try to smash his head up against the 
wall.  When asked if he was calm, so that they could let him up, the young person 
continually replied: “Yeah, I’m calm, yeah, let me up I’m calm, I’m gonna kill you.”  
The police were called and after being threatened with capsicum spray the young 
person was released and he left the school grounds.  He was formally expelled.  He 
has not returned to any formal education from that day to this.  
 
Significantly, the collapse in the teacher-student relationship and the subsequent 
unwanted outcome of school exclusion completely contradicted the teacher’s good 
intentions, their expertise and training and the flexibilities afforded by the alternative 
setting itself.  Thus, despite good policy, intentions and institutional arrangements this 
young person, like many others diagnosed with ‘mental disorders’, followed a well-
trodden path of school exclusion constituted by either formal expulsion, as with the 
young person above, or by early school leaving.  This thesis will examine the set of 
institutional relations that make exclusion possible despite all good intentions in order 
to point to the set of institutional relations that could make inclusion possible.   
 
Specifically, this thesis will focus on an area of inquiry suggested by previous 
educational and psychological research as critical to school inclusion and exclusion.  
That body of knowledge has repeatedly emphasised the importance of ‘understanding’ 
and ‘appreciation’ within inclusive teacher-student relationships and, more 
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particularly, the importance of processes of iteratively and reflexively understanding 
the role of the local context and interaction in the young person’s practices.  More 
concretely, previous research points to the importance of knowledge construction and 
application practices within teacher-student interactions as being central to 
‘understanding’ associated with inclusion.  However the educational and 
psychological research also raises the problem posed by the institutional context to 
‘understanding’. This thesis closely investigates this problem and specifically 
constitutes an inquiry into: (i) the obstacles to reflexive knowledge construction and 
application within these interactions posed by the institutional context; and (ii) the 
knowledge construction and application practices associated with these institutional 
obstacles that prevent reflexive knowledge construction and application at the level of 
interaction.  This investigation makes possible the conceptualisation of the 
institutional conditions and practices at the level of the interaction order that limit 
reflexive understanding associated with inclusive teacher-student relationships. This 
in turn points to the possibility of reflexive understanding.  As a result the thesis aims 
to make a direct conceptual contribution to the body of applied knowledge aimed at 
school inclusion and exclusion for this group of young people.   
 
To make this contribution the thesis presents data from a critical case study of an 
episode of violent teacher-student relationship breakdown associated with ‘mental 
disorder’ within an alternative setting that ends with school expulsion.  The case to be 
examined represents a limiting case that was selected to expose the pertinent 
conditions for, and features of, knowledge construction and application practices 
associated with exclusion that would, in turn, point to the conditions for, and features 
of, knowledge construction and application practices associated with inclusion.  
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However, the selection of a case study within an alternative setting means that the 
study also makes a substantiative contribution to the body of knowledge surrounding 
special education and school inclusion and exclusion.   
 
As a critical case study the findings of this thesis do not aim for statistical 
generalisability, but rather theoretical generalisability.  However, because this 
theoretical generalisability lies at the level of conceptualising everyday practice – the 
sets of institutional relationships necessary for the ‘doing’ of exclusion and inclusion 
within classroom settings – this theorisation makes a potentially important 
contribution to applied practice.  By bringing a conceptual light to what has been 
previously only intuitively experienced, the thesis explores the possibility of a highly 
systematic and controlled approach to promoting and disseminating everyday 
inclusive practice.  In this regard, the thesis does not presume to ‘discover’ practices 
or conditions that have previously not existed or been intuited.  Instead, by negotiating 
an applied epistemological space between theory and practice, the thesis aims to 
conceptualise, at the level of interaction, what may already be intuitively known, but 
perhaps not seen clearly because of subjectivities in the field.   
 
To this end the thesis introduces sociological theorisation into a stable knowledge 
field previously occupied by psychology and psychiatry, disability and education.  In 
this regard sociology under-labours for the applied task at hand so as to, as Outhwaite 
(1987: 55-60) argues, clear away epistemological smoke and mirrors.  These are the 
epistemological obstructions that arrive in the guise of unanalysed presumptions and 
commonsense thinking generated by the subject-to-subject and normatively pre-
interpreted positioning of the practitioner and researcher to the object of scientific 
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inquiry (Bhaskar, 1979: 27).  Specifically, the thesis introduces Bourdieu’s 
theorisation of practice to break with commonsense thinking and provide a rigorous 
theoretical framework to raise questions about, and analyse the unfolding relationship 
between, the young person’s practice and the local context in the case study.  In 
drawing upon Bourdieu’s theorising of practice the thesis will make a theoretical 
contribution to Bourdieu’s theorising of exclusion by examining some of the local 
conditions for exclusion in actual classroom settings.  
 
In order to reveal the nature of, and conditions for, knowledge construction and 
application practices at the level of interaction, within the set of relations suggested by 
Bourdieu, the thesis turns to the interaction order theorists Goffman, Garfinkel and 
Sacks.  Thus interaction order methods are applied to the teacher’s and young 
person’s interview accounts of the episode to reveal the fine detail of linguistic 
practices, in much the same way that increasing the resolution of an image will reveal 
the composite pixilation.  As Schegloff argues, these methods allow for an 
examination at the right level of ‘granulity’ to capture the detail of linguistic practice 
(2002: 314). This in turn reveals the detail of the set of relations in play, as suggested 
by Bourdieu, and the knowledge construction and application practices within and 
about those relations at the level of the interaction order.  As such, the research 
represents an example of applied ethnomethodology, where interaction order methods 
are used to study institutional interactions and/or advise on practice (ten Have, 2001: 
3).  Consequently the research makes a substantiative contribution to the body of 
knowledge surrounding applied ethnomethodology.  
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The adoption of interaction order methods in the thesis also has a specific 
epistemological importance.  This is because the application of interaction order 
methods to the protagonists’ accounts guards against the introduction of the 
researcher’s own presumptions, thus enabling a highly reflexive description of the set 
of relations in play.  This is a sense of reflexivity in Bourdieu’s terms; that is, a 
systematic exploration of the ‘unthought categories of thought’ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992: 40).  Accordingly, the thesis makes a direct contribution to the body 
of methodological knowledge addressing the epistemological problems of 
representation associated with qualitative interviews.   
  
 At the heart of this inquiry lies a critical question.  This question is pragmatically 
related to the scenario provided above, just as it is pragmatically related to young 
people in this group that face school exclusion, albeit less provocatively, through 
early school leaving.  That question is this: what are the set of relations that make it 
possible and impossible to understand and appreciate the point of view and practices 
of these young people in order to foster inclusion?  In this sense, the thesis embraces 
Bourdieu’s position that the possibility of social transformation is dependent on 
illuminating empirically why people engage in the practices that they do (Fowler, 
1996: 1).  The way that this inquiry approaches this task of empirical illumination is 
to throw an intense spotlight on a single episode of exclusion using the conceptual and 
methodological tools provided by Bourdieu and the interaction order theorists.  As 
such, the thesis empirically and conceptually takes up Slee’s challenge that ‘engaging 
in authentic reform requires a fundamental analysis of the relationships between 
ontology, epistemology, language and action.’ (2006: 116).  The end result is a 
contribution towards the conceptualisation of the practices and set of relations 
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necessary to pragmatically foster a reaching out to ‘not one of us’ (Rorty in Danforth, 
1999:  747). 
 
2.0 Definitions 
The thesis trades on the term ‘mental disorder’.  Nevertheless it needs to be 
recognised from the outset that there are no clear definitions or international 
consensus about such terms as ‘mental disorder’ (Laughlin, 1998: 4).  As Sawyer et al 
clearly state in the introduction to their national survey of Mental Health of Australian 
young people, ‘Terms such as mental health problems, mental disorder and emotional 
and behavioural problems do not have exact definitions’ (2000: 3).  In the place of an 
exact definition is a bewildering array of similar terms that all seem to refer to a 
similar phenomenon, but may mean different things according to who is using them 
and where, when and how they are used.  These terms include Emotional Disorder, 
Behavioural Disorder, Emotional Disturbance, Behavioural Disturbance, Conduct 
Disorders, Emotional Disability and Disruptive Behaviour Disorders which are 
encompassed by umbrella terms such as Mental Illness or Disorder, Psychiatric Illness 
or Disorder and Abnormal Psychology.   
Not surprisingly, this lack of definitional consensus presents an initial obstacle to an 
inquiry setting out to conceptually address the problem of the social exclusion of this 
group of young people.  In the face of this confusion, the thesis adopts the pragmatic 
approach of describing this group in terms of those young people who have been 
recipients of a psychological or psychiatric clinical diagnosis.  This is regardless of 
the particular diagnostic tool employed to provide the diagnosis. More specific 
definitions for the array of terms encountered in this thesis can be found in Appendix 
1.  While this strategy circumvents definitional problems it does not imply a 
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trivialisation of the conceptual problem itself.  On the contrary, in the course of this 
inquiry the taken-for-granted notion of ‘mental disorder’ becomes highly 
problematised.      
 
3.0 Plan of the Thesis 
The following three chapters are devoted to posing the research questions outlined 
above and developing a conceptual and methodological framework for their 
investigation.  Chapter 2 begins by showing that institutional exclusion from 
secondary educational settings for this group is a significant social problem.  The 
chapter then reviews  research on the relationship between ‘mental disorder’ and 
school exclusion, and arrives at the finding that: (i) the sets of relationships between 
historical relations, meaning-making and local institutional relations are crucial to an 
understanding of the conditions producing ‘mentally disordered’ practice; (ii)  culture, 
gender and socio-economic relations mediate the production of ‘disordered’ practice, 
teacher-student relationships and reflexive understanding of student practices. This 
suggests that symbolic power relations are crucial to understanding the production of 
‘disordered’ practices associated with school exclusion; (iii) teachers’ knowledge 
construction and application within and about these sets of relations operating in local 
teacher-student interactions is critical to the production of institutional exclusion and 
inclusion.  The chapter then argues that while the literature recognises that 
institutional conditions can provide obstacles to reflexive understanding, a precise 
conceptualisation of the nature of these conditions and associated knowledge 
construction and application practices, at the everyday level of interaction, represents 
a critical gap in applied knowledge.  This defines this study’s point of departure.   
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Chapter 3 introduces a theoretical perspective based on Bourdieu’s theorising of 
practice to carefully construct the object of inquiry, thereby providing an 
epistemologically rigorous set of thinking tools to reflexively analyse the set of 
institutional relationships foregrounded by the literature review.  The chapter, firstly, 
introduces the broad epistemological foundation for Bourdieu’s model of practice, and 
then explores two key dimensions of Bourdieu’s model: habitus and field, drawing 
attention to epistemological implications, symbolic power relations and the 
relationships between them.  The chapter argues that Bourdieu’s abstract 
conceptualisation of habitus and field, in terms of dispositions, positions and position 
taking, opens up the possibility of examining the dynamic set of symbolic relations 
between practice and context within institutional settings.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodologies, methods and research design selected for the 
purpose of studying these relationships at the level of interaction in actual classroom 
settings.  The chapter describes a methodological framework informed by interaction 
order theorists Goffman, Garfinkel and Sacks. This chapter argues that this framework 
is suited to this kind of study in terms of delivering a highly reflexive account of 
knowledge construction and application within, and about, the set of relations between 
dispositions, positions and position taking in play in the case study.  The chapter 
outlines the case study data selection, data collection through interviews and data 
analysis, including the specific methods used in data analysis: membership 
categorisation analysis and conversation analysis.   
 
Chapters 5 and 6 then present and analyse the findings from the case study of an 
episode of extreme teacher-student relationship breakdown that led to school 
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exclusion.  Chapter 5 presents an intensive linguistic analysis of the young person’s 
accounts, to analyse the durable elements of disposition in play in the episode.  
Chapter 6 presents an intensive linguistic comparative analysis of both the young 
person and teacher’s accounts in order to reflexively analyse the young person’s logic 
of practice in the episode within the unfolding set of relationships between the 
protagonist’s dispositions, positions, position making and position taking.  This 
analysis exposes an inferable breakdown in the teacher’s knowledge construction and 
application of the young person’s logic of practice within those set of relations and 
relationship between that breakdown and the interactional collapse.   
 
Chapter 7 then analyses the set of contingent relations between the protagonists’ 
dispositions, positions and position takings that gave rise to a breakdown in the 
teacher’s knowledge construction and application associated with exclusion – despite 
the best of intentions and flexibilities afforded by the setting.  This provides the 
grounds for arguing that relationships of symbolic violence and misrecognition play 
havoc with reflexive understanding, resulting in the breakdown in the interaction and 
school exclusion.  Furthermore, this analysis reveals the precise nature of the 
interactional knowledge construction and application practices caught up in symbolic 
violence and the institutional conditions operating at the level of interaction that 
ensure the production and reproduction of these relationships of symbolic violence 
and misrecognition.   
 
Chapter 8 follows with a discussion of what these findings point to in terms of the 
possibility of, and conditions for, reflexive knowledge construction and application 
associated with inclusive teacher-student relationships at the level of the interaction 
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order.  The thesis concludes with a summary of the contributions of the study and an 
examination of the limits of the study and its implications for further research.   
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Chapter Two 
Teacher-Student Relationships and the Limits to, and Possibility of, 
Understanding and Inclusion 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the point of departure of this research from 
existing work.  The chapter will show that institutional exclusion of young people 
clinically diagnosed with ‘mental disorders’ from secondary educational settings is a 
significant social problem.  The chapter will then review existing research while 
seeking to understand the relationship between mental disorder and school exclusion 
with a particular focus on the way this operates in the institutional setting. That 
research converges on the pragmatic finding that ‘understanding’ and ‘appreciative’ 
teacher-student relationships ameliorate patterns of exclusion.  An examination of 
these inclusive relationships points to the importance of teacher interactions refined 
iteratively through a reflexive understanding of the role of context and interaction in 
the young person practice.  The chapter will then argue that while the critical features 
of context in these interactions have been well documented and while reflexive 
approaches to understanding practice have been abstractly theorised, there remains a 
gap in applied practical knowledge.  The chapter identifies that what is missing is 
analytical insight into the institutional conditions for, and the practical nature of, 
‘understanding’ associated with inclusion at the everyday level of interaction.  This in 
turn gives rise to the research questions that are the focus of this study and mark its 
point of departure. 
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2.2 The Social Problem 
This section will present the case that the exclusion of this group of young people 
from secondary educational settings represents a persistent social problem despite 
Australian and international policy efforts.  The section will begin by identifying the 
prevalence of young people diagnosed with mental disorders and their problematic 
social outcomes.  It will be shown that, while inclusion within education systems is 
understood as a means to interrupt these poor outcomes, this group nevertheless faces 
significant institutional exclusion from those systems. 
 
2.2.1 The Prevalence of Young People with Mental Disorders 
While there are problematic definitional issues that confound both an accurate 
identification of prevalence and an ability to compare different sets of data, there is 
nevertheless convincing evidence that the sheer size of this population portends a 
significant social policy problem. 
 
In terms of Australian estimates of ‘mental disorders’, Sawyer et al (2000), in an 
extensive national representative sample of children and young people aged 4-17, 
estimated that 14.1% (n=521,886) of this population have some kind of clinically 
significant mental health problem (10). For the 13-17 year old group 19.0% of the 
sampled population, using the Achenbach and Rescorla’s Youth Self Report (YSR), 
reported clinical mental health problems on the total problems scale (Sawyer, Miller-
Lewis & Clark, 2007: 187-188). More recently the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare (AIHW) reported that in 2007 26% of young people aged 16-24 had some 
kind of mental disorder (2011). The AIHW has also reported that in 2003, 2.1% of 
children aged 0-14 had a ‘psychiatric disability’, that is, a clinically diagnosed mental 
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disorder that seriously ‘impaired personal functioning in normal social activity’ 
(AIHW, 2006: 6-7). 
 
These estimates appear to be comparable with US and other international estimates.  
For example, in 2006 Rescorla et al compared rates of problems reported on the total 
problems scale of the YSR by young people in 22 countries.  In their comparison the 
mean YSR Total Problems score for Australian young people approximated the 
overall mean score reported for all young people across the participating countries 
(Rescorla et al in Sawyer, Miller-Lewis & Clark, 2007: 191-192). Similarly the US 
Surgeon General’s Report on Mental Health in 1999 estimated that while 21% of all 
young people have some kind of diagnosable mental or addictive disorder and that 5% 
have an ‘extreme’ mental or addictive disorder (In Whittaker et al, 2006: 194). 
Kauffman (2005), following an extensive survey of the literature, reported that a 
reasonable estimate for the percentage of students ‘whose behavior is so persistently 
troublesome that special education is desirable’, that is, students that are arguably 
commensurate with the US Surgeon General’s ‘extreme’ end of disorder, was 3-6% 
(32). 
 
2.2.2 Social Exclusion 
In Australian policy, ‘social inclusion’ refers to opportunities, resources, and human 
capability.  Drawing on definitions from the Australian Social Inclusion Board (2010) 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in their report, ‘Perspectives on Education 
and Training: Social Inclusion, 2009’ argued that social inclusion is generally 
understood ‘as the extent to which individuals and populations have the choice and 
capacity to participate in society’ (ABS, 2011). Accordingly the numbers of young 
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people identified as having ‘mental disorders’ in itself would not represent a 
significant social policy problem if existing interventions aimed at social inclusion 
were highly successful.  However this is not the case.  It is particularly not the case for 
that proportion of young people assessed as having a more extreme or severe mental 
disorder.  This is the 2.1% of the Australian population of young people assessed as 
having a ‘psychiatric disability’ or the 3-6% at the ‘extreme end of disorder’, that is, 
those assessed as having a ‘severe emotional disorder’ in the US.  This group of 
young people has exceptionally poor social outcomes. Young people with ‘psychiatric 
disabilities’ or ‘severe emotional disorders’ find themselves sharing the experience of 
educational exclusion, early school leaving, academic failure, homelessness and Out 
of Home Care (OoHC) placement breakdown.  They also share elevated probabilities 
of life long social exclusion, including long term unemployment, long term 
involvement with the criminal justice system,  early and violent death, suicide, drug 
abuse, adult homelessness and persistent health problems (Armstrong, Debrick & 
Greenbaum, 2003: 71; Broidy et al, 2002: 223-235; Corbett et al, 2002: 358; Dick et 
al, 2005: 220; Gresham, Lane & Lambros, 2000: 84-85; Hemphill 1996: 110-111; 
Kann & Hanna 2000: 267; Lane et al, 2006: 108; Lewis et al, 2012: 83; Loeber, Burke 
& Lahey, 2002: 24-34;  Mihalas et al, 2009: 109; Milne 2001: 15; Nock et al, 2006: 
699-700; Osborn & Delfabbro 2005; Sawyer, Miller-Lewis & Clark, 2007: 192; 
Simpson, Peterson & Smith, 2011: 230; & Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber 2002: 69-76; 
Wiley et al, 2009: 451).  Collectively this research continues to throw a spotlight on 
the chronic social exclusion of this group of young people. 
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2.2.3 Schools as Sites for Social Inclusion 
Schools have been repeatedly identified as providing an opportunity to ameliorate 
these poor outcomes and interrupt the development of ‘psychopathology’.  Thus 
schools provide the opportunity for positive experiences that have been consistently 
reported to be strongly linked to positive outcomes for young people with ‘mental 
disorders’.  These positive experiences have been seen to arise from a sense of 
connectedness, pro-social relationships and academic achievement (Abrams, 2005: 
42; Armstrong, Debrick & Greenbaum, 2003: 74; ABS 2011; Egelund & Hansen, 
2000: 294; Gable et al, 2002: 460-463; Guerra, Boxer and Kim, 2005: 280-284; 
Huang et al, 2001: 78-98; Lane et al, 2006: 109; Lingo, Slaton & Jolivette, 2006: 265-
267; .Luna & Medina, 2001: 98-99; Mihalas et al, 2009; Murray & Greenburg 2006; 
Urbis, 2011: 39; & Wagner & Davis, 2006: 87-89).   
 
2.2.4 School Exclusion 
For a large number of young people diagnosed with mental disorders the opportunity 
that schools may represent is never realised because of systemic patterns of exclusion.  
These patterns can be read against high rates of disaffected early school leaving and 
high rates of school expulsion and suspension regardless of good intentions and 
special education programs. These high rates are difficult to reconcile against the 
principles of connectedness and positive achievement that seem to underpin the 
reported efficacy of schools in ameliorating poor social outcomes and fostering social 
inclusion. 
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2.2.4.1 Early School Leaving  
The US National Longitudinal Transition Study-2 (NLTS2) studies are large 
investigations of students receiving special education services.  Fifty-one percent of 
these ‘seriously emotional disturbed’ students drop out of education programs that are 
supported by these special education services (Wagner et al, 2005: 80).  In addition, 
the U.S. Department of Education (2006) reported that 65% of students with 
‘emotional disturbances’ drop out (in Pyle & Wexler, 2012: 283). This national 
statistic is further corroborated by a number of other studies including Scanlon & 
Mellord’s (2002) smaller case study of 277 students with and without ‘Learning or 
Emotional/Behavioural Disorders’.  This study showed that 68% of students with 
‘Emotional/Behavioral Disorders’ dropped out early (245). 
 
The Australian evidence is consistent with the NLTS2 findings. The Australian 
research includes a number of investigations drawing a persistent link between 
students with ‘mental health’ issues and early school leaving (Australian Social 
Inclusion Board, 2011: 5; Batten & Russell, 1995; Brooks et al 1997: 13-16; House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Employment, Education & Training 
(HRSCEET), 1996: 26-30; & Lamb et al 2004: 18).  It also includes research that has 
been undertaken with young people involved with the juvenile justice system and 
research with young people in Out of Home Care (OoHC), that is, young people 
where the parental responsibility lies legally with the State. Both of these groups are 
of special interest here because both are distinguished by their exceptionally high 
percentage of young people with ‘psychiatric disorders’, so this kind of research is 
likely to be of great value in assessing educational outcomes in Australia. 
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The 2006 health study of NSW young people on Community Orders 2003-2006 –  
young people who have received a non-custodial juvenile justice sentence – reveals 
that 40% of this group have ‘severe symptoms consistent with a clinical disorder’.  Of 
this 40% an overwhelming 86% had left school prior to Year 10 (Kenny et al, 2006: 
22-30).  Similarly, the 2009 NSW Young People in Custody Health Survey showed 
that 86.7% were assessed with a psychological disorder.  Of this group 72.7% were 
assessed as having two or more disorders.  Only 37.9% of the population had been 
attending school prior to custody while the mean age of leaving school was 14.4 years 
(Indig et al, 2011: 16 & 144-145). 
 
The second group of children and young people in OoHC is also distinguished by an 
exceptionally high prevalence of ‘psychiatric disorders’ with estimates from audits 
and sample surveys ranging from 15% to 57% of the population (Department of 
Human Services Victoria (DHS), 2001: 28; De Lemos in CREATE Foundation, 2005: 
12; Osborn & Delfabbro, 2005; & Tarren-Sweeney & Hazell, 2006: 91).  Early school 
leaving for this group of young people also appears to be exceptionally high as 
evidenced in the CREATE Foundation 2006 Report Card on Educational Services 
throughout Australia, which reported a non-retention rate of 55.6% for post-
compulsory 17 year olds (27). 
 
Of course it could be legitimately argued that the high rate of drop out both in 
Australia and the U.S. is not a reflection of educational service delivery alone but 
rather a reflection of some other factor unrelated to education services.  Student 
mobility is the most likely candidate here because as Sinclair, Christenson & Thurlow 
(2005) note, 52% of students ‘with emotional or behavioural disabilities’ who exited 
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special education did so because they moved (466).  Now Sinclair et al do not define 
‘moved’, but even if ‘moved’ refers solely to family movement the argument tends to 
lose some of its strength given that: (a) 48% of ‘drop outs’ drop out even though they 
didn’t ‘move’; (b) in Sinclair et al’s own study changes in teacher intervention 
reduced the mobility itself and the negative effect of the mobility in terms of drop out; 
and (c) while Wagner et al report that according to NLTS2 64.5% of secondary school 
students with ‘severe emotional disorder’ have attended four or more schools since 
starting elementary school, only 13.4% of the most recent changes were as a result of 
the family moving while almost 20% were the result of the school ‘reassigning the 
student’ and 28.1% were due to grade-level progression (2005: 88).  In other words 
school related mobility factors far outweighed family mobility factors.  Malmgren & 
Gagnon (2005) made a similar discovery in their study of school mobility and 
students with ‘emotional disturbance’.  They found that many of the high numbers of 
school changes were dictated by the schools themselves as they attempted to provide 
different or more restrictive school placements matching learning and behavioural 
disabilities (309). Conversely Sinclair, Christenson and Thurlow (2005) showed that 
interventions targeting school factors significantly decreased mobility and increased 
attendance (474). Of course this finding does not discount other unknown factors, but 
it would seem that mobility alone cannot account for all of the systemic failures, and 
in any case ‘mobility’ is related to school practices. This means that we are back at the 
starting point that ‘dropping out’ represents a widespread failure in policy aimed at 
educational inclusion. 
 
The relationship between school factors, mobility and early school leaving also raises 
the issue of early school leaving as institutional exclusion.  This issue is captured in 
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the distinction between the elective ‘pulled out’ and the institutionally ‘pushed out’ in 
the early school leaving research.  Essentially ‘pushed out’ refers to student-reported 
problems in the school setting and ‘pulled out’ refers to those circumstances of early 
school leaving where outside issues interfere with continued schooling (Bradley & 
Renzulli, 2011: 521). Significantly, ‘pushed out’ early school leaving is strongly 
associated with poor relationships, histories of suspension and exclusion, alienation 
and absenteeism (Bradley & Renzulli, 2011: 538; Sefa Dei et al in Delamont 2000: 
773-774; Jimerson et al, 2000: 526-527; Marks & Fleming 1999: 2, 9-10 & 19-22; 
Pyle & Wexler, 2012: 284-287; Ripple & Luther, 2000 280-281 & 292-293; & 
Rumberger & Thomas, 2000: 40-45).  Given that these are exactly the characteristics 
that define the population of young people diagnosed with mental disorders, it is not 
surprising that the notion of early school leaving for this group has been consistently 
tied to ‘pushed out’ characteristics (Cobb et al, 2006: 271; Hill & Coufal, 2005: 36; 
Lane et al, 2006: 108-109; Pyle & Wexler, 2012; & Sinclair, Christenson & Thurlow, 
2005).  Therefore for this group of young people early school leaving appears to be 
strongly associated with systemic school exclusion. 
 
2.2.4.2 School Expulsion and Suspension 
Turning to the issues of school expulsion and suspension the NLTS2 data show that 
72.5% of US students receiving a special education service for severe emotional 
disorders have been suspended and 3.3% have been expelled (Bradley, Henderson & 
Monfore, 2004: 219).  This is almost three times the rate of suspension/expulsion for 
other disabilities and more than three times that of the general population (Wagner et 
al, 2005: 89). 
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An examination of NSW suspension and expulsion data reveals that at the same time 
as NSW disability education was experiencing major reforms and a significant 
injection of disability funding ($328m in 1994/5 compared with approximately $1.1b 
in 2009/10), there was also a more than doubling of the serious or long term 
suspensions from 0.76% of the student population in 2000 to 1.7% in 2010 
(Department of Education and Training, NSW (DET), 2002a; & Department of 
Education and Communities (DEC), 2012).  Of course it is not possible to claim that 
the population of students receiving long term suspensions is necessarily the same 
population of young people with psychiatric or mental disorders.  However it is at 
least credible to argue that there is likely to be a large overlap.  This is because the 
primary reasons for long suspension are associated with the following: violence, 
criminal behaviour associated with the school and possession of a weapon (52%); and 
persistent ‘misbehaviour’ (44%). Both of these sets of reasons are characteristic of 
externalising ‘mental disorders’ and both are also identical to the NSW definition of 
either ‘emotional disturbance’ or ‘behavioural disorder’ (DET, 2002b: 6; & DET, 
2006b). 
 
Turning once more to students who become involved in juvenile justice and those in 
OoHC we see the same kinds of systemic failure.  For the first group, the 2003-2006 
survey of NSW young people on community orders shows that an extraordinary 89% 
had a history of school suspension even though 36% had received special education 
services (Kenny et al, 2006: 22-30).  For the second group, the 2001 Victorian Audit 
of Home Based Care discovered that 29% of OoHC students had a history of school 
suspension and 8% had been permanently expelled from a school, compared with an 
estimate of 5-15% suspended in the general population (DHS, 2001: 47).  Similarly 
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the CREATE Foundation’s 2005 Report Card on Education reported that 13.4% of 
these students had experienced permanent expulsion and 49.2% had experienced 
suspension in the course of their school history (25). 
 
2.2.4.3 School Exclusion and Special Education 
The high rates of school exclusion appear to be continuing both in Australia and 
internationally even in the face of inclusion policy and special education attention.  
For example the US longitudinal NLTS2 studies are large investigations of students 
already receiving special education services under IDEA.  Yet as previously noted 
51% of these ‘seriously emotional disturbed’ students drop out, 72.5% have been 
suspended and 3.3% have been expelled from these same special education services 
(Bradley, Henderson & Monfore, 2004: 219; & Wagner et al, 2005: 80).  Similarly 
Scanlon & Mellard (2002) reported that 90% of the 68% of students with 
‘Emotional/Behavioral Disorders’ who had dropped out were participants in a special 
education class or program (245). 
 
Similar concerns are evident in Australia.  For example the health study of NSW 
young people on Community Orders1 2003-2006 showed that although 36% received 
special education intervention at some time during their school history, nevertheless 
86% had left school prior to Year 10 and 89% had a history of school suspension 
(Kenny et al, 2006: 22-30).  The OoHC population seems to follow the same pattern.  
This group also has an increased likelihood of receiving special education services 
(CREATE Foundation, 2006: 11).  Indeed in NSW this group attracts the specialised 
support of nominated Itinerate Support Teachers in addition to all other special 
                                                 
1 Community Orders are a non-custodial juvenile justice sentence. 
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education services available to students living at home.  Yet despite this special 
education attention the group is also distinguished by its continuing high rates of early 
school leaving, suspension and exclusion. 
 
A national comparative study of 300 ‘high needs’ children and young people in care 
in four different Australian States by Osborn & Delfabbro (2005a, 2005b & 2006) is 
of particular interest in this regard.  In some ways this group can be understood as 
providing a case study of outcomes for specialist attention for ‘psychiatric disorder’ 
given that (a) 67.7% of this group is considered to have ‘Conduct Disorder’ and 
27.6% a ‘mental illness’; and (b) 72% received psychological services and 49.6% 
received ‘behaviour management services’.  Furthermore a significant proportion of 
the sample were ‘receiving a number of school service supports including: periodic 
meetings between teachers and carers (54.4%); individually tailored curricula 
(41.4%); general education support worker at location (24.7%); a range of other 
services such as special day programs or specially designed educational interventions 
(28.0%); a private tutor at home (14.6%); and a private tutor at school (6.9%).’ 
(Osborn & Delfabbro, 2006: 63).  The special services component comprised extra 
tuition by a teacher or the involvement of a Departmental educational officer, extra 
funding for placement in a specialised school, etc (Osborn, 2006 pers com). 
 
The above study can be largely read as an investigation of children and young people 
with psychiatric disorders receiving psychological services, behaviour management 
services and special education services even if the exact specialist education 
component is unknown.  An extraordinary 42.9% of these students had been 
suspended or excluded in the past six months alone despite professional specialist 
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attention (Osborn & Delfabbro, 2005b: 12).  Furthermore the State that provided the 
most school support services also recorded a significantly higher rate of school 
exclusions – 22.1% of the sample were excluded in Victoria (Osborn & Delfabbro, 
2006: 65). 
 
Collectively these significant rates of early school leaving, suspension and expulsion 
amount to the experience of institutional exclusion across the breadth of education 
settings.  This experience runs contrary to the central aims of existing policy, such as 
the NSW Government Disability Policy Framework, which aims to ensure that this 
group has ‘access to services provided to the general community’ and that they are 
‘full and valued members of the community’ (Ageing and Disability Department, 
NSW, 1998:5). In terms of the latter aim the pattern of institutional exclusion seems 
entirely contradictory.  Without diminishing the evidence demonstrating numerous 
individual cases of teachers valuing such students, on a systemic level, a much more 
common view is portrayed by Kauffman where he describes this group as: 
 …children and youth who arouse negative feelings and induce 
negative behaviour in others, including teachers….Most adults choose 
to avoid these children and youth as much as possible because their 
behaviour is so persistently irritating to authority figures that they 
seem to be asking for punishment or rebuke (2005: 5). 
 
Thus the experience of a significant portion of this group frequently seems to be one 
where educational trajectories are either chronically interrupted and/or prematurely 
terminated and where school relationships are marked more by aversion than 
appreciation.  As a consequence, the opportunities that schools may represent are 
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never fully realised for that proportion of this group despite all good intentions to the 
contrary. 
 
2.3 The Relationship between Mental Disorder and School Exclusion 
In order to improve on inclusive outcomes researchers have sought to understand the 
set of causal relationships between ‘mental disorder’ and school exclusion. The 
underlying logic of this research has been to understand the developmental aetiology 
of mental disorders and student trajectories in educational systems so as to identify 
likely points of intervention.  However even a quick review of the literature uncovers 
two broad areas of contention.  Firstly, different researchers have focused on, and 
vigorously defended, different causal relationships.  Secondly, there is an overall 
division between what Danforth and Morris (2006) refer to as the divide between 
‘orthodox’ positivist approaches and ‘heretical’ critical approaches.  Broadly this 
divide can be measured in terms of orthodox research that takes at face value that 
‘mental disorder’ is a sign of an intrinsic mental dysfunction as opposed to critical 
research that raises the epistemological and ontological question of the social 
construction of ‘mental disorder’. 
 
Nevertheless, in a pragmatic turn, it is also possible to discern broad areas of 
agreement between the two above positions when seeking to identify potential sites of 
intervention.  Firstly, there is overall agreement that schools do offer potential for 
intervention – in other words, that this is a struggle worth having. Secondly, while the 
epistemological and ontological status of ‘mental disorder’ is contested, there is 
implicit agreement that there are identifiable patterns of particular behaviour 
associated with particular individuals who are then labelled as being ‘mentally 
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disordered’.  Thirdly, all the research can be positioned as having a concern with 
understanding the complex set of relations between historical and local sets of 
relationships that give rise to particular practices associated with ‘mental disorder’ 
and school exclusion.  Specifically, much of the research underscores the importance 
of understanding the relationship between ‘disordered’ practice, developmental 
history and local features of the school environment. 
 
Educational, sociological, psychiatric and psychological research has accumulated a 
wealth of insights about historical and local relationships associated with ‘mentally 
disordered’ practice and school exclusion.  What follows is a relatively brief overview 
of the relationships that have been identified as being important to understanding the 
practices of this group of young people.  The focus of this overview will be on the 
way these relationships operate at an institutional level given this study’s interest in 
institutional inclusion and exclusion. This overview also attempts to weave together 
some of the insights from both orthodox and heretical research.  While recognising 
the epistemological and ontological divide that separates the two, the following 
discussion will attempt to avoid tumbling into that divide.  Instead, in a pragmatic 
turn, it will attempt to identify those features pertinent to understanding the practices 
of this group of young people, thereby highlighting opportunistic points of 
intervention. 
 
2.3.1 Historical Relationships Giving Rise to ‘Disordered’ Practices 
With regard to ‘mentally disordered’ subjectivities, psychiatric, psychological and 
education research points to a set of preceding individual and environmental 
relationships that may come into play in the production of ‘disordered’ practice in 
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schools.  This knowledge is extensively covered in psychological, psychiatric and 
educational literature and a more extensive review can be found in Appendix B.  What 
follows is a brief summary of that body of knowledge. 
 
From an orthodox perspective a range of individual ‘social skills’ and cognitive 
‘deficits’ are associated with ‘mentally disordered’ practice (e.g. Bradley, Henderson 
& Monfore, 2004: 218; Gable et al, 2002: 462; Lane et al, 2006; Murray & 
Farrington, 2010: 635-636; Smart et al, 2005: 3-4; Wagner et al, 2005: 80-87).  In 
seeking to understand the causes of these personal ‘deficits’ a second body of 
orthodox research has attempted to ground these discoveries in genetic and other 
biological causes (e.g. Dick et al, 2005; Efron, 2006: 549; Hill & Coufal, 2005: 33-38; 
Kauffman, 2005: 166-169; Mattison, Hooper & Carson 2006; & van Bokhoven et al, 
2005: 153).  
 
While a small number of orthodox researchers have attempted to locate the causes of 
‘mentally disordered’ practice solely in biological or genetic abnormalities, the great 
majority have accepted that other historical relations significantly contribute to the 
manifestation of ‘disordered’ practice.  These researchers argue that ‘disordered’ 
practice is a complex product of the interaction between biological and environmental 
relations. These historical environmental relations include: (i) abuse within the 
‘dysfunctional family’; (ii) family demographics such as single parents and low 
maternal education; (iii) low ‘Socio-Economic Status’ (SES) acting as a stressor that 
fosters the conditions for individual biological deficits and/or family dysfunction and 
abuse; (iv) low SES neighbourhood effects related to violence and norms; (v) ‘anti-
social’ peer groups; (vi) marginalised cultural background acting as disguised 
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economic disadvantage; and (vii) gender factors tied to different socialised responses 
to environmental stressors.  These different factors are used in orthodox literature to 
explain correlations between the presence and absence of these factors and over-
representation or under-representation in incidence of ‘mental disorder’ in the 
population (e.g. Achenbach & Rescorla, 2007; Bradshaw et al, 2006; Guerra et al, 
2005; Kauffman, 2005; Kenny et al, 2006; Malgrem & Meisal, 2004; Muris, 2006; 
Murray & Farrington, 2010; Seedat et al, 2009; Smart et al, 2005; Urbis, 2011; van 
Bokhoven et al, 2005; NSW Teacher’s Federation & Federation of P&C Associations 
of NSW, 2002; & Walrath, 2006). 
 
In contradistinction to orthodox psychological and psychiatric literature there runs a 
rich tradition of critical research that points to the construction of individual frames of 
reference arising from class cultural differences (e.g. Bourdieu, 1990b; Corrigan, 
1979; Gleeson, 1992; & Willis, 1977).  On the one hand these class cultural 
subjectivities have been argued as lending themselves to diagnoses of mental disorder 
because of dominant class bias inherent in assessments of ‘disorder’ (Bogardus, 1997: 
58-87; Cosgrove, 2005: 283-288; Harwood, 2000: 9-32 & 137-161; Laws, 2001:43-76 
& Laws & Davies, 2000: 213).  On the other, such subjectivities may lend themselves 
to oppositional and disruptive practices in response to imposed dominant school 
norms and values (Corrigan, 1979: 20-71; Furlong & Morrison, 2000: 8-12; & 
Gleeson, 1992: 453-454) – practices that may then be seen as indicative of 
externalising mental disorders. 
 
Irrespective of disagreements between dominant or critical perspectives there remains 
a consensus that understanding the socio-economic backgrounds of young people 
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diagnosed with mental disorders is exceptionally important in understanding their 
practices in schools.  This is partly because of the way that class background can 
come into play in ‘disordered’ practice as described above, partly because of the way 
that class background mediates interventions (Urbis, 2011:45 & 113; Wilson & 
Lipsey, 2007: 458-459) and partly because class background appears to underpin 
other sets of historical relations giving rise to subjectivities that are also associated 
with ‘mental disorder’. 
 
2.3.2 Institutional Relations Giving Rise to ‘Disordered’ Practice 
A number of different elements of the institutional context of schools have been 
identified as being associated with ‘disordered’ practices and school exclusion.  This 
includes, but is not limited to, cultural, socio-economic, gender and teacher-student 
relations.  The full set of these institutional relations are of course intertwined such 
that, for example, cultural relations can work through and also be independent of 
teacher-student relations. 
 
2.3.2.1 Cultural Relations 
As previously mentioned, cultural relationships have been at least partly read as 
disguised economic disadvantage.  However this interpretation fails to explain 
variability in the under-representation and over-representation of different 
marginalised cultural groups identified as having a ‘mental disorder’.  It also 
overlooks research pointing to the separate effects of socio-political and socio-
economic factors operating in schools. 
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Considering this problem further, a number of researchers have argued that education 
systems in developed countries incorporate inherent psycho-cultural biases that 
inappropriately but differentially target specific groups of culturally and linguistically 
diverse students for identification, assessment and segregation.  These biases appear 
founded in discontinuities between home and school cultures (Cartledge, 1999: 78-79; 
Coutinho et al, 2002: 111; Gable et al, 2002: 471; McDowell, 2001: 5; NSW Teachers 
Federation & Federation of P&C Associations of NSW, 2002: 21; & Serpell et al, 
2010: 322-323.).  This body of knowledge is supported by several significant findings 
including:  (a) Coutinho et al’s (2002) finding that Afro-American students living in 
largely white communities are more likely to be identified as having a ‘mental 
disorder’ than those who live in a community with a more culturally diverse 
population (121); (b) research suggesting significant academic and participation gains 
when pedagogic practices incorporate a sensitivity to cultural differences related to 
interpersonal communication and cooperative as opposed to competitive individual 
styles of learning (Gable et al 2002: 470-471; Jordan & Branch, 2001: 57-58; Peart & 
Campbell 1999; & Serpell et al, 2010: 324-327); and conversely (c) research 
suggesting that the cost of educational inclusion both in terms of drop-out rates and 
academic success is in fact the loss of cultural identity and disposition particularly in 
terms of cooperative as opposed to competitive dispositions (Davalos, Chavez & 
Guardiola 1999: 64; & Ripple & Luthar 2000: 292-293).   
 
Consequently, cultural relations appear to be associated with ‘mental disorder’ both 
developmentally through socio-economic marginalisation, and also socio-politically 
through exclusive practices within institutional contexts (Coutinho et al, 2002: 120-
121). The upshot is that disproportionate numbers of children and young people from 
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particular marginalised cultural backgrounds are over-represented in the various 
pathways to school exclusion. 
 
2.3.2.2 Socio-Economic Relationships 
Class relationships appear to help structure both the identification and production of 
‘disordered’ practice within school settings.  This structuring role is reflected in the 
over-representation of dominated classes amongst those diagnosed with ‘mental 
disorder’ (Achenbach & Rescorla 2007: 96-104; Conway, 2006: 17; Coutinho et al 
2002: 110-112 & 120-121; Laws, 2001: 65; Malmgren & Meisel, 2004: 186; 
Salmelainen, 2002: 11; Sawyer et al, 2000: 21; Sawyer Miller-Lewis & Clark, 2007: 
188; van Bokhoven et al, 2005: 153; NSW Teachers Federation & Federation of P&C 
Associations of NSW 2002: 12; & Wagner et al, 2005: 84). However the nexus 
between class and ‘disordered’ practice goes beyond the production of subjectivities.  
This is suggested by the following: firstly, there is the nexus between class, 
institutional exclusion and the diagnosis of disorder, which immediately begs a 
question of power in the systemic relationship between school cultures and student 
class backgrounds (Slee, 2006: 117; & Danforth, 2007: 19-20); and secondly, there 
are various statistical relationships that cannot be explained by a 'class equals poverty 
equals mental disorder' perspective. 
 
To begin with, the disproportionally high rates of institutional exclusion shared by 
working class students through early school leaving (ESL) or school expulsion, 
whether they have been diagnosed as having mental disorders or not, are strongly 
suggestive of a pattern to do with class relationships to school not individual 
dysfunction.  Additionally there are several other statistical regularities that make 
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little sense if reduced to individual characteristics rather than school class relations.  
For example, there is the paradoxical finding of higher rates of identification of 
‘mental disorder’ in high socio-economic status (SES) schools.  This is the case even 
though there is a clearly established parallel finding that poverty is associated with 
‘mental disorder’ at the individual level (Coutinho & Oswald, 1998 in Coutinho et al, 
2002: 112).  Alternatively Wiley et al (2009) reported differential relationships 
between academic performance, externalising disorders and High and Low income 
schools.  They discovered that academic performance was related to externalising 
behaviour.  However, in low income schools, higher externalising behaviour was 
associated with lower academic achievement, but in high income schools, higher 
externalising behaviour was associated with higher academic achievement.  This 
points to a relationship between institutional class context and externalising practice 
(458). 
 
In a similar vein Franklin & Streeter (1992) found that compared with working class 
‘drop outs’, middle class 'drop outs' have far more serious behavioural and depression 
problems.  It is as if the congruent relationship between their class status and the 
institutional system protects them from ESL.  Conversely in studies comparing 
working class ‘non-dropouts’ with working class ‘drop outs’ – a group notable for its 
overlap with students diagnosed with ‘mental disorders’ – Ripple & Luther (2000: 
292-293) & McMillan & Reed (1994: 137-140) found that working class students that 
remained in school shared far more cultural characteristics with the school than those 
that ‘dropped out’.  The more recent 2007 Australian Council for Educational 
Research (ACER) national study tends to confirm these cultural relationships between 
SES, academic achievement, acceptable school norms and ‘emotional wellbeing’.  
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That study reported that: (i) high SES students significantly out-performed low SES 
students on teacher rated perceptions of acceptable behaviours; and (ii) high social 
and emotional wellbeing mapped over the performance of acceptable behaviours 
(Bernard, Stephanou & Urbach, 2007: 7). 
 
These findings tend to corroborate the insights offered by critical researchers 
previously mentioned. Critical researchers point to class relations in schools working 
through incongruities between dominant and dominated class related values, norms 
and beliefs.  Three effects that have gained particular attention are: socio-political 
effects related to family; school and work contradictions; and the problem of 
unintended bias and discrimination (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, Cosgrove, 2005: 
283-288; Coutinho et al, 2002:111; Okey & Cusick, 1995: 251-266; Slee, 1994: 16-
22; Smyth & Hatton, 2001: 403-411; & Tait, 2001: 99-101). Together these represent 
significant institutional obstacles to inclusive school practices arising from different 
class related beliefs and expectations. 
 
2.3.2.3 Gendered Relationships 
Gender appears to come into play at an institutional level as well as developmentally.  
In the first instance the unequal distribution, between males and females, of disorders 
that schools find troublesome – aggressive and violent ‘externalising’ disorders, as 
opposed to less socially disruptive ‘internalising’ ‘disorders’ – ensures an over-
representation of males in schools identified as having ‘ED’ and therefore facing 
institutional exclusion (Coutinho & Oswald, 2005: 12; Kann & Hanna, 2000: 268; 
Lennings, 2001: 34 & Rowe, 2003: 10).  For example Wagner et al (2005), reporting 
on US national longitudinal studies, states that ‘more than three fourths of children 
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and youth classified with ED are boys’ (84).  Similarly in Australia, Conway reports 
that in 217 referrals to specialist teachers in a large school district in NSW in 2001, 
86% were males; and for referrals to specialist secondary conduct disorder units, 88% 
were males (2006: 17). 
 
There is also some evidence that gendered relationships work in another way, namely 
that young women must exhibit much more severe problem behaviours to come to the 
attention of schools (Nelson et al, 2003: 356).  Implicitly this indicates that there is 
less tolerance for male problem behaviour than female even when it is the same kind 
of behaviour.  Furthermore, the institutional environment of schools and school 
curriculums have been seen as generating problems arising from gender based 
differences in attentiveness and verbal processing and communication skills.  Hence 
Rowe (2003) has pointed to the ‘feminisation’ of the school context as fostering 
disengagement and alienation amongst young males leading to the search for 
recognition in ‘macho’ aggressive activities (10-16).  This phenomenon can plausibly 
be expected to further contribute to the alienation of young males diagnosed with 
‘mental disorders’.  The consequences of these gender based relationships are 
different for males and females.  For females they produce a problem of under-
servicing (Biederman et al, 2002: 36 & 39-41; & Nelson et al, 2003: 356).  However 
for males, the occurrence of aggressive disruptive behaviours, notwithstanding 
‘mental disorder’ as such, ensures that it is males rather than females who appear to 
take the lion’s share of pathways to school exclusion. 
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2.3.2.4 Teacher-Student Relationships 
One of the most consistent findings in research over the past twenty years has been 
the role of teacher-student relationships in ameliorating school exclusion.  This 
finding is evidenced both in educational studies specifically focused on this group of 
young people, as well as by educational and psychological studies of a broader, but 
strongly overlapping, population of disaffected early school leavers or aggressive and 
violent students.  All of this evidence points in exactly the same direction.  That is, the 
quality of teacher-student relationships is a critical mediator in relation to school 
exclusion. 
 
With regards to early school leaving, Schlosser (1992) in an early U.S. ethnographic 
study identified a strong relationship between ‘teacher distance’ and ‘student 
disengagement’ for a group of 31 culturally diverse students identified as likely to 
drop out.  After two years Schlosser concluded that relationships with teachers were a 
key factor in preventing marginalisation and dropping out (137).  Kortering, Braziel & 
Tompkins (2002), in a three year interview study of 33 young people with ‘behaviour 
disorders’, concluded that a key to success lay in ensuring that young people with 
‘BD’ ‘have positive relationships with their teachers’ (151).  Mihalas et al (2009) 
reported on a study of 11,000 high school ‘adolescents’ that found that those students 
who reported being ‘supported’ by their teachers were less likely to drop out 
compared to those who did not (112).  Finally, Sinclair, Christenson and Thurlow 
(2005) turned to an experimental research design to examine the effectiveness of a 
relationship building program among 164 U.S. urban high school students with 
‘emotional and behavioural disabilities’.  They concluded that participating students 
were about half less likely to drop out than similar students in the control group (474). 
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The quality of teacher-student relationships has also been tied to school expulsion and 
suspension and the incidence of student aggression, violence and disruptive 
behaviours.  Murray & Greenburg (2001) in a study of 289 fifth and sixth graders 
using a number of psychological scales and measures identified that the quality of 
teacher-student relationships and bonds to school was associated with self-reports of 
delinquency, depression, anxiety and conduct problems (38-39).  Conversely 
participants who reported having positive relationships with teachers had better 
reported outcomes in these areas than those with greater conflict in teacher-student 
relationships.  Oliver, Pike and Plomin (2008) employed a monozygotic (MZ) twin 
differences experimental design to explore the association of behaviour problems to 
differences in classroom environment.  The study included 570 children (8-10 years) 
and their teachers. They found that students' pupil-teacher relationships made a 
significant contribution to teacher reported behaviour problems.  Children with less 
favourable perceptions of pupil-teacher relations were significantly correlated with 
‘hyperactivity’, ‘conduct problems’ and ‘peer problems’ (649-650).  In a longitudinal 
study of 808 U.S students, which involved interviewing participants at ages 13, 14, 16 
and 18, Huang et al (2001) confirmed that ‘prosocial bonding’ with adults at home 
and school mediates later violence at 18 years of age (98).  Murray-Harvey & Slee's 
(2010) study of 888 secondary and primary teacher-student pairs arrived at similar 
conclusions.  Murray-Harvey & Slee found a strong relationship between supportive 
teacher relationships and reduced reports of ‘bullying’, ‘psychological health 
problems’ and ‘social/emotional adjustment’ (287).  Indeed the research by Hughes & 
Cavell (1999), albeit undertaken with early primary school students, has shown that 
‘the quality of teacher-student relationships actually predicts aggressive children’s 
developmental trajectories’ (180).  In fact Hughes & Cavell discovered in their study 
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of 68 children identified as being ‘aggressive’ that children and teacher reports of 
relationship quality in one year predicted teachers' next year ratings of aggression, 
while positive relationships were followed by decreased aggression the next year 
(1999: 180). 
 
The correlation between teacher-student relationships and unwanted behaviours also 
works in reverse.  For example the UK Prince’s Trust survey (2002) (N=700) showed 
that for those excluded from school, 42% reported on the absence of any positive 
adult encouragement or involvement (in Joughin & Morley, 2007: 54-55).  The 
Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER) ASG Student Social and 
Emotional Health Report paralleled these findings.  This report, drawing on an 
Australia-wide longitudinal wellbeing survey of 11,526 students in 81 schools, noted 
that ‘larger percentages of students who get into trouble perceive the absence of 
positive teacher actions’ (Bernard et al, 2007: 83).  While both of these reports 
represent large scale national surveys, similar findings have been made through some 
close-up, intensive studies.  Cook & Cameron (2010) conducted a close up quasi-
experimental classroom study of 14 general education teachers and 26 of their 
students assessed with a range of disabilities. By analysing teacher ‘concern’ and 
‘rejection’ ratings against classroom interactions Cook & Cameron confirmed that: (a) 
teacher concern ratings are positively related to teacher-initiated positive academic 
interactions; (b) students with BD received higher rejection ratings than did non-
disabled students; and (c) rejection ratings are positively related to negative remarks 
concerning students’ unwanted behaviours (74). In another small study Pomeroy 
(1999) interviewed 33 Year 10 and 11 students attending a Behavioural Support 
Service following school exclusion.  Pomeroy discovered that these young people 
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repeatedly identified a relationship between exclusion and the lack of ‘meaningful 
relationships’ with teachers (2 & 13). 
 
Moreover this problem was not limited to ‘externalising’ behaviours.  The report also 
noted that ‘smaller percentages of students who feel down in comparison with 
students who do not feel down say they have ‘teachers who care about them, who try 
hard to help and are nice, who help them believe they can be successful, who discuss 
how to make friends and solve problems’’ (Bernard et al, 2007: 83).  Murray & 
Murray (2004) made a similar discovery in their study of correlates of teacher-student 
relationships for children in late primary school.  They concluded that both 
internalising and externalising behaviours were strongly associated with close teacher-
student relationships (in Mihalas et al, 2009: 112). 
 
All of this research points to the importance of teacher-student relationships in 
interrupting patterns of school exclusion.  However it is difficult to discern the exact 
extent of this effect in the complex contexts of schools.  This is because there is some 
variability in the findings. For example Bernard, Stephanou & Urbach (2007: 83) 
found only small, albeit statistically significant, correlations between student 
perceptions of positive teacher actions and ‘externalising’ behaviours, while Murray-
Harvey & Slee found strong relationships between academic outcomes, relationships 
and prosocial behaviour (2010).  It is tempting to speculate that this variability is the 
product of variability in the various operational definitions employed to measure 
‘relationship’ and outcomes; variability in the conceptualisation of ‘mental disorder’, 
‘emotional wellbeing’ and so on; variability in the practical meaning of these concepts 
in the classroom (Danforth, 2007: 21); and variability in rates of inclusion arising 
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from the complex and dynamic contexts of those relationships.  In this regard it is 
highly significant that grounded in-depth qualitative research focused on the lived 
experiences of alienated young people, as opposed to experimental methodologies 
more reliant on abstracted operational definitions and abstracted outcome measures, 
has particularly emphasised the crucial importance of teacher-student relationships 
(Luna & Medina, 2001, Pomeroy, 1999 & Schlosser, 1992).  As Pomeroy noted in his 
study of 33 excluded Year 10 students attending a Behavioural Support Service: 
Overall, relationships with teachers was the most salient and 
consistently described feature of the interviewees’ experience of 
school.  It was the topic that tended to take up more time than any 
other (466). 
Nevertheless regardless of the precise degree, teacher-student relationships have been 
shown in the research to be amongst the most robust predictors of institutionally 
inclusive outcomes for young people assessed with ED/BD. 
 
2.3.3 Summary 
What the above review highlights is the incredible complexity confronting policy 
makers and practitioners in attempting practical change.  This complexity arises not 
simply through the sheer number of relationships that could possibly be in play.  The 
complexity also arises because of the dynamic yet occasioned nature of those multiple 
relationships as well as the complexity of the intersections between biological, family 
and structural forces.  In this regard this review draws attention to the relatively 
straightforward hope for change that teacher-student relationships provide. 
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2.4 Teacher-Student Relationships and Inclusive Schooling 
This section will present the case that teacher-student relationships are a promising 
site of practical intervention aimed at interrupting patterns of school exclusion.  To 
that end this section will examine what is already known about the nature of inclusive 
teacher-student relationships. This examination will reveal the importance of 
‘understanding’ and ‘appreciation’ in these relationships.  This in turn highlights the 
importance of a rigorous conceptualisation of ‘understanding’ that lends itself to 
‘appreciation’ in order to foster controlled systematic approaches to inclusion.  
Accordingly the section will examine what is already known about the practical 
nature of ‘understanding’ in inclusive teacher relationships as way of identifying what 
is not known and furthering the current study’s point of departure. 
 
2.4.1 Teacher-Student Relationships as a Practical Site of Intervention 
What stands out in the above review is that, within schools, teacher-student 
relationships offer singular promise for improving rates of school inclusion.  There are 
several good reasons for this optimism.  Firstly, teacher-student relationships appear 
to ameliorate the negative effects of other relationships.  As Rowe (2003) argued, in 
light of Australian and International research on the cognitive, affective and 
behavioural outcomes of schooling: 
…whereas students’ literacy skills, general academic achievements, 
attitudes, behaviours and experiences of schooling are influenced by 
their background or intake characteristics – the magnitude of these 
effects pale into insignificance compared with classroom/teacher 
effects (original emphasis) (1). 
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Furthermore, as Rowe goes on to argue, central to these classroom/teacher effects is 
the quality of ‘caring’ teacher-student relationships (30-32). 
 
The second point is related to the first and renders it unsurprising. As Simpson, 
Peterson, & Smith (2011) pointed out in their extensive review of critical educational 
program components for students with ED/BD: 
Programs and interventions for students with EBD are only as 
effective as the individuals who apply them and are inextricably 
aligned with relationships between teachers and learners (232).  
This view echoes Murray’s earlier conclusion that although no single intervention 
strategy is likely to affect all problems associated with ‘emotional and behavioural 
disabilities’, 
…socially supportive relationships with adults have been shown to 
influence a broad range of social, behavioral, emotional, and academic 
outcomes, including: depression, anxiety, self-esteem, delinquency, 
social competence, involvement with drugs and alcohol, achievement 
motivation, academic performance, and decisions related to staying in 
or dropping out of school (2002: 286). 
In other words relationships are foundational to any educational experience and any 
intervention. 
 
The third point is related to the complexity of the set of developmental and school 
relationships that are in play for any particular young person within any particular 
setting.  This inherent and dynamic complexity precludes a mechanical replication of 
educational practices from either one setting to the next, or even from one interaction 
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to the next (Urbis, 2011: 136; & Wiley et al, 2009: 457-459). As Wiley et al 
concluded after their experimental study of 140 children in K-6 ‘with ED’ in a range 
of low and high SES Boston Special Education settings, simplistically responding to 
ED ‘as a unitary concept in special education may be particularly hazardous in both 
research and practice’ (2010: 459).  Similarly Mihalas et al (2009) conclude in their 
review of caring relationships that: 
Given the diversity of students with EDB, the multitude of life 
histories, and current ecologies, it  is no wonder that there is no one 
process that effectively addresses all students’ social, emotional, and 
behavioral needs. One approach works with one student while the 
same approach fails to work with a different student (115). 
 
However the strength of teacher-student relationships remains a counterpoint to this 
diversity in shaping positive outcomes, regardless of shifting contexts.  This view is 
corroborated by McLaughlin et al’s review of ‘severe emotional disturbance’ (SED) 
student approaches where they suggested that: 
…simply pointing to a set of practices and attempting to replicate them 
across settings have met with far more failure than success….school 
staff are as important as specific practices and programs (1997: 19-20). 
In other words, what is fundamental to the success of interventions in addressing the 
dynamic occasioned variability of settings is something that occurs and is enabled 
within positive teacher-student relationships. 
 
The final point is tangential to these others and speaks more to the possibility of – and 
empirical strengths to be derived from – a pragmatic bridge over the divisions 
 54 
represented by orthodox and heretical research approaches.  In other words, a focus on 
the practical details of teacher-student relationships can be understood as a pragmatic 
convergence of the evidence bases offered by both approaches.  Crucially, both 
approaches hold in common and can inform the importance of objectively 
understanding the historical and local relations that give rise to ‘disordered’ practice 
associated with school exclusion.  It is within the everyday experience of teacher-
student relationships that the meeting between a history of subjectivities and local 
institutional relations is played out and it is by pragmatically informing those 
relationships that this convergence of knowledge has the opportunity of reaping 
rewards. 
 
2.4.2 Teacher-Student Relationships & ‘Understanding’ 
Researchers have attempted to identify the key characteristics of these relationships 
that contribute to their efficacy. The qualities that have been repeatedly identified 
have included ‘understanding’ (Abrams, 2005:41; Jacobson, 2000: 33-34; Luna & 
Medina, 2001: 96-101; Mihalas et al, 2009: 116-117; Murray, 2002: 288; Pomeroy, 
1999: 470; Schlosser, 1992: 134-137; & Urbis, 2011: 47; Van Acker, 2007: 6; & 
Wagner et al, 2005: 79), ‘caring’ (Diamond, 1992:143; Fitzsimons-Lovett, 2001:39; 
Guerra, Boxer & Kim, 2005: 281-283; Jacobson, 2000: 38; Schlosser, 1992: 132; Van 
Acker, 2007: 10) ‘empathy’, (Diamond, 1992: 143; Karver et al, 2006: 51; Kortering, 
Braziel & Tompkins, 2002: 143; Laws, 2001: 74-76; & Luna & Medina, 2001: 96-
100), ‘emotional warmth’ (Murray 2002: 286; & Murray & Greenburg, 2006: 229) 
‘equitable or collaborative’ (Gale & Densmore, 2001: 602; Joughin & Morely, 2007: 
58; & Mihalas et al, 2009: 117) and ‘valuing or affirmative or appreciative’ (Abrams, 
2005: 41; Gale & Densmore, 2001: 602 & 617; Jacobson, 2000: 38; Luna & Medina, 
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2001: 96-100; McEvoy & Welker, 2000: 135; Mihalas et al, 2009: 111; Schlosser, 
1992: 134; Simpson, Peterson & Smith, 2011: 232-233; & NSW Teachers Federation 
& Federation of P&C Associations of NSW, 2002: 79-80). 
 
Arguably foremost amongst these is ‘understanding’.  Firstly this is because the 
conceptualisation of two other characteristics that gain much attention in the 
literature, – ‘caring’ and ‘empathy’ – appears to be constituted by ‘understanding’: so, 
for example, Luna & Medina conceptualise ‘empathy’ as ‘caring about the student 
and seeking to understand that student from his or her own frame of reference’ (2001: 
97). Similarly Mihalas et al (2009), in their extensive review of ‘caring relationships’ 
between teachers and secondary students with EBD, confirmed that ‘caring’ is 
contingent on ‘learning about students’ backgrounds, interests and lives’ (115). The 
second reason is suggested by the first and lies within the logical relationship between 
‘understanding’ and the other elements: that is, without ‘understanding’, ‘caring’, 
‘empathy’, ‘equity’ and ‘appreciation’ arguably become empty of content and 
meaning.  Consequently ‘understanding’ appears to be foundational to inclusive 
teacher-student relationships.  However, having said that it also needs to be 
remembered that this is an ‘understanding’ that lends itself to appreciation, 
affirmation and valuing the other. 
 
2.5 The Nature of Practical Understanding 
The central role of ‘understanding’ in locally inclusive teacher-student relationships 
draws attention to the importance of conceptualising the practice of ‘understanding’ in 
order to foster controlled systematic approaches to school inclusion.  Current 
educational, sociological, psychiatric and psychological research has gone some way 
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towards outlining the critical features of what counts in practical understanding in the 
classroom.  This section will describe the central features of practical understanding 
that are suggested by that research.  These features include an understanding of the set 
of contextual relations associated with the production of ‘disordered’ practice, the 
interactional nature of understanding and the importance of reflexivity. 
 
2.5.1 Understanding Context 
An examination of the research suggests that the practice of ‘understanding’ is 
fundamentally concerned with understanding the local context giving rise to young 
people’s practices.  In this sense the relationship between local context and young 
people’s practice is the object of understanding.  More specifically this object can be 
provisionally described as the relationship between young people’s practice and the 
set of historical relations giving rise to a young person’s subjectivity, ‘frame of 
reference’, or in other words, their subjective meaning-making, and features of local 
classroom circumstances where that young person’s meaning-making and practice 
take place.  Thus the educational literature repeatedly emphasises the importance of 
understanding the interactional dynamics between a student’s personal background, 
their meaning-making, local classroom circumstances and ‘mentally disordered’ 
practice (e.g. Abrams, 2005: 40-43; Bernard, Stephanou & Urbach, 2007: 74-77; 
Lewis et al, 2012: 88-89; Luna & Medina, 2001: 96-97 & 99; Malmgren & Causton-
Theoharis, 2006: 302-303; McEvoy & Welker, 2000: 130-134; Murray, 2002; 288; 
Schlosser, 1992: 129 & 136-138; Simpson, Peterson & Smith, 2011: 234-239; 
Sutherland & Morgan, 2003: 32-33; Urbis, 2011 & Wagner et al, 2005: 79). 
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The use of the word ‘context’ here needs to be distinguished from taken-for-granted 
understandings of context as ‘surroundings’.  It also needs to be distinguished from 
much of the actual use of ‘context’ in the educational, psychiatric and psychological 
literature itself. This is because ‘context’ is relatively under-conceptualised in that 
literature and simply tends to reiterate Goffman’s 1964 argument that the problem of 
‘context’ remains largely neglected.  Hence as Goffman critiqued, the treatment of 
‘context’ in the educational, psychological and psychiatric literature is basically 
undertaken in a 'happy go-lucky way' where social situations are reduced to 
'geometric intersection of actors making talk and having particular social attributes’ 
(1964: 134). 
 
Peter Burke (2002), in his careful examination of ‘context in context’, helps to 
provide a conceptual appreciation of ‘context’ that is actually much more faithful to 
what is suggested about practical understanding in the research literature.  That is, his 
approach is more faithful to the notion that this group of young people’s practices 
arise from the relationship between the set of relations giving rise to subjective 
meaning-making and the sets of relations within local school environments.  Burke 
argues that social context represents a complex set of relationships that are not 
reducible to a traditional taken-for-granted but arbitrary understanding of context as 
the ‘opposition between context and thing contextualised’ (Rorty in Burke, 2002: 
172).  On the contrary, following Thomas, Burke points out that ‘objects and contexts 
not only define each other, but may change and disrupt each other’ (Burke, 2002: 
172). This insight prompts a relational point of view such that context is better 
understood as the full set of relationships pertinent to the object of interest, which in 
this case is ‘mentally disordered’ practice.  However the full set of pertinent 
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relationships is not a thing that is self-evidently found.  Rather, the elements of 
context have to be selected or constructed because there are an endless number of 
possible contexts or possible relationships.  Thus understanding the context of 
incidents of ‘mentally disordered’ practice epistemologically requires a consciously 
controlled selection of pertinent relationships by abstracting from practice in social 
situations and isolating particular elements in order to understand them better  (Burke, 
2002: 172-5). 
 
As has already been demonstrated, educational, sociological, psychiatric and 
psychological research has accumulated a wealth of insights about the pertinent 
features of context associated with ‘mentally disordered’ practice. This is in regard to 
the set of relations giving rise to practices and presumably subjectivities associated 
with ‘mental disorder’ and the set of relations operating in local institutional settings.  
These are the evidence-based specifics of what is frequently referred to as 
understanding the ‘background, beliefs and values’ of young people with ‘mental 
disorder’ and understanding school ‘climate, ecology and/or culture’.  That research 
points to a set of crucial relationships that need to be taken into account in order to 
understand this group’s practices.  Arguably then an understanding of these relations 
lends itself to an abstract understanding of the occasioned meaning-making that 
occurs at the point of intersection between historical relations giving rise to particular 
subjectivities and local institutional circumstances. 
 
2.5.2 The Iterative, Interactional Nature of Practical Understanding 
The second insight offered by previous research about the nature of practical 
understanding relates to its interactional nature.  Teacher-student relationships are in 
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practice defined by their interactional nature (Mihalas, 2009: 110; Pomeroy, 1999: 
476; Sutherland, 2000 & Sutherland & Morgan, 2003: 33).  Moreover teacher-student 
relationships are largely constructed in the commonplace of what Goffman (1964) 
refers to as face-to-face social situations.  Hence teacher-student relationships are 
constituted by and constitutive of the ordinary everyday interactional events of the 
classroom and school.  This means that practical understanding is necessarily 
concerned with an understanding of the local interaction between students' and 
teachers' practices. This necessarily follows from the finding that the object of 
practical understanding is the set of relationships between the young person’s practice 
and context given that a critical part of the interactional context is teacher practice. 
 
The micro-detail of the way these everyday interactions are undertaken has seemingly 
exponential effects on practices associated with ‘mental disorder’ and school 
exclusion.  Thus various researchers have demonstrated strong relationships between 
‘disordered’ practices and different kinds of interactional micro-detail such as 
‘concern’ and ‘rejection’ interactions (Cook & Cameron, 2010), praise interactions 
(Sutherland, 2000), and opportunities to respond and positive reinforcement 
(Sutherland & Morgan, 2003: 35).  What these micro-details add up to is the central, 
but nuanced role of interactional communication and particularly interactional talk as 
a defining feature of teacher-student relationships (Abrams, 2005:4 & Murray & 
Greenburg, 2006: 229). 
 
Taken broadly, the quality of communication practices including interactional talk 
appears to be constitutive of the quality of teacher-student relationships at the very 
least through the communication of positive regard.  However as a constitutive part of 
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these relationships communication practices and interactional talk also appear to be 
central to the practical understanding that defines those relationships. This is 
specifically the case in terms of the construction of a practical understanding of the set 
of relationships between a particular young person’s meaning-making and local 
circumstances.  This conclusion rests on the observation that central to these 
communication practices that produce inclusive relationships is an ‘active listening’ 
aimed at producing local understanding of the meaning-making of students (Abrams, 
2005: 41; Habel, 1999: 8; Mihalas et al, 2009: 111; & Pomeroy, 1999: 470).  As 
Mihalas et al (2009) explained in their review of research in relation to cultivating 
teacher-student relations with secondary students with ‘emotional and behavioral 
disorders’, the two are inextricably linked in interactions: 
Active listening means to listen to the meaning of what another person 
is communicating and checking with that person to determine if he or 
she has been understood.  Mutual understanding is the product of 
people who actively listen to one another (117). 
This position is also confirmed in a number of ethnographic and survey studies 
including Pomeroy’s study of excluded students where he reports that: ‘In this study, 
the most consistent and common grievance is that teachers do not listen to students’ 
(1999: 470). 
 
The attention to communication practices, in particular active listening, reemphasises 
the primary importance of objectively understanding the meaning-making of students 
in situ.  It is not enough to simply have knowledge of background relations that may 
be in play.  What appears to be required is an understanding of meaning-making as it 
is locally applied.  What this points to is that practical understanding is not simply a 
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matter of application of a priori abstract knowledge to interactions, but is also a 
matter of local knowledge construction through verbal and non-verbal 
communication. That is, practical understanding is a product of both knowledge 
application and construction practices and these practices take place at the local level 
of interaction.  This makes sense given the complexity of the relationships in play.  In 
addition these interactional knowledge construction and application practices both 
logically and evidentially appear to produce understanding iteratively in contextually 
sensitive ways.  For example the entire logic of Functional Behaviour Assessment 
(FBA) and Positive Behaviour Supports (PBS) is arguably based on an iterative cycle 
of knowledge construction and application that takes place through interactions 
whereby knowledge construction leads to knowledge application and further 
knowledge construction. 
 
2.5.3 Reflexivity 
The third insight provided by previous research is that objective understanding 
requires ‘self reflection’.  Thus practitioners are called on to critically reflect on their 
own beliefs, attitudes and values and the way that these are enacted in their 
interactions  (Abrams, 2005: 42; McEvoy & Welker, 2000: 134; Mihalis et al, 2009: 
110; Murray, 2002: 288-89; Murray & Pianta, 2007: 109; Tyler & Bynley, 2000: 85-
86; Urbis, 2011; 47; & NSW Teachers Federation & Federation of P&C Associations 
of NSW, 2002: 98-102).  Essentially this amounts to a call to critically interrogate 
teachers’ own ‘frames of reference’ or points of view, that is, their subjectivities as 
they are enacted within interactions. 
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The requirement for critical self reflection arises in the first instance from the 
recognition that teacher bias and discrimination is associated with both the quality of 
teacher-student relationships and exclusionary practices.  Presumably biased and 
discriminatory frames of reference arising from teachers' own gendered, socio-
economic and cultured histories operate within interactions to decrease understanding. 
That is, they interfere with an understanding of the set of objective relationships 
between local student practices and the historical relationships giving rise to meaning-
making, student meaning-making and the institutional circumstances. 
 
The requirement for critical self-reflection also arises from the recognition that the 
emergence and maintenance of ‘disordered’ practice is itself correlated with the 
subjective ‘frame of reference’ or point of view of the teacher (Guerra, Boxer & Kim, 
2005: 282; Hughes & Cavell, 1999: 181; Lewis et al, 2012: 85-89; Oliver, Pike and 
Plomin, 2008; & Urbis, 2011: 134).  This recognition is substantiated by the empirical 
findings that: (i) the presentation of ‘disordered’ practices with a particular student 
varies from teacher to teacher according to the beliefs, attitudes and values of those 
teachers (Hughes & Cavell, 1999: 181); (ii) teacher-reported ‘disordered’ behaviour 
for monozygotic twins varies from teacher to teacher (Oliver, Pike & Plomin, 2008); 
& (iii) student ‘disordered’ practices are linked to teacher ‘concern’ and ‘rejection’ 
ratings but ‘rejection’ ratings by teachers differ between students diagnosed with a 
cognitive disability and students diagnosed with conduct disorder even when student 
practices are identical (Cook & Cameron, 2010: 75). 
 
Educational and psychological researchers have also drawn attention to particular 
features of the teacher’s experience that needs to be called into question.  Accordingly 
 63 
it is not just the teacher’s own attitudes, beliefs, values and expectations that require 
critical reflection, but also the relationships between individual teacher’s subjectivities 
and the institutional context. This includes institutionally legitimised, ‘commonsense’ 
practices (NSW Teachers Federation & Federation of P&C Associations of NSW, 
2002: 98-102); cultural values and biases built into practitioner’s professions and the 
effects of socio-political histories in relationships with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders (Australian Psychological Association in Urbis, 2011: 47), and the attitudes, 
beliefs and ‘ecological’ norms underpinning instructional practices (McEvoy & 
Welker, 2000: 134). 
 
Some writers have pursued the practical implications of critical reflection even 
further.  Thus Furlong & Morrison (2000) point to the importance of considering the 
differences in values between students and teachers as a way of fostering 
understanding and inclusive relationships (79).  Murray (2002) suggests that self 
examination and reflection proceeds interactionally by seeking student’s alternative 
views thereby bringing the teacher’s own frames of reference into sharp relief (288-
89).  While Tyler & Brynley (2000) go one step further, in an evaluation of an 
ecological approach, by showing that inclusive relationships are the product of 
critically questioning normal responses and current explanations of ‘disordered’ 
practices and then positively reframing those practices (86). 
 
Essentially this requirement for self reflection implicitly represents a reflexive turn 
that recognises that all knowledge or understanding at the very least runs the risk of 
being in some way autobiographical.  That is, the call for ‘critical self reflection’ 
implicitly presupposes that having a point of view about a young person’s practices is 
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linked to the history and local institutional circumstances of that point of view.  
Therefore the call for ‘self reflection’ can be understood more precisely as a call for a 
reflexive approach to understanding. Such an approach takes stock of the 
epistemological insight that there is a reciprocal relationship between the knower and 
what is known, the representer and what is represented (Pels, 2000: 2). 
 
Within interactions this reflexive approach can be recast as a concern with the set of 
relations giving rise to knowledge constructed and applied in practice with regard to 
the young person’s practices. However, this enacted knowledge defines the teacher’s 
meaning-making in relation to the young person’s practices. This means that the 
reflexive approach can be also be reframed as a concern with aspects of the teacher’s 
meaning-making that inform their interactional practices via interpretations of the 
young person’s practices.  Thus reflexivity is necessarily concerned with the set of 
relations between the teacher’s practice and context: that is, between teachers' 
interactional practices, their meaning-making, the historical relations giving rise to 
their meaning-making, and the set of local institutional relations, including the 
teacher-student relations, informing that meaning-making. 
 
The orthodox literature is helpful here as it points to the critical aspects of the 
knower’s context that require reflexive attention. These aspects as previously 
reviewed include the set of historical and local, gendered, cultural and socio-economic 
relationships.  However, comparative readings between the orthodox and heretical 
literature reveals that the pertinent features of meaning-making, gender, culture and 
socio-economic status, and the contextual relationships between them in orthodox 
research, are seriously under-conceptualised.  For example ‘culture’ in orthodox 
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literature is reduced to either geography or only very loosely tied to gender or class.  
Similarly local situational contexts and their relationships to meaning-making and 
culture are only loosely defined in terms of a smorgasbord of situational scenarios 
such as those provided in Axis IV of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (fourth edition, text revision) (DSM-IV-TR).  It is then left up to the 
practitioner to fill in the conceptual gaps with ‘intuitive’ judgements about these 
relationships (Wakefield, Pottick & Kirk, 2002: 380-382).  Likewise ‘socio-economic 
status’ is reduced to multiple operational definitions of income or parental education 
and so on, which are empty of any conceptual linkages to pertinent features of 
‘culture’ or ‘gender’ or meaning-making.  One of the problematic consequences of 
this under-conceptualisation is that it inevitably poses a significant obstacle to a 
rigorous conceptualisation of the practice of reflexive understanding in inclusive 
relationships. 
 
Researchers referencing critical theoretical tradition, such as Bourdieu, Bogardus and 
Harwood, have pursued the issue of reflexivity with far more precision.  This group of 
researchers have started their inquiry by raising the question of the relationship 
between knowledge construction and power relations implicit in cultural, gender and 
class relations.  This questioning has prompted a turning to the sociology of 
knowledge, which gives rise to a far more rigorous theorisation of reflexivity in terms 
of the problems posed by symbolic power relations.  In particular this group of 
researchers have drawn attention to the way that the dominant symbolic order, 
particularly through discursive practices, presents epistemological obstacles to 
understanding and simultaneously contributes to exclusion (e.g. Bogardus, 1997, 
Bourdieu, 1990a, Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron 1991, Danforth 1999; Danforth 
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2007; Danforth & Morris, 2006; Harwood, 2000; McCarthy & Rapley, 2001; Parker, 
1992; Slee, 2006; Slee & Cook, 1999; & Tait, 2001).  
 
As a consequence of its interest in symbolic power relations, heretical research has 
highlighted the way that the dominant, taken-for-granted symbolic order generates 
obstacles to reflexive understanding through a synergy between: (i) substantialist 
ontological and epistemological footings; (ii) theoretical and practical metaphors that 
draw on dualistic and hierarchical notions of the individual versus society and notions 
of individual and social order; (iii) discursive practices that objectify morally 
evaluated difference in terms of us-them or othering classificatory judgements of 
disorder and disability; (iv) the silencing of presumptively deemed ‘irrational’ voices 
of young people; (v) the stripping of local context from meaning-making; (vi) 
reducing explanations of practice to individual mentalities whereby meaning becomes 
authoritatively decreed by professionals; and (vii) the stripping of context from an 
appreciation of reflexivity (Bogardus, 1997; 58-87 & 104-136; Bourdieu, 1990a: 123-
139; Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991: 13-77; Cosgrove, 2005: 283-288; 
Danforth, 1999; Danforth 2007; Danforth & Navarro, 2001; Danforth & Rhodes, 
1997; Gaines, 1992; Gleeson, 1992: 439-460, 469-470 & 478-483; Hamovitch, 1996; 
Harwood, 2000: 9-32 & 135-213; Henriques et al, 1984: 1-26; Herr, 1999; Holstein, 
2002;  Laws & Davies, 2000; Laws, 2001: 43-110; McCarthy & Rapley, 2001; Parker, 
1992; Skrtic, 1991: 148-153; Smith, 1978; Slee, 1995; Slee, 2006; Slee & Cook, 
1999, Szasz, 1960; Tait, 2001; & Thomas & Glenny, 2000).   
 
To sum up, the literature reveals that a prerequisite for practical understanding is 
reflexivity.  This means that practical understanding requires a consideration of the 
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relationship between the teacher’s practice and local context in order to comprehend 
the relationship between the young person’s practice and the local context.  This 
epistemological requirement arises from the relationship between the knower and the 
known, but it also arises substantively.  This is because practical understanding in 
teacher-student relationships requires a comprehension of the interactional 
relationship between student and teacher practice.  However, an understanding of 
teachers' interactional practice requires an understanding of the relationship between 
their own historical relations, their meaning-making, or more specifically their 
knowledge construction and application in relation to the young person’s practices, 
and local institutional circumstances.  Thus the object of practical understanding can 
be more rigorously described as the interactive set of relationships between the young 
person’s practice and context and the teacher’s practice and context.  More 
specifically, it is the set of relations between the teacher's and young person’s 
interactional practices, historical relations, meaning-making and local institutional 
circumstances. Importantly this includes the symbolic relations embedded within 
these relationships. 
 
2.6 Research Questions 
The above review has provided several insights about the broad nature of practical 
understanding associated with inclusive teacher-student relationships.  These include 
the importance of understanding practice in terms of the set of relations between 
meaning-making and the historical and local context, the interactional iterative nature 
of practical understanding and the importance of a reflexive approach to practical 
understanding.  The review has also highlighted the critical importance of 
interactional talk in knowledge construction and application within inclusive teacher-
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student relationships.  This then begs two important questions that represent gaps in 
existing knowledge and mark the contribution of this thesis. 
 
Firstly, existing research has highlighted the fact that the institutional context plays an 
important role in mediating understanding and reflexivity. However, a precise 
understanding of how the institutional context provides the conditions for and limits 
to practical understanding at the level of interaction is missing.  In order to develop 
this understanding it is necessary to ask how the institutional context itself poses 
obstacles to practical understanding. Or more specifically, what are the limits to 
reflexive local knowledge construction posed by institutional conditions at the level of 
interaction?  This would seem to be a critically important question given the 
relationship between reflexive understanding and inclusive and exclusive teacher-
student relationships. 
 
Secondly, if features of the local institutional context pose obstacles to reflexive 
understanding, what is the nature of local, language based knowledge construction 
practices that, associated with these conditions, pose obstacles to reflexive 
understanding?  In other words, what knowledge construction and application 
practices prevent an understanding of the local relationships between meaning-making 
and historical and institutional contexts at the level of the interaction order?  The 
answer to this question should bring insight into what practices make reflexive 
understanding associated with inclusion possible.  This would therefore seem to be a 
particularly important question given that: (a) local interactional knowledge 
construction and application practices underpin inclusive relationships; and (b) the 
complexity of historical and local relationships that may be in play in any given 
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interaction preclude mechanical and highly abstract knowledge construction and 
application insensitive to local context. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Together the answers to these questions contribute to an applied conceptualisation of 
the interactional practice of objectively understanding the local practices of young 
people diagnosed with mental disorders that are associated with school exclusion.  
This material should inform a conceptualisation of reflexive knowledge construction 
associated with inclusion. In the absence of this conceptualisation practitioners can 
only rely on intuitive approaches. Intuition however is a troublesome companion for 
the development of highly systematic approaches to reflexive understanding and 
hence inclusive teacher-student relationships.  This is because the opaque nature of 
intuitive practices poses obstacles to analytical evaluation and/or reflection, thereby 
presenting opportunities for the non-conscious smuggling-in of unanalysed taken-for-
granted assumptions. 
 
Furthermore, in the absence of a rigorous conceptualisation, the sharing of knowledge 
about exclusive and inclusive practice is reduced to an exchange of highly abstract 
terms that does little to elucidate the practical doing of understanding but simply 
recycles similar lexical terms.  Thus current educational explanations of 
‘understanding’ tend to amount to an endless exchange of the word ‘understanding’ 
with other equally abstract words or phrases like ‘empathy’ or ‘walk in their shoes’ or 
‘appreciate’. This represents a substitution of similes for ‘understanding’ without 
progressing knowledge of how it is actually done or not done in practice.  Similar 
problems haunt conceptualisations of reflexivity as ‘reflecting on your values and 
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beliefs’. Consequently what is practically at stake in this thesis is a concrete 
description of the interactional language-based practices that comprise the doing and 
not doing of reflexive ‘listening’ and the conditions for and against reflexive 
knowledge construction that makes salient ‘the background’ in understanding local 
practice.  Such an inquiry requires a theoretical framework that can inform a study of 
these practices.  The next chapter will turn to Bourdieu’s theorising of social practice 
to provide these conceptual tools. 
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Chapter 3 
The Object of Inquiry 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter documented psychological, psychiatric and educational research 
pointing to the crucial dimensions of context that need to be taken into account in 
researching the conditions producing episodes of ‘disordered’ behaviour practice.  
Those dimensions included the sets of relationships between historical relations, 
meaning making and local institutional relations.  In addition the finding that culture, 
gender and socio-economic factors mediate the production of ‘disordered’ practice, 
teacher-student relationships and reflexive understanding suggests that symbolic 
power relations are crucial to understanding ‘disordered’ practices associated with 
school exclusion. In particular, it raised the question of the role of teachers’ 
understanding as a key factor in these relationships. 
 
This chapter reviews a theoretical perspective based on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice that is needed to sensitise this research into the possibility of and limits to 
practical understanding in teacher-student relationships.  The careful 
conceptualisation of the pertinent relationships associated with understanding practice 
introduces an epistemological rigour into this enterprise and also provides the 
methodological framework for the project. This is because the systematic set of 
relationships that are fore-grounded by an initial theorisation of the object to be 
described makes possible ‘a systematic questioning of the aspects of reality that are 
brought into relationship by the question that is put to them’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon 
& Passeron, 1991: 35).   
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Bourdieu’s framework was selected because it is a conceptually rigorous model for 
reflexively analysing the relationships between practice, historical relations, meaning 
making, institutional context and symbolic power relations.  The chapter will firstly 
introduce the broad epistemological foundation for Bourdieu’s model of practice, and 
then will explore two key dimensions of Bourdieu’s model, habitus and field, drawing 
attention to epistemological implications, symbolic power relations and the 
relationships between them.  The chapter will close by posing a set of research 
questions that stem from the ‘thinking’ tools provided by Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation of practice.  
 
3.2 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
This section will introduce Bourdieu’s key concepts firstly by discussing their 
epistemological foundations and secondly by framing the broad theoretical project 
that encapsulates his conceptualisation of practice.    
 
3.2.1 Epistemological Foundations 
Consistent with his epistemology, Bourdieu argues that the development of a reflexive 
model of practice requires two breaks.  The first is triggered by a break with primary 
experience realised by a disinvestment in the illusion of immediate knowledge or a 
spontaneous sociology of social action that results from subjective familiarity 
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991: 15-17).  Such spontaneous knowledge 
tends to privilege the subject’s experience of their social action as being individually 
motivated and determined, and consequently, to give credence to an ontology of the 
social as a conglomerate of individual motivations.  Commonsense social theorising 
therefore lends itself to a ‘methodological individualism’ that posits that all facts 
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about societies and social phenomena in general, are to be explained solely in terms of 
subjectivist facts about individual behaviour (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 15-17).   
 
A break with this spontaneous sociology leads to two realisations. The first is that the 
social is not reducible to collective or group behaviour.  Instead, as Bhaskar argues, an 
understanding of the social needs to confront the persistent, general and implicitly 
structural relations, ‘between individuals (and groups), and with the relations between 
these relations (and between such relations and nature and the product of such 
relations’ (179: 36). These enduring relations make some actions possible and others 
impossible such that they provide the pre-existing and ongoing conditions for 
individual experience and action.  As such, they can be understood as causal 
mechanisms at least partly determining practice (1979: 31-49).  
 
Secondly, as Bourdieu argues, the ‘doxic’ or non-conscious acceptance of the tacitly 
assumed presuppositions that give the social world its self-evident, natural character is 
only possible because it excludes, by definition, the question of the particular 
conditions that make that experience possible (1981: 87).  Consequently the first 
epistemological break represents a reversal of this subjective non-consciousness.  This 
reversal occurs via recognition of the primacy of social relations or structures in 
producing objectivist knowledge.  This objectivist knowledge constructs the objective 
relations (e.g. economic or linguistic) that whilst escaping commonsense awareness 
nevertheless structure the possibilities of practice and tacit representations of practice.  
This in turn leads to the logical conclusion that neither social phenomenon nor 
individual practice can be objectively defined independently of the historical and 
structural relations in which it is located (Bourdieu, 1981: 86-87).  
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However, this first break results in only a provisional objective knowledge of practice.  
For Bourdieu, this only provides the preconditions necessary for such knowledge.  In 
a reflexive turn what is now required is a second break that grasps the limits of 
objectivist knowledge produced by the objectifying relationship itself. As Bourdieu 
argues, objectivism tends to be oblivious to the distinction and relationships between 
experiential meaning and objective meaning, thereby surrendering to the fallacy of 
mistaking the ‘the things of logic for the logic of things’ (1990b: 129).  An 
understanding of practice that is faithful to the sense of practice under study therefore 
needs to take into account what is inscribed in the distance and externality with 
respect to primary experience produced by the act of objectification.  That is, 
produced by the act of withdrawing or standing apart from that which is observed that 
provides the necessary conditions for the initial objectifying relationship constituting 
the first break.  This means that an understanding of the full set of relations producing 
practice needs to account for a distance and externality that is both an epistemological 
break with the primary experience of the social and also a social break. That is, a 
break arising from a viewpoint that is at a distance from the immediacy or necessity of 
practice and the stage in which practice is actually played out (Bourdieu, 1990b: 14-
21).   
 
Consequently, social science must not only break with primary experience and 
representations of that experience, but also, in a second break, call into question the 
presuppositions and social conditions inherent in the practices of the 'objective’ 
observer.  As Bourdieu points out, what is at stake is how far the objectifier is willing 
to get caught up in the act of objectification, how far they are willing to objectify their 
own practices, given that what often goes unanalysed in theoretical analysis is the 
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theorist’s own subjective relation to the social world, and the objective social relations 
presupposed by this subjective relation. The danger is that in the absence of this 
objectification that observers who, seeking to interpret practices, tend to import or 
project onto the object, including the very act of constructing objects, the principles of 
their own non-conscious socially conditioned relations to the object.  This includes the 
non-conscious importation of their own social categories of thought, perception and 
appreciation that are the unthought principles of all representations of the 'objective' 
world (Bourdieu, 1990b: 14-29). 
. 
A truly reflexive understanding of practice therefore requires an act of reducing the 
distance by ‘objectifying the objectifying relationship’.  Significantly this act is not 
simply a matter of calling into question the objectifier’s view of the object by bringing 
to bear a conscious relativism, that is, an awareness of the situated viewpoint of a 
particular observer thus encouraging a false hope in wishing away the distance by 
‘standing in someone else’s shoes’.  More fundamentally, because it is constitutive of 
the operation of knowing and therefore inevitably remains unnoticed, it involves a 
calling into question of the initial act of taking up a viewpoint on an object and 
constituting it as an object of knowledge.  Hence Bourdieu argues that the necessary 
and sufficient condition for the act of objectifying the objectifying relationship is to 
subordinate scientific practice to an understanding of the knowing subject. This 
understanding amounts to a theory of the primary or subjective relation to the social 
world and the objective social conditions that make this possible.  In other words, 
what is required to objectify the objectifying relationships is the reinsertion into 
theories of practice of a theory of the logic of primary practical knowledge that 
incorporates a sociological analysis of the social conditions for practical knowledge, 
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including social scientific practice (Bourdieu, 1990b: 18).  The upshot is as Bourdieu 
comments: 
Distance is not abolished by bringing the outsider fictitiously closer to 
an imaginary native, as is generally attempted; it is by distancing, 
through objectification, the native who is in every outside observer that 
the native is brought closer to the outsider (1990b: 20). 
This epistemological inquiry has specific implications for a conceptual theorising of 
practice to which the discussion will now turn.  
 
4.2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Bourdieu’s proposal that a scientific theory of practice can be achieved only after 
reinserting a theory of subjective primary experience back into objectivist knowledge 
prompted an understanding of practice as a dialectic between subjective experience 
and objective structures.  Thinking about practice as a dialectic  avoids what Bourdieu 
called ‘the sterile theoretical oppositions’ between ‘structuralism’ that ‘tends to 
deduce actions and interactions from structure’ and ‘subjectivism’, which runs the risk 
of ignoring objective conditions by mistakenly reducing structures to interactions’ 
(1990a: 129).  Bourdieu subsequently characterised his work on practice as 
‘constructivist structuralism’ or ‘structuralist constructivism’ which he explains in the 
following terms: 
By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exist, in the social 
world itself, and not merely in symbolic systems, language, myth, etc., 
objective structures which are independent of the consciousness and 
desires of agents and are capable of guiding or constraining their 
practice or their representations.  By constructivism, I mean that there 
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is a social genesis on the one hand of the patterns of perception, 
thought, and action which are constitutive of what I call the habitus, 
and on the other hand of social structures, and in particular of what I 
call fields and groups, especially of what are usually called social 
classes (1990a: 123).  
 
Conceptualising practice therefore requires that the social scientist grasps what is 
owed to objective structure in subjective action and what is owed to subjective action 
in objective structure.  Accordingly, Bourdieu proposed that all social action in effect 
brings together two states of history: an objectified history, that is, the history ‘which 
has accumulated over the passage over time in things, machines, buildings, 
monuments, books, theories, customs, law’ and significantly for the purposes of this 
current study, in institutions, and an embodied history in the form of ‘habitus’ 
(Bourdieu, 1981: 305).  In addition Bourdieu introduced the dialectic concept of 
‘field’ to focus on the way in which this meeting of two histories occurs in a specific 
social domain of practice such as Education. 
 
The concepts of ‘Habitus’ and ‘Field’ are the key concepts in Bourdieu’s theorising of 
practice both having their origins in the explication of the dialectical relationships 
between objective structures and subjective meaning making in specific social 
domains.  What follows is an examination of these concepts pertinent to our goal of 
producing thinking tools to rigorously describe ‘mentally disordered’ practice within a 
classroom setting.  
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3.3 Habitus 
According to Bourdieu, habitus represents a conceptualisation of the relationship 
between objective and material conditions in social environments and the regularities 
of lived practices of individuals and groups.  In a retroductive step that drew upon 
identified sets of empirical regularities, such as the relationship between educational 
achievement and economic status (e.g. Reproduction: In Education, Society & 
Culture, The State Nobility) and the relationship between educational attainment and 
aesthetic disposition (e.g. Distinction), Bourdieu theorised that objective conditions, 
particularly those of early experience but not limited to early experience, are inscribed 
upon the individual to produce the ‘structuring structure’ of habitus.  By using the 
term ‘structuring structure’ Bourdieu makes a distinction between the opus operatum 
and the modus operandi of practice where habitus is seen as a generative principle 
discoverable in the latter rather than the former (Bourdieu, 1990b: 12).  Hence habitus 
refers not to the manifestly regular practices themselves, but to the unconsciously 
structured ‘system of schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action' 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 40), the 'systems of durable dispositions which 
functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices' (Bourdieu 
in Mahar, Harker & Wilkes, 1990: 10). 
   
Habitus is therefore theorised by Bourdieu as a mediating mechanism between the 
objective conditions that give rise to it and the practices and representations that it 
produces.  Bourdieu identified that two pertinent properties of these objective 
conditions are economic and cultural capital. Economic capital refers to the various 
forms of material economic capital whilst cultural capital is defined as culturally 
valued and relatively rare taste and consumption patterns, which includes goods such 
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as art, education and forms of language (Bourdieu, 1990a: 128-29; & Mahar, Harker 
& Wilkes, 1990: 13-14).   
 
As a mediating mechanism, understood as a set of durable transposable dispositions, 
habitus explains not only the regularities of practices of individuals across a number 
of different social domains or fields, but also the shared regularities between groups 
of individuals according to economic and cultural capital.  This is because the similar, 
historically formed, objective conditions associated with similar localities in social 
space, defined by the differential distribution and composition of the two forms of 
capital, give rise to similar dispositions thus producing similar practices.  These 
affinities in dispositions tied to theoretically close positions in social space 
incorporate Bourdieu’s theorising of ‘socio-economic’ class.  In this way then 
Bourdieu is able to explain the association between objective regularities between 
social groups, that is, social structures, and objective inter-generational regularities 
between the practices and representations of those individuals and groups.  Habitus 
can therefore be understood as a set of structured dispositions within which these 
social structures are actualised, or as Bourdieu & Passeron poetically explain, habitus 
is the ‘internalisation of externality and externalisation of internality’ (1990: 205).  
Ultimately then, habitus is objectively a mediating mechanism between positions in 
social space, determined by economic and cultural capital, and practice (Bourdieu, 
1981: 87; Bourdieu, 1990a: 128-9; & Mahar, Harker & Wilkes, 1990: 13-14).    
 
This does not mean that habitus, as a set of dispositions, represents a mechanistic 
master plan, which Bourdieu specifically rejects.  Instead habitus is a ‘strategy-
generating’ principle rather than a mechanistic rule.  Although tending to operate 
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beneath the level of consciousness habitus nevertheless enables agents to respond to 
unforeseen, infinite and ever-changing situations according to their own logic in 
present time.  Yet at the same time strategies are limited to the incorporated 
generative schemes produced by the conditions of its own production.  In this way 
external structures exert themselves, ‘but in accordance with the specific logic of the 
organisms in which they are incorporated, i.e. in a durable, systematic and non-
mechanical way’ (Bourdieu, 1990b: 55). Habitus then precludes both the mechanistic 
determinism of structuralism and the implicit free will of subjectivism.  As Bourdieu 
emphasises, habitus, as an acquired system of generative schemes, ‘makes possible 
the free production of all thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the particular 
conditions of its production – and only those.’ (Bourdieu, 1990b: 55).   
 
The inscription of objective conditions upon individuals to produce habitus takes 
place under the synergistic influence of environmental material conditions determined 
by the distribution and composition of economic and cultural capital and the 
pedagogic practices of predecessors previously inscribed by the same conditions.  The 
inscription of habitus therefore occurs from practice to practice where both the 
process of acquisition – a ‘practical mimesis’, a learning by identification rather than 
conscious imitation – and the process of reproduction – a practical reactivation 
exclusive of memory or knowledge, occur at the level of bodily practice beneath the 
level of consciousness or expression in the absence of an consciously controlled 
reflexive step.  As Bourdieu argues: 
The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief.  It 
does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it 
enacts the past, bringing it back to life.  What is ‘learned by body’ is 
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not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but 
something that one is  (1990b: 73).  
 
The inscription of habitus from practice to practice produces two further critical 
insights. Firstly it leads directly to Bourdieu’s argument that the deepest of 
inscriptions occur in the body; that the physical immersion in practices establishes 
different relationships to the body as a ‘bodily hexis’, which then manifest as 
organising principles of practice in relation to the body, language and time.  For 
example, Bourdieu argued that the kinds of manual work that the body was required 
to do within the working class encourage a functional relationship to the body, which 
manifests as the privileging of substance over form.  This in turn produces a whole 
relation to the world embodied in practice through the prioritising of functional 
aspects of practice rather then practices devoted to form.  Bourdieu could then explain 
the objective regularity discoverable in the differences in practices between working 
and professional classes where members of the working class, contrary to the 
professional class, were found to prioritise food over clothing, the domestic over the 
public, ‘being’ over ‘seeming’ and the inside over the outside (Adkins, 1997: 34-35).  
The acquisition and enactment of habitus from practice to practice in these kinds of 
ways subsequently explains why Bourdieu speaks of habitus as an ‘em-bodied’ 
history where the history of objective conditions found in particular positions of social 
space is turned into a ‘permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, 
walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking’ (Bourdieu 1990b: 69-70).  Consequently 
it is not just that physical habits are embodied, but also mental habits, which arise 
from the discipline of the body through the repeated regularities of ordinary practice 
(Bourdieu, 1990b, 127-29 & Hanks, 2005: 72).    
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This first insight is related to the second.  Bourdieu proposed that non-reflexive 
acquisition from practice to practice and subsequent actualisation of the habitus as a 
bodily hexis results in the ‘misrecognition’ of the arbitrary nature of the set of 
dispositions comprising the habitus, which is the same as saying a misrecognition of 
the imminent ethical and intellectual limitations of a particular habitus.  Therefore 
agents have a ‘doxic’ relationship to the familiar world where the ordering of the 
social world tends to be falsely perceived in taken-for-granted ways as non-arbitrary, 
universally valid, self-evident and natural.  This is partly because the very absence of 
reflexive consciousness in the acquisition and actualisation of habitus ensures that 
agents are predisposed to actively apprehend the world as taken for granted.  But it is 
also because this initial predisposition is endlessly perpetuated by the natural fit 
experienced between the mental structures of agents through which they apprehend 
the social world − the product of an internalisation of external structures − and the 
external structures that they encounter of which they are the product.  As Bourdieu 
points out: 
In this predictable world, everything can be taken for granted because 
the immanent tendencies of the established order continuously appear 
in advance of the expectations spontaneously inclined to anticipate 
them (1998: 4).  
 
This effect is further compounded by the seemingly free production of subjective 
thought, perception and action, offered by the strategy generating principle of the 
habitus.  This strategy-generating principle unwittingly predisposes agents to 
apprehend the familiar world as a construction of their own perception – their own 
point of view − even though this construction is carried out under structural 
 83 
constraints unconsciously provided by their point of view, that is, from their position 
in social space.  In fact, as Bourdieu argues, agents would not be so totally the blind 
prisoners of the limitations of the possible and impossible imposed by the dispositions 
of habitus if it were not that they live out their thought and practice in the illusion of 
freedom and universality (Bourdieu, 1990a: 130-131; & Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 
40).   
  
Added to this is the illusion of universality offered by the accepted ‘commonsense’ of 
the group to which an agent belongs.  The harmony between internal structures and 
objectified meaning incorporated in things and structures, which produces for the 
individual the immediate self-evidence of a common-sense world, is made ‘common’ 
sense because it is accompanied by an illusion of objectivity provided by a shared 
consensus on the meaning of practices, structures and things between agents with 
similar conditioning.  Hence there is a harmonisation of experiences between agents 
in similar positions in social space through the constant reinforcement ‘each of them 
receives from expression – individual or collective (in festivals, for example) 
improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings) – of similar or identical 
experiences’ (Bourdieu 1990b: 58).  Everything therefore conspires in the production 
and reproduction of the habitus in such a way that agents tend to see the world as 
natural world of commonsense, a social world that seems self-evident (Bourdieu, 
1990a: 130-131; Bourdieu 1998: 1-6; & Codd, 1990: 140-41). 
 
The doxic relationship between objective conditions and habitus, viewpoint and point 
of view, also involves particular operations of the habitus.  These operations reinforce 
and defend the sense of naturalness and non-arbitrary universal value of practices, 
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representations and products produced by a particular habitus in the face of alternative 
practices, representations and products produced by other positions in social space.  
The source of these sets of reinforcing and defensive operations lies in the binary 
nature of the habitus as a system of models for the production of practices and at the 
same time a system of models for the perception, evaluation and appreciation of 
practices.  Bourdieu refers to the latter aspect of habitus as ‘taste’.  Hence the 
opportunities and prohibitions associated with particular objective conditions, 
including pedagogic actions that positively reinforce or negatively sanction practices 
and classifications, generate dispositions that are objectively compatible with the 
social conditions of their production. This is both in terms of practice but also in terms 
of classificatory judgements of practice, which also amount to values and aspirations 
or motivations (Bourdieu, 1990a: 130-33; & Bourdieu, 1990b: 52-65).  Consequently, 
Bourdieu argues that there is an inevitable adjustment of disposition to position 
where: 
The most improbable practices are therefore excluded, as unthinkable, 
by a kind of immediate submission to order that inclines agents to 
make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway denied and 
to will the inevitable (1990b: 54). 
 
These schemes of perception and evaluation are relational.  This is because taste 
‘generates the set of ‘choices’ of goods and practices constituting lifestyles, which 
derive their meaning − that is, their value − from their position in a system of 
oppositions and correlations’ (Bourdieu, 1984 in Adkins, 1997: 34).  As a result the 
habitus produces practices, products and representations that are available for 
classification.  These are able to be objectively differentiated in specific ways by 
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agents who possess the specific classificatory models, constituting the basis of 
classificatory judgement, associated with a habitus generated within specific positions 
in social space.  The relationship between these two capacities of habitus, production 
and taste, therefore symbolically transmutes the total system of practices, 
representations, classifications and works into a distinct system of signs.  This system 
of signs in turn provides a system of differentiation, via classificatory judgements, 
that places value upon the particular practices, works and representations associated 
with a particular point of view or position in social space over others.  Thus the 
habitus generates not only ‘a sense of one’s place’ and ‘a sense of the other’s place’, 
but also a sense of value for one’s place and a ‘rational’ sense of preference for one’s 
values as natural and self-evident, particularly give that these set of values or tastes 
are reinforced by the objective necessities of the economic and cultural market tied to 
the agent’s position in social space  (Adkins, 1997: 33-36; Bourdieu, 1990a: 130-33; 
Bourdieu, 1990b: 52-65; & Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 203-204).  
 
Of course the habitus formed from early experience is potentially vulnerable to threats 
from new information as a result of accidental or forced exposure to social 
circumstances that differ from the objective and pedagogic conditions of the primary 
experience.  However it is exactly against this possibility that taste works to defend 
and reinforce the habitus, firstly by rejecting information capable of calling into 
question accumulated schemes of practice and appreciation, presumably because it is 
perceived as imminently and eminently valueless, but secondly and especially, by 
avoiding exposure to such information. Hence the habitus tends to protect itself from 
critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as 
possible, a constant universe of situations tending to reinforce its dispositions.  One 
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has only to think about how peer groups in schools cluster around similar dispositions 
to recognise the kinds of ‘choices’ through which the habitus tends to favour 
experiences that reinforce it.  And once again it is what Bourdieu refers to as the 
paradoxical property of the habitus, the reflexively and unconsciously ‘unchosen 
principle of all ‘choices’’ that provides the basis of this avoidance:  
The schemes of perception and appreciation of the habitus which are 
the basis of all the avoidance strategies are largely the product of a 
non-conscious, unwilled avoidance, whether it results automatically 
from the conditions of existence (for example, spatial segregation’ or 
has been produced by a strategic intention (such as a avoidance of ‘bad 
company’ or unsuitable books’) originating from adults themselves 
formed in the same conditions (1990b: 61).  
 
Thus once again we arrive at the same point that everything conspires in the 
unconscious formation and operations of the habitus to ensure that agents tend to 
misrecognise the world as a natural world of commonsense, a non-arbitrary social 
world that seems self-evident.  But having reached this conclusion we also need to 
make a necessary distinction between unconscious operations of the habitus and the 
reasonings produced by the habitus.  In saying that the habitus operates beneath the 
level of consciousness is not the same as claiming that agents can not provide reasons 
for practice or that these reasons given can not point, in a reductive movement, to the 
habitus.  Rather these rationalisations are rarely fully cognizant of the deeper practice 
generating metaphors of the habitus.  Further, they are not reflexively cognizant of the 
relationship between the arbitrary limits to thinking and being, the possibilities and 
impossibilities imposed by the habitus and the objective conditions of its production 
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and implementation.  Hence what is ‘unconscious’ in this sense is the historical 
production of limits in thinking and being which is in effect a ‘forgetting’ of  the 
history of objective structures.  Of course, it is this same unconscious relationship to 
one’s viewpoint that animates the epistemological problem of prenotional thinking 
and also the ‘scholastic point of view’, that is, the non-reflexive relationship between 
habitus, position in social space and the production of scholastic works (Bourdieu, 
1981: 94-96; Bourdieu 1990a: 140-155; Bourdieu, 1990b: 52-65; Bourdieu & 
Passeron 1990: 40; & Shirato & Webb, 2003: 541-549).   
 
The transmutation of practices, representations and classifications through habitus 
into a symbolic space of signification has specific implications for the 
conceptualisation of moral, linguistic and cultural practice.  First, a symbolic system 
of distinction and differentiation arguably provides the basis for a moralisation of 
representations and practices such that the total system of practices and 
representations not only constitutes a symbolic order but also leads to the constitution 
of different moral orders.  Second, the cognitive and evaluative structures of habitus 
produce categories of perception or systems of classification, that is, classificatory 
judgements, within the words of language, which construct as much as describe social 
reality according to the possibilities and impossibilities of the habitus.  Thus the social 
space becomes a discursive space of representations where habitus provides a 
disposition to use language in certain ways, to embody expression in gesture, posture 
and speech production and to evaluate it according to inscribed tastes (Bourdieu, 
1990a: 134; & Hanks, 2005: 71).  The confluence of these first two provides the basis 
for a theorisation of description in language as inextricably embedded in a moral order 
whose foundations rest upon taste.   
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Third, according to Bourdieu, the symbolic systems produced by habitus − mental, 
moral and linguistic classificatory systems − refer to the selection of meanings that 
objectively define a group’s culture.  In this sense, the habitus can be defined as the 
internalisation of the principles of a group’s culture, capable of generating practices 
conforming to those principles and reproducing its intellectual and moral integration 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 36).  This selection of meanings is objectively arbitrary, 
in the same way that the dispositions of the habitus are arbitrary.  This is despite the 
doxic experience of their taken-for-granted universality, ‘insofar as the structure and 
functions of that culture cannot be deduced from any universal principle, whether 
physical, biological or spiritual, not being linked by any sort of internal relation to 
‘the nature of things’ or any ‘human nature’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 8).  
Bourdieu consequently refers to the arbitrary selection of meanings as the ‘cultural 
arbitrary’ (CA).  Bourdieu’s usage of the word ‘arbitrary’ should not be confused with 
gratuitousness.  Instead, the cultural arbitrary is socio-logically necessary ‘insofar as 
that culture owes its existence to the social conditions of which it is the product and 
its intelligibility to the coherence and functions of the structure of the signifying 
relations which constitute it’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 8).  Hence the ‘choices’ 
that constitute culture, choices ‘which no-one makes’, are arbitrary when related to 
differing present or past cultures but in fact owe their existence to the specific social 
relations of their production and reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 8-9).  
 
Culture, therefore, according to Bourdieu, is not conceptualised according to the 
collective vagaries of geography, but rather to the synergy between material 
conditions and practices of pedagogic predecessors, precisely embodied in a set of 
durable dispositions.  This means that on the one hand an analytical appreciation of 
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‘cultural’ effects can not be divorced from the schemes of practices and classificatory 
judgements associated with the divisions of social space according to economic and 
cultural capital.  On the other it means that any social system, defined as a set of 
relations between groups in social space − a set of relations between symbolically 
classifiable practices and products − needs to be understood as not comprising a 
single culture, e.g. ‘Australian’ or ‘Aboriginal’ or a mix of embedded cultures, e.g. 
Lebanese-Australian, according to geographic heritage.  More precisely, it needs to be 
described as system of relations between cultural arbitraries tied to positions in social 
space and determined by the objective conditions of their production.  An 
understanding of culture in these terms provides the analytic tools necessary to 
decipher the role of ‘culture’ – embodied and enacted as a set of durable dispositions 
– in the production of any practice and also, in a reflexive turn, in the act of 
classificatory judgement by a particular group in social space about a different 
group’s practice.  Significantly this includes classifications of ‘mentally disordered’ 
practice (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 10-11). 
 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of practice as a function of habitus must have a way of 
addressing other elements of context such as interactional relations and 
objectifications within institutional settings, given that habitus neither arises nor 
actualises in a vacuum but is enacted in specific conditions.  This leads to Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation of ‘field,’ to which we now turn.  Habitus, Bourdieu argues, 
emerges at the point of intersection between agents and the specific conditions of the 
field – habitus has no independent existence apart from the field (Hanks, 2005: 72).  It 
is within specific fields that the meaning of practices needs to be understood as it is 
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within the specific dynamic conditions of fields that the meeting of embodied history 
and objectified history occurs.   
 
3.4 Field 
The concept of the ‘field’ represents a theorisation of the actual conditions in which 
mechanisms associated with habitus and structure produce their effects in the 
production and reproduction of specific kinds of capital, which nominally define 
particular fields, such as the field of education or culture or economics (Adkins, 1997: 
36).  Applications of habitus occur then in the context of fields or social domains of 
activity in the pursuit of capital.  Within Bourdieu’s theorising of practice, fields are 
understood as having three principle features which constitute these conditions: (i) 
fields comprise a configuration of ‘positions’; (ii) fields are social domains of struggle 
for various kinds of economic, cultural and symbolic capital; and (iii) the operations 
of fields are conditional upon misrecognition.  The following briefly discusses each of 
these aspects of field in relation to an understanding of practice with a particular focus 
upon practice within institutions before considering the specific methodological 
implications for a study of ‘mentally disordered’ practice in situ.  
 
3.4.1 Positions and Position Taking 
Bourdieu argues that social domains of practice such as education or culture can be 
understood as a configuration of positions ordered within hierarchical structural 
relations and defined by historically objectified requirements for specific kinds of 
capital, tastes and practices.  The configuration of positions therefore represents the 
accumulated objectification over time of particular schemes of classification and 
practices.  Within institutions, positions and the requirements of positions can be 
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formalised such that positions and to some extent the requirements of positions are 
codified within particular social roles such as ‘student’, ‘teacher’ and ‘principal’ in 
schools.  However an account of position is not entirely limited to these codifications 
and additional analysis needs to take place at the level of the field to account for the 
schemes of categorisation associated with taste that produce further differentiations 
such as ‘troublemaking’ student or ‘good’ student and even ‘dickhead’ teacher and 
‘good’ teacher (Adkins, 1997: 37; Bourdieu, 1987; & Bourdieu, 1990a: 76-86). 
 
It is the theorisation of fields in terms of a configuration of positions that points to the 
necessity of understanding practice as the meeting of two histories - the objectified 
history of positions and the embodied history of habitus, that is, of positions and 
dispositions.  This amounts to an understanding of practice in terms of an encounter 
between the requirements of habitus and the requirements of positions.  Bourdieu 
explains that this encounter gives rise to an individual agent’s ‘position taking’ 
‘stance’ in relation to the problems raised by positions for the application of specific 
habitus.  An understanding of the contextualising relationships producing practice in 
the shape of an individual’s position taking therefore requires an appreciation of the 
distinct contributions that both disposition and position provide to practice whilst 
simultaneously appreciating the set of historically structured relationships between 
them (Adkins, 1997: 56-58; Adkins et al, 2006: 358-359; Bourdieu, 1987 & Bourdieu 
1990b: 52-59).  
 
Bourdieu’s emphasis upon the analytical distinction and set of relationships between 
position and disposition is critical.  This is despite the actual apparent widespread 
confluence of agents’ dispositions and positions in fields of practice giving rise to the 
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mistaken assumption that this confluence is the happy product of  a ‘milieu and a 
consciousness’.  In other words, the mistaken notion that this coincidence is either the 
product of the imminanent logic of structure of positions shaping dispositions or 
psycho-sociological dispositions shaping positions, especially if divorced from 
conditions of production (Bourdieu, 1987: 306).  Whilst Bourdieu allows for the fact 
that positions inevitably shape dispositions whereby the flexibility of the strategy 
generating habitus allows for an adjustment to the current demands of the position, he 
nevertheless draws attention to the historical structuring relationships that exist prior 
to any position taking.   
 
So rather than reducing the coincidence of position and disposition to an internal 
relationship Bourdieu argues that this coincidence is a product of the successful 
meeting of two histories itself where the ability to take up a position is largely 
premised by the possession of dispositions that mirror, and therefore meet, the 
objectified requirements of the position.  Indeed, it is the harmonious meeting of 
disposition and position that enables the objectified history of the field and 
specifically institutions, which are instituted history, to become lived realities.  
Bourdieu argues that institutions only become an enacted history when they are 
inhabited by agents whose own history predisposes them to do so – by agents who 
possess the necessary schemes of appreciation and attributes or practices to make 
them function (Bourdieu, 1987: 306).  This occurs when the same history of 
structuring structures inhabits both habitus and habitat and as Bourdieu eloquently 
explains: 
This is why so many actions, and not only those of the functionary who 
merges with his function, present themselves as ceremonies in which 
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the agents – who do not thereby become actors performing roles – 
enter into the spirit of the social character which is expected of them 
and which they expect of themselves (such is a vocation), by virtue of 
the immediate and total coincidence of habitus and habit which makes 
the true monk (1987: 309).  
 
Hence Bourdieu argues that the successful encounter and confluence of positions and 
dispositions is largely the product of a meeting of similar or identical objectified and 
internalized histories where history in a sense is communicating with itself.  That is, 
where the history of structures embodied in a subject as the habitus, a set of structure 
generating practices, discovers itself in history as an object or set of structured 
relationships objectified in positions.  This constitutes a case of the logic of tastes and 
practices generated by the habitus perfectly conforming to the logic and demands of 
the position and the field, which in effect represents an inclusive relationship between 
agent and field.  Alternatively Bourdieu points out that the harmony between position 
and disposition is disrupted when there is insufficient matching between disposition 
and the positions offered by the field.  That is, when dispositions ‘function out of 
phase and practices are objectively ill-adjusted to the present conditions because they 
are objectively adjusted to conditions that no longer obtain’ (Bourdieu, 1990b: 62).  
Agent’s practices and tastes under these circumstances will be negatively sanctioned 
leading to the impossibility of successfully accessing or maintaining positions. This is 
because the environment they encounter is too different, being beyond the range of 
the adaptive capacity of the habitus, from the one to which they are objectively 
adjusted.  This amounts to an exclusive relationship defined by the disjuncture 
between position and disposition (Bourdieu 1987; & Bourdieu 1990b: 52-65). 
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For these reasons Bourdieu argues that practice can not be understood in terms of 
present or past conditions alone.  Instead practices: 
…can therefore only be accounted for by relating the social conditions 
in which the habitus that generated them was constituted,  to the social 
conditions in which it is implemented, that is, through the scientific 
work of performing the interrelationship of these two states of the 
social world that the habitus performs, while concealing it, in and 
through practice (Bourdieu, 1990b: 56). 
To ignore these sets of relationships would therefore disguise and misrepresent the 
full set of historical relationships between them, which would inevitably lead to an 
inadequate understanding of an agent’s practice, that is an inadequate understanding 
of the contextual conditions that produce practice and significantly, for the purposes 
of the present study, would also lead to a misunderstanding of the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion from institutions and fields (Bourdieu, 1987 & Bourdieu 
1990b: 56).  
 
In the context of field then, the ability to successfully take up positions is dependent 
upon the possession of specific dispositions.  However Bourdieu also argues that 
successful position taking is more broadly dependent upon the acquisition of various 
kinds of legitimate capital. These kinds of capital include socially valued dispositions 
such as particular relationships to language, time and the body, which subsequently 
becomes a form of cultural capital.  Thus Bourdieu argues that the acquisition of 
legitimate capital is an important influence on the extent to which agents can compete, 
gain and maintain positions.  The gaining and maintaining of positions itself is 
important because the hierarchy of positions is tied to a hierarchy of social recognition 
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and differential ability to appropriate further legitimate capital.  This means that the 
logic of position taking becomes the logic of recognition and the struggle for capital.  
The notion of position, then, is intrinsically tied to the conceptualisation of fields as 
fields of struggle (Adkins et al, 2006: 359; Bourdieu, 1987: 313; Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1990: 20-22; Hanks, 2005: 73 & Mahar, Harker & Wilkes, 1990: 8-14). 
 
3.4.2 Fields of Struggle 
There are two kinds of related struggles that define fields – the struggle for ‘material’ 
economic or cultural capital, including certified cultural capital, for example, 
accreditations in fields of education, and the struggle for ‘non-material’ ‘symbolic 
capital’.  This latter kind of capital involves social recognition, status and authority.  
Bourdieu theorised that symbolic capital is a form of capital assumed by economic 
and cultural capital when they are perceived and recognised as legitimate   (Mahar, 
Harker & Wilkes, 1990: 13; & Bourdieu, 1990a: 128). 
 
The relationship between practice and the struggle for the different kinds of capital is 
explained by Bourdieu using the analogy of field as a historically determined ‘game’.  
The stakes of this game are the various kinds of capital and players or agents within 
the game compete for capital through strategic moves using the ‘cards’ that they have 
at their disposal. The forms of capital represent trump cards in this game whilst the 
explicit rules of the game define the value of the playing cards (Bourdieu, 1990a: 63-
4).  A field then can be conceptualised as a space of strategic possibilities in which 
agents have potential moves and courses of action in the pursuit of capital (Hanks 
2005: 73).   
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The source of this string of strategic moves is the habitus, which in this sense 
constitutes a ‘feel for the game’, that is, an eminently practical sense – a sense for 
both the necessity and logic of the game.  The habitus as a feel for the game, produced 
in childhood by exposure to the game or social activities analogous to the game and 
therefore the objective structures within which it is played out, is in effect the game 
embodied.  Thus the habitus, as an incorporated history of the game, is what enables a 
perfect synchronisation of agent’s strategic acts with the game’s possibilities and 
objective demands.  It is this practical sense that provides a subjective sense of the 
game as a capacity for a practical anticipation of the games demands such that 
‘everything that takes place in it seems sensible: full of sense and objectively directed 
in a judicious direction’ (Bourdieu, 1990b: 66).  It is also this practical sense that 
provides an objective sense of the game via the practical mastery of the economic 
regularities of field. These regularities are the basis of ‘sensible’ practices linked 
intelligibly to the conditions of their enactment and therefore predictably towards 
producing profits (Bourdieu, 1990a: 62-63; & Bourdieu, 1990b: 66-67).     
 
Within Bourdieu’s model the notion of ‘strategy’ does not presuppose the existence of 
a transcendental idealistic subject negotiating the demands of fields through a rational 
and reflexive calculus.  As a function of the habitus, the feel for the game and the 
string of strategies that are produced share the same unconscious and non-reflexive 
characteristics and limitations of the habitus in relation to the objective conditions of 
its production. In the first instance, whilst the embodiment of the game produces 
practical knowledge of what is strategically required according to the constraints and 
demands of the game, it also simultaneously produces an unconscious non-reflexive 
relationship to that game.  The result is that players have an ‘enchanted’ relationship 
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to the game, which is a non-reflexive relationship to the necessity of the game and 
therefore their investment in the game and the presuppositions of the game, that is, its 
categorical schema of ‘visions and divisions’.  As Schirato & Webb (2003) explain, ‘I 
can know what the game or the field knows, but I cannot know what is foreclosed 
within those institutionalized points of view’ (542).   
 
Bourdieu also points out that this non-conscious investment in the game, ‘illusio’, 
which is also a non-conscious commitment to its presuppositions, ‘doxa’, are in fact 
conditions of entry and participation in the game in the absence of which the game is 
rendered meaningless.  It can also be seen that the power of this enchantment is 
significantly multiplied by the fact that players do not enter the game with a conscious 
recognition that they are engaged in an arbitrary and artificial social construct.  This is 
unlike entry into traditional games. Instead players are either born into the game or 
they are inducted into it in ways that inculcate a pre-reflexive acknowledgement, so 
that a player’s relationship of investment is the more total and unconditional by way 
of the fact that they are unaware of what it is (Bourdieu, 1981: 94-96; Bourdieu, 
1990a: 62-3; Bourdieu, 1990b: 52-77; & Schirato & Webb, 2003: 541-543). 
 
Secondly, because the ‘feel for the game’ has the same strategic limitations of the 
habitus, this subsequently precludes any sense of a truly strategic intention within 
fields, which would presuppose: (a) an omniscient ability to predict and manage an 
infinite series of possible interactions arising from the imminanent preferences, 
capacities and position taking of other agents in the field; (b) that each strategic action 
be apprehended and appreciated as one among the complete set of possible strategies; 
(c) a transcendent relationship to an agent’s relationship to time; and (d) a 
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transcendent relationship to the presenting stimuli or conditions of the field 
(Bourdieu, 1990b: 61-64). Instead, born of a set of dispositions structured by the 
objective structures of the field and tending to reproduce those conditions, the 
freedom of strategic invention is at the very least identical to the limits of the field.  
This means that even when a series of practices look as if they are teleologically 
determined, but only in hindsight, by an anticipation of the future, this only occurs to 
the extent that ‘the structures within which they function are identical to or 
homologous with the objective structures of which they are the product’ (Bourdieu, 
1990b: 61).  This presupposes that interactants in an episode of harmoniously 
unfolding interactive strategies contribute significantly to establishing the objective 
conditions for each other at each point in the interaction – objective conditions that 
are necessarily homologous to the conditions of production for each other’s habitus. 
Indeed this harmony becomes defined by the very ability of each interactant to 
successfully expect and appreciate the fulfilment of congruent objective conditions 
through the immediately forthcoming practical strategies of the other interactants.  Of 
course as Bourdieu points out this is only a ‘particular case of the possible’ (1990b: 
63).   
 
A further limitation arises when we consider that not all practical strategies in a 
universe of possible strategies are in fact possible – or even possible to imagine – for 
any given agent governed by their own schemes of appreciation and classification and 
restricted by the objective possibilities of their position.  This precludes an 
understanding of practice as a highly abstract rational calculation aimed at 
maximising profit based upon some average probability of profit available in a 
universe of theoretically possible profits.  Moreover, as Bourdieu emphasises the art 
 99 
of estimating, sensing and seizing the chance of profit and the art of imagining future 
time – in other words the relationship to time –, infers a particular disposition 
associated with particular positions in social space.  Consequently it is, as Bourdieu 
comments: 
Only in imaginary experience (in the folk tale, for example), which 
neutralizes the sense of social realities, does the social world take the 
forme of a universe of possibles equally possible for any possible 
subject.  Agents shape their aspirations according to concrete indices of 
the accessible and the inaccessible, of what is and is not ‘for us’, a 
division as fundamental and as fundamentally recognized as that 
between the sacred and the profane (1990b: 64). 
 
Finally, it also needs to be considered that stimuli in the field do not exist for practice 
in their objective truth as conventional triggers for all agents.  Rather, legitimate 
responses appropriate to the field occur only on condition that the stimulus encounters 
agents with the appropriate habitus conditioned to recognise and orient to that 
stimulus offered by the objective structures of the field.  Thus the stimulus reactivates 
an expectable, albeit flexibly adaptable, strategic response aligned with the demands 
and expectations of the field.  But it also produces a practical response that is 
historically conditioned and limited by the structures of the field.  Hence Bourdieu 
points out that nothing is simultaneously freer or more constrained than the action of 
the good player.  On the one hand the habitus as the feel for the game enables the 
‘infinite acts of the game - written into the game as possibilities and objective 
demands - to be produced.’ (Bourdieu, 1990a: 63)  On the other, the constraints of the 
game: 
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…although they are not restricted to a code of rules, impose themselves 
on those people - - and those people alone – who, because they have a 
feel for the game, a feel, that is, for the immanent necessity of the 
game, are prepared to perceive them and carry them out (Bourdieu, 
1990a: 63).   
 
Consequently the practices of agents in the field can be understood not as those of 
some kind of transcendent rationally strategic agent or even of an ‘actor’ playing a 
‘role’ but rather of someone who is ‘possessed’ by the field, who is a non-conscious 
embodiment of its objective structures – whose possession is only successful in that 
the one who submits contributes to its efficacy because they are through prior 
experience non-consciously and non-reflexively predisposed to recognise and 
misrecognise it.  Hence, as Bourdieu argues, no one can take advantage of the game, 
even those who dominate it, without also being taken up and taken in by it (Bourdieu, 
1981: 307-08; & Bourdieu, 1998: 3).   
 
Bourdieu’s analogy of the field as a game raises the question of the legitimisation and 
authorisation of positions and position taking within the game.  This points to the 
second kind of struggle endemic within fields, that is, symbolic struggle, which 
amounts to the struggle to legitimately nominate positions and ways of taking up 
those positions in the field  (Bourdieu, 1990a: 59-75).  The legitimisation of positions, 
their hierarchy and subsequently the determination of legitimate and illegitimate 
position taking is underpinned by specific schemes of classification and categories of 
perception, that is, a particular selection of meanings, a cultural arbitrary, comprising 
a hierarchy of values, which constitutes a legitimate symbolic order.  This symbolic 
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order is also a discursive order given that the schemes of classification and categories 
of perception are the words that name and construct what is reality.  Thus the 
legitimate symbolic order above all comprises a classification system for discursively 
describing, naming and judging positions and position takings within the field. More 
accurately it comprises the official point of view or official system of categorisations 
that every player has to recognise (Bourdieu, 1990a: 123-39).  
 
Bourdieu refers to the power to establish the official point of view as ‘symbolic 
power’.  Symbolic power is objectively ‘worldmaking’, that is, it represents the power 
to impose a vision of legitimate divisions that organise the perception of the world, 
and under certain circumstances actually organise the world itself, by separating and 
uniting, by ‘carrying out decomposition or analysis, and a composition or synthesis, 
often by the use of labels (1990a: 137).  Symbolic power therefore becomes 
recognisable in what Margaret Wetherall, following Foucault, refers to as nodal points 
or discursive clumps that discursively constitute legitimate relations between things 
recognised as people and objects thereby constructing the ensemble of legitimate 
positions, that is, the ensemble of authorised categorisations of persons and things 
(1998: 393). These authorised categorisations accomplish three functions.  Firstly, 
they have a diagnostic function that affirms ‘what a person or thing is and what it is 
universally, for every possible person, and thus objectively….an almost divine 
discourse that assigns to everyone an identity’ (Bourdieu, 1990a: 136).  Secondly, 
they are prescriptive and function as the administrative discourse that through 
‘directives, orders, prescriptions, etc., says what people have to do, given what they 
are’ (Bourdieu, 1990a: 136).  Thirdly, it establishes ‘what people really have done, as 
in authorized accounts such as police reports’ (Bourdieu, 1990a: 136).   
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Within fields not all individuals or groups share the same symbolic power to name or 
make judgements about legitimate values, goals, products, positions or position 
takings within fields.  Nor is the legitimate symbolic order arrived at by either a 
simple cumulative addition of all the individual orders or habitus in the field or, as 
previously discussed, through an exercise of deductive logic from some wholly non-
arbitrary universal principle.  Instead objective power relations, that is, relations of 
power based upon the unequal distribution of objective economic and cultural 
resources, tend to reproduce themselves in symbolic power relations such that the 
dominant groups in social space imposes the symbolic order within particular fields 
which best reflects their interests and products (Bourdieu, 1990a: 135).  
 
Bourdieu refers to this act of imposition of the dominant cultural arbitrary upon a 
social system of subsequently dominated cultural arbitraries as ‘symbolic violence’.  
Symbolic violence consequently has a two-fold arbitrariness – it is objectively the 
imposition of an arbitrary symbolic order by an arbitrary power.  According to 
Bourdieu symbolic violence is conditional upon the misrecognition of its two-fold 
arbitrariness such that through illusio and doxa the dominant symbolic order comes to 
be seen as ‘commonsense’ and universal. This effect is made all the more convincing 
given that a second condition of symbolic power is that the set of constructed 
symbolic relations must have some grounds in objective reality.  Symbolic violence 
has at its base a reproductive function because the imposition of the dominant 
symbolic order as the dominant symbolic order, in a system of power relations 
between classes or groups, also tends to reproduce the objective conditions that 
provide the basis of those sets of power relations   (Bourdieu, 1990a: 138; & Bourdieu 
& Passeron, 1990: 1-15).  
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Bourdieu points out that the dominant group, that is, the group that has a virtual 
monopoly of symbolic violence, is able to achieve this because they hold a de facto 
monopoly, via economic and political power, over institutions that are instruments of 
symbolic reproduction like the education system, cultural institutions and the State 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 135; & Wacquant, 1998: x).  An important symbolic function of 
this monopoly, but by no means its only function, is the subsequent power to 
officially and judicially legitimise and recognise rank and status thereby underwriting 
symbolic power by underwriting individual symbolic capital within particular fields.  
Under these circumstances symbolic capital becomes objectified as a judicially 
certified and recognised authority, for example through educational qualifications, to 
impose recognition and the symbolic order of the dominant group.  Such official 
‘nominations’ of symbolic capital subsequently release the holder from the ‘struggle 
of all against all’ whilst simultaneously releasing them from a relativity point of view 
by imposing the universally approved perspective consistent with the symbolic order 
of the dominant group or class (Bourdieu, 1990a: 135-37). 
 
Fields therefore can never be seen as entirely autonomous.  Rather fields are 
interconnected in such a way that the field of Education articulates with the economic 
field or the field of cultural production and all of these fields are embedded in what 
Bourdieu refers to as the field of power relations, which is embedded in the power 
relationships between groups or classes in social space.  This means that legitimate 
positions and position taking are never solely defined by the power relations in the 
field itself.  It also means that agents in dominant positions of authority and power 
within fields and particularly within institutions can be understood as consecrated 
representatives of the dominant group. The responsibilities of these agents include 
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authoritatively discerning the requirements of dominated positions according to the 
logic of the dominant cultural arbitrary.  Discipline within fields, however, is not 
entirely reducible to the actions of these dominant agents.  Rather, fields need to be 
seen as embedded networks of power relations laced with illusio in such a way that 
the struggle of all against all for higher positions, recognition and products, whose 
social success are objectively determined by the state of class power relations, in fact 
ensures position taking orthodoxy.  As Bourdieu comments, short of opting out of the 
game and falling into oblivion, agents must struggle to conserve or increase specific 
capital, whose value is tied to a specific symbolic order, and in so doing help to 
subject all the others to the constraints of the field   (Bourdieu, 1987: 311; Bourdieu, 
1998: 261-336; Hanks, 2005: 74 & Wacquant, 1998: xi).    
 
Yet despite the network of symbolic power that defines fields, the monopoly of 
symbolic power is never complete.  There are always struggles between symbolic 
powers for the right to name legitimate categorisations of perception and evaluation 
thereby defining the authentic account of the world.  At the base of this struggle is a 
struggle for position.  This is because a restructuring of legitimate visions and 
divisions constitutes a restructuring of the hierarchy of values and therefore the 
hierarchy of positions.  The terrain that this struggle is fought on is a discursive 
terrain.  Bourdieu identifies that this discursive struggle occurs at two levels, both of 
which appear to be tied to identity.  Firstly, it occurs at the interpersonal level such 
that agents become ceaselessly occupied with negotiations of their own and other’s 
identities in talk in interaction. Fundamentally this appears to be the moral 
categorisation talk of position making and position taking. Secondly it occurs at a 
collective, more political level where the focus is upon discourses that either attempt 
 105 
to depose or alternatively conserve the dominant discursive construction of the social 
world (Bourdieu, 1990a: 134-7).   
 
The emphasis upon language in Bourdieu’s theorising of symbolic struggle underlines 
the importance of understanding any given field not just as a game but as a particular 
language game.  Hence fields need to be understood as fields of interpersonal 
discursive struggle in which certain ends are pursued with certain discursive 
resources.  Consequently speaking and discourse production are practices that not 
only make inferable dispositions, both in their relationship to language and their 
representation of taste, but are also ways of attempting to take up positions within a 
symbolic struggle.  In this sense agents are simultaneously encountering, negotiating 
and being shaped by the dominant and legitimate discursive construction and 
authentication of those positions.  As Hanks points out, in this perspective various 
verbal functions such as reference, description, illocutionary force and indirection are 
recast as ways of taking up positions in the field (2005:73-75).  Similarly these same 
verbal functions can be recast as ways that dominant agents establish the legitimate 
requirements of dominated positions. 
 
3.5 Research Questions 
What Bourdieu’s theorising of practice provides is a way of talking about this group 
of young people’s practices and teacher-student interactions that takes into account 
the set of contextual relationships implicated in existing research.  The identified 
relationships effectively house the social problem of ‘mentally disordered’ practice 
and institutional exclusion in a way that operationalises the question of context.  In so 
doing, this systematically addresses the previously identified, yet under-
 106 
conceptualised relationships, that exist among the elements of practice, the set of 
historical cultural, gendered and class relations giving rise to particular subjectivities, 
local meaning making and features of local institutional circumstances.   
 
As a result Bourdieu’s theory of practice points our investigation of practical 
understanding in the following analytical directions: 
(i) Practice in situ needs to be understood in terms of the unfolding relationship 
between disposition and position where agents adopt position taking ‘stances’ in 
the face of problem raising situations presented by a local meeting of the 
requirements of disposition and position. 
(ii) The local requirements of dominated positions can be described and understood as 
being partly produced in interaction with agents in dominate positions.  That is, 
the requirements of dominated positions are asserted in the position taking stances 
of agents in dominate positions.  This makes sense given that the classificatory 
schema underpinning position taking relationally positions both the agent and 
others relative to that classificatory schema and the requirements of position.  This 
in turn points to an analytically useful distinction for dissecting interactions 
between ‘position taking’ and ‘position making’. In this regard ‘position making’ 
is the provision of positions for the interactional other inherent in ‘position 
taking’.   
(iii) An implication of Bourdieu’s theorising is that in situ knowledge construction 
and application or practical understanding is referenced by the classificatory 
judgements that come into play in local position making and position taking in the 
field.   
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(iv) A description and understanding of practice in situ needs to be sensitive to power 
relations in the field. 
(v) The limits to reflexive knowledge construction and application imposed by 
institutional context operate through the contingent relationships between the 
requirements of institutional positions in the field and teacher dispositions within 
the unfolding dynamics of teacher-student interaction. 
(vi) Language is a privileged site of investigation of practices in situ, given that 
position taking and position making in fields are underpinned by symbolic 
linguistic practices and symbolic struggle.  
 
The systematic conceptualisation of practice also now allows a reframing of the key 
research questions in terms of the following social scientific questions:  
(i) What are the conditional limits to local reflexive understanding of the 
relationships between young people and teacher dispositions, positions, 
position making and position taking practices, imposed by the relationship 
between the requirements of the teacher’s disposition and the institutional 
requirements of teacher position at the level of interaction?  
(ii) What language-based knowledge construction and application practices are 
associated with these conditions that pose obstacles to reflexive understanding 
of these relationships at the level of interaction?  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
By identifying the key mechanisms of disposition and position in social space and the 
contextual conditions of their activation in the field Bourdieu’s theorising of practice 
provides a systematic means to describe and understand the relationship between 
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practice and context in any given setting.  This in turn allows for a construction of the 
object of inquiry as: (i) the institutional limits to reflexive knowledge construction and 
application arising from the contingent conditional relationships between teacher 
positions and dispositions within the set of interactional relations.  These interactional 
relations are the relations between teacher’s and student’s dispositions, positions, 
position taking and position making; and (ii) the nature of knowledge construction 
and application practices associated with these institutional conditions that place 
limits upon a reflexive understanding of these interactional relations.  In short, the 
institutional conditions and practices at the level of the interaction order that limit the 
possibility of reflexive understanding associated with inclusive teacher-student 
relationships.  
 
Nevertheless this theoretical account remains highly abstract and merely suggests 
theoretical sets of relations that may come into play in any given situation.  Moreover, 
Bourdieu’s theorising of practice does not directly refer to an understanding of 
practices at the level of interaction. What is now required is an examination of a 
concrete situation of interaction associated with ‘disordered’ practice.  This will allow 
for a conceptualisation of the institutional limits to, and possibility of, reflexive 
knowledge construction and application associated with practical understanding in 
terms of the actual sets of dynamic in situ relations. The next chapter will describe a 
research framework and methodological approach suited to this aim.   
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified the conceptual relationships of disposition and 
position that need to be focused on in investigating the limits to, and possibility of, 
practical understanding in the contexts in which ‘disordered’ behaviour is at issue.  
While Bourdieu’s theorising of dispositions and positions is useful in abstractly 
identifying the mechanisms and conditions that may occur in the production of 
practice, it does not provide the specific methodological instruments to dissect the 
operations of those mechanisms and conditions in actual settings of practice. Nor does 
it provide the methodological tools to analyse local linguistic knowledge construction 
and application practices.  The following chapter outlines an approach and research 
design suited to capturing these relationships in an incident of ‘mentally disordered’ 
practice in the classroom.   
 
In order to  contribute to a conceptualisation of the limits to, and possibility of, 
practical understanding at the practical level of the interaction order, the current 
inquiry aims to conduct an intensive examination of a case of teacher-student 
relationship breakdown, associated with a diagnosis of ‘mental disorder’, that led to 
school exclusion.  This represents a ‘critical’ case study that was selected to bring to 
sharp relief the set of institutional relations necessary for a reflexive understanding 
that is central to current thinking addressing the issue of mental disorder in school 
settings. These sets of relations will be analytically exposed by examining the 
unfolding interactional dynamics between teacher and student dispositions, positions, 
position taking and position making as the teacher-student relationship and, 
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presumably understanding, collapses.  This research strategy is premised on the 
assumption that if understanding underpins good teacher-student relationships then a 
breakdown in the relationship should expose the pertinent sets of contingent practices 
and relations that produce a, presumably concurrent, break down in understanding.  
This, in turn, should point to necessary features of, and conditions for, knowledge 
construction practices associated with inclusive relationships.   
 
This chapter will argue that the methodologies associated with Goffman’s Interaction 
Order provide an epistemologically rigorous analytical framework suited to the study 
of these objects, which will allow for a close examination of the contingencies and 
language based practices involved in the interactional breakdown.  The chapter will, 
therefore, begin with an account of the Interaction Order, which will be followed by a 
discussion of its suitability to the object of inquiry, before identifying the research 
approach to data selection, collection and analysis.   
 
4.2 The Interaction Order Sui Generis: The Contribution of Goffman, Garfinkel 
and Sacks 
The Interaction Order perspective has been outlined by Rawls (1987 & 1989), who 
synthesised the common theoretical and methodological insights of Goffman, 
Garfinkel and Sacks.  The Interaction Order takes its name from the work of Erving 
Goffman (1964), who argued that there was a scientific neglect of social context that 
failed to recognise that social episodes have a structure of their own.  Goffman (1983) 
went on to argue that there exists a specific local, or ‘face-to-face’, level of social 
ordering, tying practices to context, which is not reducible to either subjective 
mentalities or structural institutional constraints.  Instead, this social ordering has its 
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own constraints, generated at the level of situational interaction (Goffman, 1983: 7-
16).  For Goffman, this amounted to a warrant for a discrete focus of social 
investigation on this domain of social ordering as a unit of analysis in its own right 
(1981: 131).  
 
As Rawls (1987) explains, Goffman’s research of the interaction order has four 
aspects: 
(i) The social self needs to be continually achieved in, and through, interaction. 
Therefore the presentational nature of self places constraints on interaction order 
practices, providing an intrinsic motivation for compliance, where the constraints 
themselves originate neither in the structural order or the individual.  Instead, the 
source of constraint arises from a commitment to a set of shared cognitive 
normative presuppositions and self-sustained restraints.  These amount to enabling 
conventions, or 'involvement obligations' of interaction, necessitated by the 
requirements of self and sociality (Goffman 1983: 5).  The interaction order is, in 
fact, orderly only to the extent that participants meet this large base of assumed 
shared expectations with respect to ‘involvement obligations’. This amounts to a 
set of constraints on practice arising from a shared acceptance of the basic 
structural features necessary for interaction that precedes individual action but 
which stands in an autonomous relationship to the second source of social 
constraints discoverable in institutional or structural constraints.      
(ii) These constraints may also defy and resist the demands of social structure. The 
obligations imposed by the interaction order can cut across the constraints 
engendered by class, roles and formal institutional structures.  
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(iii) Interaction is conceived as a production order wherein a commitment to that order 
generates meaning such that actions do not acquire their meaning primarily 
through a relation to external institutional goals but through a commitment to the 
internal ends of the interaction order.  Meaning then becomes a constitutive 
production in, and through, interactional participant performance.   
(iv) The interaction order is fundamentally a moral order, where a normatively moral 
commitment to the working consensus for its own sake is one of the ground rules 
for interaction. 
 
These principles gave rise to two other important findings.  Firstly, the interaction 
order is vulnerable to collapse following any rupture of the working consensus 
(Goffman, 1971). Secondly, that the distinctive regulations, processes and structures 
of the interaction order are often expressed through a linguistic medium, thus making 
the study of turns of talking and things said during a turn a critical area of study in the 
interaction order (Goffman, 1964: 136).   
 
Rawls (1987: 148; & 1989: 151-159), however, points out that Goffman did not 
produce a systematic theory of language consistent with the theorising of the 
interaction order as having only a ‘loose coupling’ to macro structural or social 
institutional orders.  Rawls (1987) also argues that this theoretical gap, along with the 
need to fully articulate a theory of constraint (formal rules, etc), presents a significant 
obstacle to Goffman’s ability to develop a highly systematic theory of the practices of 
interaction order (156-159).  It is for this reason that the works of Harold Garfinkel, in 
ethnomethodology, and Harvey Sacks, in conversation analysis, are incorporated in 
Rawls’ account of the interaction order methodological perspective.   
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Like Goffman, both Garfinkel and Sacks developed social analyses of the relationship 
between practice and context that departed from attempts to understand practices in 
terms of either individual motivations and mentalities or the constraints of social 
structure (Adkins & Nasarczyk, 2008: 119).  However, whereas Goffman conceived 
the interaction order based primarily on constraints imposed by the needs of social 
selves, whilst neglecting the relationship between linguistic meaning and institutional 
order, Garfinkel and Sacks introduce the idea that intelligibility and meaning, as an 
interactional achievement, also imposes constraints on the interaction order.  Thus, 
unlike Goffman, Garfinkel and Sacks identified that the local production order was 
based on the constitutive achievement of intelligibility, or intersubjective meaning, 
rather than more abstractly on the interactional achievement of the self. In this way, 
Garfinkel and Sacks were able to provide the missing, systematically pragmatic 
approach to grasping the construction of constitutive order and inter-subjective 
meaning within situational episodes (Rawls, 1989: 151-2). 
 
Garfinkel’s broad theoretical project was aimed at revealing the accountable, 
intersubjective nature of social action by understanding the way that social action is 
designed, with reference to how it will be recognised, mutually understood and 
described (Heritage, 1984: 144).  The key theoretical contribution of Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology to the interaction order centres on his notions of ‘reflexive 
accountability’ and ‘indexicality’.  Garfinkel demonstrated that there existed a 
powerful moral order at the level of everyday interaction where participants, or 
‘members’, held each other accountable for attending to local orderliness and 
coherence in settings in practice.  A part of this moral order involved the participant's 
attendance to intersubjectivity, where members are required to monitor interaction for 
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the purposes of displaying and ensuring shared understanding.  Thus, participation in 
interaction morally obliges participants to perform the ongoing work of interpretation 
and displays of that interpretation.  This occurs against a set of background 
expectations of conduct that participants reference, manipulate, renew and/or 
situationally alter the sense of conduct appropriate to the setting.  Participants in local 
interaction are therefore understood as constantly renewing the orderliness of 
interaction, and in so doing are renewing the specific context that informed their 
practices and the intelligibility of their practices.  Therefore, practices are seen as 
being ‘reflexively’ related to contexts because they reproduce the context to which 
members then refer in the production of further practices (Adkins, 1997: 60-61 & 
Adkins & Grant, 2007: 7).  Notice that this conceptual reference to an interactional 
reflexivity should not be confused with Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of an 
epistemological reflexivity.   
 
This relationship of reflexive accountability between practices and contexts stands in 
stark contradistinction to cognitive and/or structural theories of action.  These tend to 
position social interactants as what Garfinkel referred to as ‘judgemental dopes’ 
mechanically responding to external social forces or driven by inner moral directives.  
Instead, Garfinkel demonstrated that actors dynamically produced social order 
through contingent, reflexive and ongoing interpretative work (Gubrium & Holstein, 
1997: 40).  This helps to explain Garfinkel’s primary advice to treat social facts as 
interactional accomplishments given the understanding that the orderly features of 
interaction are self-organising.  In other words, social situations and contexts are not 
‘out there’ and independent of members but are interactionally produced, that is, the 
orderliness is a practical accomplishment of participants (Cuff et al, 1994: 158).  
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The second key contribution provided by ethnomethodology was the observation that 
indexicality is a fundamental feature of social activity.  Garfinkel was able to show 
that not only language but social activity in general gained its precise intersubjective 
intelligibility from its use within a local context and from the order of events (Adkins 
1997: 60 & Adkins & Grant, 2007: 7).  As Adkins and Grant (2007) note, this 
postulate subsequently draws attention to the way in which interactive practices are 
based on an ongoing common sense of the local setting, and the gist of interaction 
occurring in it (8).  
 
These two key postulates are fundamental to Sacks’ contribution to the theorisation of 
the interaction order in conversation analysis.  For Sacks, conversation provided the 
fine-grained analysis of the way in which reflexive accountability and indexicality are 
achieved in settings of practice to make social action and interaction, mutual sense-
making and context construction possible (Heritage 1997: 161-3).  In other words, 
Sacks showed that a framework of interactional intelligibility binding context to 
practice was discoverable in language-in-use.  The two primary and related areas of 
interest for Sacks in describing this ‘machinery’ of intelligibility was the ‘sequential 
architecture of intersubjectivity’ discoverable in conversational turn-taking and the 
‘inference making machine’ of conversational descriptions (Heritage, 1997: 163 & 
Sacks, 1995, V1: 113-25).  
 
Central to the relationship between conversational practices and intelligibility was the 
identification of a sequentially organised turn-taking system involving a set of 
conversational conventions oriented to normative expectations in talk that formed a 
‘sequential architecture of intersubjectivity’ (Adkins & Grant, 2007: 8 & Sacks, 
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Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974).  For Sacks, utterances in conversation are sequence 
relevant and it is that which provides for the construction of context and, therefore, 
intersubjective sense-making within context (Rawls, 1989: 161).  As Sacks 
demonstrated, conversation is designed so that the next thing said can only be 
understood in the context of what went before, so that the taking of a turn requires 
attendance to, and an understanding of, prior utterances in sequence.  This ensures 
that the ongoing talk is shaped locally by context.  Furthermore, in producing a 
current speech action, participants commonly require that a normatively specific next 
speech action be done by a subsequent participant.  For example, questions are 
normatively followed by answers, certain preferences exist for displaying 
understanding immediately and displays of understanding are normatively required in 
response to talk that has preceded it. Thus the current talk maintains or renews the 
context for the next person’s talk, and by producing the next normatively expected 
speech action participants show an understanding of the prior speech action (Heritage 
1997: 162-3).  In addition, Sacks was able to show that participants maximised the use 
of indexical lexical terms such as the use of ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, or ‘that’ that created 
ambiguity unless interpreted within a sequential context (Rawls, 1989: 161).   
 
The sequential architecture of intersubjectivity therefore provides the means to 
establish and verify a display of mutual understanding.  As Adkins notes, the 
requirement on participants to sustain this understanding imposes a moral order on 
talk, where participants are morally accountable for maintaining an order of turn-
taking and a preference system which displays a commitment to conversation (1997: 
63).  Consequently as Rawls (1989) explains, conversational constraints are inherently 
interactional and organised with respect to the needs of conversation rather than the 
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needs of grammar, truth criteria or institutional order. This means that in the first 
instance the ordering of conversation is not oriented to reproducing institutional order 
but toward the need for mutual commitment, listening, hearing and so on, which in 
fact may neutralise institutional considerations (161).  
 
Further to his investigation of the relationship between institutional and interactional 
order, Sacks was also able to demonstrate that while the relevancies of structure and 
institutions, including status and role, entered conversations in accountable ways, not 
all meaning in conversation can be reduced to, or related to, institutional or structural 
relevance.  In making the distinction between the sequential order of relevancies and 
the relevancies tied to motive or institutional order, Sacks was able to show that: (a) 
both sequential and institutional relevancies occurred in conversations; (b) sequential 
relevancies provided the constitutive level of meaning; and (c) institutional 
relevancies, which operate at the level of accounts, could only work if meaning was 
first achieved at the constitutive level (Rawls, 1989: 169).   
 
 
In addition to the ‘sequential architecture of intersubjectivity’ Sacks also 
demonstrated that mutual intelligibility was achieved through what he called the 
‘inference making machine’ of membership categorisation (1995, V1: 113-125).  This 
aspect of Sacks’ work centred on the ways in which descriptions index meanings and 
experiences that are shared with other members of the same society or culture through 
the lexical selection of categories (Adkins & Grant, 2007: 9 & Sacks, 1995, V1: 116).    
 
Sacks demonstrated that the primary apparatus of the inference making machine were 
‘membership categorisation devices’ (MCDs). For Sacks, MCDs constitute the 
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apparatus for generating the categories used in descriptions, thereby providing an 
efficient solution to the ‘practical translation problem’ in interaction.  That is, the 
problem presented to a hearer of understanding a speaker’s account as well as 
understanding its illocutionary force (Jayyusi, 1984: 86-89 & Schegloff, 2007: 467). 
Sacks defined MCDs as follows: 
By this term I shall intend: any collection of membership categories, 
containing at least one category, which may be applied to some 
population containing at least one member, so as to provide, by the use 
of some rules of application, for the pairing of at least a population 
member and a categorisation device member.  A device is then a 
collection plus rules of application (1974: 218). 
 
Thus MCDs represent collections of ‘categories-that-go-together’, for example ‘baby’ 
and ‘mommy’, which can be heard to be in the collection ‘family’, plus their rules of 
application (Sacks, 1995, V1: 238).  The ‘rules’ (which include corollaries to rules) 
that Sacks refers to here consist of situated constraints on using, hearing and viewing 
category descriptions and activities.  For example, the economy rule provides for the 
sufficiency of using a single membership category to describe a person, while the 
consistency rule holds that: 
…if a Member is categorizing some population of persons – then if 
they’ve used one category from some collection for the first person 
they’re going to categorize, they may – it is legitimate, permissible – to 
categorize the rest of the population by the use of the same or other 
categories of the same collection (Sacks, 1995, V1: 239) 
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As Sacks demonstrated, both compliance and departures from these rules in 
conversation have consequential relevance in the production and intelligibility of 
meaning.   
 
MCDs produce orderly meaning, largely because of the way in which they 
methodically organise relationships between categories based on their normatively 
expected attributes.  Sacks explained this relationship using the term ‘category bound 
activities’, which references the way in which particular activities are heard, seen or 
done as expected by members of particular categories within particular MCDs.  For 
instance, in a now iconic example, Sacks demonstrated how ‘crying’ is a category 
bound activity for ‘baby’ within the MCD ‘family’. Subsequent researchers have 
extended the theorising by observing that ‘activities’ are just one kind of predicate 
tied to categories.  Other predicates include rights, entitlements, obligations, 
knowledge, attributes and competencies (Hester & Eglin, 1997a: 5).  The point that 
Sacks is making here is that: (a) the intelligibility of accounts is largely dependent on 
the activation of a stock or cluster of predicate knowledge through the speaker’s 
ability to invoke either a category or a category bound predicate that subsequently 
invoked the category; and (b) the kinds of category members and predicate knowledge 
activated are contingent on the device made relevant in the talk.  This is because the 
same category can belong to different devices with different normatively expectable 
predicates, while the same person can belong to different occasioned categories by 
making relevant different MCDs, even within the same setting (Schegloff, 2007: 468).  
Thus the relationship between a category and category activity is seen to be device 
sensitive and occasioned, and that membership of a MCD is seen as a constituent 
feature of their meaning (Hester & Eglin, 1997b: 46; & Hester & Eglin, 1997a: 9). 
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MCDs, therefore, provide a commonly held framework for grasping the intended 
substance of a description, including both its sense and what it references.  This 
addresses the first part of the practical translation problem pertaining to descriptions.  
However, Sacks’ investigation of MCDs revealed that they also provided a set of 
procedures to address the second part – understanding the intended illocutionary force 
of a description, that is, understanding what the speaker is doing by describing 
something in that way.  This argument has a number of steps.  First, Sacks argued that 
since anyone in any culture can be categorised by more than one category from more 
than one device, then being a category is in itself an insufficient warrant for its use.  
This means that descriptions inherently involve the problem of category selection and, 
therefore, categorisation is not only descriptive but is also a thoroughly ascriptive 
matter (Jayyusi, 1984: 26-7; & Schegloff, 2007: 468 & 474).  Second, Sacks (1995) 
was able to demonstrate that these ascriptions were contingent on the situated 
relevancies of the speaker (V1: 113-125).  In other words, the task at hand provides 
for relevance of category selection, and it is in terms of this task that this feature is 
selected, providing it with its illocutionary force (Jayyusi, 1984: 26-7).  Third, the 
principle of reflexive accountability draws attention to the way in which these 
selections are recipient designed and displayed and accountable to other participants.  
Sack showed that whatever description was selected as usable and intelligible in 
particular situations was embedded in an appraisal of relevance, task at hand, recipient 
categorisation, and so on.  Thus the description is co-fitted to that appraisal and is 
taken to be produced in this way by the co-participants (Jayyusi, 1984: 240; & 
Silverman, 1998: 89).  This means that hearers appreciate that descriptions are doing 
something apart from describing a situation and that what they are doing is inferable 
from the category ascriptions.  Fourth, the selection or absence of categories and/or 
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predicates within local settings makes inferable and provides the procedures for 
deciphering what the description amounts to.  For example, ‘complaints’ are inferable 
from the warrant provided by breaches to expectable category rights and obligations, 
justifications are inferable from the warrant provided by category dilemmas, and 
contested rights and obligations and invitations are made inferable by categorisations 
that reference shared membership of speakers and hearers.   
 
Apart from the attention to the way in which the need for intelligibility produces its 
own constraints on the interaction order, Sacks’ treatment of descriptions parallels his 
treatment of the ‘sequential architecture of intersubjectivity’ in a number of other 
ways.  Firstly, the interactional order produced through MCDs is not reducible to 
either subjective mentalities or institutional constraints.  Instead, the constraints 
arising from the MCD rules of application and the commonsense store of knowledge 
of categories are directly aimed at the accomplishment of intelligibility at the level of 
the interaction order itself.  What is emphasised by Sacks is that MCDs are (a) 
indexical expressions whose sense is situated, contingent and contextually embedded 
in the ongoing talk; and (b) an analytical resource that members use in the ongoing 
accomplishment of practical actions and practical reasoning (Hester & Eglin, 1997a: 
11-12).  Hence, categorisation is not simply expressive of interior identities or of 
abstracted cognitive or linguistic models of representation - members are not 
judgemental dopes.  Instead categorisation is also social action, where categorisation 
talk is a practice designed to address locally situated tasks at hand while referencing 
an underlying linguistic and cognitive structure for local purposes rather than just 
mechanically realising that structure (Edwards, 1991: 523-7).  Similarly, situations do 
not ‘trigger’ category descriptions. More accurately, members assemble the social 
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world and pragmatically make relevant category features to produce identities, 
situations and institutions (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998: 2-3; Baker, 1997: 132: 
Edwards, 1991: 516-18; Edwards, 1998: 18; & Hester & Eglin 1997a: 21-22).  As 
Baker (1997) explains: 
…when speakers ‘do describing’, they assemble a social world in 
which their categories have a central place. These categories are in a 
sense the speakers’ ‘puppets’, which they can dress up in different ways 
and make behave in various ways (category-associated activities).  
These are powerful statements about what could be the case, how the 
social order might be arranged, whether or not it really is (143). 
 
This first point is related to the second, that is, while MCDs are clearly substantively 
deployed in practice to build members’ accounts, the MCD apparatus itself, like the 
sequential architecture of intersubjectivity, is aimed at the constitutive level of 
intersubjective meaning.  The MCD apparatus is a member’s method of ordering 
meaning to deliver accounts through description, but these accounts themselves are 
firstly contingent on the categorisation apparatus for intelligibility.  
 
Thirdly, similar to Sack’s treatment of sequences, the MCD apparatus is embedded in 
a moral order.  However, unlike the intrinsic moral ordering associated with the 
constraints of the turn-taking system and its preferences, the moral ordering of the 
MCD apparatus can be said to be largely, although not exclusively, extrinsic, and tied 
to the cultural stock of knowledge that it references.  This ‘cultural’ stock of 
knowledge constitutes a cultural classificatory scheme that is infused with a normative 
and moral logic based on evaluative standards.  This normative and moral logic is 
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referenced via the moral organisation of categorisation talk specifically through 
category tied rights and obligations, which serve as the moral loci for various 
inferences and imputations (Jayyusi, 1984: 209; & Watson, 1997b: 67).   
 
In addition, categorisations simultaneously display the speaker as both morally 
positioned and morally accountable for the interactional consequences of any 
description provided (Edwards, 1991: 523; Jayyusi, 1984: 209; & Roulston, 2001b: 
103).  In which case, descriptions provided by speakers, and the inferences available, 
are as much about the evaluative and moral position taking of the speaker and their 
relevancies as they are about the description of some proposed ‘real’ account, which 
now amounts, at least partially, to a moral rhetoric aimed at the local task at hand.   
 
Sacks’ contribution to the interaction order framework can be summarised as 
providing a highly systematic and nuanced approach to the construction of mutual 
intelligibility through language-in-use, grounded in the situational relevancies of 
participants at the level of the interaction order.  The significance of Sacks’ 
contribution, sitting alongside of Goffman and Garfinkel’s theorising of the 
interaction order, is easily recognised when we consider that conversation is the social 
base for the production and intelligibility of all social episodes.  Having described the 
methodological approach of the interaction order, we can now turn our attention to a 
substantiation of the linkages between the object of inquiry and this approach. 
 
4.3 Suitability of the Interaction Order Methodology  
The primary criterion for methodology selection is its suitability to a study of the 
dynamic unfolding relationship between teacher knowledge construction and 
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application practices and the meeting of dispositions and positions in the production 
of an interactional breakdown associated with ‘mental disorder’.  The problem that a 
methodology framework is required to solve is how to systematically grasp the way in 
which these relationships unfold in actual contexts of practice.  This section will argue 
that the interaction order methodological framework outlined above is ideally suited 
to this purpose on the following grounds: (i) the interaction order approach is 
homologous to Bourdieu’s model of constructivist structuralism; (ii) the interaction 
order approach provides a fine grained analysis of knowledge construction and 
application practices, dispositions and positions; (iii) the interaction order approach 
provides the epistemologically reflexive tools to objectify the objectifying 
relationship.   
 
4.3.1 Homologous Relationship to Constructivist Structuralism 
The above theorisation of practice by Goffman, Garfinkel and Sacks as being neither 
a simple product of subjective nor structural-objective constraints displays some 
consistencies with Bourdieu’s theorising of constructive structuralism in the 
application of habitus within fields.  As Adkins (1997) points out, in terms of practice 
within institutional settings, for both Garfinkel and Sacks the normative ordering of 
institutions are understood as being reflexively constituted in institutional practice by 
members where both local interactional and institutional orders are invoked and 
deployed as resources (59).  This is, at the very least, congruent with Bourdieu’s 
dialectic theorising of the meeting of two histories, where habitus is a strategy 
generating principle applied to specific institutional positions and structures, or 
orders, in the field whose application serves to reflexively reproduce that institutional 
structure.  Hence, for both Bourdieu and the theorists of the interaction order, 
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institutional practices and structures are the product of a practical reasoning by 
members or agents that engages with local and structural orders to reflexively 
reproduce those local and structural orderings.  This amounts to an affinity between 
the constructivist side of Bourdieu’s conceptual scheme and the substantiative focus 
of Goffman, Garfinkel and Sacks on the interaction order and the constraints of 
sociality (Adkins, 1997: 65).    
 
There is also a second area of congruence that is particularly consequential to a study 
of an interactional breakdown, in particular a study oriented to the relationships 
between linguistic practices and power and practical relations. Both Bourdieu and the 
interaction order theorists, as part of a linguistic turn in social sciences, have rejected 
the dichotomy between language and activity and language and social structures.  This 
shared repositioning of language and practice opens up the practical possibility of 
interrogating the detail of how it is that agents’ language-in-use, categorised 
descriptions, classificatory schemes, practices, social relations and power relations are 
deeply intertwined (Jayyusi, 1991: 233).  
 
Both of these homologous relationships converge upon a highly practical third 
homologous relationship.  This is the homology between Bourdieu’s theorisation of 
habitus, as generating applied classificatory schema, and Sack’s theorisation of 
MCDs, as making inferable an occasioned and indexical classificatory moral order.  
For Interaction Order theorists there is the sense of categorisation talk as: (a) 
performing moral work on the world indexical to the current interaction and the 
participants; and (b) comprising an in situ achievement of members’ practical actions 
and practical reasoning that amounts to ‘culture-in-action’.  This strongly resonates 
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with Bourdieu’s dialectic principle of habitus as emerging specifically in the 
interaction between individuals, and the field and as having no independent existence 
apart from this interaction.  It is precisely because of these homologous qualities that 
the interaction order framework provides the intensive analytic resources necessary to 
study that interaction in the concrete dynamic details of linguistic practice itself 
(Edwards, 1991: 518; Hanks, 2005: 72; Hester & Eglin, 1997b: 21-22; & Jayyusi, 
1984: 198-209).    
 
While there are strong homologies between these two sets of theorising of practice, 
there are also obvious distinctive differences.  However, these differences tend to 
contribute to the study of the breakdown associated with ‘disordered practice’ in situ 
rather than detract from it.  In this sense, a key distinction between Bourdieu’s 
conceptual scheme and the theorists of the interaction order is that the latter, in 
focusing on the local interactional order sui generis, introduce the understanding that 
objective ‘structural’ constraints are not limited to broad social relationships, such as 
gender or class or institutional positions.  The interaction order theorists argue that 
structures also include structures at the local level of the interaction order itself and 
that these local structures are constitutive of intersubjective meaning in practice, 
including linguistic practices.  The implication is that if we are to study the logic of 
interactional practices in situ, and particularly of linguistic practices, then we need to 
grasp the way in which interactional, as well as structural, orders are constitutive of 
linguistic practices and meaning.  The interaction order framework, therefore, 
provides the means of systematically studying conditions related to these local 
interactional structures at the level of interactional linguistic practice, which may 
influence the production of ‘disordered practice’ and interactional breakdown.  This 
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would seem to be particularly pertinent in developing an understanding of the doing 
or undoing of local ‘relationships’ in the interactional breakdown. 
 
4.3.2 A Fine Grained Analysis  
It is because the theorisation of the interaction order explicates conditions at the level 
of interactional linguistic practice that a fine grained analysis of the unfolding 
practical relationships between linguistic knowledge construction and application 
practices, disposition, position and position taking is made possible.  This is because 
the explication of linguistic practices and methods at the level of interactional order 
allows for an intensive scrutiny of not just of what dispositions and positions are 
inferably made relevant, and what stances are made relevant by interactional 
participants, but how these positions and position takings are talked into being in their 
accounts. It is this latter feature that allows for a clinical dissection of knowledge 
construction and application practices in relation to interactional position taking and 
position making. This is all made possible by the focus on practical reasoning and 
practical action and the explication of how speech actions and their settings are 
reflexively self-organised and made accountably visible within interaction. In short, 
without the linguistic/symbolic tools provided by Sacks’ conversational analysis (CA) 
and membership categorisation analysis (MCA) such an enterprise would be 
practically unthinkable.   
 
Analytically, the enterprise is made possible because of the homologies between the 
interaction order theorisation of MCDs and Bourdieu’s theorisation of habitus in 
terms of classificatory schema.  These homologies provide the framework for 
identifying the relevancies of disposition and position.  This works in the following 
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way.  First, the use of categories and category predicates and the relationships 
between them within MCDs make inferable a moral reasoning.  Thus MCDs comprise 
both classifications and moral reasoning, tying those classifications together. 
Consequently, MCDs in use represent both classifications and evaluative principles.  
MCDs in use are, therefore, homologous with Bourdieu’s classificatory schema, 
comprising taste, or the evaluative principles of habitus.  Accordingly, categories in 
use can be understood as classificatory judgements.  This means that the system of 
classificatory schemas can be identified from an analysis of categories in use through 
an analysis of MCDs – in terms of the categorisations and the moral reasoning made 
inferable by those categorisations.  The identification of classificatory schema in 
representations of practice in turn makes inferable dispositions that comprise the 
habitus as a system of schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action.  
 
Similarly, the interaction order framework precisely allows access to the relevancies 
of positions as they are dynamically and situationally made available in the field.  
This is a two part argument.  The first part focuses on the way that investigations at 
the level of the interaction order are concerned with how participants in a local setting 
invoke, visibly produce and make a structure accountably consequential to the social 
interaction (Widdicombe, 1998: 196).  This work is guided by Garfinkel’s observation 
that institutional contexts may be visibly created and realised in local sequences of 
talk outside of their usual formal locations, not be created within them.  This suggests 
that it is within these local sequences of talk that institutional structures, including 
positions, are talked into being.  As Garfinkel argues, given that any social setting is 
self-organising, to make its activities accountable, such institutional contexts are 
created as visible states of affairs on a turn-by-turn basis. It is, ultimately, through 
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such means that 'institutions' exist as accountable organisations of social actions 
(Garfinkel in Heritage, 1984: 290).   
 
The second part takes up Davies and Harre’s (1999) argument that a constitutive force 
of discursive practice lies in its provision of subject positions, where subject positions 
are understood as encompassing a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons 
within the structure of rights and obligations for those that use the repertoire (35-36).  
In other words, position making is visibly displayed in the categorisation talk, and 
particularly within an agent’s predicate talk. Given that, as previously identified, 
dominant agents in a field can be seen to be responsible for the monitoring of 
dominated positions, it logically follows that the institutional requirements of 
dominated positions in the field are visibly and accountably displayed in the fine 
detail of the categorisation talk of dominant agents.  Consequently, there is no need to 
defer to extra-textual analysis as all the grounded in situ relevancies of institutional 
position are inferable in the descriptions and accounts of dominant agents. Similarly, 
the orientation and position taking by dominated agents to the positions available is 
discoverable in the classificatory judgements of dominated agents as they reflexively 
position themselves in the talk.  
 
Collectively this means that membership categorisation analysis coupled with 
sequential analysis exposes the underlying habitus at the identical moment that it 
exposes the application of habitus to position. This marks a distinct advantage of the 
interaction order approach because it converts the relevancies of positions and 
position making and, subsequently, of position taking into an analysis, which is 
grounded in details of agents’ talk in the field.  Hence this analysis provides a detailed 
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explication rather than merely a sense of how the application of habitus to position in 
the field works.  In addition, it is because this analysis is grounded in the fine detail of 
agents’ linguistic practices that allows for a close-up study of the linguistic knowledge 
construction and application practices made relevant in the teacher’s talk. This is 
because these practices are visibly and accountably displayed in the intersubjective 
machinery of the teacher’s position making and position taking talk. In this sense 
knowledge construction and application and practical understanding can be read off 
against the classificatory judgements about the young person made inferable by the 
teacher’s sequentially organised MCDs in use.  How this is talked into being makes 
visible the knowledge construction and application practices.   
 
So, rather than provide ‘external’ abstracted accounts of agent’s conduct, beliefs and 
judgements, a study at the level of the interaction order, employing the analytical tools 
of conversation analysis and membership categorisation analysis, allows for a detailed 
investigation of the way that the relevancies of classificatory schemes, classificatory 
judgements and institutional positions are actually organised, constructed and made 
intelligible in the agent’s own accounts and descriptions.   
 
4.3.3 Objectifying the Objectifying Relationship 
The principle within the principle of objectifying the objectifying relationship is the 
scientific struggle with non-consciousness (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 
1991: 16).  It is this principle that both informs and explains the contribution of the 
interaction order framework and, particularly of conversation and membership 
categorisation analysis, to the science of describing and understanding the object of 
inquiry. 
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To apprehend that contribution we need to appreciate that ‘objectifying the 
objectifying relationship’ has two methodological aspects.  The first refers to the 
epistemological effects that methods have on the object while the second refers to 
objectifying the objectivity that ‘runs through the supposed site of subjectivity’, 
including, most significantly, the research practitioner’s subjectivity (Bourdieu, 
1990b: 21; & Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991: 11 & 39).  The interaction 
order framework speaks to both aspects, but perhaps more explicitly and directly to 
the latter.  
 
4.3.3.1 Objectifying the Site of Subjectivity 
In terms of the latter, Bourdieu argues for a methodological approach that 
incorporates an epistemologically reflexive disposition, ‘a conscious comprehension’, 
which he defines as a systematic exploration of the 'unthought categories of thought 
which delimit the thinkable and predetermine thought' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 
40; & Schirato & Webb, 2003: 544).  Hence the call to reflexively interrogate the 
supposed site of subjectivity – supposed only on the non-conscious misapprehension 
of the dialectic construction of the habitus – represents the epistemological 
requirement to reflexively examine the researcher’s own point of view and practice.  
This includes the practice of knowledge construction, determined by their own habitus 
within particular fields, most frequently the academic and scientific fields (Bourdieu, 
1990b: 20-21; & Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991).  For Bourdieu, then, 
reflexivity represents a disillusioning stance in relation to the illusio and doxa of the 
field.  This stance reflects on the limitations of habitus on knowledge arising from: (a) 
objective conditions and trajectories in social space; (b) our position in whatever field 
we are located; and (c) the ‘scholastic point of view’, that is, an intellectual bias 
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marked by its tendency to abstract practices from their contexts and see them as ideas 
to be contemplated rather than problems to be addressed (Schirato & Webb, 2003). 
What this reflexive examination of the habitus amounts to is an examination of the 
product of these limitations, those very ‘unthought categories of thought’ within local 
contexts of practice.  As Bourdieu describes elsewhere, these are ‘the social categories 
of thought, perception and appreciation, which are the unthought principle of all 
representations of the 'objective' world’ (1990b: 21).   
 
By raising these categories to awareness, Bourdieu argues that a self-appropriation is 
possible in the research inquiry that guards against the imposition of prenotional 
codes in deciphering the practices of social subjects.  These are the codes that have 
been constituted via the trajectories and objective conditions of the researcher, that is, 
the cultural schemes of classification characteristic of the researcher’s own class and 
group in social space.  This ultimately means, as Bourdieu argues, that every genuine 
sociological undertaking is inseparably a socio-analysis, but that it is also, 
specifically, a socio-analysis of the categories comprising the schemes of 
classification that constitute the habitus.  Without this interrogation the researcher’s 
subjectivity, and consequently their epistemological stance within the field of inquiry, 
is ‘abandoned to the forces of the world’. Under these conditions, even with the best 
of intentions, the researcher unwittingly becomes vulnerable to transposing their 
schemes and codes of classification and relationship to those codes and schemes, 
including their moral relationships of taste and meaning, onto an object and subject 
simply because it is ultimately an unthought operation of predetermined thought 
(Bourdieu, 1990b: 20-21; & Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991: 72-73).   
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The suitability of any methodological framework, therefore, needs to be measured by 
its ability to guard against the smuggling in of prenotional categories of thought and 
meanings at each step of inquiry; to invigorate, as Bachelard puts it, the struggle of 
the chemist with the alchemist lurking within (Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron, 
1991: 25).  However, at the level of in situ practice it is not enough to renounce 
prenotional thought through sociological reading or merely adopting an intuitive 
stance of suspicion to category use.  Nor is reflexivity achieved, as Bourdieu points 
out, through a kind of Paulian conversion on the road to Damascus, which would 
effectively equate to the researcher pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps.  
Moreover, while Bourdieu argues that a reflexive and relatively autonomous field is a 
necessary condition for reflexive practice it is evidently not a necessary and sufficient 
condition, and in any case would seem to work only extrinsically after the fact of 
interpretation and representation (Schirato & Webb, 2003: 545).  The problem is that 
these solutions are at a level of abstraction too removed to provide a systematically 
detailed way of approaching the issue of reflexivity at the level of deciphering the 
speech actions of interactive participants.   
 
This is exactly where the contribution of the interaction order framework proves to be 
invaluable.  Because it provides a theory of intersubjective intelligibility at the level 
of interaction that is stringently grounded in the observable and local relevancies of 
participants, it effectively provides a systematic framework to uncover and protect 
against the introduction, imposition, misinterpretation and substitution of a interactive 
participant’s classificatory schemes with the researcher’s own prenotional 
classificatory schemes or codes.  Another way of saying this is that the interaction 
order framework exposes and provides a check against prenotional thoughts being 
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smuggled into the analysis at the very point of intersubjective linguistic interpretation, 
which lies at the heart of analytical information processing.  As Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson note in relation to the study of sequential talk: 
But while understandings of other turns’ talk are displayed to co-
participants, they are available as well to professional analysts, who are 
thereby afforded a proof criterion (and a search procedure) for the 
analysis of what a turn’s talk is occupied with.  Since it is the parties’ 
understandings of prior turn’s talk that is relevant to their construction 
of next turns, it is THEIR understandings that are wanted for analysis.  
The display of those understandings in the talk of subsequent turns 
affords both a resource for the analysis of prior turns and a proof 
procedure for professional analyses of prior turns – resources intrinsic to 
the data themselves (1974: 729). 
 
Hence the kind of analytical scepticism encouraged by conversation analysis and 
membership categorisation analysis that brackets analysts’ concerns and seeks to 
describe rather than impose relevancies, translates a largely intuitive wariness of bias 
and non-consciousness, which is, ultimately, reliant on the challenging task of 
thinking unthought thoughts into a methodical procedure.  This methodical procedure 
has two aspects.  Firstly, it guards against prenotional impositions unwarranted by the 
local relevancies of the participants displayed and oriented to in the course of the 
interaction.  Amongst other things, this means, as Watson (1997b) points out, that the 
analysis of talk as categories and sequence ensures that ‘we can study members 
speech for contextualising as well as contextualised talk and we do not need to skip to 
analysts furnishing of context’ (75).  This would also seem to at least partially address 
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the dangers presented by the ‘scholastic point of view’ and the epistemological 
temptation of abstracting from local contexts.  Secondly, the close attention to the 
sequential ordering of categorisations allows for a stringently epistemological 
monitoring of misalignments between the meaning-making and classificatory 
relevancies of the researcher and those of the participants.   
 
Additionally, by showing that intersubjective meaning is first achieved at the 
constitutive level of talk, that is, at the level of ‘how’ talk is produced, prior to the 
adaptation to institutional pre-requisites at the level of accounts, that is, ‘what’ is 
being said, the interaction framework points to an order of analysis of habitus, 
position and position taking made relevant in talk that also poses obstacles to 
prenotional imposition.  Thus Sacks’ insistence that talk is firstly examined for how it 
is produced rather than what is being said introduces an epistemological caution that 
guards against unwarranted but non-conscious leaps of interpretative faith that skip an 
analysis of the production of talk, thus becoming vulnerable to the prenotional 
imposition of meanings at the level of the interaction order.  This initial bracketing of 
what is being said in order to focus on how and when things are said provides the 
schematic methods of reflexively disrupting prenotional leaps of understanding that 
seek to lump together generally normative categories and meaning-making abstracted 
from their local contexts and unwarranted by the situated local relevancies of the 
participants (Adkins, 1997: 63; Rawls, 1989: 163; Silverman, 1994: 184: & 
Silverman, 1998: 77).     
 
The upshot of this is that the interaction order framework provides a methodically 
royal road to Bourdieu’s sense of reflexivity that is intrinsic rather than extrinsic to 
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the analytical examination of the object.  This allows for a pragmatic means of 
implementing Bourdieu’s primary epistemological directive to subject the tools of 
language to a methodical critique to prevent the insinuation of prenotions into analysis 
through the uncontrolled preconstructions of ordinary and erudite language (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991: 21-24).  However, beyond this, it also provides the 
systematic means to not only expose prenotions, but in a way that is analogous to 
Bachelard’s cycle of scientific progress, in exposing them, initiating a cycle of 
epistemological breaks.  These breaks occur as a direct result of the correction of 
misinterpreted meanings that triggers an escape from the unthought categories of 
thought, which then leads to breakthroughs in objectively describing and 
understanding the logic of practice of the other and the relationship between habitus 
and position.   
 
4.3.3.2 Objectifying the Epistemological Effects of Methods  
Having addressed the second part of objectifying the objectifying relationship we can 
now turn our attention to the first part, what do the methods do to the object?  The 
problem arises from the character of methodologies in selecting particular processes 
and metaphors of inquiry suited to the study of the object, that by definition implicitly 
delimit the scope of observation.  As Adkins (1997) observes, this issue is analogous 
to the problem faced by biologists concerning techniques for staining slides for 
microscopic analysis:  
The judgement is made on the basis of the technique which makes 
visible specific aspects of the tissue under examination on the clear 
understanding that this may render other aspects of the material less 
visible (66). 
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With respect to the interaction order framework, Bourdieu was highly critical of what 
is made less visible through the application of ethnomethodological methods, such as 
conversational analysis.  Bourdieu’s critique stands on the argument that the full set of 
relations operating within any particular setting cannot be reduced to relationships 
between subjectivities or the representations which subject’s form of them.  This is 
because it is the objective relations between two histories that define those 
subjectivities and provide the precondition for a complete understanding of the 
experiential relationship that subjects have within settings (Bourdieu, Chamboredon 
& Passeron, 1991: 18)  Hence the full set of objective relations in a setting are 
irreducible to the interactions in which they are manifested (Bourdieu, 1990b: 127-
28).  As Wetherall has argued, many of these relations may not be an obvious concern 
for the participant, or evident in their position taking within interactional procedures, 
which tend to orient to local issues of accountability (1998: 334).   
 
Bourdieu’s critique consequently raises a potential problem for the application of 
ethnomethodological methods to the object of inquiry, which can be framed in terms 
of their inability to capture the history of relations operating in the field. Thus, while it 
has been argued that these methods are highly suited to capturing the local in situ 
relationships between habitus and position, there are potential blind spots inherent in 
the approach.  By adopting the interaction order framework, the current study is likely 
to pay the price for fine interactional detail and epistemological rigour by obscuring 
the complete set of historical objective relations.  This problematic is addressed in two 
interrelated ways.   
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Firstly, the application of these methods in the current study does not pretend to 
capture the full set of historical objective relations relevant to the setting.  By focusing 
on the interaction order, the application of these methods in the first instance aims to 
foreground the set of local interactional conditions surrounding a breakdown in 
interaction associated with ‘mentally disordered’ practice.  This examination, 
therefore, has the potential of contributing to a broader theorisation of the relationship 
between knowledge construction practices and exclusion and inclusion in the field at 
the level of the interaction order – a level of investigation that is made particularly 
relevant by the weight of evidence pointing to the critical role of teacher-student 
relationships.  While specific questions surrounding the history of class, cultural, 
gendered or family dispositions are, to some extent, reductively inferable, they are, 
nevertheless, left to other studies.  The focus of this thesis remains on the 
epistemology of local knowledge construction practices, but in a way that does not 
neglect the influence of local and institutional symbolic power relationships in 
shaping those practices. 
 
Secondly, the application of these methods are best understood, in ten Have’s terms, 
as ‘applied ethnomethodology’, where CA findings and methods are used to study 
institutional interactions and advise on effective practice (2001: 3).  This applied 
approach is particularly significant because the principle thrust of Bourdieu’s critique 
of ethnomethodology was directed at the way in which ethnomethodological research 
was exclusively devoted to members’ methods, an ‘account of accounts’, and was 
unsuited to, and obscured, the full set of objective relations operating in fields of 
practice (1990b: 26).  The pointed end of this critique is deflected in the current study 
because of the way in which CA and MCA are employed as epistemologically 
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reflexive tools to access schemes of classification rather than as a means to focus on 
members’ conversational and descriptive methods.  Thus, unlike Sacks, whose main 
interest in MCD was in the interactive apparatus rather than the content of the 
classificatory schemes themselves, this study is particularly interested in engaging 
with CA and MCA tools to make epistemologically warranted claims about the 
dispositional content of the classificatory schemes, and about the position taking 
dynamics of the interaction between classificatory schemes.   
 
Ultimately, this means that while the thesis is strongly influenced by 
ethnomethodological thinking, it is not located exclusively within an 
ethnomethodological project that strictly subscribes to a bracketing of ‘what’ is being 
said to focus upon members’ procedures and methods or ‘how’ it is being said.  
Instead, this research is deeply interested in meaning in practice, or rather, the practice 
of meaning.  So, if it can be said that ethnomethodology marks an analytical shift of 
focus from what is said by research participants to how it is said, and what is realised 
in the process, then this research is best described as attempting to better understand 
what is said by placing the meaning of what is said in relationship to how it is said, 
when it is said and what is realised (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997: 7-8; & Silverman, 
2005b).  Strictly speaking, these ethnomethodological tools are used not to examine 
members’ methods as such, but to be used as an epistemologically reflexive means of 
prising open the set of relations made relevant within the fine details of participant 
descriptions of an interaction order breakdown. 
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4.4 Data Selection  
This research employs a case study approach to intensively examine an episode of 
violence in a classroom associated with a diagnosis of comorbid ADHD/CD.  The 
case study data presented and analysed in the following chapters was drawn from 
accounts provided by a young person (male, 13 years) previously diagnosed with 
‘comorbid ADHD and CD’ and accounts provided by his teacher (male).  Both 
participants were key protagonists in an episode of violence in the classroom, 
associated with the diagnosis of ‘comorbid ADHD & CD’, which resulted in school 
expulsion. The young person was at that time enrolled in a specialised alternative 
education setting targeting ‘students’ with ‘mental disorders’.  The teacher was a full-
time ‘behaviour’ teacher at the alternative setting.  The following section provides an 
account of the rationale for adopting a case study approach as well as an overview of 
the case study selection.   
 
4.4.1 Case Study Approach Rationale 
A case study approach was adopted as being particularly suited to the following 
research objectives: 
 
4.4.1.1 To provide an intensive account of a breakdown in interaction  
Discovering the properties of social relationships requires that the object of study that 
could reveal these properties be described, as it is defined within the direct context of 
the experiences of the social actors and meanings they assign directly to such 
experiences (Hamel, Dufour and Fortin, 1993: 32-33).  This understanding of 
experience requires a level of intensity suited to a qualitative case study methodology.     
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It is the time spent in the rich detail of a case study and, particularly in this case, the 
time invested in analysing the minute detail of interactional discourse, which provides 
an intimate knowledge of the opaque sets of pertinent contextual relationships linking 
the complexities of in situ social episodes (Mitchell in Blaikie, 1993: 224).  This 
intimate knowledge is the necessary condition for an analytical dissection of context, 
defined by a set of ‘subtle and explicit local, emergent, socially organised activities 
that are often difficult to describe or measure’ (Cicourel, 2003: 360).  A case study 
approach is, therefore, ideally suited to an intensive examination of the complex 
contextual relationships that constitute the object of inquiry (Yin, 1994: 13).  
 
4.4.1.2 To provide an account that lends itself to theoretical generalisability   
The underlying principle governing the choice of a case study methodology lies with 
the potential for a singular case to expose the pertinent theoretical properties inherent 
in the relationships producing practical understanding.  The case study does not aim 
for statistical generalisability, nor has the case study been selected on the grounds of 
statistical representativeness or sampling.  Rather, it aims for a theoretical 
representation of practical understanding at the level of interaction in order to expose 
the empirically manifested dynamics of previously postulated theoretical relationships 
that constitute the object of inquiry.  As Mitchell has argued, the case study 
methodology documents a particular phenomenon ‘which has been assembled with 
the explicit end in view of drawing theoretical conclusions from it’ (Mitchell in 
Blaikie, 1993: 217).  
 
This will lead to theoretical generalisability rather than statistical generalisability.  
The validity of the theoretical conclusions that are subsequently drawn from the case 
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study will, therefore, necessarily rest on a logical inference, where we infer that the 
features present in the case study will be related in the wider population of episodes, 
not because the case is statistically representative but because of the logic of the 
theoretical analysis (Mitchell in Blaikie, 1993: 223).   
  
4.4.2 Case Study Selection 
Silverman has argued that one of the great strengths of qualitative research is that it 
allows for significant interactive flexibility.  This flexibility enables decisive shifts in 
theoretically guided data selection in response to discoveries made in the course of the 
research (2005a: 133-4).  The current investigation has capitalised on this 
characteristic.  Therefore, following an initial entry into the field, which involved 
investigating a broader sweep of cases, a decision was made to intensively interrogate 
a single case study.  This decision was made following the realisation that each case 
was a matter of great complexity with extremely dense data, and further to this, that 
an intensive close-up analysis of one limiting case would be sufficient to interrogate 
the theoretical relationships under study.  The selection of the single case study was 
consequently undertaken on the basis of this case study’s theoretical credentials as a 
limiting case of ‘teacher’-‘student’ relationship breakdown associated with ‘mentally 
disordered’ practice that led to school exclusion.  In other words, the case study was 
selected on the grounds that it was highly likely to include a configuration of 
dispositions, positions and position takings leading to a breakdown in ‘teacher’-
‘student’ relationships associated with ‘disordered’ practice and school exclusion.   
 
The case study’s credentials as a ‘limiting case’ takes up Bourdieu’s argument that 
‘moving to the limit’ provides an irreplaceable opportunity to explore the pertinent 
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properties of a phenomenon.  According to Bourdieu, these properties are accentuated 
in the observable object or ‘exhibit in the highest degree the greatest number of 
properties of the constructed object’ (1991: 50).  As such, the case study represents a 
privileged case that should be theoretically related to the family of cases of which it is 
an element.   
 
There are a number of features of the case study that establish it as a case of ‘moving 
to the limit’, including: 
(i) A case of ‘extreme’ violence resulting in permanent school exclusion  
(ii) A case of practice associated with comorbid ADHD & severe CD, which is not 
only strongly correlated with school exclusion, but has been elsewhere described 
as being at the extreme end of ‘disruptive behaviour disorders’ and indicative of 
‘fledgling psychopathology’ (Gresham, Lane & Lambros, 2000: 84; & van 
Bockhoven et al, 2005: 155) 
(iii) A case of ‘mental disorder’ leading to permanent school exclusion within a local, 
specialised setting that was well resourced, with a teacher that was not only 
highly experienced, but also tertiary trained in ‘behaviour management’.  
This last point relates to the way that the study constitutes a limiting case for 
institutional conditions.  That is, particular features of the case study ensure that it 
represents a crisis in institutional conditions prenotionally accepted as fostering 
inclusion.  These features include:  (i) the depth of resources in the specialised setting 
devoted to individual programs for a small number of ‘students with mental 
disorders’; (ii) the depth of experience and expertise of the teacher participant and 
other staff in the setting.  The teacher had almost 15 years of experience working in 
the field and a post-graduate degree related to working with students with ‘mental 
 144 
disorders’; (iii) the teacher’s lengthy experience matched his reported commitment, 
enthusiasm and compassion for this group of students; and (iv) an inability to 
straightforwardly or commonsensically reduce determinate causes to ‘poor 
relationships’ between the young person and the teacher or other staff.  Consequently, 
the case study constitutes a limiting case for institutional conditions because a 
relationship breakdown occurred despite the teacher’s expertise and the flexibilities 
afforded by the alternative setting.   
 
Furthermore, although the case study is not attempting to be substantively ‘typical’ of 
the family of cases, there are a number of linkages to existing research that are 
worthwhile noting because of the way they reference systemic patterns of exclusion 
associated with histories of disposition and symbolic power relations.  These include 
the selection of: (i) a male working class participant, which is consistent with gender 
and class over-representation in patterns of institutional exclusion; (ii) a young person 
participant who is in foster care, establishing a history of family abuse; and (iii) a 
young person participant who has an archetypical trajectory of school exclusion.   
 
There are also a number of implications arising from the case selection that provide 
important caveats on the research findings.  These caveats are the immediate by-
product of the limitations of a single case study that does not substantiatively extend 
to other possible gender or ‘culturally’ tied sets of dispositions and position takings, 
or other possible configurations of dispositions and institutional positions in the field 
or any other field.  This means that in describing a particular case of the phenomenon 
the specific substantiative findings of this research does not hope to represent the 
substantiative differences between incidents of ‘disordered’ practice involving other 
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possible alternative configurations of  disposition and positions.  But this does not 
represent a flaw in case study selection, nor is it a weakness of the case study 
approach. To accept this as a flaw would mean that we are mistakenly equating the 
substantiative limitation as a theoretical limitation.  This would misrepresent the case 
study intention, which is aimed at conceptually describing everyday epistemological 
practices.  Such a description is likely to make salient theoretically generalisable 
epistemological features of exclusive and inclusive teacher-student relationships, 
which can then be applied to the family of case studies of which it is an element.   
 
4.5 Data Collection  
Data collection followed a rigorous ethics approval procedure involving three separate 
approvals from two government institutions and the Queensland University of 
Technology.  As a result of a deep commitment to ethical practice the research was 
strongly oriented to managing potential risks to the wellbeing of participants.  These 
risks were largely managed by ensuring participants were in control of all aspects of 
their participation, conducting the research in a highly collaborative and transparent 
manner and ensuring their confidentiality.  The CREATE Foundation, an Australia-
wide organisation managed by young people for young people in OOHC, were closely 
consulted in the development of the recruitment process, interview questions and risk 
management strategies.   
 
Ethical issues also played a direct role in participant selection and data collection.  In 
terms of the former, the decision to recruit young people in OOHC, as participants, 
was made on the grounds that personal family trajectories of the young people did not 
need to be explored but could be presumed to be problematic.  In terms of the latter, a 
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decision was made prior to entering the field that the research would rely on 
interviews rather than direct observations.  This decision was made taking into 
account that: (i) this group of young people is already highly surveilled in their 
everyday practices; and (ii) a critical episode of a ‘breakdown in teacher-student 
relationships’ is likely to constitute a highly traumatic event with serious 
consequences for both teachers and young people.  Under these circumstances asking 
teachers and young people to provide accounts of such episodes is arguably far less 
intrusive and voyeuristic while offering the opportunity for greater control by the 
participants.  This reasoning was confirmed by CREATE Foundation.   
 
Accordingly, the then NSW Department of Community Services (DoCS) was 
approached and requested to identify potential young people participants with a 
diagnosis of ‘mental disorder’ and a current history of ‘getting into trouble at school’.  
DoCS caseworkers subsequently contacted potential participants and arranged a 
meeting with the researcher for an introductory discussion.  Two young people with 
diagnoses of ‘mental disorder’ were subsequently recruited and, following the first 
interview, two of their teachers.  As discussed, this was later narrowed to one case 
study of a young person and a teacher who was a central protagonist in the episode of 
violence in the classroom. 
 
The case study data set comprised 4 x 1-1.5 hour audio-taped and transcribed semi-
structured open-ended interviews conducted with the young person and 4 x 1-1.5 hour 
audio-taped and transcribed interviews with his male teacher.  The episode of violence 
occurred after the first interview with the young person and prior to the interviews 
with the teacher.   
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The semi-structured interviews with the young person explored both his experience of 
‘getting into trouble’ at school and interview data, where the young person provided 
an account of the specific episode of violence.  A copy of the structural framework of 
the questions is provided in Appendix C. The term ‘getting into trouble at school’ 
trades on local understandings of becoming involved in any kind of school 
disciplinary action.  While the term was kept deliberately broad in the interviews it 
was also specifically defined, in the introduction to the research for prospective 
participants, as the kind of ‘getting into trouble’ that leads to suspensions or 
expulsions and/or special education intervention.  Therefore, the talk of ‘getting into 
trouble at school’ in the interviews orientates to school suspension, expulsion and 
subsequent participation in alternative settings for ‘disordered students’.  Similarly, 
the interview accounts with the teacher explored his experience of working with 
‘disordered’ students, and also interview data where the teacher provided an account 
of the episode of violence.  As such, the interview data constitutes an ‘embedded’ 
case study, where the interviews focusing on the specific episode of violence can be 
understood as being contiguously embedded as a specific example within the broader 
corpus of data concerned with ‘disordered behaviour’ and school exclusion (Blaikie, 
1993: 221).   
 
Employing interviews as a method comes at a certain epistemological price, not least 
being the epistemological tension with the ethnomethodological methodology 
employed in the interview analysis.  As Blaikie notes, interviews represent a ‘semi-
natural’ setting rather than a ‘natural’ setting and are, therefore, at least one degree 
abstracted from the natural setting of relationships unfolding within school settings 
and unfolding in the course of an episode of ‘disordered behaviour’.  Consequently, 
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the use of interviews as a method runs against a tide of critique from 
ethnomethodological research influenced by Sacks, who emphasised the importance 
of studying naturally occurring conversation.  Sacks rejected interview approaches on 
the basis that they blurred the specific features of the events under investigation in 
such a way that the actual details of naturally occurring interactional conduct are lost 
and replaced by the interviewer’s artificial idealisations (Heritage, 1984: 236-38).  As 
Sacks pointed out, in traditional interviews researchers are attempting to study the 
categories that members use, but they are not investigating those categories by 
attempting to find them in the activities they are employed (Ryen & Silverman, 2000: 
122-23).   
 
However, semi-structured interviews have a number of significant strengths that 
weighed heavily in the decision to adopt them as a research strategy.  This includes 
the way in which interviews: (i) ease ethical concerns associated with the 
reintroduction of intrusive power relations through further surveillance with a group 
that is already subject to extreme governmental surveillance (Laws, 2001: 24; & 
Potter, 2003: 80-81); (ii) address problems of reactivity arising from the researcher’s 
direct participation in classroom settings (Potter, 2003: 81); (iii) have the potential to 
incite meanings and discursive practices in safe and controlled ways (Potter, 2003: 80-
81; & Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995: 73-74); and (iv) interview conversations 
focused on accounts of positions and position takings in the field are, in themselves, 
‘naturally’ a part of the discursive construction and discursive contest of agents 
struggling for legitimate positions in the field. The interviews then need to be seen as 
a part of the discursive struggle in the field rather than being artificially divorced from 
the field.   
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Nevertheless the adoption of the interview strategy in this research is forced to 
address the problem posed by Silverman that traditional interviews trying to tap into 
interviewee’s perceptions make the naturally occurring phenomenon ‘disappear’, as it 
is abstractly reinterpreted  (2005a: 68).  The response to Silverman’s problem has two 
parts.  The first part focuses on the nature of the object under study, that is, teacher 
knowledge construction and application practices within, and about, the unfolding 
interactional relationships between teacher and student dispositions, institutional 
positions and position takings. Thus the phenomenon under examination is 
fundamentally oriented to a description of the relationship between the participant’s 
schemes of classification and evaluation and the linguistic knowledge construction 
and application practices underpinning the teacher’s classificatory judgements.   
Given that interviews are ideally suited to explore participants’ reasonings, and thus 
their schemes of moral reasoning – their schemes of judgement, classification and 
evaluation – it suggests that, in this case, the scientifically conceptualised 
‘phenomenon’ under question does not disappear through interview techniques but 
remains very much in focus.   
 
However, this first part would be epistemologically meaningless if interviews were 
romantically conceived as a transparent doorway into the participant’s inner thoughts, 
perceptions and feelings, or if the interviewer’s own prenotional abstractions were 
unwittingly imposed on the data.  Such an approach would necessarily abandon the 
epistemological lessons of the interaction order.  Therefore the approach to interviews 
adopted in the current research follows the lead taken by Baker (1997a, 1997b & 
2002), Silverman (1993, 1994 & 2005a) and Gubrium & Holstein (1997) in 
conceiving interviews not as a technique for accessing hidden worlds, but as a local 
 150 
interactional accomplishment where interviewers and interviewees assemble 
recognisably sensible accounts.  Accordingly, as Carol Baker pointed out, interviews 
are seen as data making accounts rather than data collecting reports (1997: 131 & 
2002: 778).  As Baker also points out, interviews can then be analysed as instances of 
settings where agents use interactional and interpretative resources to build versions 
of social reality.  In this way, interviews become a site for analysing the co-production 
of situated identities and the moral work of accounting (2002: 778).   
 
It is this visible moral work of accounting that opens up the possibility of accessing a 
participant’s stable schemes of classification and evaluation in use – their 
dispositions, position makings and position takings – while simultaneously attending 
to how this moral logic is being constructed as a result of, and within, the interactional 
talk.  The second part of the response to Silverman’s epistemological problem posed 
by interviews consequently lies in this re-conceptualisation of interviews as local 
interactional events.  Ironically, this accepts Silverman’s own position that the 
opposition between artificial and natural data is a red herring: ‘Everything depends 
upon the status which we accord to the data gathered in such interviews’ (1993: 106). 
 
The interviewing strategy recognises interviewees as artfully and interactionally 
constructing accountable versions of events that nevertheless implicate their own 
moral worlds.  Consistent with this recognition, the interviews in this study employed 
Holstein and Gubrium’s (1995 & 1997) ‘Active Interview’ approach, which attempts 
to eschew the ‘image of the vessel waiting to be taped in favour of the notion that the 
subject’s interpretive capabilities must be activated, stimulated, and cultivated (1995: 
17).  A central part of this approach rests on the interaction order realisation that 
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meaning is displayed at the nexus of the ‘hows’ and ‘whats’ of talk through 
interpretative practice, that is, through the procedures and classificatory resources 
used to apprehend, organise and represent reality, thus active interviewing aims to 
‘activate, stimulate and cultivate’ both of these aspects of a research participant’s 
interpretative practice (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997: 122).  Active Interviewing also 
recognises that meaning is indexical and that classificatory resources are deployed in 
situated and occasioned ways.  Therefore, Active Interviewing attempts to actively 
encourage shifts in the participant’s sense-making or position taking by shifts in local 
contextualising (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995 &1997).    
 
4.6 Data Analysis  
The methodological approach informed by the interaction order theorists allowed for a 
series of questions to be systematically put to the case study to reveal the pertinent 
properties of the object of inquiry.  These questions then guided the analytic project in 
‘what to look for’.  These questions included: 
(i) What is the unfolding relationship between the young person’s disposition, 
position, position making and position taking, referenced by classificatory schema 
made inferable by MCDs in use by the young person’s interview accounts?  
(ii) What is the unfolding relationship between the teacher’s and young person’s logic 
of practice in terms of dispositions, positions, position making and position taking, 
referenced by classificatory schema made inferable by MCDs in use?  
(iii) What is the nature of the knowledge construction and application practices 
referenced by classificatory practices associated with the teacher’s position 
making and position taking made inferable by MCDs in use?  
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(iv) What is the relationship between the teacher’s classificatory schema, the young 
person’s logic of practice and the teacher’s disposition and position with the field 
made inferable by MCDs in use?  
(v) What is the epistemological nature of the limits imposed by the relationship 
between the teacher’s disposition, position, position making and position taking?  
 
The analysis of the interview data itself follows the logic of analytic induction.  In this 
process analysis traces a dialectic series of moves between data and generalisation 
that aims at increasingly more precise accounts of the data (Adkins, 1997: 77).  This 
process should not be confused with the kind of hyper-empiricism that Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon & Passeron warns against, based on a mistaken faith in ‘facts speaking 
for themselves’, otherwise described as the ‘curse of the speaking object’ (1991: 37).  
Instead, the constructed object of inquiry focuses the inductive process on particular 
objectively constructed aspects of experience that are, at the same time, firmly 
grounded in the participant’s own logic.  In this way we avoid the epistemological 
obstacle posed by Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron (1991), eloquently expressed 
as: 
It is not sufficient for the sociologist to listen to the subjects, faithfully 
recording their statements and their reasons they offer; in doing so, he 
(sic) is liable to replace his own preconceptions with the preconceptions 
of those whom he studies, or with a spuriously scientific and spuriously 
objective blend of the spontaneous sociology of the “scientist” and the 
spontaneous sociology of the object (37). 
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Membership Categorisation Analysis (MCA) and Conversation Analysis (CA) were 
reciprocally employed to analyse the interview talk.  MCA involved the following 
basic steps: (i) Identify categories (people, places or things) underpinning the talk; (ii) 
Identify predicates associated with categories in order to identify explicit and implicit 
predicate attributions linked to category bound actions, rights and obligations; (iii) 
Identify MCDs, including Standard Relational Pairs (SRPs), complimentary pairs and 
oppositional pairs, paying attention to asymmetrical and symmetrical relationships. 
SRPs comprise any relational pair, such as ‘husband/wife’, ‘parent/child’, 
‘teacher/student’, that constitutes a locus for a set of rights and obligations concerning 
the activity of giving help’ (Sacks in Jayyusi, 1984: 214).  The sum total of these steps 
allowed for a determination of inferable schemes of classification and evaluation from 
moral inferential logic and moral grounding of practical inference (Baker, 1997: 142 
& Jayyusi, 1991: 240).    
 
Analytically, MCDs should not be understood as providing some kind of cognitively 
mechanical stimulus-response framework that pre-determines categorisation or 
categorisation incumbency.  As Schegloff argues, categories are not taxonomic (2007: 
471).  Instead, category relevance and, hence, the relevance of MCDs, including SRPs 
and their rights and obligations, is locally produced to perform moral work in an 
occasioned way within current interaction (Edwards, 1991: 518).  This has two 
important consequences for this analysis.   
 
Firstly, it means that any category incumbency, including incumbency in the S-R pair 
‘teacher’-‘student’ cannot be taken for granted by an analyst, as it needs to be 
relevantly displayed (Jayyusi, 1984: 62-3).  As Schegloff (2007) warns, to avoid 
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promiscuously introducing into the analysis what the writing needs for the argument-
in-progress there must be analysis to show the claim is grounded in the conduct of the 
parties, not just the beliefs of the writer (476).  Researchers are thus required to 
demonstrate the ‘relevance’ and ‘procedural consequentiality’ for the participants of 
the claims and inferences they invoke.   
 
Consequently, it is epistemologically unwarranted and, therefore, analytically 
worthless simply to presumptively read off moral reasoning in relation to the 
institutional ‘fact’ that the ‘young person’ is a ‘student’ or that ‘adults’ in the episode 
are ‘teachers’ or even that the episode occurs in a ‘classroom’.  To do this would 
simply be to impose the analyst’s moral reasoning or categorisation on the episode, 
which would not analytically further any objective description of the inter-
relationships occurring between the ‘young person’ and the ‘teacher’ in the production 
of the episode.  Schegloff makes the identical point in his analysis of ‘interruption’ 
where he argues that the relationship between gender, power, dominance and the 
construct ‘interruption’ needs to be based on an evidential linkage based on conduct 
not concept:  
Studies too often disengage an outcome, such as the occurrence of, or 
success of, an interruption, from the behavioural and contextual 
elements in which it was embedded and by reference to which it was 
produced by the participants; they aggregate such disengaged outcomes 
and relate them, instead of to their real life context in the round, to the 
disengaged elements of the investigator’s preferred analytical 
commitments.  That may not necessarily yield problematic outcomes 
within the investigator’s own frame of reference, but it does replace 
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statistical and conceptual representations disengaged from their 
empirical counterparts for the robust and textured configuration of 
elements …in which the outcomes of interaction were formed up 
(2002: 317). 
This is not simply an expression of ethnomethodological pedantry. It has highly 
significant implications for a description of ‘what happened’ in the interaction 
breakdown in terms of the empirically demonstrable, rather than presumptive moral, 
logic of the participants within a context demonstrably oriented to by those same 
participants.   
 
It is partly for this reason of stalling an a priori analytic imposition that an analysis of 
the categorisation talk is undertaken in conjunction with an analysis of the local 
sequential talk.  What is at issue here is the local relevance to the participants of the 
category talk, including the relevance of categories, predicates and MCDs, and the 
warranted inferences that can be made from that categorisation talk.  As Hester and 
Eglin argue, categories and their sequential contexts are not independent objects:  
…the meaning or sense of a category is constituted through the use of 
features of the context, and the contextual features are themselves 
constituted through the sense of the category collection is constituted 
through its use in a particular context, it is part and parcel of its use in 
that way (1997a: 27).   
This suggests that there is an irremediable indexicality to MCDs and member 
categories in use, which are the product of the agent’s practical discursive action and 
practical reasoning, such that ‘category and context comprise a reflexively constituted 
relational configuration’ (Hester & Eglin, 1997a: 28-31).  
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This has at least two significant upshots for the analysis.  Firstly, because 
categorisation talk is indexical and occasioned, it means that the analysis cannot 
legitimately search the data for individual instances of categories or predicates and 
then perform an aggregate analysis to identify stable dispositions. What is required is 
an examination of each local sequence that the category or predicate occurs to 
determine meaning for each instance (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998: 2; & Silverman, 
2005b: 2-7).  Nor can inferences made in one instance be presumptively applied to 
another instance without examination of the sequential relevancies of that instance.   
 
This insight encourages an analytical approach that in the first instance imminently 
interrogates each particular sequence that a category or category feature is located, 
grounding claims about what is inferable about the participant’s moral logic solely on 
the evidence derived from those category features made locally relevant and the 
organisational features of that particular local sequence.  The aim is to import nothing 
of the analyst’s resources into the analysis. Only then can the analysis turn to other 
examples in the data set, where the participant makes locally relevant the same 
category feature but in a different sequential context. It is by analysing the 
relationships between these category features in local sequential contexts that allows 
claims to be made about a consistent stable classificatory moral reasoning suggestive 
of stable classificatory schema and the construction of an analytically nuanced 
description of that reasoning.  In other words, the claim that the repeated appearance 
of any particular category and set of category features in the accounts represents a 
case of the participant referencing a particular stable classificatory schema, can only 
be empirically substantiated after the grounds for accumulation of the separate local 
instances have been substantiated. This ensures that the logic-in-use in each local 
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account justifies similar inferences about meaning-making and moral classificatory 
reasoning by taking into account the ‘hows’, the ‘whats’ and also the ‘whens’ of the 
talk.  That is, when, or under what local circumstances, a category or MCD is made 
relevant.   
 
The second upshot is related to this last point about the ‘whens’ of category use that is 
made possible through a study of sequences of talk.  In this respect, category 
selection, and specifically category transformation and inferable category dilemmas, 
make a unique contribution in developing a nuanced understanding of the situated 
moral logic of practices. Category transformations refers to instances in the talk where 
different categories are employed to describe the same object or person in a local 
sequence, and category dilemmas refers to the problem of simultaneous practical 
relevance of two contextually oppositional categories (Jayyusi, 1984: 136). 
 
In addition to the above, the analysis of sequential talk makes its own separate 
contribution to a highly reflexive (in Bourdieu’s sense) understanding of participants’ 
dispositions, position making and position taking that arises from the sequential 
architecture of intersubjectivity.  This occurs firstly because the way in which the 
researcher actively co-produces the talk can be monitored in a methodical way by 
examining how the talk is being produced (Heritage, 1984: 177).  Secondly, because 
the moral ordering of sequential talk provides a means to monitor troubles in mutual 
understanding.  This is achieved through a close examination of conversational 
objects, such as adjacency pairs, preferred and dispreferred responses, adjacency 
relevance, interruption and overlaps, upshots and gists, trouble talk, extreme case 
formulations, repairs, self-correction, affiliative laughter and so on.  The subsequent 
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discovery of a misunderstanding of a lexical choice and/or categorisation talk then 
precipitates, in a dialectic move, a re-examination of the data set, giving rise to an 
increasing precision in warranted and inferable meaning.   
 
The employment of sequences and categories in this way ensures that an analysis of 
the ‘hows’ or social organisation of the talk is not at odds with an analysis of the 
substantiative content of MCDs and the moral reasoning made inferable by that 
categorisation talk.  In this regard, MCA embedded in CA constitutes an analytical 
strategy to incisively approach meaning at the nexus of the ‘hows’ and ‘whats’ and 
‘whens’ of talk.  Above all it represents a cautiously reflexive approach to 
understanding the moral classificatory reasoning of the other that does not unhitch 
analytical answers and, ultimately, answers to ‘why’ questions from the empirical 
circumstances of their production (Baker, 2002: 793; & Silverman 2005b: 13-44).  
Thus the analysis engages with the ‘hows’ and ‘whens’ of talk to provide an empirical 
warrant for claims about the ‘whats’ in terms of the substantiative content of habitus 
as it is empirically made available in discursive practice.   
 
These ‘whats’, or schemes of classification, judgement and evaluation, are, in fact, 
central to the claims made in the research in reflexively describing, and subsequently 
understanding, the episode.  Indeed the ‘whats’ describing the substantive content of 
dispositions as well as the ‘whats’ concerned with accounts of the sequence of events 
are central to the objective description of the episode.  This is because the description 
of the episode, in terms of unfolding dispositions, positions and position takings, 
amounts to an analytic reconstruction derived from the separate interview accounts.  
The primary warrant for that reconstruction rests on the empirical demonstration of 
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stable dispositions made relevant and inferable in the ‘hows’ and ‘whats’ of the 
interview talk.  Further warrant for the reconstruction rests on strong similarities 
between the separate accounts as well as a retroductive step that reconstructs the 
unfolding dynamics of disposition and position in terms of an ‘as if’ logic that 
provides the analytical warrant for making the link between the dispositions identified 
in the separate accounts and a description of the phenomenon (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991: 49).  As Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 
acknowledge, the danger in employing this retroductive strategy lies with the 
temptations of intuition and speculation, but this temptation is resisted in the 
reconstruction through the vigilant grounding of all claims in the relevancies made 
inferable by the participants themselves (1991: 49). 
 
This stringent investment in a fine-grained inductive analysis of the ‘hows’, ‘whats’ 
and ‘whens’ of the audiotaped detailed transcriptions of interview talk also amounts to 
a strong claim for reliability and validity.  In this respect, reliability is understood as 
the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category, 
while validity refers to a confidence in the truth claims about knowledge (Silverman, 
1993: 143-55). These claims are further enhanced by lengthy provision of extracts 
from the interview and the detailed exposition of the discursive resources employed in 
the analysis. Claims to validity are also strengthened by a constant comparative 
method of analysing the coproduction of the accounts.  This meant that the inferable 
schemes of classification made relevant by the young person’s, the teacher’s and my 
own interview talk were constantly compared with each other to draw attention to the 
potential relevance of moral elements discovered in one participant talk to each of the 
others.   
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined an approach and research design suited to analytically 
interrogating the object of inquiry.  The chapter has specifically argued that the MCA 
and CA methods associated with Goffman’s Interaction Order provide an 
epistemologically rigorous analytical framework suited to this study. Within a critical 
case study approach, these methods will allow for an intensive examination, at the 
level of the interaction order, of the identified sets of relations, contingencies and 
language-based practices involved in a case of ‘teacher’-‘student’ interactional 
breakdown associated with ‘mental disorder’.  This examination aims to be highly 
reflexive in Bourdieu’s sense of stripping away the possibility of prenotions being 
smuggled into the analysis.  This is achieved through the use of sequential analysis of 
the categorisation talk to patrol the introduction of the researcher’s own relevancies.  
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Chapter 5 
Aaron’s Dispositions 
5.1 Introduction  
The following two data chapters examine a case of in situ ‘teacher’-‘student’ 
relationship breakdown associated with school exclusion and ‘mental disorder’ in 
order to conceptually expose the limits to, and possibility of, practical understanding. 
The case to be examined involves an episode of ‘physical violence’ in the classroom 
involving a ‘young person’, Aaron, and his ‘teacher’, George.    George describes this 
as an example of ‘blowing up’. The two chapters aim to describe Aaron’s logic of 
practice within the unfolding set of relationships between the ‘teacher’s’ and the 
‘student’s’ dispositions, positions, position taking and position making.  This 
description provides the opportunity to examine George’s knowledge construction and 
application about Aaron’s logic of practice in terms of the set of relationships in play.   
 
In order to describe Aaron’s logic of practice, the first chapter describes his pertinent 
dispositions.  This intensive examination serves to clearly evidence the claims for a 
durable set of dispositions relevant to the interaction order breakdown.  It also serves 
to exemplify the detail of analysis that was applied to both Aaron and George’s sets of 
interviews in identifying dispositions.  The current chapter, describing Aaron’s 
dispositions, is divided into four parts.  The first part provides an analytical overview 
of Aaron’s categorisation talk of ‘getting into trouble’.  That overview identifies three 
MCDs central to this talk. The next three parts closely examine the three MCDs for 
classificatory moral reasoning suggestive of classificatory schema pertinent to 
‘blowing up’.  This examination will show that Aaron’s talk of ‘getting into trouble’ 
suggests classificatory schema that: (i) are highly durable; (ii) are constituted by a 
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system of complimentary classificatory moral reasonings that legitimise a right to 
bodily autonomy in power relations; (iii) authorises and provides the conditions for a 
specifically overt expression of that right to autonomy; and (iv) justifies and explains 
‘getting into trouble’ as a product of the legitimate defence of that right to autonomy.  
These identified classificatory schema subsequently point to stable dispositions, 
which generate practices and appreciation relevant to ‘getting into trouble’ and 
‘blowing up’. 
 
 5.2 Aaron’s Categorisation Talk of ‘Getting into Trouble’ 
Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble’ describe a rich street and school world  
populated by ‘smartarses’, ‘friends’, ‘good people’, ‘teachers’, ‘cops’, ‘parents’, 
‘homeys’, ‘surfys’ ‘Aboriginals’, ‘‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’’ , 
‘dickheads’, ‘cunts’, ‘people-who-are-streetsmart’ and ‘people-who-are-schoolsmart’.   
This cast of characters presented in Aaron’s talk comprise a potentially bewildering 
array of locally occasioned and overlapping categories and predicates that move in 
and out of Aaron’s talk of ‘getting into trouble’ and ‘blowing up’ in situated ways.  
However, an initial analysis of this talk uncovers four findings that reduce its 
complexity and allows us to approach the data in a way that systematically exposes 
distinguishable elements of Aaron’s disposition relevant to ‘blowing up’.  
 
The first significant finding of this study is that while both Aaron and George’s moral 
descriptions reveal actors, or in Roulston’s (2001b: 101) terms, ‘characters’ within 
‘scenes’ that are categorised in situated ways, the problem of an infinite number of 
possible categories and predicates deployed as occasioned rhetorical devices does not 
surface.   So that, like Baker’s 1997 study of teacher ticketing rules, the moral tales 
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produced in these accounts are constituted by a relatively limited and stable set of 
relationships between limited sets of categories and attributes.  These relationships 
comprise a specific set of MCDs that demonstrably position the speakers as 
referencing a stable system of moral reasoning.  This system of moral reasoning 
amounts to a stable and durable set of evaluative principles in relation to specific 
practices.  These MCDs in use, therefore, correspond to stable classificatory schemas 
whose evaluative principles, in relation to representations of the practices in question, 
point to specific sets of durable dispositions.  
 
The second finding is that Aaron’s talk of ‘smartarses’, ‘homeys’, ‘surfys’, ‘teachers’, 
‘parents’, ‘cops’, ‘dickheads’, ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ shows 
that these different categorisations comprise occasioned typifications of two broader 
generic member categories within various local storylines.  This is because they share 
identical sets of constitutive predicates.  The two generic member categories can be 
described as ‘smartarse’ and ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’.  
Consequently, ‘homeys’ and ‘surfys’ are kinds of occasioned ‘smartarses’, while 
‘teachers’, ‘cops’, ‘parents’, groups of dominant ‘Aboriginal’ ‘kids’ and DoCS 
workers are kinds of occasioned ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’.    
 
The third finding is that within this narrative world of the street and school, Aaron 
self-avowedly occupies the position of ‘a smartarse.’  So much so, that if an identity 
can be described as a display, or ascription, to a feature rich category then being a 
‘smartarse’ can be heard as constituting a master identity for Aaron in his talk of 
‘getting into trouble’ (Antaki & Widdicombe 1998: 2).  This is because: (i) it is a 
central organising feature of his talk about ‘getting into trouble’ that is talked into 
 164 
existence through ascription, or implication, through its contrasts and relationships 
with all other categorisations in his accounts of ‘getting into trouble’; (ii) key 
descriptive features of ‘getting into trouble’ are either avowed or implied attributes of 
the category ‘smartarse’; and (iii) being a ‘smartarse’ is a constitutive feature of 
Aaron’s network of relationships with other characters in both the domain of school 
and the street. 
 
The fourth finding is that Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble at school’ are 
primarily concerned with the relationships within three category collections including: 
(i) the set of relationships between ‘smartarses’, ‘teachers’ and ‘good people’;  (ii) the 
contrast pair ‘friends’/‘cunts’; and (iii) the contrast pair ‘streetsmart’/‘schoolsmart’.   
Analytically, these sets of relationships can be understood as comprising three 
separate but overlapping membership collection devices (MCDs) on the grounds that: 
(i) there is a fit between the semantic-taxonomic sense of category concepts and the 
talk’s relevancies, such that the categories within each collection are mutually 
exclusive, but are not exclusively tied to category membership of other categories 
outside the collection; and (ii) there is a pragmatic implication generated by the way 
in which Aaron organises his talk of these collections in terms of tied and 
distinguishable sets of predicates (Jayyusi, 1984: 82).    
 
The first two collections can nominally be described as the School Relationships 
MCD and the ‘friends’/’cunts’ MCD, respectively. They comprise distinguishable sets 
of category relationships whose constitutive features are locally defined in terms of 
their relation to power, relative to two different sets of occasioned rights, obligations 
and attributes.  In Aaron’s talk, the contrast pair ‘friends’/‘cunts’ is mapped on to the 
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‘school relationships’ MCD to justify and authorise a specific set of power 
relationships and social actions tied to these relationships.  The ‘streetsmart’/ 
‘schoolsmart’ contrast pair comprises a third overlapping, but equally distinct, MCD.  
In contrast to the first two collections, the ‘streetsmart’/‘schoolsmart’ device is 
concerned with Aaron’s relationship to activities tied to the school setting.  This third 
collection, however, also references a specific set of power relationships because of 
the way that ‘streetsmart’ and ‘schoolsmart’ represent a mapping out of a logic of 
power relationships onto the separate domains of street and school.  The exact nature 
of these power relations is the subject of the following account.  
 
Now, as Jayyusi points out, the location, or hearing, of a category device at use by 
members is not in itself particularly enlightening for the practical purposes of 
understanding, given that the talk itself provides a self-explicating character to the list 
of items/categories used  (1984: 82-84).  However, the abstracted identification of 
three separate MCDs is analytically useful here because it frames a central concern of 
Aaron’s logic, that is, a concern with power.  It is also useful because it provides a 
heuristic tool to analytically approach the nuanced detail of Aaron’s dispositions 
pertinent to ‘blowing up’. What follows, then, is an analysis of Aaron’s dispositions 
referenced by classificatory moral reasoning made inferable in the sequentially 
organised ‘school relationships’, ‘friends’/ ‘cunts’ and ‘Streetsmart’ / ‘Schoolsmart’ 
MCDs.   
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5.3 The ‘School Relationships’ MCD 
The following section seeks to identify pertinent elements of Aaron’s disposition by 
teasing out the stable classificatory moral reasoning made inferable in his ‘smartarse’, 
‘teacher’ and ‘good people’ talk, focusing primarily on the way in which he works up 
the set of relationships within the oppositional pair ‘smartarse’/‘teacher’ and the 
contrast pair ‘smartarse’/‘good people’ and the complimentary pair ‘teacher’/‘good 
people’.  This section will show that the categorisation talk tied to these three pairs 
has a deep investment in a classificatory moral reasoning of bodily autonomy that is 
complemented by classificatory moral reasoning of overt verbal expression and of 
‘don’t care what happens’.   
 
5.3.1 ‘Smartarses’, ‘Teachers’ and the Right to Symmetrical Power Relations 
Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble’ at school and on the street are 
predominantly and routinely described in terms of the oppositional relationship 
between Aaron, reflexively categorised as a ‘smartarse’, and a range of other situated 
characters who Aaron collectively and overtly describes as ‘people-who-think-they-
can-tell-me-what-to-do’.   These accounts rhetorically legitimise a reading of ‘getting 
into trouble’ as a product of these oppositional relationships.  The opposition turns on 
Aaron’s claim to a moral right to autonomy that is inferably and repeatedly made 
evident in the avowed, but contested, right to symmetrical power relations in the 
‘smartarse’/‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ pair.  In the school 
setting this relationship can be categorised as the ‘smartarse’/‘teacher’ oppositional 
pair.  
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Aaron’s first description of a ‘smartarse’, which is reproduced below, offers an ideal 
point of entry into his classificatory schema surrounding ‘getting into trouble’.  This is 
partly because of the way that it exposes the deeply nuanced features of Aaron’s 
moral reasoning.  This reasoning consistently pervades his talk of ‘getting into 
trouble’ and ‘blowing’.  The sequence occurred in the first interview and was 
preceded by a sequence focused on relationships between ‘friends’, ‘homeys’ and 
‘surfies’.  In the preceding sequence Aaron takes up the self-avowed category of 
‘homey’ in the oppositional pair ‘homey’-‘surfy’, which is interesting in its own right.  
However, as we shall soon see, the logic of ‘getting into trouble’ is more generically 
related to the categorisation of ‘smartarse’ than ‘homey’, which operates as a kind of 
localised presentation of the broader collection ‘smartarse’.   
 
Extract 5.1 
29. R: So what does being a homey s-what do you-why would you choose that. 
30. (1.0) But what does that say about who you are? (1.0) Does it say 
31. about who you are? Or is it about who-yeh 
32. A: S-says about who you are.  
33. R: Wh-wh-what does it say about who you are? 
34. A: Says about you’r- (0.5) you're a smartarse really.  
35. R: Does it? (0.4) Oh:h OK so if you're a homey you're a bit of a  
36. smartarse. 
37. A: Yeh you're a skeg you're a smartarse too. 
38. R: A skeg? 
39. A: Skeg surfy.  
40. R: Oh ok  
41. A: I don't know if you surf or- (0.5) so::o-yeh  
42. R: When you say smartarse what do you mean by that? 
43. A: Like oh:h (1.0) yeh a teacher goes yeah go do this get fucked do 
44. it yourself.  
45. R: O ok. 
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46. A: Like (0.2) like that you're just always in trouble kinda thing. 
47. R: Yeh-yeh= 
 
An examination of lines 35-39 shows that ‘homey’ and ‘surfy’s’ are both kinds of 
‘smartarse’, where ‘smartarse’ operates as a collective term for ‘homey’ and ‘surfy’, 
and ‘homey’ and ‘surfy’ ‘says who you are’ = belong to the collection ‘smartarse’.  In 
line 43-44 Aaron provides a vignette that scenically summarises the constitutive 
category features of this category ‘smartarse’.  In so doing, Aaron makes inferable the 
significant features of his classificatory moral reasoning on those occasions of ‘you’re 
just always in trouble kinda thing’.   
 
If we examine line 43-44, after the introductory ‘Like oh: h (1.0)’, we can see that it is 
comprised of two contrastive parts.  The first part is spoken by a ‘teacher’ declaring 
the directive ‘yeah go do this’ and the immediately juxtaposed second part is ‘get 
fucked go do it yourself’.  The sequentially tied juxtaposition and the list-like 
construction of the two parts ensure that the second part is heard as a ‘smartarse’ 
reprisal to the first part.  So that with the kind of automatic going together of lists, the 
rightful and unqualified response to the first part must be ‘get fucked’ and ‘do it 
yourself’. 
 
The design of the utterance as a reprisal makes relevant the hearing of ‘get fucked’ as 
a moral complaint that is tied to the ‘teacher’s’ directive ‘go do this’.  This point is 
underlined by the systematic way in which ‘get fucked’ is consistently produced 
throughout the entire interview set, without exception, as a moral complaint.  This 
complaint is directly and sequentially tied to accounts that reference oppositional 
relations between a range of protagonists and Aaron’s character in his scenic 
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accounts.  These characters include ‘teachers’, ‘cops’, an ‘old man’ in the street, his 
‘parents’, ‘DoCs’ personnel and a set of dominating ‘Aboriginal’ ‘students’ at a 
particular school.   Moreover, these accounts of exclaiming ‘get fucked’ are consistent 
complaints that, without exception, reference serious moral ruptures of inferable 
rights.   
 
Thus the ‘get fucked’ references a moral notion of what is and what isn’t appropriate 
in the relationship within a ‘teacher’ and ‘smartarse’ pair (Jayyusi, 1984: 171).  Quite 
clearly, what is not morally appropriate and what is strongly disavowed is the 
presumption that: (a) a ‘teacher’ has the moral right to give directives to ‘smartarses’; 
and (b) that ‘smartarses’ are a category that are obliged to follow directives from 
‘teachers’, presumably in an expectably compliant and polite way.  The ‘get fucked’, 
then, serves to forcibly disturb both positions offered by a ‘teacher’ in Aaron’s 
account – both the position-taking of a ‘teacher’ as someone in the relationship who 
has the right to expect deferential compliance and the position-making by a ‘teacher’ 
of a ‘smartarse’ as the kind of person who would accept the deferential obligation to 
comply.  By declaring ‘get fucked’, Aaron completely discredits both of these 
possibilities, disavowing both, and, just as strongly, avowing an alternative yet 
contradictory position, which inferably draws on constitutive category predicates tied 
to a ‘smartarse’ and referencing a contradictory moral logic.   
 
Aaron provides the upshot of this disavowal and lack of deference in line 46: “like 
(0.2) like that you're just always in trouble kinda thing”.  In line 46 the ‘that’ is tied to 
the category feature of saying ‘get fucked go do it yourself’ when given a directive by 
a ‘teacher’.  In other words, the ‘always in trouble kinda thing’ is a constitutive 
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feature of being a ‘smartarse’, where the ‘trouble’ is, in Aaron’s account, a sanction 
that is produced by the category bound feature of saying “get fucked do it yourself”.  
Aaron is, therefore, in this account of a ‘teacher’ telling a ‘smartarse’ to ‘yeah go do 
this’ that produces the ‘always in trouble kinda thing’, inferentially making relevant a 
disjunction in the perceived rights to give directives and the perceived obligations to 
comply   In other words, he is making relevant a disjunction between the moral 
reasoning of a ‘teacher’ and a ‘smartarse’. The disjunction turns on the presumed, but 
contested, asymmetry invoked by the right of a ‘teacher’ to give directives and the 
expectation that they be followed, with the rejection of this asymmetry and the 
expectation through the disavowal of both the right and the obligation.  There is also, 
presumably, a moral expectation, which is simultaneously rejected, that directives are 
followed with an expectably polite demeanour. 
 
Consequently, Aaron’s categorisation of ‘smartarse’ is constitutively bound to his 
disjunctive position taking in terms of the set of what are arguably normative 
asymmetrical  rights (or ‘rules’) and obligations surrounding  ‘teacher’ directives.  
According to Aaron, this is how ‘being in trouble’ is produced.   Therefore, 
understanding Aaron’s account of ‘always being in trouble kinda thing’ is a matter 
that is tied to an understanding the nuances of Aaron’s own classificatory moral 
reasoning.  This moral reasoning provides the grounds for his complaint ‘get fucked’ 
at the points that it intersects the asymmetrical moral background expectancies of a 
‘teacher’.  
   
This aim of appreciating the nuances of Aaron’s classificatory moral reasoning 
requires careful reflexive precision.  So far, only a part of that reasoning has been 
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uncovered by identifying what he refused.  The problem is that identifying what 
Aaron disavows is not necessarily the same thing as identifying what right Aaron is 
claiming, other than the right to say ‘get fucked do it yourself’.  To describe the kind 
of rights and obligations that Aaron is claiming in terms of what he is refusing would 
be to fall into the epistemological trap that is sprung whenever Aaron’s actions are 
reinterpreted in terms of normative classificatory judgements.  This kind of analytical 
logic necessarily reaches its own barren conclusion in the egocentric and 
epistemologically questionable point of departure (rather than arrival) that Aaron is 
‘oppositional’ (to us).  To avoid this kind of error the analysis is required to pursue a 
discriminating logic grounded in what Aaron makes inferentially relevant about the 
occasioned rights he is claiming.  That is, the specific grounds for his complaint in 
terms of his own moral reasoning, not just the moral reasoning he is refusing.   
 
Therefore, to arrive at a more objective understanding of Aaron’s point of view it is 
necessary to tease out Aaron’s reasoning in terms of the possible set of symmetrical, 
or asymmetrical, rights to give directives and the obligation to comply in the 
‘teacher’/‘smartarse’ relationship.  In fact this is a particularly interesting way of 
approaching Aaron’s account.  This is because it provides a direct insight into Aaron’s 
classificatory moral reasoning concerning the set of power relations invoked in the 
‘teacher’/‘smartarse’ pair in terms of the power to ‘tell me what to do’.  The question 
then becomes ‘exactly what kind of symmetry in terms of these different aspects of 
the category predicate is being claimed and disavowed by Aaron?’  
 
Clearly, on this occasion, Aaron is not making relevant symmetries of knowledge or 
competencies.  Just as clearly, he is making relevant rights, entitlements and 
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obligations.  More specifically, he is rejecting the kind of asymmetrical relationship 
defined by the ‘teacher’s’ right to give directives and the ‘smartarse’s’ obligation to 
comply.  This leaves four alternatives.  Aaron is either: (i) reversing the asymmetrical 
presumption so that ‘smartarse’ is superordinate; or (ii) claiming the same kind of 
symmetrical rights to give directives; or (iii) claiming a different set of symmetrical 
rights; or (iv) orienting to a different aspect of his rights within this pair where the a 
‘teacher’ does have the right to give compulsory directives but which are nevertheless 
not made relevant on this occasion.   Unfortunately the task of discriminating between 
these is made particularly difficult because of the equivocal phrase ‘do it yourself’, 
which presents a kind of inferential puzzle.  However the empirical solution to this 
puzzle can be discovered through a process of deductive elimination.   
 
Firstly, alternative (iv) can be eliminated.  There is no evidence, either here or 
anywhere else in the interview set, that Aaron is orienting to a different aspect of his 
rights within the ‘teacher’/‘smartarse’ pair.  Certainly there is no evidence here or 
elsewhere that Aaron accepts the rights of ‘teachers’, ‘cops’, ‘students’, old men or 
‘parents’’ to give arbitrary directives.  Second, both option (i) and option (ii) can be 
provisionally eliminated on the grounds of what is missing from this utterance, 
namely: any further follow up narrative and, specifically, any further account of 
proposed or enacted sanctions for the failure of the  ‘teacher’ to follow the directive.  
This would expectably follow the utterance if Aaron was invoking a moral right to 
give directives, given that, as Goffman points out, sanctions expectably and routinely 
follow ruptures of moral rights (1956: 473).   Of course, this provisional elimination 
would need to be revised if somewhere else in the interview set Aaron, under similar 
contextual circumstances, produced accounts calling for sanctions, or if he provided 
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accounts of giving directives outside of his refusals to follow directives.  The fact that 
he doesn’t, further corroborates the present argument.  Consequently, this represents a 
strong piece of empirical evidence that suggests that in rejecting the assumed 
asymmetry invoked by the characterisation of a ‘teacher’ in the account, Aaron is not 
reversing the asymmetry.  In other words he is not making a claim for power over 
‘teachers’ by claiming a right to give directives to ‘teachers’. This leaves option (iii), 
that Aaron is claiming a different set of symmetrical rights.  In other words, Aaron is 
orienting to some other shared category predicate in the ‘teacher’/‘smartarse’ pair that 
is also a constitutive predicate for the category ‘smartarse’.   The exact nature of this 
predicate is presumably embedded in the work that the equivocal ‘do it yourself’ 
achieves.   An interrogation of this ‘do it yourself’ reveals the moral work it 
undertakes.   
 
The first thing to notice is that once the ‘do it yourself’ is divested of any directive 
intent, it can be heard as ironically mirroring the ‘teacher’s’ own initial directive: 
‘yeah do this-do it yourself’.  The symmetry then lies in the implicit moral 
presumption that a ‘teacher’ should ‘do it yourself’.  In which case the symmetry is 
exposed as ‘You (‘teacher’) should do the things you want and I (a ‘smartarse’) 
should do the things I want’.  In this way, the ‘do it yourself’ is designed not so much 
as a directive but as an artful strategy that simultaneously: (i) actively averts the 
directive by mirroring it back to the speaker; and (ii) provides an embedded 
justification for the complaint on the grounds that Aaron shares the equal right to ‘do 
the things I want - you do the things you want’.  In other words a ‘teacher’ has no 
right to tell him ‘yeah go do this’ because like the ‘teacher’ he is autonomous and it is 
this logic of autonomy that provides the grounds for the ‘get fucked’ complaint.  
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Therefore, Aaron is not claiming power over a ‘teacher’ but, instead, is claiming 
equal autonomy in terms of the right ‘to do’, that is, ‘to act’ autonomously.    
 
This last point gains momentum when every other account is examined where Aaron 
is confronted by ‘people’ presumptively ‘telling him what to do’.   What is strikingly 
obvious is that this particular utterance ‘Get fucked’ followed by ‘do it yourself’ is 
structurally identical to the entire set of utterances in his accounts of ‘being told what 
to do’.  That is, where Aaron routinely and systematically couples a first part 
constituting a complaint ‘get fucked’ with a second part ‘wear what I want’, ‘do what 
I want’ where the second part clearly constitutes a justification on the grounds of 
autonomy.  This structural resemblance adds further credence to the argument that the 
‘do it yourself’ in this particular account similarly represents an embedded 
justification on the grounds of autonomy.    
 
Thus, what is inescapably evident in every account of ‘getting into trouble’ is the 
repeatedly avowed right to refuse arbitrary directives.  Arbitrary in the sense that each 
scenic protagonist presumes a right to give directives that is unwarranted on the 
grounds of Aaron’s symmetrical claim of autonomy.  That is, Aaron demonstrably 
identifies the constitutive category bound predicate of a ‘smartarse’ as a refusal to 
submit to a perceived arbitrary exercise of power and, concomitantly, a refusal to be 
positioned as a subordinate in asymmetrical and arbitrary relations of power.   This 
can be expressed perhaps more elegantly as the key constitutive predicate of a 
‘smartarse’ = autonomy in symmetrical relations of power.   Here, power is made 
relevant in terms of a contested right to act autonomously. 
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5.3.2 ‘Smartarses’, ’Teachers’ and the Performance of Autonomy  
Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble’ and ‘blowing up’ also consistently reference 
a moral preference for a specific kind of performance of autonomy, that is, a specific 
demeanour within locally occasioned oppositional relationships.  Thus, the proper 
performance of bodily autonomy under these circumstances requires what can be 
analytically summarised as an overtly externalised expression of autonomy.  The 
overt externalised expression of autonomous position taking has two parts.  The first 
part is a performance of autonomy through overtly voiced declarations of oppositional 
position taking and position making, while the second part is the performance of 
autonomy through physical fighting.   
 
Aaron’s moral reasoning in legitimising overt declarations of autonomy is inferable 
through two interrelated category bound predicates: the moral obligation of ‘being 
honest’ and the moral right to ‘voice my opinion’.  These features are made relevant 
through his sequentially organised categorisations within the ‘school relationships’ 
and ‘friends’/‘cunts’ MCDs.  The ‘being honest’ predicate works to morally legitimise 
overtly pejorative position making and to disavow covert pejorative position making 
in occasioned oppositional relationships.  The ‘voice my opinion’ predicate works to 
morally avow overt and to disavow covert expressions of oppositional position taking. 
This logic, therefore, morally complements his claim to bodily autonomy in power 
relationships, ensuring that its social expression as a defence of that right necessarily 
occurs overtly and pejoratively.  The following analysis demonstrates how Aaron 
makes inferable the moral reasoning of overt declarations of autonomy by making 
relevant these two category predicates in his  ‘teacher’ talk of ‘getting into trouble’ 
and ‘blowing up’.  
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5.3.2.1 ‘Being Honest’ 
The way in which Aaron orients to the category predicate ‘being honest’ in his 
accounts of ‘getting into trouble’ can be seen in the following sequence.  The 
sequence begins with a topic change that separates it from the prior exchange, as the 
researcher returns to a previous summary of Aaron’s character:  
 
Extract 5.3 
821. R: Oh right ok. (7.0) Mrs Seaton (0.2) so sh- where those things that  
822. you've said (.) right? Um standov- oh leader (.) stand up for yourself 
823. honest smartarse. (1.2)  Does- sh- would she like you would she see  
824. being a leader is a really good thing to be? 
825. A: (nods)  
826. R: Yeh? What about stand up for himself? (1.0) See that as a good  
827. thing? 
828. A: Everyone says to me I'm honest [I'm honest] 
829. R:                                [Honest] what do you mean by that  
830. honest? 
831. A: Did you do it? Yep.  
832. R: Oh-ok.  
833. A: Of course I did it I laugh about it. (0.5) Yep I went and smashed 
834. that dude yep huhhuh yep well I stole that (.) sorry (.) can't do  
835. anything about it. (0.5) I mean like (1.2) do you think that this du- 
836. this teacher's a dickhead?  I'll go n tell- I-I-I won’t say it to them 
837. I go tell them to their face I think you're a fucking dickhead mate. 
 
The sequence begins with a long summary. This is followed by Aaron’s utterance in 
line 828 where he designs a turn that is somewhat sequentially misaligned to my 
preceding utterance.  That is, it marks a shift from the kind of response made relevant 
by the preceding questions.  This shift hearably marks a hierarchy of relevance for 
Aaron, where he provides a minimal response to the production of a list, and, finally, 
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ignores the last list item and introduces his own list item ‘everyone says to me I’m 
honest’.  Indeed all of the design features of his response, including the use of the 
extreme case formulation ‘everyone says’, the misaligned response itself and the 
second repeat of the phrase ‘I’m honest’, produce the clear inference that ‘honesty’ is 
strongly oriented to among this constructed list of character features.  When Aaron is 
asked ‘what do you mean by that honest’ Aaron’s extensive response in the form of an 
elaborate scenic description serves to build the relevance of this characterisation.   
 
Thus, in response to the question in lines 829-30, Aaron produces a scenic description 
of the kinds of category predicates tied to the category ‘honest person’ as someone 
who when asked ‘did you do it’ admits to stealing and ‘smashing this dude’.  Honesty 
in this description is, therefore, described not in the normatively expectable terms of 
‘not stealing’, or even of normatively expectable rule-breaking in the form of not 
fighting, but in admitting to actions that others find accountable, hence the call to 
accountability ‘did you do this’.   Notice Aaron draws attention to his response as a 
‘laughing matter’, which has a candidate inference, in the absence of any sign of 
laughing-with in the described scene, that this is a laughing-at the scenic protagonist 
or, at the very least, a matter of careless laughter juxtaposed against the protagonists 
authoritative call for accountability.  In other words, this admission is hearable as 
resistance to a normatively expectable reciprocal positioning of authority = right to 
sanction and subject = obligation to accept sanctioning.  The ‘of course’ that initiates 
this line is also interesting, in that it may establish the occasioned nature of the 
‘honesty’.  That is, that this kind of laughing matter is occasioned when an 
accountable matter is ‘of course’ self-evident.  Self-evident perhaps because of the 
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publicly available nature of events or the publicly available matter of Aaron’s identity 
as the kind of person who would steal or ‘smash that dude’.  
 
The next described category feature of ‘honesty’ is designed as being somewhat 
different, although in the same collection as the first two-part list ‘did you steal that’ 
and ‘did you smash that dude’ This difference is raised through the conjunctive 
qualifier ‘I mean like’, which forewarns the listener that what follows is potentially a 
gloss.  What follows is described in lines 836-37 in terms of an oriented contrast 
between overt and covert predicates ‘I-I-I won’t say it to them I’ll go tell them to their 
face’ on the occasion of pejoratively confronting a ‘dickhead’.  In other words, Aaron 
overtly ascribes to a category associated with this feature, that is contrasted with a 
second kind of category who would just covertly ‘say it to them’, as in, some other 
party, and not overtly ‘go tell it to their face’.   
 
Interestingly, in lines 835-36 Aaron makes a noticeable repair, "Do you think that this 
du-this teacher's a dickhead?"  Arguably, the particle ‘du-‘is the first part of ‘dude’, 
which Aaron consistently employs as a neutral non-hierarchical person category, as he 
does in line 834.  A ‘teacher’ on the other hand is consistently oriented to by Aaron in 
terms of a contested claim to hierarchical rights ‘to tell him what to do’ and, 
furthermore, as a category where there is a normative acceptance of these rights. By 
making the repair, Aaron is evidently orienting to the difference between these 
categories.  He is, therefore arguably, orienting to a qualitatively different kind of 
claim in terms of being ‘honest’ when it comes to responding to the question ‘do you 
think this dude/teacher’s a dickhead?’  This produces the candidate inference that a 
distinguishing feature of being ‘honest’ is that he ‘tells it to their face’, rather than the 
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contrast ‘not telling it to their face’ and, presumably, to someone else’s face, despite 
an expectable hierarchy that normatively makes relevant deferential obligations not to 
do so.   
 
Consequently, there are at least two inferences that are made available by the repair.  
The first is that Aaron’s scenic example is a form of an extreme case formulation that 
emphasises the strength of his ascription to ‘honesty’.  In which case, the ‘telling it to 
their face’ to a ‘teacher’ also confirms the hierarchical legitimacy of ‘telling it to their 
face’ to any other less threatening category.  Of course, there’s an inference also made 
available here that this news is only newsworthy because it’s played against a 
normative background expectation that not ‘telling it to their face’ to authoritative 
figures arises from fear of possible consequences – an inference that is confirmed by 
category-tied predicates elsewhere in the text, ‘it’s a fear thing’. The second is that 
Aaron is limiting the activity of being honest to occasions involving either teachers or, 
more broadly, a collection of categories within a hierarchical relationship to Aaron.  
This latter inference, however, fails to explain Aaron’s descriptions elsewhere in the 
interview set where he ‘tells-them-to-their-face’ where the protagonists are in 
symmetrical albeit occasioned antagonistic relationships such as with ‘surfys’ or with 
‘friends’. 
 
The following response in line 838 takes up the category contrast ‘tell it to your face-
not tell it to your face’ to explore candidate categorisations that may not be ‘honest’:   
 
Extract 5.4 
838. R: Huhhuhhuh do you- huh with that honest stuff (.) do the ki- do the  
839. young people who don't get into trouble?  
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840. A: No they don't- they don't go off and (tell them dickhead [you're a])  
841. R:                                                        [they don't]= 
842. A: = to themselves oh I think that dude's a dickhead. 
843. R: Ah;h-ok and that's a real difference between you and them?= 
844. A: =Yep. 
845. R: Does that lead- get you into trouble?  
846. A: ((grimaces humorously))  
847. R: Huhhhuh[huhhuh] 
848. A:        [A:ll the time.] You fat pig. 
849. R: Huh[huh] 
850. A:    [Fuck] off coppers huh. 
 
Notice that Aaron’s response in line 840 works to cooperatively respond to an 
incomplete question in 838-39, which marks a strong agreement to the proposed 
candidate predicate ‘young-people-who-don’t-get-into-trouble’ = ‘don’t tell it to their 
face’ = not ‘honest’.  Aaron then builds on this predicate with the scenic description 
of this contrast category as someone who only tells it to themselves ‘oh I think that 
dude’s a dickhead’.  The reintroduction of the word ‘dude’ here is interesting because 
it works to deepen the contrast established by Aaron’s previous use of a ‘teacher’ as 
an extreme case formulation.  The inference here is that ‘young-people-who-don’t-
get-into-trouble’ are not just ‘not honest’ to ‘teachers’, but ‘not honest’ to any ‘dude’ 
a generic person category.   
 
Aaron then provides the upshot of being ‘honest’ as ‘getting into trouble’ in a series of 
otherwise cryptic scenic descriptions ‘you fat pig’ and ‘fuck off coppers huh’.  Of 
course, the category shift to ‘fat pig’ and ‘coppers’ would be perplexing without the 
collaborative turn by turn construction that takes place in this exchange.  This 
includes the humorous ‘puzzle’ design by Aaron in line 846 ‘grimaces humorously’ 
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and the ‘laughing with’ in 847 & 849 – all of which display a collaborative alignment 
and working-with my question in its proximal context.  Consequently, neither 
interview participants treat the introduction of ‘copper’ as nonsensical or accountable.   
This is because the collaboratively aligned features of Aaron’s introduction of 
‘copper’ serves to make the inference available that the identification of ‘copper’ is 
consistent with the use of ‘teacher’ in this sequence, largely because they share 
category features made relevant by Aaron’s descriptions of ‘being honest’. This 
retrospectively confirms, and simultaneously draws on, the previous ‘teacher’-as-
gloss candidate inference to help make sense of the unannounced introduction of 
‘copper’.  This produces the inference that both ‘teachers’ and ‘coppers’ on this 
occasion are members of the same collection of categories, ‘people-who-think-they-
can-tell-me-what-to-do’, that Aaron ‘tells them to their face’, which leads to ‘getting 
into trouble’.  Significantly, the addition of ‘fuck off copper’ here also makes 
available the inference that the activity of ‘telling them to their face’ not only includes 
the pejorative positioning ‘you fat pig’ but also the coupled overt declarative ‘fuck 
off’.   
 
Aaron’s avowal of ‘telling them to their face’ is not limited to these two categories, or 
even to this collection.  For example, in the sequence that immediately follows, Aaron 
describes an incident of being ‘honest’ with a counsellor.   Elsewhere, he describes 
himself being ‘honest’, that is, telling-them-to-their-face to ‘fuck off’ and ‘you’re a 
dickhead’, to such categories as ‘parents’, ‘old men’ and ‘surfys’.  Indeed, as will be 
shown later, the overt position-making of ‘you’re a dickhead’ is also a morally 
expectable occasioned attribute of the complimentary category ‘friends’.  This raises 
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the issue of hierarchical relevance with the inference that what is expectable for 
‘friends’ is expectable for other occasioned oppositional relationships.   
 
Conversely, Aaron provides several accounts involving scenic descriptions, including 
people who could abstractly be categorised as ‘teachers’ who are not ‘told to their 
face’.  Consequently, ‘telling them to their face’ is not tied the category ‘teacher’ or 
‘copper’ or, for that matter, ‘authority’ figure.    This kind of honesty, which can 
analytically be understood as pejorative and undisguisedly as overt position-making, 
is clearly an occasioned matter that is not abstractly and reactively bound to abstract 
categories.  It is inferably a sustained moral reasoning that is oriented to according to 
the contextually antagonistic circumstances where a ‘teacher’ or ‘copper’ or even a 
‘friend’ comes to be categorised as a ‘dickhead’ or a ‘pig’.  On these occasions it is 
clearly evident that what is morally obliged is an overt declaration, rather than the 
negatively positioned covert ‘tell themselves’ of his view of honesty, that is, to tell 
them to ‘fuck off’ and/or ‘telling them to their face’ that they are a ‘dickhead’. 
    
Similarly, Aaron’s response to the contrast categories ‘people-who-don’t-get-into- 
trouble’/‘people-who-get-into-trouble’ to make relevant the overt/covert moral logic 
is  not limited to this sequence and is consistently tied to ‘getting into trouble’.  Aaron 
persistently categorises ‘people-who-don’t-get-into-trouble’, which in the local school 
setting are categorised as ‘good people’, in terms of the ‘covert’, that is, ‘not-telling-
them-to-their-face’ category bound feature ‘talking shit’, as a contrast with ‘people-
who-get-into-trouble’.   In addition, other ‘people-who-get-into-trouble’, who are 
‘friends’ or ‘mates’, are consistently described in terms of ‘telling them to their face’. 
So, quite apart from the direct scenic summary provided above, Aaron’s repeated 
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orientation to the contrast between ‘good people’-‘people-who-get-into-trouble’ 
implies that this kind of overt honesty is a significant feature of the moral logic of 
‘getting into trouble’.   
 
There is also evidence in the above sequence, and throughout the entire interview set, 
that the category activity ‘tell them to their face’ is a category bound feature of 
‘smartarse’.  For example, Aaron’s description of the kind of person who is honest as 
the kind of person who in line 850 says ‘fuck off coppers’, which is also a category 
bound activity for ‘smartarse’, makes relevant the inference through Sacks’ ‘hearer’s 
maxim’ that being ‘honest’, in the sense of ‘telling them to their face’, is also a 
category bound feature of a ‘smartarse’.  In other words, ‘being honest’ or ‘telling 
them to their face’ is a moral position taken up by Aaron in his reflexive 
categorisation of himself as a ‘smartarse’.  This is consequentially relevant for 
‘getting into trouble’ and partly explains the ‘smartarse’ category bound feature of 
‘getting into trouble’.   
 
Certainly in Aaron’s classificatory moral reasoning, locally occasioned overt position 
making in oppositional relationships with ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-
to-do’, is explicitly tied to perceived threats to bodily autonomy and, therefore, is 
consequentially relevant for ‘getting into trouble’.  As he explains in the following 
account of ‘blowing up’:  
 
Extract 5.5 
180. R: Do you ever think (.) that you could (.) not say anything?  
181. A: ((A shakes head)) Nah:h. Not possible.  
182. R: Ah-yeh (.) yep.  
183. A: You know you know it’s like (.) it’s fuck’n (0.5) too hard. 
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184. R: mm 
185. A: Really really hard. 
186. R: mm  
187. (1.0) 
188. A: S'like if someone went n hit your daughter (0.5) could you say? 
189. Could you not say anything?  
190. R: No:o. 
191. A: It’s like that.  
192. R: [mm] 
193. A: [It] is exactly like that.  
194. (0.5) 
195. R: [mm] 
196. A: [It] is exactly like that. You cant- it’s (0.5) like (.) ah::h it’s  
197. just an instinct you know what I mean? Like  
198. R: Ye::[ah] 
199. A:     [(done)] it for that long n you feels that protective (0.5) of 
200. yourself (.) its like your daughter.  
201. (0.5) 
202. R: Yeh-ye:h= 
203. A: =If you like oh:h-mate.  
204. (0.8) 
205. R: No [it’s just] 
206. A:    [It’s exactly] [like that] 
207. R:                  [yeh yeh] 
208. A: It is exactly like that.  
 
Each of the organisational features of the sequence, including: (i) the extreme case 
formulation in lines 181, 183 & 185; (ii) the repetition of its ‘fuck’n hard’ and its 
really really hard; (iii) the use of the family membership device in line 188; and (iv) 
the overlapping utterance in line 206 ‘its exactly like that’ following what is a 
hearably dispreferred ‘no’ in line 205, each work to collectively confirm a rhetorical 
argument justifying ‘saying something’.  This rhetorical argument evidently makes 
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available Aaron’s moral reasoning that: (i) overt pejorative position making, and, 
presumably, antagonistic position taking, is not only a moral right, but, in oppositional 
relationships with ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ and ‘cunts’, is a 
category bound moral obligation; and (ii) that pejorative overt position making is 
inescapably bound to oppositional relationships with categories that constitutively 
disavow the right to ‘bodily autonomy’. This is consequentially relevant to the 
production of ‘getting into trouble’ and ‘blowing up’. 
 
5.3.2.2 ‘Voicing my Opinion’ 
In the accounts of ‘being honest’ Aaron works up a justification of pejorative position 
making.  However, Aaron also references another aspect of overt moral reasoning 
through a second overlapping category feature where his descriptions are inferably 
designed to display overt antagonistic position taking.  Aaron describes this category 
feature as the right to ‘voice my opinion’.  In the sequence below, Aaron specifically 
claims this right in ‘teacher’ relationships in a way that also ensures that ‘voicing my 
opinion’ is evidently hearable as position taking rather than just pejorative position 
making.  This sequence is a part of discussion where I asked Aaron how schools could 
be improved: 
 
Extract 5.6 
441. R: Oh-yeh (3.5) what's the difference between the centre and a regular  
442. school? (0.5) What are the different things you notice? 
443. A: Teachers are calm. [Um] 
444. R:                   [Are they?] (0.5) Oh:h-right ok. 
445. (1.0) 
446. A: Which (.)should be(.) in every single school. (1.2) Teachers can  
447. take (1.0) or you can give more abuse. (2.5)  Like (1.2) you- you can 
448. voice your opinion. (0.8) For the record.  
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449. R: huhhh 
450. (0.5) 
451. A: huh you can huh voice (.) you can (.) voice your opinion? (3.5) 
452. Basically. 
453. R: Yeh? (3.2) You can't do that so much in a regular school?  
454. A: Nah. (0.5) You go but sir and he goes but GET FUCKED. 
455. R: huhhuh= 
456. A: Not in those words but basically that's what he's saying. 
457. R: Right. 
 
In this sequence, Aaron once more deploys a category contrast to make relevant an 
avowed moral right to overtly ‘voice my opinion’.  On this occasion, the category 
contrast rests on the distinction between ‘teachers-at-the-centre’ and ‘teachers-at-a-
regular-school’, where a constitutive category feature of the former is that they are 
‘calm’ + ‘teachers can take or you can give more abuse’.  Consequently, Aaron is 
orienting to a set of rights and obligations where teachers have the obligation to take 
‘abuse’ and he has the right to give ‘abuse’.  Aaron, however, does not leave this 
utterance unqualified. He ties and, thereby, justifies the ‘teachers can take or you can 
give more abuse’ through the use of the gloss ‘like’ to the right to ‘voice your 
opinion’.  Consequently, the activity of ‘giving abuse’ is tied to, and has an 
implicative fit with, ‘voicing my opinion’.  However, ‘voicing my opinion’ is not 
necessarily, because of the ‘like’, an exact equivalent of the activity ‘giving abuse’.  
Instead, ‘giving abuse’ is a kind of ‘voicing my opinion’ and is justifiable on those 
occasions where ‘voicing my opinion’ is made relevant.  The corollary of this 
displayed logic is that ‘voicing my opinion’ is not inferentially limited to ‘giving 
abuse’, which has a candidate hearing of pejorative position making, but may include 
something else.   
 187 
The ‘for the record’ references prior collaborative humour and this explains the 
‘laughing with’ in the next line.  Aaron then proceeds to underscore the relevance of 
the right to overtly ‘voice my opinion’ in this giving and taking of abuse by repeating 
his statement and then providing the resolution, or summary, ‘basically’.  When the 
category contrast is drawn out in line 453, Aaron replies with the incredibly curious 
scenic description ‘you go but sir and he goes but GET FUCKED’.  Aaron introduces 
the scene with the inclusive ‘you go’ that produces the inference that what follows is 
expectable behaviour.  As Sacks notes, the use of the word ‘you’ in this way is clearly 
not referring to the researcher, nor solely referring to the speaker, rather, the use of the 
word ‘you’ is systematically ambiguous because it doesn't discriminate between 
singular and plural.  It’s a way of talking about something that refers to 'everybody', 
which avoids saying something peculiar about a particular individual position while 
orientating to the collective. At the same time the ‘you’ acts like a kind of 
incontestable commonsense rule – this is the kind of thing perforce anybody would do 
under these circumstances (1995, V1: 165-166).   
 
Thus, the ‘but sir’ is produced in a way to make the ‘but sir’ unremarkable.  This ‘but 
sir’ is, nevertheless, highly remarkable given that: (i) Aaron has just completed a 
thorough working up of ‘voicing my opinion’ in terms of ‘abuse’; and (ii) this is the 
only occasion in the entire interview set where he employs the word ‘sir’ in any scenic 
description, let alone a scenic description involving a ‘teacher’.  Of course some of 
this is mitigated by: (i) the use of the word ‘you’, which doesn’t say anything 
specifically about Aaron’s own scenic performance; and (ii) the availability of the 
previously worked up candidate inference that ‘voicing my opinion’ is not limited to 
abuse.  Nevertheless, the inclusive inferential quality of the ‘you’ in relation to the 
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‘sir’ stands in remarkable relief to his previous descriptions of ‘voicing my opinion’, 
as, for example, ‘get fucked you cunt’.  The difference between the ‘but sir’ and the 
‘get fucked you cunt’ is not only that the latter is normatively accountable but that 
Aaron orients to the need for an account for the second but not for the first.  In other 
words, he is designing this description of ‘voicing my opinion’ in such a way that it is 
defensible, and specifically defensible in terms of both expectable demeanour and 
expectable deference through the lexical choice of the ‘sir’.  Aaron is making relevant 
the category activity ‘voicing my opinion’ in an artful way that is uncomplicated by 
another possible categorisation ‘abuse’, which runs the risk of being accountable and, 
therefore, normatively morally questionable.    Quite clearly, ‘voicing my opinion’ is 
hearable on this occasion as antagonistic position taking rather than pejorative 
position making.  Of course, apart from anything else, Aaron is once again artfully 
displaying and managing a masterful appreciation of the logic of what is normatively 
expectable.  
 
If we look at the next part of the utterance we see that this normatively expectable 
deference and demeanour is juxtaposed with the normatively unexpectable and 
accountable departure from that demeanour – the ‘teacher’s’ scenic utterance ‘but get 
fucked’.  Aaron orients to this departure in his unprompted follow up account ‘not in 
those words but basically that's what he's saying’.   The clearly worked up inference 
being that the ‘get fucked’ is the ‘gist’ of all the possible things that ‘he’ ‘says’ on 
these kinds of occasions whilst not ever actually speaking this ‘get fucked’ on any 
occasion.  Thus Aaron is producing a fictional account to underscore a rhetorical 
argument. This rhetoric has to do with ‘voicing my opinion’, where at least one half 
(and noticeably not the other half) of the scenic illustration, ‘but sir-but get fucked’, is 
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described in terms of an overtly worked up metaphorical gist provided by ‘get fucked’ 
said by a ‘teacher’.    
 
The design features of this utterance draw attention to two embedded contrasts.  The 
first is between the unquestionable ‘but sir’ with the morally accountable ‘but get 
fucked’.  The second is between the implied reference to a ‘teacher’ expectably 
saying ‘get fucked’, but in some other words, and a ‘teacher’ unexpectably, although 
fictionally, saying ‘get fucked’.  Both of these contrasts artfully revisit the different 
nuanced aspects of the moral logic of ‘voicing my opinion’.   The first contrast turns 
on the word ‘but’ and is oriented to as such by Aaron.  This is clearly evident in the 
repetition of the word ‘but’. This amounts to an incredibly economical description in 
the complete absence of any scenic content.  Given that ‘but’ is a disagreement what 
is oriented to here is: (i) the right to voice disagreement, specifically with a  
‘teacher’; as opposed to (ii) the antagonistic refusal by the  ‘teacher’ of that right 
while avowing the right to voice the  scenic  ‘teacher’s’ own disagreement.  Clearly, 
Aaron draws attention to the moral reasoning of ‘voicing my opinion’, at least in the 
school setting, as the contested right to overtly declare disagreement and the 
observation that this contest normally takes place within a presumptively 
asymmetrical set of rights to do so.   
 
The second contrast inferentially references a category contrast previously 
mentioned.  By working up the contrast, Aaron is effectively orienting to the 
difference between the words the ‘teacher’ speaks and the words that he doesn’t 
speak.   If we accept that: (i) the speaking of ‘but get fucked’ is a category activity 
tied to the kind of person who ‘voices their opinion’; and (ii) that the meaning of ‘but 
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get fucked’ is a kind of ‘abuse’ oriented to as such by Aaron, then there is a clear 
inference that is made available.  The inference is that because he doesn’t speak these 
words the conditions for ‘voicing my opinion’ are unmet, but that nevertheless the 
gist of what is said is a kind of ‘abuse’.  That is, despite being unsaid, the 
illocutionary effect of what is said is abusively and ‘basically’ ‘get fucked’.  
Consequently, what Aaron is referencing here is a moral reasoning directly tied to the 
overt/covert contrast.  It is this logic that is being displayed in the way that he orients 
to in his description of ‘teachers’ in normal schools who do not overtly ‘voice their 
opinion’.  That is, openly disagreeing as ‘get fucked’ but covertly ‘voice their 
opinion’ as ‘get fucked’ ‘basically’, but not in those words.   
 
This kind of moral commitment to overt expression is a long way from Goffman’s 
(1956) point that normatively acceptable deference and demeanour enables endless 
covert deferential insinuations and endless covert stratagems for individual gain 
(478).  The traceable moral reasoning displayed here appears to consciously strip 
away and implicitly denounce those camouflaging aspects of demeanour, while 
simultaneously orienting to the asymmetries in the relationship pair surrounding the 
avowed but contested right to disagree or the right to ‘voice my opinion’.   
  
Before moving on to a closer examination of the ‘smartarse’/‘good people’ contrast 
pair, the threads of the preceding discussion can be drawn together in the following 
way: the category features ‘being honest’ and ‘right to voice my opinion’ reference a 
classificatory moral reasoning corresponding to a classificatory schema committed to 
overtly externalised voiced position taking and making on occasions marked by 
antagonistic positioning. This includes those occasions of ‘getting into trouble’ and 
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‘blowing up’ where oppositional relationship pairs, such as ‘smartarse’ / ‘people-
who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do, and antagonistic categories, such as ‘teacher’ 
or ‘dickhead’, are made relevant. Conversely, ‘covert’ position taking and making in 
oppositional relationships is morally repudiated. 
 
5.3.3 ‘Smartarses’, ‘Good people’ and Autonomous, Authoritative and 
Compliant Power Relations 
The analysis provided so far has largely relied on the avowed attributes of ‘smartarse’ 
in occasioned oppositional relationships to ‘teachers’.  However, it is important to 
appreciate that all of Aaron’s categorisation work employed in his talk of ‘getting into 
trouble’ is premised by this same classificatory schema suggested by the classificatory 
moral reasoning of autonomy.   To borrow a phrase from Sacks, the moral order of 
autonomy represents an ‘order at all points’ and is implicated throughout his talk of 
‘getting into trouble’ and across all of the category work undertaken in this talk (1995, 
V1: 484).   This includes the sequentially organised construction and juxtaposition of 
the contrast pair ‘smartarse’/ ‘good people’ and, as we shall see later, the oppositional 
pair ‘friend’/ ‘cunt’.   
 
Aaron also deploys the ‘smartarse’/‘good people’ category contrast to reference a 
second thread of complementary moral reasoning that appears to operate as a 
condition for the empirical expression of autonomy in social episodes.  Hence ‘good 
people’ are also reflexively distinguished from Aaron and the category ‘smartarse’ in 
terms of the constitutive category predicate ‘don’t care what happens’.  It is to an 
understanding of the moral reasoning made inferable by the making relevant of ‘don’t 
care what happens’ that we now turn.  
 192 
5.3.4 ‘Smartarses’, ‘Good people’ and ‘Don’t Care What Happens’  
Early in the first interview Aaron identified a constitutive category feature of 
‘smartarse’ as ‘don’t care what happens’.  Aaron was asked how a ‘teacher’, who he 
generally got on well with, would describe him.  He explained that she would describe 
him as a ‘standover merchant’, a ‘leader’, that he ‘stands up for himself’, that he was 
‘honest’ and that he was a ‘smartarse’.  He then explained that he was able to act like 
a ‘smartarse’ because he ‘didn’t care’ unlike ‘good people’ in school who ‘cared’ and 
didn’t get into trouble at school.  That is, he announces that the social expression of 
‘smartarse’ is contingent on ‘not caring’.  This reasoning is repeatedly underlined and 
made relevant throughout the interview set by the way in which Aaron inserts ‘don’t 
care’ as an appendix to his scenic descriptions of ‘getting into trouble’.   Thus the 
utterance ‘don’t care’ or ‘don’t’ care what happens’ is often tagged onto 
announcements of ‘get fucked’ or scenic descriptions of physically resisting ‘people-
who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ including ‘cops’ and ‘teachers’.   
 
In the following sequence, which occurred immediately after his explanation that he 
can be a ‘smartarse’ because he didn’t care, Aaron unpacks the moral reasoning of 
‘don’t care’: 
 
Extract 5.7 
673. A: So (.) that's what I mean because I don't care= 
674. R: = You don't care. 
675. (0.8) 
676. A: That’s’right. 
677. (1.0) 
678. R: Do kids? Do kids that are (0.4)[um] 
679. A:                               [Yeah] they think that's good. Yeh I 
680. don't care. I wish I could not care I wish I could do that I wish I  
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681. could go up’n jump in front of a car and not care what happens. Wish I 
682. could (.) you know (.) run across the road before- ‘nstead of waitin’ 
683. half an hour for the traffic to go by n y’know what I mean like 
684. R: Yeh-mm 
685. A: Wish I could do (.) do (3.0) do- do a back flip. How's it going  
686. buddy? 
687. ((to passerby)) Do a backflip. Pretty good. ((to passerby)) Um do a  
688. backflip. 
689. R: hhuhhhuh you do know so many people. 
690. A: Yeah:h do a- do a backflip on the- on- on the- on the bike and = 
691. R: =[yeh-yeh]  
692. A:  [Like] wish I wasn't scared what happened you know?  
693. R: Yeh-yeh- yeh they wish all those things.  
 
In working up the category contrast ‘smartarse’/‘good people’ Aaron again makes 
relevant the constitutive predicates: (i) fearlessness and fearfulness, as he does in line 
692 ‘wish I wasn’t scared’; and (ii) physical action, as he does in producing the long 
list of inferably dangerous actions in 679-690.  In this sequence, however, he ties 
these predicates to ‘don’t care what happens’.   Notably ‘what happens’ references the 
physical body.   Thus the scenic description of ‘good people’ producing a list of 
physical actions and bodily consequences: ‘I wish I could not care I wish I could do 
that I wish I could go up’n jump in front of a car and not care what happens.’ coupled 
with the final ‘wish I wasn’t scared what happened’.   
 
Apart from clearly making relevant ‘don’t care what happens’ in his account of 
‘getting into trouble’, there are a couple of other things that are worthwhile noting in 
this sequence that are also repeatedly reproduced in contextually similar 
circumstances throughout the interviews.  The first is that Aaron orients strongly to 
the association between ‘don’t care what happens’, ‘physical action’, ‘fearlessness’ 
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and ‘getting into trouble’.  Indeed, it is possible to argue that ‘don’t care what 
happens’ provides a coded summary for all three, just as it does here.  This is evident 
in the way that he sequentially juxtaposes them in this description, as he invariably 
does in every description of ‘getting into trouble’ that includes physical opposition.  It 
is also evident in the way that he provides an account of ‘smartarse’ and ‘getting into 
trouble’ involving physical action, through a final and concluding utterance, as he 
does in line 692, ‘like wish I wasn’t scared of what happened you know’. This 
utterance immediately follows the list of items and is consequently imminently 
hearable as a summary and conclusion. Significantly, the force of this last utterance as 
a concluding summary is further emphasised by his overlapping turn.  The 
overlapping turn is arguably an interrupting topic shift for this next turn, despite the 
aligning opportunity that I provide in my turn for him to continue his descriptive list.  
 
In addition, there are at least three other organisational features of the sequence that 
help to produce the inference, and thus the inferable moral argument, that ‘getting into 
trouble’ is consequentially and irrevocably bound to ‘don’t care what happens’.  The 
features include: (i) the overlapping turn in line 679 that is also hearably an 
interruption that produces the inference of strong alignment with the forthcoming 
utterance; (ii) the use of a three part argument, that is, ‘jump in front of the car’, ‘run 
across the road’ and ‘do a backflip on the bike’; and (iii) the use of direct reported 
speech in the production of scene.  The direct speech underscores how the purported 
event should be heard, and thereby blending the ‘reconstructed moral activity from the 
past with the in situ moralisation enacted in the present’ (Bergman in Roulston, 2001: 
103-104). 
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‘Don’t care what happens’, then, is particular way of thinking that Aaron declares is 
tied to the category ‘smartarse’.  This reasoning, through its valorised association with 
‘fearlessness’, is reflexively tied to the category ‘smartarse’, in contrast to 
‘fearfulness’, which is tied to both of the other two categories in the ‘School 
Relations’ MCD. Thus it is hearable as moral reasoning along the lines of a fearless 
‘don’t care what happens’, as opposed to a fearful ‘care what happens’.  In addition, 
Aaron overtly declares that the moral reasoning of ‘don’t care what happens’ enables 
the expressive acts of autonomy, including social acts performed in the defence of 
autonomy.    In this sense, the classificatory schema corresponding to the moral 
reasoning of ‘don’t care what happens’ can be understood as a governing condition 
that moderates the empirical expression of the primary moral reasoning of autonomy.   
 
5.3.5 Summary 
This section has primarily examined ‘smartarse’, ‘teacher’ and ‘good people’ talk in 
Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble’ to unpack the classificatory schema 
associated with ‘getting into trouble’ and blowing up.  The key to understanding these 
schemas is to understand the primary importance of Aaron’s claim to symmetrical 
power relations with teachers, which amounts to the moral right to autonomy.  This 
represents a stable classificatory moral reasoning across a number of different situated 
contexts.  The classificatory moral reasoning of autonomy articulates with two other 
sets of moral reasoning.  The first, the moral reasoning of overtly voiced expression, 
governs aspects of demeanour and the overtly voiced social expression of the moral 
reasoning of autonomy.  The second, the classificatory moral reasoning associated 
with ‘don’t care what happens’, serves as a condition that moderates the social 
expression of the moral reasoning of autonomy.  The classificatory moral reasoning of 
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autonomy can, therefore, be said to act as the primary moral reasoning that articulates 
with these other two sets of complementary moral reasoning.  Together, they suggest 
an overarching classificatory schema centred on autonomy. 
 
5.4 ‘Friends’/‘Cunts’ MCD 
The following section seeks to tease out pertinent elements of disposition referenced 
by the classificatory schema made inferable in the ‘friends’/‘cunts’ MCD.  This 
section will show that the categorisation talk tied to ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’, like the 
‘school relationships’ MCD, also makes inferable classificatory schema centred on a 
classificatory moral reasoning of autonomy.     An examination of this talk will 
expose further nuanced elements of the classificatory moral reasoning of autonomy as 
well as to identify an additional aspect of demeanour associated with a moral 
commitment to the overt physical expression of autonomy.   
 
5.4.1 ‘Friends’, ‘Cunts’ and Autonomy, Trust and Power 
In Aaron’s talk of ‘getting into trouble’, he repeatedly draws attention to a contrast 
between ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’ based on a set of attributes orienting to issues of ‘power 
over’ his body.  This occurs in sequences that authorise resistance to disavowed 
exercises of arbitrary authority.    Accordingly, a constitutive feature of ‘friends’ is 
that they can be ‘trusted’, in that they do not try to have ‘power over’ Aaron while 
‘cunts’ cannot be ‘trusted’ because they constitutively are attributed as trying to have 
‘power over’ him and attempt to physically enforce that ‘power over’ him.  The 
‘friends’/’cunts’ contrast pair overlaps the ‘school relationships’ MCD so that other 
‘smartarses’ and ‘good people’  and, significantly, ‘teachers’ and ‘adults’ can be 
categorised as ‘friends’ or ‘cunts’ according to the contrasting locally occasioned 
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attributes of ‘trust’/‘power over’.   In addition, the contrasting attributes of ‘trust’ and 
‘power over’ are tied to another set of category-tied attributes that are explored below.  
Aaron also employs the ‘friends’/‘cunts’ contrast pair to valorise and normalise 
physical fighting and draws a distinction between the meaning of physical conflict 
between ‘friends’ and with ‘cunts’ that once again rhetorically authorises the moral 
right to autonomy.   
 
The following extract provides a sustained series of sequential categorisations that 
exemplify Aaron’s rhetorical use of the ‘friends’/‘cunts’ contrast pair.  This extract 
occurs within a conversational storyline of teachers who try to ‘stand over you’. 
 
Extract 5.8  
260. A: [IF MY friend] 
261. R: To you. 
262. A: If MY friend (0.5) come up n said to me (0.5) don't do that (.)   
263. you're a dickhead. I'd go righteo (.) alright. (2.0) But if a teacher 
264. come up n said Don't do that. (2.0) You'll get somethin' rahrahrah. I'd 
265. go GET FUCKED. I'll smash you you dumb cunt. 
266. R: What’s the difference? 
267. A: What’s the difference?  
268. R: Yeah.  
269. A: Because I know they're talkin' shit. 
270.  (2.0) 
271. R: Oh:h ok= 
272. A: N they r- n they (.) their- their just they're not me mate. (2.0) O  
273. I'm ya mate rahrahrah rahrahrah.  
 
In this sequence Aaron works up the contrast between ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’ via a 
number of attributes related to issues of power, ‘speaking shit’ and fighting.  
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Curiously, in lines 262-63, Aaron specifically provides a categorisation of ‘friends’ in 
similar terms as ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ through the scenic 
description of ‘don’t do that (.) you’re a dickhead’.  This is immediately hearable as 
‘telling him what to do’.  However, in the case of ‘friends’, the ‘don’t do that’ is 
followed by unhesitating compliance rather than a refusal.  The point is underlined in 
the utterance by the repeated agreement ‘righteo (.) alright’ and the absence of any 
sanction ‘get fucked do what I want’.  In other words, Aaron neatly makes available 
the inference in this opening utterance that the contrast between ‘friends’ and ‘people-
who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’, a category made inferentially available 
through the specific reference to its constitutive predicate, orients specifically to who 
has the  moral authority to tell him ‘don’t do that’.   
 
Aaron then flags a forthcoming category contrast by starting with the long pause 
followed by the ‘but’ in line 263.   Notice the lexical structure of the description 
provided in line 264 ‘don’t do that’ and ‘you’ll get somethin’ differs from previous 
scenic descriptions of ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’.  This 
difference occurs with the addition of a second part ‘you’ll get something’, hearable 
as a threat of some kind of sanction.   This is immediately followed by the same 
routinely offered refusal ‘get fucked’, but with an alternative categorisation ‘you 
dumb cunt’.  By inference, this utterance constitutively ties the category ‘cunt’ not 
only to the activity ‘telling me what to do’ but also to the kind of person who goes 
further, with threatened sanctions.  An investigation of the rest of the interview set 
reveals that Aaron invokes the category ‘cunt’ on 28 of 29 occasions under exactly the 
same local circumstances.  That is, Aaron provides a category description of ‘cunt’ = 
claimed right to tell me what to do + threatened or actual sanction.  Furthermore, the 
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single exception does not disrupt the moral features of the category in use but, instead, 
orients to a second tied feature of the category contrast ‘friends’/‘cunt’, that is ‘friend’ 
= ‘trust’ + ‘know’ or ‘understand’ him/‘cunts’ = ‘tell him what to do’ + ‘don’t know 
him’.  Moreover, throughout Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble’, it is the actual 
expression of this right to sanction that prompts a category shift from ‘people-who-
think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ to ‘cunt’.  In other words, the act of threatening or 
applying sanctions is the constitutive attribute for the category ‘cunt’.   Under such 
circumstances Aaron reflexively claims the right to symmetrically respond with his 
own sanctions ‘I’ll smash you’.   
 
Interestingly, the way in which Aaron organises the contrast between ‘cunts’ and 
‘friends’ in this sequence represents a category puzzle whose resolution exposes an 
important feature of Aaron’s moral reasoning surrounding ‘people-who-think-they-
can-tell-me-what-to-do’. Thus, in Aaron’s talk, as evidenced above, ‘friends’ 
constitutively have the right to say ‘don’t do that’. But this ‘don’t do that’, while 
imminently hearable as ‘telling me what to do’, is clearly not oriented to, as such, by 
Aaron, because of the worked up category contrast.  In other words, Aaron does not 
hear this as ‘telling me what to do’, which establishes a kind of category puzzle that is 
oriented to in line 266 with ‘what’s the difference?’    
 
The resolution of this puzzle is provided in Aaron’s following response ‘they talk shit’ 
+ ‘they’re not me mate’ where the ‘they talk shit’, on this occasion, is tied to the 
disavowed claim to being a ‘mate’.  Aaron makes available the inference that the 
constitutive grounds for categorisation of ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-
to-do’ and subsequently of ‘cunt’ are not met just by the utterance ‘don’t do that’ but 
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in something to do with whatever is alerted by the category shift ‘friends’ to ‘mates’.  
To understand the importance of this category shift, in terms of what is being made 
inferable, it is first necessary to examine the construction of the category puzzle.  
What then becomes evident is that Aaron consistently orients to a moral reasoning to 
do with power relations throughout this entire sequence, and that he works hard to 
make the elements of this logic evident in both the construction of the category puzzle 
and in its subsequent resolution.  
  
So, returning to the initial part of the sequence, where the puzzle is constructed, the 
first thing to notice is that ‘don’t do that’, as opposed to ‘do this’, can be heard as 
‘advice-giving’ rather than directing.  Significantly, there are no cases in the interview 
set of ‘friends’ or ‘mates’ saying the openly authoritative ‘do this’.  If we look at the 
organisational features of the utterance we can see that contrast orients to the 
difference in the second part of the scenic first order accounts rather than the first, 
given that the ‘don’t do that’ remains constant.  That is, that the category contrast and 
moral force of the utterance orients to the difference between ‘you’re a dickhead’ and 
‘you’ll get somethin’.  This offers a candidate inference that the ‘don’t do that’ and 
implicitly ‘do this’ is constituted as ‘telling me what to do’ only because the speaker 
is positioned as also inferably claiming the arbitrary moral right to sanction if the 
directive is ignored, that is, ‘you’ll get somethin’.  Therefore, what appears to be of 
critical import to Aaron, which is oriented to as such both here and throughout the 
data set, is not the ‘don’t do that’ and presumably ‘do this’ but, rather, the tied threat 
or act of sanctioning.  In which case, both the category ‘people-who-think-they-can-
tell-me-what-to-do’ and the category ‘cunts’ are constitutively attributed by Aaron as 
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claiming a disavowed moral right to sanction because it is this inferable moral right 
that definitively constitutes a hearing of ‘telling me what to do’.   
 
The moral elements present in the construction of the puzzle are present in its 
resolution.  Aaron begins his account in line 269 with a predicate contrast that 
presumably encapsulates the solution to the puzzle, that is, ‘cunts’ = ‘talk shit’ = make 
illegitimate claims to ‘being my mate’.  The organisational features of the sequence 
that make available the hearing of a category contrast consequently also make 
available the contrasting candidate inference that ‘friends’ = ‘don’t talk shit’ = make 
legitimate claims to mateship. Furthermore, while ‘talking shit’ is substantively 
described in this example as making illegitimate claims about mateship it is also 
generically defined in terms of making illegitimate claims to ‘being honest’.  This 
candidate inference is confirmed elsewhere in the data set, where Aaron describes this 
same generic feature as ‘being honest’ and ties this feature to ‘being trustworthy’ and 
attributes this predicate to ‘friends’.  The puzzle can be reframed in the question, in 
what specific way is this disavowed claim to mateship and ‘talking shit’ and, by 
inference, ‘being honest’ and ‘being trustworthy’, relevant to the moral features 
embedded in Aaron’s talk?  Or, what are the specific indexical features of ‘talking 
shit’, ‘mateship’ and so on that are being made relevant?  The rest of this sequence 
works to build up exactly what is being made relevant.   
 
Extract 5.9 
274. A: I'd go back to that fuck’n centre just like that. If they said  
275. righteo your comin’ back today I'd go righteo walk in there (.) n go  
276. righteo doin’ my work. (1.0) But fuck if they went (1.0) well(.) w- you  
277. realise we can do this I'd jump up n go well do it. (1.0) Fuck’n do it. 
278. (0.5) Don't just stand here fuck’n do it. Do somethin’ ’bout it.(1.0) 
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279. I'm waitin’ for you (.) I don't- don't want to stand around here. (1.0) 
280. S’like I do it with all my friends. I have fights with them constantly.  
281. (1.0) The next day we're just like yep let’s go(.) let’s go down to Bi 
282. Lo. (3.0) 
 
In lines 274-282 Aaron returns to the category contrast ‘friends’/‘cunts’ and once 
again returns to the problematic ‘cunts’ = threat of sanction, which in line 276-77 is 
‘well you realise we can do this’.  Aaron then underscores his moral problem by 
attributing fighting as a routinely and morally expectable attribute of ‘friends’ ‘I have 
fights with them constantly’, but then adds a feature in lines 281-82 ‘the next day 
we're just like yep let’s go (.) let’s go down to Bi Lo.’ It can be seen here that Aaron 
works up a moral parable – a tale of two fights with two very different aftermaths.  
His moral message is revealed in the contrast between ‘teachers’ who follow with 
sanctions and ‘friends’ who continue on with a collaborative life-as-usual activity.  
Therefore, rather artfully, Aaron incidentally diverts possible criticisms of ‘fighting’ 
with ‘teachers’ as morally problematic by establishing ‘fighting’ with ‘friends’ as 
routine and expectable.  The inferable hierarchical moral order consequently ensures 
that if fighting with ‘friends’ is morally acceptable then fighting with others is 
assuredly so.  But then, once again, returns to the moral problem ‘tell me what to do’ 
and ‘threaten sanction’.  Consequently, what is clearly being made relevant about 
‘mates’ is an inferable egalitarianism stemming from the categorisation of ‘mates’ 
‘fighting’.  ‘Mates’ ‘fighting’ is not tied to implied power relations that are tied to 
threats of sanctions and inferably ‘don’t tell me what to do’.  It is an egalitarianism 
that, through the worked up contrast, is problematically absent from power 
relationships with these ‘teachers’. 
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The exchange that follows continues to work and rework the moral problem of ‘telling 
me what to do’ and category bound rights to sanction through the ‘friends’/‘cunt’ 
contrast.   
 
Extract 5.10 
295. R: Next day it was sweet. Was it sweet? 
296. A: Yeah fuck’n oath. Went down Bi Lo n (.) went n stole a fuck’n twenty 
297. bucks of chocolate n had somethin' to eat.   
298. ((R looks around to check if anyone was listening))  
299. A: Oh they know I do it I'm banned from Bi Lo (.) huh 
300. R: Mm. 
301. (1.0) 
302. A: But (.) like (.) you know (.) its (.) 
303. R: Aah= 
304. A: =They don't care= 
305. R: =I mean gen- there's no hard feelings?  
306. A: No hard feelings. We just talk about it mate fuck’n wasn't that a  
307. six hit I gave you last night ye:h’n I broke your thumb’n I sm:ashed 
308. ya. Then he goes ye:ah (.) that was pretty funny remember the time I 
309. fuck’n (.) clocked you that day you know what I mean like (.) we jus’ 
310. had a laugh about it. (2.0) Like (.) you know what I mean? Do what we  
311. do. 
312. (0.5) 
313. R: So:o if the tea:chers?= 
314. A: =Now if the teachers went oh you know that was so funny I'd go get  
315. fucked that wasn't funny cunt you (        ) fuck’n grab me like that.  
316. Grab me like that again n I'll kill ya.  
317. (0.5) 
318. R: What's the difference Aaron? 
319. A: What's the difference [cause] 
320. R:                       [mm] 
321. A: I know who I can trust n who I can't (2.0) I know that was all that 
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322. wasn't all (0.5) yeh righteo (.) emotional. That was all fuck’n my 
323. emotions. (0.5) Not theirs. (1.0) Power (.) they were tryin’ to have  
324. power over me. 
325. R: A::h ok. And your mates don't? 
326. A: My mates don't. They just (0.5) try to voice their opinion like I do  
327. R: huhhuhhuh  
328. (2.0) 
329. A: Yeh it doesn't happen. You just go no I'm voicing my opinion n I go 
330. fuck off you cu:nts (3.0) you know what I mean. We have different (.) 
331. everyone has different (.) like (0.5) everyone has different opinions. 
 
Notice how Aaron introduces three other predicates for ‘friends’, that is ‘friends’ = 
‘they don’t care’ (about fighting) + can be trusted + the right to ‘voice my opinion’.  
He uses these predicates to once again orient to the moral problem of sanctions and 
power relations tied to ‘telling me what to do’.  Aaron provides an account of ‘they 
don’t care’ by working up the category contrast ‘friends’/‘cunts’. He achieves this 
through a scenic description of ‘friends’ who have ‘no hard feelings’ and who ‘just 
laugh about it’.  Notice how the ‘just’ works to construct an extreme case formulation 
‘just’ this and only this and nothing else.  Furthermore, these ‘friends’, in this account 
of ‘six hits’ and broken thumbs, are routinely and expectably ‘doing what we do’.  
Aaron then juxtaposes the happy picture of ‘friends’ against a moral complaint about 
fighting with ‘cunts’, where the expectable response is threatened sanction “I’m going 
to kill ya’.  The justification of this worked up contrast is subsequently provided in the 
key contrasting ‘friends’/ ‘cunts’ constitutive predicates: ‘friends’ = ‘trust’ and ‘cunts’ 
= ‘can’t trust’ which are specifically articulated in terms of an account overtly 
orienting to power relations.  That is, the contrasting moral responses to fighting is 
justified as the product of a positioning of fighting with ‘friends’ in terms of a set of 
inferably universal and significantly egalitarian moral rights, ‘just’ ‘voicing opinion’ 
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as ‘everybody has different opinions’ + ‘expressing emotion’.  This is juxtaposed 
against what is disavowed in ‘cunts’, neither ‘voicing opinion’ nor ‘not their 
emotions’ but the duplicated emphasis in line 323-24, ‘power (.) they were tryin’ to 
have power over me’.   
 
The introduction of the word ‘power’ here is particularly important. Aaron’s 
occasioned use of the word ‘power’ here and on several other occasions provides the 
empirical warrant for an account of Aaron’s categorisation talk of ‘smartarses’, 
‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’, ‘good people’, ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’ 
as an oriented concern with ‘power relations’, that is, an empirical concern of Aaron’s 
rather than a conclusion arrived at through abstract analysis. This is because his use of 
the word ‘power’ is tied to both ‘smartarse’ predicates ‘always in trouble kinda thing’ 
and the right to symmetrical power relations.   The word ‘power’ has a particular 
concrete meaning in this analytical account that is specifically tied to a set of avowed 
and disavowed rights to ‘stand over’, ‘to tell him to do’ and to apply sanctions, which 
amounts to forcing him to do something.   
 
What is clearly and repeatedly oriented to, and repeatedly made relevant in the 
categorisation of ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’ and the category shift to ‘mates’, is a claimed 
right to symmetrical power relations that is rhetorically authorised and legitimised 
through  this category talk.   Thus, ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’ are constitutively categorised 
in terms of a cluster of predicates, ‘friends’ = ‘not talking shit’ + ‘trust’ + ‘voice 
opinion’ and ‘cunts’ = ‘talk shit’ + ‘can’t trust’ + ‘power over’ + ‘claimed rights to 
sanction for violation of ‘power over’.  Notably, each and every predicate is 
characterised in relation to contested claims of symmetrical and asymmetrical power 
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relations.    This once again foregrounds the primary orientation to power relations in 
Aaron’s talk.  
 
5.4.2 ‘Friends’, ‘Cunts’ and Autonomy as Bodily Autonomy 
The way in which Aaron makes relevant ‘forcing him to do something’ brings our 
attention to something that otherwise is plainly articulated by Aaron, but its 
consequential significance may be overlooked.  It is this: when Aaron orients to his 
right to autonomy he is demonstrably orienting to autonomy of action, that is, people 
can’t tell him what to do.  But what might be missed here is that this is an autonomy 
bound up with the right ‘to do’ as a physical right to act, that is, he strongly works up 
a notion of ‘autonomy’ in terms of an independence of the body to act freely. This 
kind of bodily autonomy needs to be distinguished from a range of other abstractly 
possible kinds of autonomy, most notably, and perhaps most expectably, the 
autonomy of an independent internalised self.  This sense of independent internalised 
autonomy is captured in Goffman’s descriptions of deference games.  According to 
Goffman, actors can display outward deference as a means of strategically achieving 
covert personal goals, thus ‘preserving inner autonomy’ in the face of displayed 
asymmetrical deference (1956: 478).    There is little of this sense of ‘inner’ autonomy 
evident in Aaron’s talk.   
 
Aaron consistently works up the logic of autonomy solely in terms of an externalised 
physical bodily autonomy.  This notion of autonomy as bodily autonomy is repeatedly 
displayed in Aaron’s talk in several ways.  First, Aaron constructs a description of the 
attributes of the category ‘smartarse’ solely in these terms, hence ‘you do what you 
want and I do what I want’.  Second, Aaron’s scenic contests focus solely on 
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protagonists who ‘thought they could tell him what to do’.  That is, they thought that 
they could tell him to ‘go do this’, to wear particular clothes, to not skate somewhere, 
to do work and so on.  Third, Aaron works up the contrast category ‘good people’, 
where the contrast hinges on bodily autonomy. In particular it hinges on a category 
bound feature described in terms of a bodily action that either disavows or subscribes 
to the obligation to physically comply with directives.  So ‘good people’ ‘do their 
homework’ ‘wear their uniform’ ‘go home’ and ‘just stop’2.  Fourth, he works up 
complimentary categories of ‘smartarse’ ‘friends’ who physically act as opposed to 
the contrast category ‘good people’ ‘friends’ who only ‘talk shit’.  Fifth, he works up 
a complimentary category of ‘teachers-he-can-trust’ = ‘know what he is going to do’ 
+ ‘do not try to forcibly physically restrain him’. He juxtaposes this category with an 
oppositional category ‘teachers-he-can’t trust’ who ‘do not know what he is going to 
do’ and who ‘try to forcibly physically restrain him’.  Finally, he overtly and directly 
defines a sense of autonomy as ‘being able to do anything’ with being physically 
‘untouchable’.  
 
There is a significant upshot to Aaron’s orientation of autonomy as bodily autonomy 
rather than an internalised autonomy.  Aaron strongly orients to external actions of 
other members as the source for possible threats to bodily freedom.   What’s at stake 
here, and what is being played out in the struggle for symmetrical power relationships, 
                                                 
2 In sequence 5.6 above Aaron also includes the category feature good people = respect their dad + 
respect their mum.  The use of ‘respect’ here is the only example that Aaron employs in his 
categorisations that carries a candidate inference of a non-physical category feature.  However, the 
category feature ‘respect’ in this line, as a member of a list of active attributes, has at least a candidate 
inference of respect = a collection of actions that demonstrate deference and an appropriate deferential 
demeanour to their  ‘teachers’.  In other words, it ties the list of compliant actions (do their work, 
homework, go home, wear their uniform) to a ‘good people’ category bound obligation of deference 
(respect).  This candidate inference is strengthened by the last line in this sequence where Aaron 
produces the contrast to his preceding list of ‘good people’ attributes as ‘I'm not doing that do it 
yourself’.   That is, not respecting is tied to the activity of not doing.  Consequently, ‘respect’ is bound 
to bodily actions.   
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is the control of the body.  In the absence of any evident orientation to an internalised 
sense of autonomy and a strong orientation to a sense of bodily autonomy, threats to 
bodily autonomy appear to take on an existential status, that is, threats to bodily 
autonomy appear to operate as if they constitute an existential crisis.   
 
The force and moral dynamics of this crisis is exemplified in the following sequence, 
where Aaron provides a scenic account to what he constructs as the expectable and 
logical conclusion to his struggle for bodily autonomy.  The following sequence 
occurs as a part of an account where Aaron was asked what the teachers would now 
say about him since the episode of ‘blowing up’.  ‘Dulwich’ refers to a state juvenile 
detention centre.  
 
Extract 5.11 
 
439. A: He can go to the boys home he's got too much aggression for the  
440. outside world. (1.0) And he doesn't give a fuck.(.)I was sayin’ the 
441. other day like (0.5) I don't ca:re (1.0) that'swh I mean. Like (.) (I 
442. think-) I know what was goin’ to happen to me I just (.) didn't care. 
443. (0.5) Cunt wants to fuck’n grab me I'll grab (the cunt). Someone grabs 
444. me I'll fuckn’ smash the cunt.  
445. (1.0) 
446. R: Ye::h. (0.5) Like it sounded from what you were sa:ying. (0.5) That  
447. what was most important to you in that whole thing was that no one was  
448. gonna grab you.  
449. A: [yeh] 
450. R: [and th-] 
451. A: Like he did like w- well um just went "fuck off ya [cunt."] 
452. R:                                                   [O yeh] yep. (0.5) 
453. S:o they'd say o yeah >you've got too much aggression you need to go to 
454. Dulwich<= 
455. A: =Yeh 
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456. R: Um= 
457. A: =mm 24/7 y’know. 
458. R: >24/7 "yes I'm watching [you]."<  
459. A:                         [yep]. 
460. R: What do you think of that?  
461. A: Th-th-think its probably fuckin true but they're not sending me to  
462. one.  
463. R: Huhhuh[huh] 
464. A:       [First] cunt that tries to put me- o look it'll probably 
465. happen. First cunt that tries to do that (.) I’m gonna-I'm gonna kill.  
466. Like I- if-if DoCS come and go you're goin’ to Dulwich. Come with us  
467. now I'm just gonna walk inside grab a knife and go right I'm not goin’ 
468. to Dulwich I'm not goin’ nowhere.  
469. (1.0) 
470. R: Yeh [right ] 
471. A:     [I mean] but I'm- I'm scared of that right I'll admit that I  
472. don't want to go like there. (0.5) I'm scared but I know what'll  
473. happen.  
 
It is highly significant that Aaron openly and notably ‘admits’ to being ‘scared’ of the 
threat of bodily imprisonment.  This contrasts strongly with the disavowed fearfulness 
occasioned by the threat of physical harm from ‘parents’’, noted above.  Or with any 
other potential physical threats to his body, such as through fighting or skating or 
‘doing a backflip on a bike’.  In fact, ‘fear’ and ‘fearlessness’, in relation to the threat 
of physical harm, are disjunctive category features that Aaron employs to establish 
‘smartarse’/‘good people’ and ‘smartarse’/‘teachers’ and even ‘smartarse’/‘cops’ to 
contrast oppositional categories throughout the interviews.  On this occasion, and only 
on this occasion of threatened bodily imprisonment, Aaron takes up the occasioned 
feature of ‘being scared’.   Furthermore, the organisational features of his utterance in 
line 471-73 ensures that this newsworthy admission is heard as being warranted by 
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exceptional and extreme circumstances of bodily imprisonment. These features 
include where he makes the avowal of ‘being scared’ and then immediately makes the 
avowal an accountable and particularly newsworthy matter with the “I’ll admit that’ 
and then ‘I don’t want to go like there’.  This provides the justification for his 
preceding threats ‘I’m gonna- I’m gonna kill’.   
 
The entire sequence is made hearable as an extreme case whose extremity is 
embedded in a claimed right to autonomy understood as a logic of bodily autonomy, 
where threats to bodily autonomy constitute a major crisis precipitating ‘blowing up’.  
This, therefore, prompts a revision of our previous summary of the key constitutive 
predicate for ‘smartarse’ and, subsequently, a deeper appreciation of Aaron’s moral 
reasoning and the primary classificatory schema.  That is, ‘smartarse’ = right to 
bodily autonomy in power relations.   
 
5.4.3 ‘Friends’, ‘Cunts’ and the Physical Performance of Bodily Autonomy  
It has been previously argued that ‘Being Honest’ and ‘Voicing My Opinion’ can be 
understood as a moral reasoning that legitimises and authorises an overtly declared, or 
voiced, social expression of the right to bodily autonomy.  This is one aspect of the 
social performance of bodily autonomy.  Aaron’s talk of ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’ flags a 
second aspect that takes the form of an overtly externalised physical social 
performance of bodily autonomy.  This moral reasoning is made inferable through a 
specific set of self avowed predicates, including ‘fighting’ and ‘smashing people’, and 
the self avowed predicate physical fearlessness.   
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It has already been shown in the analysis of the overlapping categories ‘friends’ and 
‘mates’ that Aaron vindicates physical fighting as a morally expectable activity in 
locally occasioned antagonistic relationships with ‘friends’ and ‘mates’.  Indeed, the 
category bound activity of ‘mates’ mutually celebrating ‘fighting’ marks a category 
transformation between the use of the overlapping categories ‘friends’ and ‘mates’ 
throughout his talk.  Hence, physical ‘violence’ as ‘fighting’ is not understood as 
morally deplorable but is, instead, celebrated as a morally expectable reflection of a 
category bound egalitarianism between ‘mates’ and ‘friends’ as a product of the right 
to ‘voice their opinion’.   
 
The hierarchical relevance of ‘fighting’ with other oppositional category pairs is made 
available here in terms of this same right to ‘voice their opinion’.  That is, if physical 
‘violence’, as fighting, is morally expectable between ‘friends’ and/or mates, then it is 
also morally acceptable activity with other locally occasioned antagonistic categories.  
This inference is reinforced through two other features of his talk, including that in 
extract 7.13 above.  These features include: (i) the claim that ‘everybody has the right 
to voice their opinion’ and, therefore, by implication, ‘everybody’ has an expectable 
moral right to ‘fighting’; and (ii) the way in which Aaron works up a category contrast 
between ‘mates’ and ‘cunts’ on the basis of the contrast between the attributed 
intention of the physical conflict, ‘voicing my opinion’/ ‘power over’, rather than the 
physical conflict itself.  Noticeably, there is no complaint attached to the activity of 
physical conflict in any scenic description of physical ‘violence’ or threats of physical 
‘violence’, whether it’s between ‘mates’ or with ‘cunts’ or ‘teachers’, ‘parents’ and so 
on.  Conversely, physical fighting as an activity is morally normalised through the 
extreme case formulation ‘I have fights with them constantly’ where there are ‘no 
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hard feelings’.  In other words, ‘fights’ is not an activity that should carry ‘hard 
feelings’.  Aaron also establishes fighting prowess itself as a morally attractive feature 
that hierarchically arranges characters in his scenic descriptions according to their 
skill.  Invariably, Aaron positions himself as someone who in fighting, or incidents of 
physical violence, ‘has it all over’ other characters in his scenic accounts.   
 
Fighting as an expression of bodily autonomy is also routinely tied to the attribution 
of positively valued and self-avowed predicate physical fearlessness and contrasts 
with the negatively valued and disavowed predicate physical fearfulness within the 
’school relationships’ MCD.   In this way, ‘fighting’ and physical expression within 
occasioned antagonistic relationships are morally praiseworthy because of the 
predicate association between ‘fighting’ and ‘fearlessness’.  Not fighting, on the other 
hand, is accountably morally reprehensible because of the attribution of fearfulness.  
Thus, Aaron produces derogatory accounts of ‘good people’ ‘not doing anything’ in 
occasioned oppositional relationships with ‘teachers’ because of the category 
constitutive feature ‘it’s a fear thing’.  Aaron also makes relevant ‘fear’ and 
‘fearlessness’ within his accounts of antagonistic relationships with ‘teachers’ in 
situations that warrant both threats of violence and fighting.  These two constitutive 
category features ‘fighting’ + ‘fearlessness’ are therefore distinctive features of the 
moral landscape in Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble’.  However, these 
category features occasioned by antagonistic relationships with ‘teachers’ are not 
produced in isolation, so that ‘fighting’ becomes rhetorically celebrated for 
‘fighting’s’ sake.  They are, rather, unfailingly and indexically located in moral 
justifications of bodily autonomy.  In this way, ‘fighting’ and ‘fearlessness’ represent 
a moral reasoning that complements the primary moral argument of bodily autonomy.   
 213 
Interestingly, Aaron’s moral reasoning tied to overt physical expressions of 
antagonistic relationships is strongly reminiscent of Machiavelli’s second aspect of 
virtu, which is associated with valour, strength and manliness.  As Lyman and Scott 
note, this second sense of virtu is expressed in the independent and voluntary effort to 
subdue fortune (1970: 22-23).   It involves what Goffman calls action, where the 
opportunities for action provide the situations in which men can demonstrate 
character.  The demonstration of virtu, in this sense, calls for courage, gameness, 
integrity, gallantry and composure.  Goffman also argues that, historically, the 
appearance of valour is often enough to establish virtu, and one of valour’s most 
salient characteristics in the form of appearance is keeping cool (Goffman in Lyman 
& Scott, 1970: 20-23).  This is congruent with Aaron’s own use of the word ‘cool’ in 
his accounts, including the call for ‘teachers’ to ‘keep their cool’, to ‘take abuse’.   
 
Overt physical action can, therefore, be understood as a second expression of a moral 
virtue placed on overtly externalising locally occasioned antagonistic relationships.  
This moral reasoning is married to ‘being honest’ and ‘voicing my opinion’ through 
the value placed on overt social expressions, as opposed to covert social expressions.  
However, it is also logically and incrementally ordered in relation to ‘being honest’ 
and ‘voicing my opinion’ according to contextual circumstances, warranting a 
transformation of members of the category ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-
to-do’ to ‘cunt’.  In Aaron’s talk, overt verbal expressions of bodily autonomy, such 
as ‘get fucked’, occur in response to ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ 
trying to ‘tell him what to do’.  Threats of physical retribution from Aaron, 
accompanied by a category transformation ‘cunt’, arise in response to threats of 
physical sanctions.  Actual overt physical ‘fighting’ with ‘people-who-think-they-can-
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tell-me-what-to-do’ subsequently occurs in response to actual attempts to physically 
impinge on his bodily autonomy.   Each of these category-bound activities is 
produced in Aaron’s talk as a moral justification that is embedded in a set of 
incremental reactions to, rather than initiation of, an escalation of moral violations by 
‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’ to his right to bodily autonomy.   
 
The classificatory moral reasoning of overt expression therefore provides the 
prescriptive evaluative principles for the manner in which the primary disposition, 
right to bodily autonomy, is socially expressed in locally occasioned antagonistic 
relationships.  That is, that the moral reasoning of overt expression suggests a 
classificatory schema governing the manner in which bodily autonomy is expressed. 
The kind of systematic ordering that justifies both the primary right and the social 
expression of bodily autonomy suggests a radically alternative account of ‘blowing 
up’ as the product of a set of carefully reasoned moral logics within specific local 
social circumstances.  This brings us to the conclusion that not only is ‘getting into 
trouble’ and ‘blowing up’ neither unreasoned nor highly contingent, and therefore 
unpredictable and ‘irrational’, but that it is cogent, reasoned and interactionally 
contingent. 
 
5.4.4 ‘Friends’ and ‘Knowing People’ 
Aaron’s ‘friends’ talk also references another kind of moral reasoning, that like ‘don’t 
care what happens’ is announced as a condition enabling the social expression of 
bodily autonomy through physical fighting.  This moral reasoning is inferable from a 
specific set of predicates explicitly tied to ‘friends’.  These predicates include: (i) the 
obligation for mutual support in antagonistic power relations; and (ii) a set of 
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hierarchical predicates associated with the categories ‘people’ and ‘kids’ that overlap 
‘friend’ that implicitly establish asymmetrical power relations with ‘friends’.  
 
Thus, Aaron’s ‘friends’ talk repeatedly makes inferable a moral obligation for mutual 
support in physical conflicts with ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’.  
Here, Aaron makes a distinction between ‘friends’ who ‘don’t get into trouble’ and 
those that ‘get into trouble’ in terms of the nature of this support.  In situated 
antagonistic relationships ‘friends’ who ‘don’t get into trouble’ = ‘stand back’ + offer 
warnings of what Aaron is likely to do + ‘calm him down’.  Whereas in the case of 
‘friends’ who do ‘get into trouble’ this obligation extends to physically ‘fighting’ 
alongside Aaron in situated antagonistic relationships with ‘people-who-think-they-
can-tell-me-what-to-do’.  Thus, ‘friends’ who ‘get into trouble’ = ‘do anything’ for 
each other where the ‘do anything’ is scenically described as ‘taking a bullet’ as an 
extreme case formulation or ‘standing up’, that is, ‘fighting’ alongside of each other 
against ‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’.   
 
Consequently there is a moral expectation that ‘friends’ provide a voiced support 
and/or physical protection in social episodes whenever bodily autonomy is at risk.  
The moral obligation tied to ‘friends’ provides one of two different aspects of another 
inferable category predicate of ‘smartarse’, which Aaron self-avowedly describes as 
‘knowing people’. Both of these different ways of talking about ‘knowing people’ are 
tied to power and bodily autonomy.  Both uses of the category ‘people’ overlap the 
category ‘friends’.  Aaron talks of ‘knowing people’ in terms of: (i) a set of mutually 
supportive relationships that has a one-to-one implicative fit with the mutually 
supportive relationship between ‘friends’; and (ii) a set of asymmetrical relationships 
 216 
with ‘kids’, which inferably includes and overlaps ‘friends’ in the school.  The 
following sequence demonstrates how Aaron ties ‘knowing people’ and, hence, his 
relationship to ‘friends’, to bodily autonomy.  The sequence occurred during an 
extended discussion of Aaron’s history of suspensions and getting into trouble at 
school.  Aaron had identified an exception to this pattern at Beladura, where he did 
not get into trouble: 
 
Extract 5.12 
199. R: Oo:::hh OK. (1.0) So (.) why didn't you? (0.8) cause (.) you were 
200. saying before that you know you were back answering teachers and stuff 
201. back here and that was the reason why you got suspended. (0.5) when you 
202. were at this place here why didn't you back answer the teachers there? 
203. A: Don't know just everything was (.) cruisey there. 
204. R: Oh was it? 
205. (0.5) 
206. A: Pretty much. (1.0) And then um (0.5) see I know everyone n- around  
207. here but (0.5) all the people around in like (0.5) Burton. (0.5) The 
208. Centre. (0.5) Like everythin’ (0.8) m’like n (.) just I- just I know 
209. everyone? and I basically I almost stand over everyone I know.  
210. R: Oh right OK= 
211. A: =Pretty much n-involving kids kind of like goin’ to high school  
212. (0.5) like classrooms go (.) like all-all the people I know I just go  
213. what? What are you looking at? You stare at me you're getting your  
214. head punched in (  )I don't really care what happens to me.(1.8)  
215. Ye::ah.  
216. R: But you didn't know people down there? 
217. A: Nah. (0.5) Oh I knew a few but (0.2) not enough.  
218. R: O:ok do you reckon things would be-would change if you'd stayed  
219. longer? 
220. (2.2) 
221. A: Probably. 
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222. (1.0) 
223. R: Ah:h-yeah so you started to know-= 
224. A: =Yeah. 
225. R: So when you- so you don't know- so you're saying (0.5) when you know 
226.  when you get to know enough (0.5) that's when you start getting into  
227. trouble. 
228. A: Pretty much. 
229. R: Is that becau:se you start to have people on your side? Or is th- is 
230. that [becau:se]  
231. A:   [Like] a (power) basically. 
232. R: Oh you know then who you can and who you can't. 
233. A: Mm 
234. R: Oh:h-OK  
235. A: And um:m (2.2) there I couldn't earn power anyway. (2.0) No one  
236. (0.5) uh:h like I've tried but I got my head punched in twice.  
 
Following the second question in line 204, Aaron provides an extended account that 
ties ‘getting into trouble’ with ‘teachers’ with ‘I just know everyone’, where the 
relevant feature of ‘know everyone’ is ‘I stand over everyone I know’.  In his 
subsequent turn, he refines the category ‘everyone’ as ‘kids kind of like going to high 
school like classrooms’.    Consequently, Aaron provides an account of ‘getting into 
trouble’ with  ‘teachers’ as conditional upon ‘knowing people’, that is, ‘standing over’ 
‘kids going to high school’.   
 
The use of the word ‘kids’ here is particularly interesting because it is one of only six 
occasions that Aaron employs this category and, by inference, the normatively 
available asymmetrical stage of life device.  Elsewhere, he routinely uses the non-
hierarchical and non-institutional category ‘people’, as he does in lines 193, 206 and 
211.  The routine use of the category ‘people’ rather than ‘kids’ is entirely consistent 
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with a moral reasoning that strongly orients to symmetrical relations of power with 
‘people-who-think-they-can-tell-me-what-to-do’.   However, he is presumably faced 
with a problem here and on three other similar occasions where he needs to make the 
local distinction between ‘teachers’ and other members of the school institution. On 
these occasions he uses the category ‘kids’, as he does here.3  Significantly, this use of 
the category kids = non- ‘teacher’ members of the school institution inferably also 
includes the category ‘kids’ who are ‘friends’.  This candidate inference is 
corroborated elsewhere in the interview set where Aaron repeatedly makes relevant in 
occasioned ways his ability to ‘have it all over’ his ‘friends’ or ‘lay them on their 
arse’, that is, the ability to physically dominate his ‘friends’.   
 
There are a number of curious things about the conditional relationship between this 
locally occasioned ‘just knowing everyone’ and ‘getting into trouble’.  Firstly, 
‘standing over’ is a self-avowed morally ascribed predicate.  This is evident in both 
the absence of any justification or excuse, that is, it is not an accountable matter 
warranting justification or excuse.  The second curious feature is that this occasioned 
relationship is not just one of strategic alliance, or, as I phrase it in line 226, ‘having 
people on your side’.  Notice the way in which Aaron interrupts the turn in line 228 
and then omits the content.  These organisational features constitute a partially 
misaligned stance to my previous turns.  Instead, he provides the alternative and 
abrupt summary ‘power basically’.   Or, again, with his relatively non-committal 
‘mm’ in line 230 followed by the return to ‘earn power’ after I once again frame up 
the problem in terms of strategic alliance in line 229. Thus Aaron explicitly 
emphasises and announces that a necessary condition for ‘getting into trouble’ with  
                                                 
3 On the three other occasions Aaron orients to the obligations that ‘adults’ have to care for ‘kids’   
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‘teachers’ is ‘knowing people’ is a set of asymmetrical power relationships with ‘kids’ 
in school, which implicitly includes ‘kids’ who are ‘friends’.    
 
Having said this, it is important not to lose sight of the evidence that Aaron elsewhere 
emphasises the first aspect of ‘knowing people’ as the set of mutually supportive 
relationships attributed to ‘friends’.  In fact, in a later interview, when we return to the 
same scenic account of ‘not getting into trouble’ at Beladura, Aaron provides an 
account that describes these same problematic relationships in a different way. He 
describes them in terms of the absence of enough mutually supportive ‘friends’ who 
would ‘back him up’ in fights on occasions of antagonistic relationships.  Similarly, in 
a scenic description of ‘knowing people’ on the streets, Aaron also explicitly makes 
relevant ‘knowing people’ in terms of people ‘jumping in’ with antagonistic 
relationships with ‘cops’, which, through Sacks’ hearers maxim, is hearable as a set of 
mutually supportive relationships indicative of ‘friends’.    
 
Consequently the moral logic of Aaron’s relationships to ‘friends’ within the school 
setting is simultaneously comprised of both mutually supportive and authoritative 
relationships.  The contradictory tension between these two sets of reasoning is 
artfully managed in Aarons rhetorical talk, through the locally occasioned selection of 
the interchangeable categories ‘kids’, ‘people’ and ‘friends’.  Hence, the asymmetrical 
talk of ‘standing over’, although implicitly inclusive of ‘friends’, is only tied to the 
category ‘people’ or ‘kids’ rather than ‘friends’.  Conversely, the occasioned use of 
the category ‘friends’ is exclusively tied to mutually supportive relationships.  What 
this amounts to is a displayed moral rhetoric where the apparently contradictory right 
to mutual support between ‘friends’ and the self-avowed attribute of ‘standing over 
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everyone I know’ in the school setting are not morally inconsistent.  Instead, they are 
both syncretistically supportive of bodily autonomy.  Thus, on the one hand, mutually 
supportive relationships with ‘friends’ provides the vehicle for a physical defence of 
bodily autonomy in antagonistic relationships, while, on the other hand, asymmetrical 
relationships with ‘kids’ provides the grounds for a claim to ‘power’, which, as we 
have already seen, lies at the heart of Aaron’s struggle for bodily autonomy.    
Moreover, these two sets of relationships in combination provide a moral logic that 
serves as a condition for ‘getting into trouble’.  Therefore, the moral logic of 
‘knowing people’ constitutes a further classificatory schema tied to the overarching 
classificatory schema of bodily autonomy.  
 
5.4.5 ‘Friends’ and the Competent Performance of ‘Smartarse’ 
Jayyusi notes that certain categorisations that involve a complex cluster of skills and 
abilities, such as ‘doctor’ or ‘director’, are constituted not only by the formal domain 
of practice, but also through the abilities and required corpus of knowledge 
displayable through performances.  The successful, or correct, performance of these 
abilities becomes an eligibility requirement for category incumbency.  These 
categories are not only normatively organised with respect to standards of competence 
and to culturally locatable sets of category relevant competencies, but they are also 
morally organised with respect to sets of obligations and commitments.  
Consequently, the fulfilment of moral obligations and commitment becomes basic for 
the assessment of performance of category tasks, and category incumbency becomes 
morally implicative for the character of the person as a whole, not just for their 
categorical capacity (1984: 43-47). 
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An examination of Aaron’s talk of ‘getting into trouble’ exposes a similar orientation 
to the moral and practical implications of the correct performance of ‘smartarse’.  The 
evidence for this can be found in the way that Aaron reflexively positions himself in 
relation to his ‘friends’ and, indeed, ‘everyone’ in school.  Firstly, Aaron makes 
relevant the claim that ‘friends’ ‘respect me’ as the condition for the attribute ‘friends’ 
= ‘support in antagonistic relationships with teachers’.  This means that Aaron’s 
orientation to the requirement of ‘respect’ from his ‘friends’ has immediate practical 
implications for ‘bodily autonomy’.  Aaron does not, however, explicitly explain the 
attribute ‘respect’.  To do that we need to turn to the following account of Aaron’s 
broader popularity in school with ‘everyone’, where Aaron responds to an initial 
question about ‘good people’ admiring him by providing an account of why 
‘everyone’ likes him:  
 
Extract 5.13  
615. R: Do you think that there's any part of you (0.2) about who you are  
616. that they'd adm- that they'd li- oh I've actually said that (.) they'd  
617. admire? 
618. A: That they'd what? 
619. R: That they'd admire that they'd like that they'd (.) oh:h (3.0) 
620. A: Being liked a lot.  
621. R: Oh::h ok. 
622. A: I was really popular at my school. Very popular.  
623. R: Were you? 
624. A: Yep Point Perpendicular every one likes me.  
625. R: Why does everyone like you do you think?  
626. A: Cause I told teachers to get fucked.  
 
This self-avowed categorisation of ‘being liked a lot’ by ‘everyone’ has an implicative 
fit with the his account of being ‘respected’ by ‘friends’, because of the semantic 
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sense of fit, the pragmatic implication in Aaron’s use of the words ‘respect’ and 
‘liked’ and also because of the way that ‘everyone’ is hearable is inclusive of 
‘friends’.  It can be argued that an implicit category feature of ‘friends’ is that they = 
‘respect Aaron’ = ‘like Aaron’ = ‘telling teachers to get fucked’.  This means that 
‘respect’ is implicitly, at least partially, tied to the performance of ‘telling teachers to 
get fucked’, and is a performance of ‘smartarse’, which has two important upshots.  
First, ‘telling teachers to get fucked’ provides at least some of the moral legitimacy 
for a claim to respect from his ‘friends’ and, hence, mutual support in antagonistic 
relationships with ‘teachers’.  Second, that Aaron orients to the import of the 
performance of ‘telling teachers to get fucked’ in terms of social claims to category 
incumbency of ‘smartarse’ because the successful performance produces affirming 
relationships with ‘friends’ and, indeed, ‘everyone’.  The performance of ‘telling 
teachers to get fucked’ not only directly defends his bodily autonomy but also 
confirms affirming relationships as a ‘smartarse’ with ‘everyone’, including ‘friends’, 
which, in turn, serves to indirectly defend his bodily autonomy through mutually 
supportive relationships.   
 
5.4.6 Summary 
An analysis of the ‘friends’/‘cunts’ MCD exposes a set of relationships that 
collectively, and primarily, reference a classificatory moral reasoning associated with 
bodily autonomy.   An analysis of his ‘friends’ talk also revealed overt physical action 
as a second social expression of a moral value placed on overtly externalising locally 
occasioned antagonistic relationships.  Aaron’s talk of ‘friends’ was also seen to be 
tied to ‘knowing people’, which Aaron announces as a condition for bodily autonomy.  
Finally, Aaron’s talk of ‘friends’ points to an orientation to the performance of bodily 
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autonomy as ‘telling teachers to get fucked’ in terms of his identity claims for 
category incumbency, which produces affirming relationships with ‘everyone’ and 
mutually supportive relationships with ‘friends’.  This analysis produces two 
significant findings.  The first is that Aaron strongly orients to his relationship to 
‘friends’ almost exclusively in terms of a defence of his bodily autonomy.  
Consequently, any threat to this relationship, by inference, would produce an equally 
and concomitant threat to his sense of physical safety.   
 
The second finding is less obvious, because it arises from the conditional relationships 
between the different evaluative elements of the classificatory moral reasoning related 
to the ‘friends’/‘cunts’ MCD and the ‘School Power Relations’ MCD.  These 
elements include the moral right to bodily autonomy as opposed to inner autonomy, 
the moral right to overt expression and the moral right to mutually supportive 
relationships.  These conditional relationships suggest that Aaron’s classificatory 
model associated with ‘friends’ is underpinned by an orientation to the ‘collective’ 
friendship group rather than to a sense of relationships between ‘individuals’.  His 
sense of identity as a ‘smartarse’ is tied to the collective group of ‘friends’ ‘who get 
into trouble’ and that the classificatory moral reasoning surrounding ‘smartarse’ is 
irrevocably tied to the classificatory moral reasoning surrounding ‘friends’.  This 
suggests that the central classificatory schema associated with ‘friends’ and ‘cunts’ 
and ‘smartarses’ can be described in terms of an orientation to the ‘collective’.  
 
5.5 The ‘Streetsmart’/‘Schoolsmart’ MCD 
The following section seeks to tease out Aaron’s classificatory schema in relation to 
setting tied school activities.  This is achieved by teasing out the moral reasoning 
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made inferable in his school work talk, in particular the way in which he works up the 
set of relationships within the ‘streetsmart’/‘schoolsmart’ contrast pair.  As we shall 
see, in Aaron’s talk of school, specifically his categorisation of ‘streetsmart’, 
‘schoolsmart’ displays a highly ambivalent and weak orientation to setting tied school 
activities where his commitment to ‘school’ work is heavily compromised by his 
moral reasoning of bodily autonomy.    
 
5.5.1 ‘Schoolsmart’ and ‘Streetsmart’: An Ambivalent Orientation to ‘School’  
Aaron describes school knowledge in terms of a set of contrasting category features 
within the contrast category pair ‘schoolsmart’/‘streetsmart’. Within this pair, 
‘streetsmart’ is inferably heard as overlapping the category ‘smartarse’ and category 
inclusive of ‘smartarse’.  The deployment of this category pairing appears particularly 
central to an analytical understanding of Aaron’s orientation to the school setting.  
This is because the identification of this collection device is warranted on the basis of 
the implicative logic generated by a contrast between categories constituted by street 
and school domains. 
 
The collection device orients to different ‘kinds of knowledge’.  In Aaron’s talk, 
‘schoolsmart’ is described as being able to ‘read properly write properly’ + ‘two 
eleven's twenty two you know three eleven's thirty eight you know what I mean? Like 
(.) thirty eight thirty three (<) y’know stuff like that=’.  Thus the category 
‘schoolsmart’ is tied to the school setting and to setting appropriate activities, such as 
‘doing work’ and attending classes at specific times, made relevant by that setting.  
Aaron contrasts ‘schoolsmart’ with ‘streetsmart’, where ‘streetsmart’ has the 
following predicates:  
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(i) Practical knowledge of mechanics rather than school theoretical knowledge; & 
(ii) Ability to ‘survive on the streets’ because of a physical ‘untouchability’ arising 
from a street knowledge comprised of the following category features: 
(a) ‘everyone knows me and they know I'll smash them’ 
(b) ‘I know what’s safe and I know what’s doin and I know who to talk to I 
know who not to talk to’ 
(c) ‘I know who  I can trust who I can't trust’ 
(d) ‘I know everyone around there’ = a set of mutually protective power 
relationships in oppositional relationship to ‘people-who-think-they-can-
tell-me-what-to-do’ specifically including ‘cops’.  
 
‘Streetsmart’, therefore, amounts to an identity characterised by practical knowledge 
and a knowledge of ‘street’ power relationships that references the moral reasoning of 
bodily autonomy, fighting and the collective mapped onto the domain of the street.  
Significantly, while Aaron recognises the long term benefits of ‘schoolsmart’ 
knowledge he does not strongly orient to the worth of ‘schoolsmart’ knowledge or 
ascribe to an incumbency of the category ‘schoolsmart’ in his scenic descriptions of 
school. Instead, he both explicitly valorises ‘streetsmart’ knowledge in contrast to 
‘schoolsmart’ knowledge and repeatedly makes relevant this same body of 
‘streetsmart’ knowledge in his accounts of school relationships and school activities, 
including ‘everyone knows me’, ‘knowing people’, ‘trust’ and ‘fighting’.   
 
Furthermore, Aaron does not orient to the value of ‘schoolsmart’ category related 
activities, such as doing school work or consistently attending school.  For example, 
Aaron on no occasion describes work in positive terms.  Instead, every account of 
 226 
schoolwork in Aaron’s talk is situated in talk of contested power relationships within 
the ‘smartarse’/‘teacher’ pair, where authoritative directives or expectations to do 
schoolwork evoke a defence of Aaron’s right to autonomy.   Similarly, while Aaron 
acknowledges the implicit requirement of school attendance in the pursuit of 
‘schoolsmart’ knowledge he also makes inferable his right to autonomously decide 
when he will and when he won’t attend school, such that on some occasions he 
attends and on others he ‘wags’, or truants, regardless of school sanctions.  
Consequently, in Aaron’s talk of school activities he consistently makes inferable a 
practical relationship to schoolwork and school attendance that is compromised by his 
right to bodily autonomy.   
 
In this sense, Aaron’s orientation to the setting relevance of doing schoolwork is 
repeatedly caught up in a pervasive, yet occasioned, assertion of his right to 
autonomy.  The dynamics of this relationship are evident in the following sequence, 
where I ask Aaron about whether he would like his life to be different from the cycle 
of school suspensions and ‘getting into trouble’:  
 
Extract 5.14 
458. R: Would you like it to be different? 
459. A: Oh ye:h.  
460. R: Yeh? 
461. A: That's what I'm doin now that's why I'm going to the centre. 
462. R: uhh 
463. A: That's why I don't-I don't want to be like the person I am I don't 
464. want to be (1.0) not being able to do stuff not being able to read  
465. properly write properly y’know.  
466. R: (   ) you will be able to learn to read and write 
467. A: Oh:h yeh that’s [what]  
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468. R:                 [jss] 
469. A: I'm doin now= 
470. R: =practice mate. (1.0) Yeh are you?  
471. A: Yeh. 
472. R: Yeh-yeh (.) it's a big thing but its just practice=  
473. A: =Mm 
474. (1.2) 
475. R: Oh:h ok so you don't-you don't- you're saying that you're sick of 
476. being suspended’n [its been (    )] 
477. A:                  [Yeh o-] 
478. R: in the-= 
479. A: =I love it. People tell me to move (.) you wan- you wanna move me?  
480. R: Oh you love doin that? 
481. A: yeh I love doin that but I don't want to do that [just] 
482. R:                                                  [yeh] 
483. A: just the person who I am now. (1.0) You-know its- you - just (moulds 
484. with me) 
 
Here, Aaron firstly produces the grounds for attendance at the alternative school as 
not wanting to be the kind of person who can’t read or write properly.  He then 
immediately contrasts the category ‘kind of person who wants to read or write 
properly’ in an alternative school setting with the contradictory ‘smartarse’ category 
bound activity tied to the right to bodily autonomy and being honest, scenically 
described in line 479 ‘people tell me to move you wanna you wanna move me’.     He 
clearly produces the right, in this context, as a problematic, given that it both 
sequentially follows my reference to being suspended and his qualification turn in line 
481, which has two explicitly declared contradictory parts, ‘yeh I love doin that / but I 
don't want to do that [just]’.  Notice that neither conversational participants find 
Aaron’s turn in 479 confusing or accountable in any way; the utterance evidently 
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makes sense to both participants.  Arguably, this is because of the set of category 
activities that are tied to the alternative school setting, which includes ‘people’ doing 
reading and writing, ‘teachers’ giving directions such as ‘telling me to move’, and 
‘smartarses’ in setting relevant ways rejecting the asymmetrical right to give 
directions.   Hence through this scenic account, Aaron orients to, and demonstrably 
works up, the relevance for the specific divergent elements of asymmetrical school 
and symmetrical ‘smartarse’ requirements that produce local, yet seemingly prevalent, 
problems for the successful performance of school related activities. 
 
Arguing that Aaron’s practical relationship to school activities is subject to 
occasioned assertion of his right to autonomy does not mean that Aaron does not 
orient to the setting relevance of doing school work or attending school and so on.  
This is made inferable through the unproblematic way that he associates school 
activities, such as schoolwork, recess, school attendance, to the setting.  For example, 
it is not an accountable matter or a matter of complaint for Aaron that schoolwork is 
taking place or that school attendance is expectable.  This point is made even more 
clearly through a paradoxical obligation to comply with sanctions tied to the non-
performance of expected setting related activities.  For example, in Aaron’s scenic 
description of ‘truanting’, he provides an account of calmly accepting the subsequent 
school suspension with ‘you get that’.  This utterance makes available recognition of 
an obligation to comply with sanctions, which are oriented to as legitimate, under 
these specific circumstances of breaching expectable school activities.  The utterance 
also confirms an orientation to the setting-tied relevance of this activity in the first 
place.   
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In Aaron’s talk he appears to orient to the setting relevance of school activities 
without orienting to the moral obligation of consistently performing those activities.  
He specifically disavows the obligation to perform school activities within the set of 
rights and obligations routinely claimed by ‘teachers’.  So, in a sense, for Aaron, there 
is an uncoupling of the normative tie between activities that have a setting relevance 
and the institutional obligation to undertake those activities. Thus, when he performs 
those activities, he does so on his own terms.    Indeed, the moral reasoning 
underpinning this is referenced, and invoked, in the kinds of categories that Aaron 
employs, compared with a more institutional and normative categorisation of school 
relationships.  In over four hours of interviews, Aaron neither employs nor makes 
relevant the category ‘student’ or other institutional categories, such as ‘principal’ or 
‘head teacher’.  Furthermore, with only one exception, Aaron’s use of the category 
‘teacher’ is universally cast as an oppositional category, rather than the normatively 
expectable complimentary category.  This means that there is a complete absence of 
any orientation to normative institutional SRP ‘student’/’teacher’, and the imperatives 
tied to the set of institutional rights and obligations associated with this SRP, in 
Aaron’s school talk.  Instead, Aaron’s widespread use of the category ‘people’, who 
are implicitly undertaking ‘schoolwork’, to describe ‘students’ makes inferable a 
practical logic that divorces normative power relationships from setting-tied activities.   
 
What this amounts to is a situated ambivalence in his moral relation to school-tied 
activities.  Ultimately, this is associated with an evident ambivalence to the 
relevancies of the institutional setting itself, including the imperatives associated with 
the normative ‘teacher’/‘student’ SRP.  This ambivalence suggests a relatively weak 
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orientation to the goal and activities of school, that is, an orientation to school 
activities that is continually subject to a pervasive orientation to bodily autonomy.   
 
This begs an interesting question.  If Aaron is only weakly and situationally orienting 
to the school setting and only weakly orienting to the setting-tied relevancies of that 
setting, then what kind of setting is he orienting to in his talk of school?  What this 
question highlights is a possible difference in the quality of Aaron’s experience of 
school compared with a normative taken-for-granted understanding of ‘being in a 
classroom’.  Aaron does not appear to share the normative experience of ‘being in a 
classroom’ consistently.  Rather, he appears to experience it in highly ambivalent, 
ambiguous and occasioned ways, given that he does not consistently make 
situationally relevant the institutionally authorised setting-tied relationships. 
 
An analytical appreciation of this experience can be arrived at by: (a) inverting 
Jayyusi’s argument that some social actions are expectable and appropriate in some 
settings but not others (1994: 167); (b)  recognising that Aaron in his school talk 
makes available the inference that his actions are morally justifiable and, therefore, 
implicitly ‘appropriate’ to that setting; and (c)  recognising that the set of relationships 
that he makes relevant for the setting of the street are completely congruent with the 
set of relationships that he makes relevant in a highly occasioned way in his accounts 
of school.  Aaron’s school talk or, more specifically, his talk of ‘getting into trouble’ 
at school, appears to be organised as if he were experiencing the ‘school and 
classroom’ setting in occasioned ways as a ‘street’ setting.  Thus, in occasioned ways, 
it is the relevancies of the ‘street’ rather than the relevancies of the school institution 
that appear to commonly operate as critical determinates of Aaron’s social actions in 
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the ‘school’ and ‘classroom’ setting, including whether he does or doesn’t do the 
work or attend classes.  
 
This provides the final classificatory schema associated with ‘getting into trouble’.  
Namely, that Aaron brings into play, in ‘getting into trouble’, a ‘streetsmart’ moral 
reasoning.  This moral reasoning represents a set of evaluative principles and practices 
tied, and oriented, to street settings.  These principles include a privileging of practical 
knowledge and knowledge of ‘street’ power relationships over school knowledge, the 
right to bodily autonomy, the value of ‘fighting’ and the importance of the collective.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This analysis of Aaron’s moral reasoning suggests that his relationships with 
‘teachers’, ‘friends’ and ‘school’ activities are primarily underpinned by a moral right 
to bodily autonomy.  This chapter also demonstrates that the social expression of this 
primary classificatory moral reasoning is governed by three other complementary sets 
of moral rights and obligations, including a moral reasoning associated with overt 
expression, the friendship collective and ‘don’t care what happens’.  The 
classificatory moral reasoning of overt expression was found to govern the manner of 
social performance of the right to bodily autonomy in antagonistic oppositional power 
relations through: (i) a moral obligation to overtly declare pejorative position making 
in oppositional power relations; and (ii) a moral right to an overtly physical social 
performance of bodily autonomy in physically antagonistic power relations through 
fearlessness and physical fighting.   
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Further, the chapter identified contexts in which these dispositions might become 
mobilised. It described the way the defence of the right to bodily autonomy follows a 
series of prescribed and escalating responses to proscribed threats where: (i) 
authoritative directives are met with refusal; (ii) threats and/or imposition of 
illegitimate sanctions are met with verbally expressed antagonism, ‘being honest’; and 
(iii) attempts at physical restraint are met with physical resistance.  Alternatively, the 
classificatory moral reasoning of the friendship collective and the classificatory moral 
reasoning of ‘don’t care what happens’ provide the conditions that moderate the social 
and empirical expression of the right to bodily autonomy.   
 
This analysis provides an understanding of Aaron’s accounts of ‘getting into trouble’ 
as referencing a highly cogent, normative and stable system of classificatory schema.  
This is clearly evidenced in his talk through a consistently repeated and reasoned 
account of ‘getting into trouble’ as the product of a repeatedly avowed set of moral 
rights, and where and when those rights are denied.    This discovery has critical 
implications for the detailed description of ‘blowing up’ in the next chapter, where the 
description is shown to be consistently underpinned by this system of dispositions  
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Chapter Six 
 ‘Blowing Up’ 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the breakdown in practical understanding that occurs in an 
episode of ‘extreme violence’ involving Aaron and his classroom teacher, George. 
George described this episode as an example of ‘blowing up’ associated with 
‘psychiatric disorder’.  To investigate the breakdown in understanding that occurs in 
‘blowing up’, the chapter compares Aaron’s logic of practice with George’s 
knowledge construction and application regarding Aaron’s practice, in the context of 
the incident. In this respect, it highlights the way the relationships and processes of 
dispositions, positions, position making and position taking are applied and unfold in 
the contingent circumstances of the conflict.   
 
The analysis focuses on differences and similarities in George and Aaron’s accounts 
of the episode. The identification of differences between the sets of classificatory 
moral reasoning made inferable by George and Aaron, which underpin their 
interactional practice, makes it possible to reconstruct Aaron’s logic of practice in 
terms of a collision of moral orders that takes place.  The structure of this analysis 
also takes advantage of a similarity in George’s and Aaron’s accounts, where they 
both make relevant the same three incidents as constituting critical moral breaches.  In 
sequential order these incidents comprise three ‘movements’, including: (i) Aaron’s 
non-compliance after recess that results in George sending him to another room; (ii) 
Aaron’s continued non-compliance that leads to the loss of ‘signatures’; and (iii) 
Aaron being physically grabbed, triggering a physical struggle between Aaron and a 
group of teachers that ultimately includes police intervention.  George and Aaron also 
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provided accounts of what followed the episode. Accordingly, the chapter will 
proceed in the following order: (i) introduction to the episode; (ii) first movement; 
(iii) second movement; (iv) third movement; (v) postscript; and (vi) chapter 
conclusion.  
 
6.2 Introduction to the Episode 
The following section will set the scene by describing who was involved and when 
and where the episode occurred, as well as providing an overview of the episode. 
 
6.2.1 Who, When & Where: Setting the Scene 
The episode occurred in an alternative school for young people with ‘mental 
disorders’. The alternative school is located in the top storey of a two-storey suburban 
house and consists of two relatively open areas, a kitchen and an enclosed office.  The 
episode took place in this top storey area.  The plan of the top story is provided below 
(Fig. 6.1) 
At the time of the episode there were four teachers (two male and two female), two 
teacher aides and three students (two male and one female) at the school.  
Immediately prior to the episode one of the male teachers and one of the aides were 
working with the three young people, who were all sitting at a common desk in one of 
the learning areas (Classroom 1).  A second male teacher (the interviewee) was ‘off-
class’ at the time, in an office located immediately adjacent to Classroom 1.  The two 
female teachers were meeting in the downstairs area.  The episode occurred in the last 
session on a Friday afternoon, at approximately 2:30PM, immediately prior to the 
completion of the school day at 3:00PM.   
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Figure 6.1 Classroom Setting  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2. An Overview of Blowing Up 
Below is a summary of the unfolding episode of ‘blowing up’ in terms of the basic 
sequence of events and locations made relevant by Aaron and George: 
 
6.2.2.1 First Movement 
Aaron and two friends, Pat and Stevie, are sitting together at a table in Classroom 1 
after recess.  According to Aaron they are ‘slackn off’ and ‘just chattn’.  According to 
George they are refusing to work, laughing at teacher directions and engaging in 
‘inappropriate conversation’ about ‘drugs and what's happening on the weekend’.   
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George directs the ‘students’ to move to separate rooms in the setting. Aaron is moved 
to Classroom 2, Stevie to the kitchen, and Pat remains in Classroom 1.  
 
6.2.2.2 Second Movement  
Having moved to the other room, the conflict continues to escalate.  George follows 
Aaron into Classroom 2. Aaron refuses further directions and, as a ‘consequence’, 
George ‘removes signatures’ from a behaviour rewards book.  George immediately 
leaves the room to go to Stevie in the kitchen.  Aaron then leaves Classroom 2 and 
goes to Pat and Stevie, and in Aaron’s account announced ‘this cunt wiped out my 
signatures’.  When he is in the kitchen with Stevie, George directs him to leave.  
George makes relevant that he ‘guides’ him out of the room by his elbow.  Aaron 
makes relevant that he responded to George’s direction with ‘get fucked cunt I’ll 
smash ya’. Aaron then left the kitchen and returned to Classroom 1 with Pat.   
 
6.2.2.3 Third Movement 
Aaron now in the original classroom space is blocked from leaving again by Phil, a 
teacher’s aide.  George makes relevant that Aaron was returning to physically threaten 
him.  Aaron makes relevant that he wanted to talk with Stevie. Aaron reported that he 
pushed Phil but couldn’t move him and then he jumped over the table to get around 
him.  According to Aaron, Phil then grabbed him, and a physical struggle ensued.  Pat 
also jumps on top of Phil. When the other teachers arrive to assist Phil a physical 
struggle ensues to restrain Aaron.  The police are called.  After the police arrive, the 
struggle ends and Aaron leaves the building with Pat.    
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6.3 The First Movement 
This section initially examines George’s account of the beginning of the episode to 
identify the assertion of moral requirements in the classroom in terms of the set of 
relationships between his dispositions, position, position taking and position making. 
Aaron’s account of these same events will then be examined to identify how Aaron 
applied his sets of classificatory moral reasoning associated with disposition to these 
moral requirements of position.  The interrogation of George and Aaron’s descriptions 
of the first movement will make three things possible.  First, it will exemplify the set 
of moral disjunctions and elements of disposition and position in play throughout the 
episode.  Second, it provides a description of how these disjunctions in situ produce 
an inherent interactional instability. Third, it provides an analytical platform to 
describe the rest of the episode in terms of the unravelling of this interactional 
instability.   
 
6.3.1 Classroom Moral Requirements in Play 
The following extract represents George’s initial response to my question ‘what 
happened’?  While he elaborates on this initial response later in the interview, this 
initial account manages to capture many of the moral elements of the reasoning that 
he brings into play in his account of the first movement.  It’s also true to say that this 
extract captures many of the moral requirements of the setting that he evokes 
throughout his entire description and which can be heard as a rhetorical preparation 
for the moral argument that is to follow. Significantly, these different elements of 
classificatory moral reasoning are completely congruent with George’s stable 
classificatory schema suggestive of durable dispositions, and are also congruent with 
category competencies tied to the position ‘good alternative teacher’. 
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Extract 6.1 
 
28. G: =ok (.) um:m ok (.) basically I think what happened was um:m (1.8) 
29. there was Aaron and two other students.  
30. (0.2) 
31. R: mm 
32. G: An:d (1.0) they'd sort of been (.) pushing boundaries (.) for most 
33. of the afternoon in terms of (.) refusing to do work (0.5) um  
34. inappropriate talk about (1.0) drugs and (0.8) what's happening on the 
35. weekend there was actually supposed to be something um (1.5) something 
36. down at Ryleton or something that ((0.5) ah I don't know whether it was 
37. the markets or there was something happening. 
38. R: mm[mm] 
39. G: [An:d] (.) there was two bo- Aaron (.) another boy and a girl.   
40. (0.5) 
41. R: mm 
42. G: An:d the girl was saying that she was going down there to sleep in a  
43. tent. And then Aaron was coming through saying well (0.4) I'll meet you 
44. there and can I sleep in the tent with you and all (  ) So- uh- there 
45. was just a bit- a lot of tension a lot of just um:m (1.5) I don't know 
46. it just- (0.5) the atmosphere it just wasn't sort of um:m very sort of  
47. pleasant (1.0) learning environment because they- they wanted- they had  
48. their agenda they wanted to talk about this- organise this stuff and  
49. (0.5) ah between the three of them (.) there was  a suspected (0.8) ah 
50. drug transactions and things like that happening had been happening and  
51. sort of you know this being talked about (.) you had the staff (0.8)  
52. coming over the top saying (0.5) no that's not appropriate  
53. R:[mm] 
54. G:[you] know and all that so (.) so there was this:s (0.8)th-there was  
55. this tension sort of building up.  
56. R: uhh 
57. G: Um:m (0.3) I basically I wasn't on class (0.5) that- that time.  
58. (0.3) 
59. R: uhh 
60. G: But I was- I was here and I was and I was around the place and I 
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61. could (.) hear things and I- and (0.5) you could just feel that (.)  
62. something was wrong (.) you [know something] 
63. R:                [mm yeh] 
64. G: just wasn't sitting right you know there was tension and (.) all 
65. this. (0.5) So I-I basically came out and just went right (0.5) I'm  
66. moving you all. (1.0) And um I moved (0.5) the girl out into the 
67. kitchen area? and closed the door? (0.5) I moved Aaron into the other  
68. cl- other learning (0.3) space and left one of the boys there. 
69. R: mm 
 
This sequence represents a successful proximal performance of the ‘good teacher’ in 
an ‘alternative’ setting that George works up throughout his interviews. In the 
interviews, the category contrast ‘good teacher’/‘bad teacher’ is embedded in a stage 
of life MCD such that good teacher = adult and bad teacher = breaches adult 
obligations.  The ‘good teacher’/ ‘bad teacher’ contrast is also mapped onto an 
‘alternative’/‘mainstream’ setting contrast.  Consequently, George reflexively 
occupies the category ‘good alternative teacher’, in contrast to ‘bad mainstream 
teacher’.  This can be heard as a master identity for George in his accounts of working 
with ‘kids who get into trouble’ (Antaki & Widdicombe 1998: 2).   
 
The category incumbency ‘good alternative teacher’ is made inferable in the above 
sequence by making relevant the following constitutive category features: (i)  using 
‘alternative’ methods = using practices other than booting kids out to ‘manipulate’ 
‘kids’ and/or ‘students’ to follow ‘teachers’ = ‘adults’ directives.  George makes 
relevant that he separates the three ‘students’ rather than ‘booting them out’; (ii) ‘not 
reacting’ = (‘not being manipulated by ‘behaviour kids to do what they want 
‘teachers’ to do) + (not ‘losing it’ = emotional verbal abuse in the face of rule 
violations).  George’s scenic description makes relevant a calm strategic 
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purposefulness; & (iii) ‘gets ‘behaviour kids’ = ‘students’ to do what he wants them to 
do.  George makes relevant that, in contrast to the ‘teachers’ in class, he stops the 
inappropriate behaviour by separating the ‘students’.   Collectively, these predicates 
capitalise on what George explicitly describes throughout his accounts as being 
‘flexible’ in an alternative setting.  Thus, in taking up this position, George can be 
understood as adopting a ‘flexible’ stance, which he explicitly contrasts with orthodox 
‘mainstream’ practices of ‘just booting them out’, ‘reacting’, ‘not compromising or 
negotiating’, being ‘manipulated’ and so on.   
 
This stance is associated with the assertion of particular moral requirements for 
‘students’ in alternative settings.  What is immediately obvious from this initial 
sequence, and all those following, is that though the description of events is 
essentially the same, George brings into play, as moral requirements, a set of rights 
and obligations that are markedly disjunctive with Aaron’s.   The points of disjunction 
include (a) bodily authority versus bodily autonomy; (b) strong versus weak 
orientation to institutional setting-tied activities; (c) moral reasoning associated with 
individualism versus a collective moral reasoning; and (d) moral reasoning of covert 
versus overt expression.   The following analysis provides the empirical grounds for 
this claim, explores the features of each of these different disjunctions and explains 
the upshot for the production of moral requirements for Aaron’s position in the 
classroom. 
 
6.3.1.1. Bodily Authority and Bodily Autonomy 
In his description, George explicitly deploys the institutional categories ‘student’ and 
‘staff’, and the gendered stage of life categories ‘boy’ and ‘girl’ to work up a scenic 
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account of ‘what happened’ leading up to ‘blowing up’.  He also appears to implicitly 
make a category distinction between the ‘staff’ ‘on class’ and a reflexive 
categorisation of himself not being ‘on class’ that is inferably tied to an attribute of 
being able, in this situation, to decisively ‘move’ ‘students’. In a latter sequence in the 
same interview, George provides an account of this distinction in terms of the contrast 
pair ‘inexperienced/experienced’ ‘teachers’, where he is self-avowedly an 
‘experienced teacher’ and the staff ‘on class’ ‘inexperienced teachers’.  The set of 
relationships between these explicit and implicit categories make inferable moral 
reasoning, emphasising: (i) the obligation of ‘student’s, who are also ‘boys’ and 
‘girls’ and, therefore, also inferably ‘children’, to follow the directions of ‘staff’, who 
are also inferably ‘teachers’ and ‘adults’; and conversely (ii)  the rights of 
‘staff/teacher/adults’ to tell ‘student’s/children’ what do.  This is made inferable in the 
moral determination of what is and what isn’t ‘appropriate’ talk, the invocation of 
‘boundaries’ and the implicit right to determine where they are placed, the sanctioning 
of the student’s agenda, the rights of staff to ‘come over the top saying no that’s not 
appropriate’ and, above all, in the right of teachers to direct ‘students’ to other spaces 
and the obligation of ‘student’s’ to follow those directions.   
 
It is also made inferable by George’s uninterruptedly making relevant the institutional 
relationship ‘student’/‘teacher’ MCD.  This is less obvious because it is a case of the 
absence of, rather than presence of, alternative categorisations for ‘students’ as 
‘behaviour kids’ or ‘kids’ that George makes relevant elsewhere in his accounts of 
‘kids who get into trouble’.   The characteristics of these categorisations are detailed 
below in table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 reveals that the set of category rights and obligations in the ‘good 
teacher’/‘behaviour kid’ talk are nested within a broader set of ‘kid’ rights that are 
worked up in the face of institutional prerogatives and ‘good teachers’ who are 
‘adults’ with obligations to protect the rights of those ‘kids’. The reverse is true in 
utterances referring to scenically providing ‘consequences’ to ‘students’.  In these 
accounts, he exclusively makes relevant the institutional categories of ‘student’ and 
‘teacher’, which are category bound to ‘student’ obligations to follow institutional 
rules and ‘teacher’ rights to authoritatively enforce those obligations.  In George’s 
talk, the use of these different categorisations is occasioned by a making relevant of 
breaches by students to comply with various verbal warnings about breaching 
institutional rules.  This is convincingly demonstrated by a pattern of local category 
transformations that switch from ‘behaviour kid’ to ‘student’ occasioned by locally 
situated orientations to either institutional roles or sanctions.   
 
Table 6.1 Alternative Categorisation Talk for ‘Behaviour Kids’ or ‘Students’ 
MCD Teacher Relationships to ‘Kids’ 
‘Bad Teacher’/‘Good Teacher’ / ‘Behaviour kid’  
Embedded in 
Institutional Relationships &  
Stage of Life &  
‘Mainstream’ / ‘Alternative’ Setting Contrast  
Institutional Relationships 
Principal /Deputy Principal/Teacher’ / ‘Student’ 
Embedded in 
Stage of Life &  
‘Mainstream’/‘Alternative’ Contrast  
Relationship Pair ‘Good Teacher’/‘Behaviour Kid’ ‘Teacher’/‘Student’ 
Dominated 
Category Rights 
& Obligations 
‘Right to have individual ‘needs’ privileged over ‘institutional’ 
‘needs’ 
Right to respectful relationships that don’t ‘belittle’ or 
‘patronise’ or authoritatively ‘stand over’ 
Right to teachers that understand ‘where they’re coming from’ 
Right to relevant curriculum 
Right to ask questions in ‘appropriate way’ 
Obligation to learn to get on socially with people 
Obligation to learn to speak to authority figures appropriately 
Obligation to learn that there are rules 
Obligation to follow institutional rules defined as ‘do the work’ & 
‘not disturb others’ where the latter includes ‘speaking to others 
‘appropriately’ & physical safety 
Obligation to speak to ‘authority’ figures ‘appropriately’  
Obligation to comply with ‘teacher’ directives & consequences 
Obligation to know that there are  boundaries & consequences 
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Dominant  
Category Rights 
&/or Obligations 
Obligation to understand where ‘kids’ ‘are coming from’ in 
terms of ‘abusive family histories’ & ‘poor histories of 
schooling’ 
Obligation of ‘being in tune’ with ‘kids’ by ‘caring’, ‘respecting’, 
‘not standing over’ and ‘find out what’s happening’ 
Obligation to use ‘alternative’ approaches that don’t involve 
‘booting kids out of the class’ to ‘manipulate’ kids into ‘doing 
the work’ and ‘not disturb others’ 
Obligation to adopt ‘relevant’ curriculum suited to ‘needs’ and 
‘wants’ of ‘individual’ 
Obligation to not ‘react’ to ‘kids’ ‘inappropriate’ idioms or ‘get 
into little power struggles’ 
Obligation to ‘guide’ and teach ‘kids’ what they ‘need’ to know 
including ‘literacy & numeracy’, ‘how to speak to people in 
authority’,  follow the ‘rules’ and ‘boundaries’ & what’s 
appropriate and inappropriate in social settings’ 
Obligation to compromise and negotiate & to try to reward 
positives and ignore negatives 
Right and obligation to bring down ‘consequences’ for breaches 
to institutional rules and boundaries  
Right to exclude ‘students’ for extreme breaches to institutional 
rules  
Obligation to follow institutional procedures 
 
 
 
Thus, on 319 occasions of selecting the category ‘kid’, there is only two occasions of 
the category ‘kid’ locally tied to any kind of consequences talk.  Overwhelmingly, it 
is not ‘kids’ that are scenically requested by George to ‘stop talking now and you need 
to do some work’ or ‘sent home’ or ‘suspended’ or ‘guided by the elbow’ out of 
kitchens, it is ‘students’. Consequently, the relative absence of ‘kid’ categorisations in 
George’s account of ‘blowing up’ is telling, because it underscores the strongly 
oriented to institutional relevance of a ‘student’ moral obligation to follow ‘teacher’ 
directions in ‘blowing up’.     
 
The sets of asymmetrical relationships between ‘staff’, ‘teacher’s and ‘students’ who 
are ‘adults’ and ‘kids’ appears to be the primary moral context for Aaron’s 
interactional involvement in this episode, given that George organises his entire 
account around these relationships. Clearly, this will have immediate interactional 
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upshots for Aaron.  This is because it establishes an interactional instability produced 
by the marked disjunction between the requirements of Aaron’s primary classificatory 
moral reasoning of bodily autonomy and the classroom requirements of position, 
which amount to the right to tell Aaron what to do, that is, ‘bodily authority’. 
 
6.3.1.2 Weak and Strong Orientation to Institutional Setting-Tied Activities 
The second major disjunction displayed in George’s account is his strong orientation 
to institutional setting-tied activities, as opposed to Aaron’s weak orientation.  This is 
evident in the way in which:  
(i) Specific institutional educational goals reflected in moral complaints such as 
‘refusing to the work’ and ‘wasn’t sort of um:m very sort of pleasant (1.0) 
learning environment’ are tied to particular institutional categories such as 
‘student’ and ‘staff’;  
(ii) Institutional rule-following is made implicitly relevant as in lines 32-33 where the 
‘students’ have been ‘pushing the boundaries’ by ‘refusing to do work’, or in lines 
33-34 where the ‘students’ were engaged in ‘inappropriate talk about (1.0) drugs’; 
(iii) Institutional rule-following is non-contingent, regardless of whether: (a) the 
events took place late on a Friday afternoon, before the events of the weekend; or 
(b) that, as George notes later, Aaron ‘was alright for the first session’ in terms of 
doing ‘his English and Maths’; and  
(iv) George deploys particular institutionally tied lexical choices describing the space, 
including ‘class’ and ‘learning space’.    
 
George’s strong orientation to the goals and activities of the ‘school’ setting has 
practical consequences in terms of the local set of institutional requirements coming 
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into play for Aaron in this particular setting.  Foremost amongst these is the evident 
assumption that Aaron is also morally bound to non-contingently orient to the set of 
moral constraints operating on social activities tied to that setting, regardless of 
situational circumstances.  Hence Aaron and his friends are morally required to do the 
work, even though it is very late on a Friday afternoon when setting relevance is 
arguably entering into what Mische identifies as ‘transitory’ or fragile ‘interstitial’ 
social space, between the school setting and post-school ‘street’ setting, where the 
demands of either setting are, to some extent, held in abeyance (1998: 705-708).    
 
The inference is that George has the moral right and obligation to unilaterally enforce 
the selection of what kind of setting this is for all members at all times.  Hence goals 
and activities relevant to a ‘street’ settings such as talk of drugs, having sex and 
partying, and presumably ‘just chattn’, are displayed as morally inappropriate for this 
setting and are  highly sanctionable.  This is the case even though they are identified 
as relevant to Aaron by George.  In this sense George’s taken-for-granted orientation 
to the school setting represents a taken-for-granted classificatory moral reasoning.  
This moral reasoning authorises a series of absolute moral assessments about the 
performance of prescribed and proscriptive setting-relevant activities. These activities 
are tied to membership of setting-relevant categories such as ‘student’, ‘boy’ and 
‘girl’ as well as to prescriptive social actions of staff and ‘teachers’.  Thus, ‘doing 
work’ is not just a practical matter of education but has a moral prescriptive force tied 
to the setting.  Conversely, not doing work prescriptively requires a sanctionable 
response from ‘teachers’.   
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George’s strong orientation to the school setting as an omnirelevant moral ordering 
runs counter to Aaron’s morally bound hierarchical organisation of setting relevance, 
which privileges a relatively strong orientation to street relevancies.    Needless to say, 
this divergence in orientation to setting, coupled to oppositional power relationships 
and divergent activities made relevant by those settings, lays a foundation of 
instability for what is to come.   
 
6.3.1.3 Individualism and the Collective 
On the subtle boundaries between Aaron and George’s moral worlds lies the 
disjunction between an individualistic and collective classificatory moral reasoning.  
Yet, despite this subtlety, and perhaps because of it, this disjunction contributes 
catastrophically to the destabilisation of the interactional order of this classroom.  
George’s classificatory moral reasoning associated with individualism is displayed, 
and made relevant, by George throughout his account of blowing up, and also 
throughout the broader corpus of interview data.  This moral reasoning is inferable 
throughout George’s accounts in his talk of ‘individuals’, ‘choices’ and 
‘consequences’.  This starkly differs from anything in Aaron’s accounts.  For instance, 
there is not one occasion that Aaron employs the words ‘choices’, ‘choose’, 
‘consequences’ or ‘individuals’, or any simile’s for these words.  They are entirely 
absent from his accounts.   
 
In particular there is nothing comparable in Aaron’s accounts of the classificatory 
moral order that George constructs around the proper performance of this category 
‘individual’.  That is, there is a moral requirement of the ‘individual’ to make ‘good 
informed decisions’ implicitly based on the ‘right’ knowledge about aspects of 
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‘consequence’.  Related to the notion of ‘consequences’ is a further category attribute 
of ‘individual’ that relates to time.  Thus an individual implicitly makes ‘decisions’ or 
‘choices’ in ‘time’ where, as Jayyusi (1984) notes: ‘‘Time’ is treatable as a location:  
specifically, as a location of intentions, motives and courses of action and events….It 
is thus a locus for a variety of practical and moral trajectories.’ (163) This notion of 
time as a locus of practical and moral trajectory, coupled with the attribute of the 
deciding and ultimately accountable self, is logically tied to the attribute of the 
category ‘individual’ implied by the notion of ‘choice’.  This is the individual self as a 
traveller through space and time endlessly weighing up possible and past choices and 
independently making choices to act now this way and now that.  Needless to say, this 
notion of linear time reflects a subscription to making ‘choices’ determined by 
‘informed’ expectations of the future.  This is noticeably at odds with Aaron’s 
classificatory schema associated with ‘don’t care what happens’. 
 
This categorisation of the ‘individual’ also implicitly points to the moral worth of self-
mastery or self-discipline.  Self-mastery is expectable because it is presumed that this 
individual self has mastery over these making of choices.  It is the individual who 
makes the choice within changing sets of extrinsic circumstances guiding and 
controlling their actions according to an intrinsic decision-making process, not the 
other way around.   In George’s talk, self-discipline or self-mastery is referenced as an 
accountable matter such that sanctions or ‘consequences’ are imposed for the ‘wrong’ 
choices.  Furthermore, in George’s talk, not to be seen as being in control of the 
individual self – the one that makes good choices – runs the risk of being categorised 
as ‘psychiatrically disturbed’.  
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Clearly, the categorisation of ‘individual’ referenced here is not just an arbitrary 
construction of George’s but, instead, references a particular, arguably dominant, 
‘commonsense’ discourse of personhood.  As Carbough (1999) explains, there is a 
dominant Western cultural premise that each person has a ‘self’ that makes choices 
and has rights (166).  Furthermore, the disjunction between the two sets of 
classificatory moral reasoning can be analytically understood as marking two quite 
different points along an ‘individualism-collectivism’ axis (Triandis in Moghaddam 
1999: 84).  This axis reflects differences in the way that boundary lines are 
metaphorically drawn between the total set of attributes ascribed to a person and the 
social and/or natural environment.  Within individualism the social world is viewed as 
involving ‘the interaction of mobile and independent individuals so that the unit of 
concern is the individual person and a sharp boundary is drawn between the 
characteristic attributes of that person and others’ (Moghaddam 1999: 84). By 
contrast, in a more collectivist orientation the primary unit of concern is membership 
of a group, and no sharp boundary is drawn between the attributes of the self and the 
group.  This results in a much stronger orientation to a sense of connectedness and 
interdependence with the collective (Moghaddam 1999: 84).   
 
George’s classificatory moral reasoning of the individual is clearly at work in his 
account of blowing up, including his account of the first movement.  It is possible to 
examine this more closely in the following extract, which follows shortly after 
George’s initial description.  Here, George is describing in more detail the ‘tension’ 
that he referred to in his initial description: 
 
Extract 6.2 
532. G: And on that day we only had (.) three (.) students. (0.2) 
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533. R: mm mm 
534. G: But two chose to be violent and aggressive and it took (0.5)  
535. R: Was there only three students there? 
536. G: Only three. 
537. R: Ur:r ok.= 
538. G: =Only three. Yep there was only three. (0.4) [(  )] 
539. R:                                              [T-](.) this:s (0.3) oh 
540. sorry two chose to be violent and aggressive.  
541. G: Yeh= 
542. R: =And it took everybody= 
543. G: Physically [yep] 
544. R:            [yeh] 
545. G: and this one here was basic- th-the girl (.) was um:m (.) she was  
546. quite stunned I think. (0.2) At the (0.5) at the viciousness and the- 
547. and the-the how quickly (0.5) the boys became violent especially the  
548. one because there was some (1.2) sexual tension between-in the group.  
549. (0.3) Because um:m previously you had um:m (0.4) before Aaron came in  
550. (0.2) that boy and that girl. (0.8) Became quite close and friendly. 
551. (1.0) I don't think there was any (.) an-any relationship going (.) I 
552. think the boy probably wished there was? 
553. R: mm mm mm  
554. G: And the girl actually played (.) up to that [yknow] 
555. R:                                             [mm] 
556. G: the girl w- (.) you know a lot of girls do huhuh you know [hhhuh] 
557. R:                                                           [mm] 
558. G: with any-hhh-fifteen year old [girls] 
559. R:                               [mm] 
560. G: they tease boys along and things like that= 
561. R: =mm 
562. G: then when Aaron came on the sce:ne (0.5) she turned her attention to  
563. Aaron.  
564. (0.2) 
565. R: mm 
566. G: And this boy I think felt quite upset about that? [Quite] 
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567. R:                                                  [mm] 
568. G: angry? 
569. R: [mm] 
570. G: [He] had a history of violence as well? 
571. R: mm 
572. G: Severe violence? [He was] 
573. R:                 [mm]  
574. G: re-he was referred to the centre for (.) taking a knife to school? 
575. R: mm 
576. G: He wanted to stab another boy who had actually punched him (.) three 
577. days ago? 
578. R: mm 
579. G: Um:m (.) so and then (1.0) possibly (.) y’know this boy watching the 
580. this boy here has got Sandra's attention and he is a:a (1.0) was  
581. indulging in some you know um:m (0.5) drug (.) yknow drug taking (0.2)  
582. um:m (0.5) non-compliant behaviour disruptive (.) in sort of talking  
583. about him and his gang and-yknow all this sort [of]  
584. R:                                             [mm]  
585. G: stuff and that (.) I think (0.5) that boy might have been taking  
586. that on board and going we:ll that's what I need to do (.) to get her  
587. attention and things like that but (.)  
 
A central organising principle in this account is George’s emphasis on ‘choosing’, in 
line 534.  For George, Aaron and the other ‘boy’  ‘chose’, amongst other ‘choices’, 
the ‘wrong’ ‘choice’.  The deployment of the word ‘choice’ arguably achieves three 
things: (i) it invokes George’s own classificatory moral reasoning associated with 
individualism; (ii) it provides an authorisation for blame-worthiness to the extent that 
it was the ‘wrong’ choice; & (iii) it simultaneously appeals to the authority of a 
dominant taken-for-granted moral account of events that everyone, including myself, 
knows.  That is, the invocation of ‘chose’ is not made as an accountable matter, as the 
moral category work thus invoked is a self-evident ‘fact’.   
 251 
The lexical selection of ‘chose’ is not the only way that the moral reasoning of 
individualism is referenced in this description.  It is also referenced indirectly through 
the gendered MCD ‘boy’/‘girl’, along with the chronological age MCD that he 
employs in line 558.  George’s categorisation of Aaron and his ‘friends’ as ‘boys’ and 
‘girls’ legitimises an account of the ‘tension’ or, more abstractly, the group 
relationships, in terms of a biologically, hence scientifically authorised, fuelled 
competition between a collection of ‘boys’ and a ‘girl’.    This is achieved once again 
on the basis of what ‘everyone’ knows about how ‘fifteen year-old girls’ and, 
specifically in lines 558-560, that ‘any-hhh-fifteen year old [girls]’ = ‘tease boys 
along and things like that=’.  Thus these kinds of behaviours are ‘naturally’, 
commonsensically and also scientifically expectable from any such group.  But this is 
an account of a group of ‘we-individuals’ competitively struggling as individuals for 
individual gain (Carbaugh, 1999: 166).  What is being announced here is a moral tale 
of individual profit and loss rather than a moral tale of interconnectedness and 
interdependence.  The two ‘boys’ and the ‘girl’ collectively resist teacher directions 
because of individual competition rather than any possible alternative account of 
mutually supportive opposition to teacher directives.  The upshot is a privileging of 
individual moral reasoning that legitimises and authorises sanctions because of 
‘wrong’ choices’. At the same time it prevents the making relevant of Aaron’s social 
actions in friendship groups, which are, at the very least, strongly determined by his 
orientation to the rights and obligations of friendship group membership.  
Consequently, the moral requirements of the ‘individual’ foreclose any making 
relevant of the moral requirements of the ‘smartarse’, which once again incites 
interactional instability.   
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This interactional instability is a product of the practical consequences that flow from 
the imposition of this reasoning.  Hence the ‘consequence’ of separating Aaron from 
the other ‘boys’ and the ‘girls’ is logically consistent with the classificatory 
judgement that the instability in the episode has its source in individual competition 
and sexual tension.  However, in not making relevant Aaron’s collective moral 
reasoning George’s stance has the potential for being critically destabilising, given 
that it predictably represents a locus point of three highly charged intersecting moral 
disjunctions.  It is a move that simultaneously challenges the classificatory moral 
reasoning of bodily autonomy, calls for a strong orientation to school goals in a 
transitory social space and poses an immediate threat to the underpinning 
classificatory moral reasoning of the friendship group as a vehicle for identity and 
safety.  The move has the potential of not only invoking a moral defence of the right 
to autonomy but it also runs the risk of making the threat to autonomy even more 
acute because of the threat to his safety arising from the threat to his support network.  
At the same time, the ‘consequence’, given that the move to separate takes place in 
front of the ‘friends’, has the potential of making this defence of autonomy publicly 
necessary to fulfil the moral requirements of the proper performance of a ‘smartarse’.   
 
6.3.1.4 Overt and Strategically Covert Social Expression 
George consistently ascribes to a covert classificatory moral reasoning that 
completely contradicts Aaron’s overt classificatory moral reasoning, so that rather 
than valorising overt verbal and physical expression in occasioned antagonistic power 
relationships, George’s moral reasoning valorises strategically covert verbal and 
physical social expression.   
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This moral reasoning associated with covert verbal or ‘polite’ social expression is 
made inferable throughout George’s categorisation talk.  On the one hand, overtly 
voiced antagonism in the form of ‘verbal abuse’ is repeatedly categorised as a 
complainable matter.  On the other hand, a strategically covert polite demeanour, 
where antagonism is disguised and occasioned goals are kept secret, is explicitly and 
implicitly avowed in occasioned antagonistic power relations.  George describes this 
as ‘catching more flies with honey’, that is, ‘that you can get what you want easier 
and probably more often if you're nice about things you can get what you want by 
being aggressive n-n nasty but generally speaking yeh nicer people get-get what they 
want’.  The sum of these categorisations point to a disposition associated with being 
‘nice’ rather than ‘being aggressive’ or being ‘abusive’, where ‘nice’ = polite 
demeanour.   
 
Unlike Aaron’s moral reasoning of ‘being honest’, which requires an externalised 
integrity in the social expression of antagonism, George’s moral reasoning of ‘being 
nice’ requires an uncoupling of the implicated inner self and external performance.  
Thus, unlike Aaron’s ‘great terrorist of the contact form’, George’s covert reasoning 
is much more Machiavellian, in order to achieve ends by managing appearances.  
Instead of an open presentation of some postulated inner self, there is a masked 
exhibition of persona, where the masks the faces social participant’s assume are 
appropriate to the situation (Lyman & Scott, 1970: 19).  In which case, the masking of 
antagonism itself becomes a moral standard of performance, and the failure to mask 
antagonism becomes an accountable matter that is associated with the ascription 
‘mentally disordered’.  
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It is clear from George’s account of the episode of ‘blowing up’ that this set of moral 
requirements is made relevant as a central feature of the requirements of Aaron’s 
position in the classroom.  For example, in George’s account of the first movement he 
provides the following scenic description when I ask him a question aimed at 
discovering the manner of Aaron’s departure to the other room:  
 
Extract 6.3 
689. R: And did (.) they go-(0.8) ho-= 
690. G: =Oh:h yeh yeh they-they um:m they went reasonably well um:m (2.2)  
691. there was whinging and whining and things like that um:m but they did 
692. actually go.  
693. R: mm-mm 
694. G: So they followed that direction. 
695.  (0.2) 
696. R: mm-mm 
697. G: Um:m physically they followed the direction.  
698. (0.2) 
699. R: mm-mm 
700. G: Mentally? (0.2) and-and that? (.) no. (.) They didn't because that's  
701. when you know there was um:m (0.8) verbal abuse n you know like yeh  
702. I'll sit here but what else can you do to me (0.2)[um this is mainly f] 
703. R:                                       [Is-is that what (.) Aaron  
704. said] 
705. G: this is mainly from Aaron (.) cause this other boy is not- not  
706. really verbal as [in he] 
707. R:        [mm-mm] 
708. G: doesn't engage in a lot of- of (0.5) [verbal] 
709. R:                                     [verbal] 
710. G: abuse [and things]  
711. R:       [mm-mm] 
712. G: like that he's more of a passive-aggressive type of guy 
713. R: right= 
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714. G: =the girl (.) whinged and whi:ned but wasn't (0.2) 
715. R: yeh= 
716. G:=but wasn't aggressive y-yknow or anything like that. ((phone rings))  
717. but Aaron was quite-quite aggressive so.  
 
In this sequence, George explicitly constructs, as a complaint, Aaron’s attributed 
failure to ‘mentally’, as well as ‘physically’, follow the direction.  The social 
performance of compliance is made relevant as a morally complainable matter – 
Aaron physically did not breach his obligation to follow directions but adopted the 
‘wrong’ demeanour for that physical performance.  Notice that the distinction that 
George makes between his categorisation of the other boy and girl and Aaron 
constitutes a hierarchy of complainable matters.  That is, where Aaron’s ‘verbal 
abuse’ = ‘aggression’ provides the warrant for greater complaint compared with the 
‘passive-aggression’ and ‘whinging and whining’, but not ‘verbal abuse’ or 
‘aggression’, of the other ‘boy’ and ‘girl’.  Thus, while all three warrant a complaint 
because they don’t ‘mentally’ follow the direction, Aaron’s performance warrants a 
higher order complaint.  This is because he is unsuccessful in performing the 
disguised ‘passive-aggression’ of the other boy or the idiomatically less ‘aggressive’ 
= ‘no verbal abuse’ and therefore idiomatically more appropriate ‘whinging and 
whining of the girl’.   George’s ordering of complaints as a hierarchy in the above 
sequence therefore displays, and depends on, an inferable standard of ‘mental 
compliance’ = no overt performance of antagonistic opposition to directives as a 
moral assessment (Jayyusi 1984: 166).   
 
There is also a second hierarchy of complaints that is made inferable in the sequence.  
This relates to the distinction between physically following the directive and mentally 
following the directive where the latter is categorised as a lower order complaint.  
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Thus the three ‘students’ went ‘reasonably well’ and ‘they did go’ is emphasised 
through repetition with the insertion of a qualification, which, although becoming an 
accountable matter, is worked up only as a qualification to the ‘reasonably well’.  The 
inference being that not physically following the directive would have constituted a 
primary breach while ‘whinging and whining’ constitutes a lower order breach that 
only modifies the overall compliance.  In a sense, moral aspects of demeanour are 
sacrificed as long as some higher aspect of deference in rule-following is maintained.   
 
The overt/covert disjunction discovered in verbal expression extends to the other 
aspect of Aaron’s overt social expression, that is, overt physical expression.  Again, 
the moral requirements made inferable by George are diametrically opposed to those 
made inferable by Aaron within occasioned antagonistic power relations.  While 
Aaron celebrates physical confrontation and fighting, George displays antipathy to 
physical fighting.  For example, ‘fighting’, or ‘violence’, attracts the maximum 
automatic sanction and constitutes a crisis in the moral order of the school and the 
classroom, or, as George describes in the extract below, ‘the worst scenario’.   
 
Furthermore while Aaron valorises ‘fearlessness’, George, while not valorising fear, 
describes ‘fear’ as a justifiable attribute of ‘teachers’ when confronted by ‘violence’, 
and valorises the converse of ‘fear’, that is, ‘safety’.   Significantly, in a discussion of 
school rules, George announces that there are only two rules: one being ‘safety’ and 
the other ‘not disturbing others’.  Both of these rules privilege physical safety while 
inevitably pointing to their opposite: a fear of physical danger.  It is also no 
coincidence that the threat expressed in ‘blowing up’ is a physical threat and that the 
danger that lies dormant in ‘behaviour kids’, or ‘kids’ with ‘psychiatric mental health 
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problems and things’, is a physical danger made inferable through the repeated 
conjunction of ‘volatility’, ‘behaviour’, ‘violence’ and ‘mental health’.   
 
George also directly references the moral problem of the ‘physically violent’ student 
in his account of ‘blowing up’, and implicitly so in the first movement.  He does this 
on several occasions throughout the interview, including in an interesting way on one 
occasion where he directly ties overt physical expression in occasioned antagonistic 
power relations as a constitutive category feature of ‘psychiatric disorders’.  The 
following sequence occurred during a discussion of the underlying and unpredictable 
‘tension’ that existed in the first movement:  
 
Extract 6.4 
498. R: [mm] 
499. G: Suppose I AL-always try and look at (0.4) what the worst scenario? 
500. R: [yep=yep (.) mm-mm] 
501. G: [gonna be?a nd  I  t h i n k ]  i n  a  b e h a v i ou r  u n i t  wi t h-with kids who are 
502. (.) volatile and kids who have got histories of-of violence and-and  
503. behaviour difficulties and (.) you know (0.3) [possible] 
504. R:                                            [mm-mm] 
505. G: psychiatric disorders or:r other (0.4) maybe got psychiatric- m- 
506. mental health problems and [things] 
507. R:                  [yep] 
508. G: like that I think you've always (1.2) you can never really  
509. relax?(0.2) And I think that's one thing we need to- (0.4) I try n  
510. talk to staff about now is when things are going smoothly (0.5)is the  
511. time to-to put in your real prevention strategies and everything like  
512. that because (.) at any time things can blow up. 
513.  (0.4) 
514. R: yep-[yep] 
515. G:     [An::d] I think you always have to staff the place and be ready  
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516. fo:r the worst scenario (0.2) 
 
So what’s made inferable in the list-like organisation of category tied features, in lines 
502-506, is how certain attributes just go together, including ‘volatile’, ‘histories of 
violence’, ‘behaviour difficulties’, ‘psychiatric disorders’ and ‘psychiatric-mental 
health problems’.  These attributes, intrinsically tied to ‘behaviour kids’, produce ‘the 
worst scenario’, which, although only made inferable here with the inclusion of 
‘violence’ and ‘volatility’, is more explicitly described in the extract above, as when 
‘two boys chose to be violent’.  This concern with the potential for, and actual 
expression of, ‘violence’ can easily be contrasted with Aaron’s own association 
between ‘valour’ and ‘fighting’.  In addition, Aaron’s moral code, which easily 
prescribes the expectable step from verbal abuse to physical fighting, can just as 
easily be contrasted with any similar, yet morally difficult step, towards George’s idea 
of physical struggle.  Presumably, this morally sanctioned, highly covert form of the 
struggle for ‘power’, that is, the maintenance of the right to ‘tell kids what to do’ 
through strategically non-violent ‘flexible approaches’, would only reluctantly 
translate into a morally justifiable physical expression of that struggle for power.   
 
Yet however reluctantly expressed, a moral right to physical force operates covertly in 
the background to ultimately shore up the right to bodily authority.   In this sense, 
physical force lies beyond the reasonable stance of ‘flexible approaches’, in much the 
same way as Wittgenstein famously announced: ‘At the end of reasons come 
persuasion’ (Jayyusi, 1984: 198).  Therefore, as Danforth (1999) says, in practice 
beyond the final vocabulary of ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
‘choices’ and beyond polite demeanour lies the institutional right to resort to physical 
force (741).  This can legitimately occur, either subtly through small gestures such as 
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holding Aaron’s elbow and ‘guiding’ him out of the room, or more overtly, by 
physically blocking his path, grabbing him, physically restraining him or actively 
advocating for his incarceration in a detention centre . Indeed, as George makes 
relevant, the presence of a high ratio of teachers and teacher’s aides to students 
represents an omnipresent reminder of the ‘staff’s’ institutionally legitimised right to 
resort to physical force when ‘students’ get ‘out of control’.   What this amounts to is 
a disguised valorisation of the practical utility of physical force occasioned by threats 
to the moral order.   
 
The disjunction between both verbal and physical aspects of covert social expression 
in antagonistic power relationships represents the fourth and final moral fault line in 
the moral geology of the classroom.   The following summary will examine the way 
in which these fault lines intersect and accrue around the right to asymmetrical power 
relations and how this produces specific upshots for the application of Aaron’s moral 
requirements.  
 
6.3.1.5 Summary of Moral Requirements Governing Participation in the Classroom  
The moral requirements of the classroom displayed in George’s scenic descriptions of 
the events leading up to ‘blowing up’ are clearly disjunctive with Aaron’s own moral 
requirements.  These disjunctions converge on opposing claims to symmetrical and 
asymmetrical power relations in the sense of being ‘told what to do’.  Therefore, 
George’s category descriptions, which inferably reference classificatory moral 
reasoning to do with ‘individualism’, ‘covert expression’, ‘safety’ and the school 
setting, consistently occur in local conversational contexts that rhetorically confirm 
asymmetrical power relations. This points to an inferably displayed ordering of 
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George’s claimed rights and obligations where the primary moral claim lies with 
asymmetrical power relations and other moral claims, such as the set of rights, and 
obligations associated with ‘individualism’, ‘strategic expression’, ‘safety’ and a 
strong orientation to school goals are secondary.  Therefore, in George’s talk of 
‘blowing up’, the central issue is compliance with asymmetrical power relations, and 
the remaining sets of rights and obligations flag either compliance or breaches to 
those asymmetrical power relations.   
 
This primary orientation predictably presents an endless series of problem-raising 
situations for the application of Aaron’s set of dispositions within the interactional 
context of this classroom.  These problem-raising situations are constituted by the 
contradictions between competing requirements, where the disjunction between Aaron 
and George’s claimed rights and obligations provide the opportunity for a cascading 
series of perceived threats to opposing claims within power relations. Accordingly, 
what can be objectively identified in George’s account of the events leading up to 
‘blowing up’ is the potential that the local context provides for an inherently 
structured interactional instability centred on a series of moral fault lines that 
converge on opposing power claims within their relationship.  What needs to be 
examined now is how this potential becomes realised through an examination of the 
way in which Aaron actually applies his sets of classificatory moral reasoning to this 
specific context in situ.  To do this, Aaron’s account of the first movement is 
examined first to identify the set of moral expectations that he brings into play in this 
specific context, the moral requirements of position that he makes relevant, the way in 
which he applies those moral expectations to those elements of position and the 
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relationship between Aaron’s own moral claims in situ and the potential for 
interactional instability.   
 
6.3.2 Attaching Aaron’s Moral Requirements: ‘Slackn Off’ 
Aaron’s accounts of the first movement appear to be organised as if he is attempting 
to manage and negotiate the practical problem-raising tensions between two 
contradictory sets of moral reasonings.  These contradictory moral reasonings 
converge on the symmetrical logic of bodily autonomy and the asymmetrical moral 
logic of the classroom.  Aaron appears to be adopting a position taking stance in the 
social space of the classroom during ‘slackn off’ that is simultaneously shaped by 
both moral logics.  The following extract, which occurred at the beginning of the 
recorded second interview, exemplifies the dynamics of this problematic in practice:  
 
Extract 6.5  
1. R: Yeh so  
2. (1.0) 
3. A: Yeah (0.5) we:ll what happened was. 
4. R: Yeh what happened? 
5. A: I was-I was (1.2) I w- (0.5) I was at um school n you know doin’ 
6. all my English in the morning mainly writing this paper article up 
7. n done all my English and everything and um  (2.0) got to recess 
8. (.)got back (0.5) in class n started slackin’ off from work.  
9. R: Yeh-yeh= 
10. A: = (    ) doin’ work. ((sniffs)) Kinda sent me into another room? 
11. (0.5) 
12. Sent this other chick into another room.  (0.5) Pat stayed in that 
13. room so we were all separated.  
14. R: Yeh-yeh 
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On the one hand Aaron is clearly orienting to his primary disposition of bodily 
autonomy throughout this sequence by making relevant the category activity ‘slackn 
off from work’.  This is because ‘slackn off’ is constituted by the implied institutional 
expectation to do work, that is, ‘slackn off’ is defined by, and is dependent on, a 
reflexive appreciation that one is routinely, in this context, obliged to do work.  
Consequently, by making relevant ‘slackn off’, Aaron is demonstrably orienting to a 
situated choice to oppose the normative expectation to do work.  This autonomy is 
made even more explicit in a latter sequence where I explore the meaning of ‘slackn 
off’:   
 
Extract 6.6 
114. R: [So] what is it- what-what were you doing when you were slackin’  
115. off? 
116. A: Jus’ not doin’ work. 
117. R: What just (.) [chattin’] 
118. A:               [Yeh.] 
119. R: to Stevie or [chattin’] 
120. A: [Chattin’] to Stevie chattin’ to Pats [yeh] 
121. R:                                       [uh] 
122. A: rahrahrah.  
123. R: uh 
124. A: Then um:m.  
125. (0.5) 
126. R: You weren’t throwin’ stuff arou:nd? [or] 
127. A:                                     [Nuh] 
128. R: Just chatting. 
129. A: Yeh (.) Aaron do your work o:r not huhhuh= 
130. R: =huhhuh[huh] 
131. A:        [and] then um=  
132. R: =so then you weren’t doing your work and they said [ok.] 
133. A:                                                    [mm] 
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134. R: What did they actually say to you?  
135. A: Aaron your going there Stevie your going here Pat your staying here.  
 
If we look at line 129, Aaron, without prompting, exposes a contrast between 
alternative positionings: ‘do your work’ or ‘not’, followed by the laughter particle, 
which makes relevant laughing with.  The laughing particle produces the inference 
that there is something comical about what he has just said.  In this case, the comedy 
relies on, and is produced by, the organisational juxtaposition of the first part, the 
authoritative direction “Aaron do your work”, with the incongruent second part ‘o:r 
not’.  However, it is unlikely that it is incongruence alone that produces an inference 
of comedy.  Rather, the humour works through the paradoxical incongruence between 
the two positions, which, in effect, makes the first position ‘do your work’ appear 
foolish.  This is because the position offered by the implied teacher protagonist ‘do 
your work’, normatively, implicitly and expectably does not have any optional 
alternatives, that is to not do the work – a lack of alternatives that reciprocally 
confirms the identity ‘teacher’ and implicitly the institutional rights of the teacher, 
constituted by the authority to give directives of this kind.  The second position, ‘or 
not’, however, draws the hearers attention, with the artful use of the ‘or’ and then the 
emphasis on the ‘not’, to the objective yet institutionally unthinkable alternative that 
the choice is not limited to ‘do your work’.  Arguably, it is the making surprisingly 
obvious of that which is not expectably or institutionally obvious that unmasks the 
now clearly exposed precarious and ‘foolish’ status of the protagonist teacher.  It is 
precarious because of the unfounded presumption to authority, and is foolish because 
of the unfounded presumption that there is only one choice.  Essentially, Aaron is 
declaring that the Emperor has no clothes.  The important point for our purposes is 
that this doing of the joke, necessarily rests on the making relevant of Aaron’s right to 
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autonomy.  Specifically, this concerns the right to choose – where such a choice is 
contextually unexpected, in the face of someone telling him what to do – to do the 
work or to ‘slackn off’.  In other words, ‘slackn off’ is an exercise in autonomy and 
symmetrical power relations and is evidently oriented to by Aaron as such.   
 
Aaron, however, is not just single-mindedly orienting to the classificatory moral 
reasoning associated with bodily autonomy.  He also orients to three specific 
classroom moral requirements that make inferable a contradictory asymmetrical 
institutional moral reasoning.  Firstly, Aaron makes relevant the institutional and local 
obligation to ‘do work’ by ‘doing his English’, and ‘doing all of his work’.  Secondly, 
he orients to the authoritative arrangement of time by making relevant and implicitly 
subscribing to the category activity of work before and after ‘recess’.  Thirdly, and 
most extraordinarily of all, in his scenic description of being sent to another room, 
Aaron orients to, and at least partially subscribes to, the set of moral rights and 
obligations inherent in institutionally asymmetric power relationships.   Unlike almost 
every other account of ‘being told what to do’, Aaron, in this account, complies with 
the directive presumably provided by ‘someone-who-thinks-they-can-tell-me-what-to-
do’!   Moreover, the interview with George confirmed that Aaron actually did comply 
with the directive and did go to the other room.  In further questioning, in line 583 
below, Aaron explicitly confirms at least a partial subscription to the set of 
asymmetrical rights and obligations that are only implied here:  
 
Extract 6.7 
578. R: So that’s what would happen you-uh- (1.0) a:h right ok. Like its 
579. (0.5) where do you th- like with this not doing the wo:rk? 
580. A: mm= 
581. R: =You know and then you got sent out here was that? fair enough of  
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582. them t-to send you in to here?  
583. A: Ye::h (.)it was. (1.0) It was fair enough to send me into here. 
584. (1.0) 
585. R: And then here= 
586. A:=but-but he didn't rub anybody else's signatures. 
587. R: Oh:::h I see just yours 
588. A: Ye:ah. 
589. R: He didn't rub Pat's out or Stevie's. 
590. A: Nuh 
 
Aaron’s account, then, represents a position taking stance that cannot be reduced to 
the unmediated, mechanical imposition of the moral reasoning associated with bodily 
autonomy onto the classroom context.  Rather, it represents a case of applying that 
moral reasoning in this local setting in a way that attempts to accommodate the 
contradictory institutional requirements of the school.  Not surprisingly, these 
contradictions inevitably produce an ongoing series of situational problematics for 
action, in the shape of a series of moral dilemmas about what-to-do, which Aaron 
orients to and works hard to resolve.   
 
Aaron’s orienting to this problematic is made inferable from his talk.  In re-examining 
Aaron’s talk of ‘slackn off’ in extract 6.5 above, the first thing to notice is the highly 
troubled beginning in line 5:  ‘I was-I was (1.2) I w- (0.5) I was at um school ….’   
The peculiar aspect of this troubled beginning is that it is highly atypical of Aaron’s 
utterances in the interviews.  While there are several occasions where Aaron repeats 
particles, or part utterances, the majority of these repeats either precede or coincide 
with interviewer overlap and can be understood in terms of ‘overlap-oriented turn 
production’, which Schegloff (2002) describes as ‘a sort of spinning-of-one’s-wheels 
in getting on with it’ (292) that commonly occurs in conversation overlap.  If we 
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exclude those occasions of repeats as an overlap-oriented turn resource there are only 
five other occasions of troubled utterances in over four hours of interviews.  All five 
of the other occasions are marked by a dilemma, where the preceding interview 
question explicitly raises a position taking problem between two possible but 
conflicting moral positions oriented to by Aaron.    On those occasions, as here, Aaron 
produces atypical troubled responses.  The conclusion drawn from this is that here too 
we may infer a position taking moral dilemma.  Consequently, whatever else is going 
on in Aaron’s account it inferentially includes an occasioned conflict between two 
contradictory moral reasonings that Aaron orients to as such.   
 
Of course the contradictory moral reasoning tied to this troubled beginning could be 
about anything.  However, the organisational features of Aaron’s talk in this sequence 
suggest that the trouble turns on the tensions between disposition and school 
requirements.  Thus one pole of the moral dilemma is implicitly established by what 
immediately follows the troubled opening.  That is, Aaron’s ascription to the category 
or position someone-who-does-all-his-English, which trades off the normative 
expectation or obligation that ‘students’ work in the classroom.  The logic of the 
second pole is subsequently made inferable by the scenic juxtaposition of the 
obligations of someone-who-does-all-his-English against the set of category rights 
associated with the activity ‘slackn off’.   As already argued, ‘slackn off’ references 
the classificatory moral reasoning of bodily autonomy and the collective and, by 
inference, is tied to the category or positioning ‘smartarse’.   This argument is further 
strengthened if we revisit the exchange in extract 6.7.  What becomes interesting 
about that exchange is not just Aaron’s affirmation of the right of a teacher to send 
him out of the classroom for not doing work, but the trouble implied by his opening 
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prolonged ‘ye::h’ in line 583, making inferable ambivalence. Again we can infer a 
local situated dilemma that turns on an inferably contested moral reasoning that 
students should do work in the classroom and that, as a consequence, it’s ‘fair 
enough’ for teachers to send him out of the classroom.   
 
The meeting of two sets of contradictory requirements can be understood as 
producing situational problem-raising moral dilemmas for the kinds of position 
takings possible in the classroom setting that Aaron orients to as such.  But if this 
opening sequence makes relevant a position taking problematic it also suggests two 
local improvised solutions that Aaron appears to take up in relation to the 
problematic, including position or category switching and ambiguous position taking.  
In terms of the former, perhaps the most noticeable feature of the sequence is the 
remarkable switching that occurs between a category ‘someone-who-does-all-of-his-
English’ before recess to the inferentially available category ‘smartarse’ after recess. 
This suggests that before recess he appears to successfully occupy one position 
consistent with the requirements of the classroom setting and after recess he occupies 
another position consistent with the requirements of bodily autonomy.   Again, this 
talk of Aaron’s position taking is not merely rhetorical but was confirmed by 
George’s accounts of events prior and post recess.  In any case, in his account, there is 
an unproblematic switching between the two moral logics and an unproblematic 
position taking of first one category and then the alternative and contrasting category. 
 
The second solution is evident in the ambiguous lexical choice of ‘kinda’, in line 10, 
where Aaron is ‘kinda’ sent into another room.  Now, as it turns out, this ‘kinda’ is 
incredibly important.  This is because it amounts to an artful straddling, or even 
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dislocation, of a situationally produced moral paradox or crisis in position taking 
when symmetrical and asymmetrical requirements of disposition and position are 
brought into sharp relief.  So, if we examine this ‘kinda’ more closely we are forced to 
ask the question: in what way can Aaron be ‘kinda’ sent into another room?  There are 
two hearable possibilities, both of which implicitly subscribe to the category right of 
teachers to ‘send into another room’ and the obligations of students to follow these 
directions.  The first possibility implicitly positions Aaron as orienting to ambiguous 
directions provided by the teacher – the teacher ‘kinda’ directed.  This hearing 
positions Aaron as following even ambiguous directions. In this hearing, Aaron 
inferably positions himself as a reasonable and compliant student who actively 
participates in the work of successfully understanding and complying with ambiguous 
directions.    However, this possibility is implausible given Aaron’s later and repeated 
accounts of being clearly directed, rather than ambiguously directed, to leave the 
room.  A much more likely alternative lies in a hearing of the ‘kinda’ as Aaron 
resisting the category of student compliance to directives from teachers, but 
nevertheless performing the category activity of complying with the directive – Aaron 
‘kinda’ went.  In which case, Aaron is making available the inference that he did not 
unambiguously comply with the command ‘sent’ because it was not really ‘sent’ but 
only ‘kinda’ sent.  This represents an artful and worked-up solution to the problematic 
because, on the one hand, Aaron complies with the directive, but, on the other, he 
morally challenges the position making predicate that teachers have the  right to 
‘send’ irregardless of the reason and that he is not a member of the category of 
students=comply with teacher directions.  Not coincidentally this ambiguous position 
taking strongly resonates with George’s account of Aaron ‘physically’ complying 
with the direction to leave the room but ‘mentally’ not complying.  
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An understanding of the way in which Aaron attaches his sets of classificatory moral 
reasoning to this specific classroom setting during ‘slackn off’ can be framed in terms 
of an attempt to negotiate, on a situation by situation basis, its problem-raising nature.  
He achieves this by taking up either ambivalent or ambiguous stances in relation to 
the requirements of his primary disposition and the requirements of the local 
classroom positions.  These two improvised solutions do not, however, represent 
arbitrary or highly contingent responses to situated circumstances.  Rather, both the 
switching and the ambiguity appear to be tied to occasions that situationally bring into 
play other elements of Aaron’s classificatory moral reasoning.   
 
If we examine Aaron’s ‘switching’ and ‘ambiguity’ more closely it becomes evident 
that other rights and obligations simultaneously come into play, and that these rights 
and obligations appear to be acting as if they are strongly associated with these 
improvised solutions.  Perhaps the most significant of these is the moral reasoning 
underpinning Aaron’s relationship to his friends.  This becomes evident through a 
close examination of Aaron and George’s accounts of before and after recess.  This 
moral reasoning does not seem to be significantly in play prior to recess.  George 
observed that ‘students’ were working individually prior to recess and in a group after 
recess.  This suggests that prior to recess the moral requirements associated with 
‘friends’ were less likely to be in play because Aaron was involved in an individual 
rather than collective activity. This seems to be corroborated by Aaron’s own 
accounts.  Aaron describes the activities prior to recess as ‘I was-I was (1.2) I w- (0.5) 
I was at um school n you know doin’ all my English in the morning’ rather than ‘we’ 
were doing our English or the ‘class’ was doing English.  The implication being that 
he was orienting to the activities as an individual rather than as a member of a 
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collective.   However Aaron, in his account of the events leading up to ‘blowing up’ 
after recess, immediately makes inferable the moral reasoning associated with 
‘friends’ when he defines ‘slackn off’ as ‘not doin’ the work’ + ‘just chattin’ with his 
‘friends’.  In other words, the switch away from compliance with institutional 
requirements of ‘doing the work’ prior to recess, to not ‘doing the work’ after recess, 
is accompanied by a switch to activities associated with the moral requirements tied to 
his set of relationships with ‘friends’. This, as it is elsewhere throughout Aaron’s talk, 
is immediately juxtaposed and aligned with category activities that make inferable his 
right to bodily autonomy.  Non-compliance and compliance in ‘doin’ the work’ 
therefore appears to be tied to local circumstances, where the moral requirements 
invoked by ‘friends’ are more or less pressing, occasioned  and oriented to by Aaron.   
 
His relationship to the goals and imperatives of school also appear to be tied to the 
switch.  Thus, prior to recess he was ‘doin’ all my English’.  There are two things to 
note here.  The first is that ‘English’ is specifically nominated by Aaron as the central 
part of his pre-account, thereby making available the inference that English hearably 
counts as a praiseworthy school activity.  This, even as a recipient designed utterance, 
displays an inferably shared agreement that English is a recognisably legitimate 
school activity.  In addition, ‘doing English’ is highly consistent with Aaron’s 
categorisation of ‘school smart’ = ‘timetables, reading and writing’ and is consistent 
with his avowed school related goal of getting ‘smart’.    ‘Doing English’ is a setting-
relevant activity that is clearly oriented to by Aaron.  It would be difficult to argue 
that Aaron orients as strongly to the post recess lesson in origami as a setting-relevant 
activity tied to his school goals of ‘timetables, reading and writing’.  Under these 
circumstances the contextual relevance of school-related, rather than street-related, 
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activities would expectably diminish.  The second thing to notice is related to this last 
point.  It is possible to hypothesise that activities prior to recess were clearly within 
the school domain in terms of the time that they occurred, given that they were 
oriented to by Aaron as such and, therefore, far less subject to the temporal 
transitional effects post recess leading into the imminent weekend.  A switching could 
be expected to become increasingly probable as a result of the likelihood of 
participants entering into a transitional space on a Friday afternoon.   
 
Turning to an examination of Aaron’s ambiguous position-taking, there is evidence 
that the displayed ambiguity in response to the directive to be ‘sent’ from the room, 
or, more specifically, his compliance with the directive, is at least partly attributable 
to the requirements invoked by the moral logic of the collective.  The evidence for 
this lies in the sequence relating to Aaron’s ambivalent agreement to the right to being 
sent from the room: 
 
Extract 6.8 
578. R: So that’s what would happen you-uh- (1.0) a:h right ok. Like its 
579. (0.5) where do you th- like with this not doing the wo:rk? 
580. A: mm= 
581. R: =You know and then you got sent out here was that? fair enough of  
582. them t-to send you in to here?  
583. A: Ye::h (.)it was. (1.0) It was fair enough to send me into here. 
584. (1.0) 
585. R: And then here= 
586. A: =But-but he didn't rub anybody else's signatures. 
587. R: Oh:::h I see just yours 
588. A: Ye:ah. 
589. R: He didn't rub Pat's out or Stevie's. 
590. A: Nuh. 
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591. R: Is it- You know this rubbing the signatures out? 
592. A: Yeh= 
593. R: =Is it for (.) you get (.) when you do something go:od they give you  
594. a signature (.) yeh? (.) So [you] 
595. A:                         [Yeh] 
596. R: get a reward is that how it works? 
597. A: Yeh. 
598. R: Yep? So have they in the pa- it also part of the rules that if you  
599. do some[thing] 
600. A:     [NUH]  
601. R: Ah:h so that was new  
602. (1.0) 
603. A: Yeh that's what I arced up about [like what the fuck?] 
604. R:                                  [Ye:h ye:h] (1.0) 
605. A: Do it to me do it to everyone else then (.) come on. 
606. R: Ah so it was just you. 
607. A: Yeah. 
 
The critical lines for our purposes are lines 583-90 and lines 603-07.  In line 583 
Aaron displays an ambivalent affiliation with my previous utterance, and then in line 
586 provides the disaffiliative qualification, which is hearable as a complaint, 
preceded by an interruption and a repeated but-but that draws attention to the 
complaint.  Noticeably, the grounds for the complaint lie with the difference between 
the way that he was treated after the sending and the way his friends were treated. 
This makes available the inference that a moral breach occurred based on an 
expectation that friends should be treated in the same way.  This moral inference is 
clearly explicit in line 605 when Aaron announces that the rule is ‘do it to me do it to 
everyone else’.  This also makes available the inference that the sending itself is 
morally fitting to the extent that it complies with the obligation to treat Aaron in the 
same way as his friends.  Therefore the ambivalence made evident in Aaron’s scenic 
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description of being sent and ‘kinda’ going is at least partly attributable to a moral 
dilemma presented by the simultaneous, but situationally paradoxical, relevance of the 
bodily autonomy and collective moral reasoning.   
 
This sequence also provides evidence for the final insight in relation to Aaron’s 
ambiguous position taking in being sent from the room.  That is, that under the normal 
circumstances of the classroom that the application of Aaron’s right to bodily 
autonomy appears to be situationally and paradoxically moderated by a moral 
obligation to meet the requirements of imposed sanctions to breaches to school 
setting-relevant activities – but only after autonomously establishing the legitimacy of 
those sanctions.  There is evidence for this throughout Aaron’s talk of getting into 
trouble, in the way he negotiates various school rules on his own terms.  However, 
there is also immediate evidence for this in Aaron’s series of utterances, particularly 
from line 600 onwards in the above sequence.  Notice the strong agreement to my 
previous ‘so that was new’ and the strong complaint made inferable by the 
organisation of this turn.  The ‘NUH’ displays strong disagreement through the 
volume, the fact that Aaron produces it is as stand alone declarative unqualified 
particle and the turn overlap, hearable as an interruption.  The inference being that no 
further account is necessary.  My next turn ends with a pause and a question, which 
makes inferable that an account, or Aaron’s previous turn, is necessary.  
Consequentially, Aaron ties the ‘arcing up’, that is, his complaint, to the breaching of 
a previously accepted rule.  This is in relation to signatures but, more importantly, is 
oriented to the ‘do it to me do it to everyone else then’.  This makes available a moral 
reasoning whereby the obligation to comply with the sanction itself is paradoxically 
not at issue or newsworthy.  What is at issue and what is oriented to, is the breach to a 
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necessary condition for sanctioning.  That is, that the sanction is not ‘new’ and, by 
inference, has been previously accepted as legitimate, and the sanction is congruent 
with the right to being treated the same as everyone else.  The paradoxical tension 
between a position taking stance that accepts the obligation to comply with the 
sanction, ‘yeh it was fair enough to send me into here’ and also that this compliance is 
conditional, consequently explains both: (i) the ambivalent beginning to this 
sequence; and (ii) that such a paradoxical logic is made relevant by Aaron as being in 
play in the situation of ‘kinda’ being sent from the room.   
 
It is worthwhile noting that George also corroborated the inferences made available, 
both here and elsewhere in Aaron’s accounts, that Aaron, because he ‘knew the 
system’, that is, was aware of how the school worked in terms of required rights and 
obligations, would comply with ‘consequences’, on the grounds that Aaron 
acknowledged the right to impose sanctions when there were breaches to institutional 
‘system’ rules, even though he autonomously claimed the right to follow or break 
those rules.   However, George also drew attention to Aaron’s claims around being 
treated justly in relation to these sanctions and the upshots to perceived breaches to 
this right in the following sequence:   
 
Extract 6.9 
641. G: and he knows that (2.0) like if-if I bu- you-know busted him for 
642. som- y‘know for something and he-he got suspended he- (1.2) he'd 
643. basically just go yeah fine. N ther-there wouldn't be a lot of  
644. resentment there? Because he sort of just he understan:ds the way the  
645. systems operate? Y’know n  
646. R: Yeh [yeh] 
647. G:     [he'd] just sort of go (.) yeh ok you got me. 
648. R: Fine I'll be a (  ) yeh 
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649. G: That's right y’know but if its unjust and this is where he's- if  
650. something was unjust or he'd perceived it as an injustice towards him  
651. (1.0) holy hell look out (0.5) y’know and he would just go to tow:n it  
652. wouldn't be just questioning it would be like aggression an:d (.)  
653. y’know conf- confrontation n things like that y’know and um (0.2) again 
654. he knew what he could and what he couldn't do? and he knew what- well 
655. not (0.2) just me but what staff could and couldn't do. Y’know and he  
656. would put- he'd put you on the line all the time. Like you can't do 
657.  that.  
 
While the term ‘unjust’ goes unexplained, its meaning is inferable from the 
organisation of the sequence.  The meaning of the  term ‘unjust’ is made available 
through the way in which George works up strong contrast, indicated by the 
emphasised but in line 649, between the set of category predicates in the first part of 
the sequence with the category predicates in the second.   Thus Aaron = aggressive + 
confrontational when ‘injustice’ is identified in the latter part is contrasted with the 
categorisation of Aaron in lines 641-47 as he knows the system + no resentment to 
consequences arising from the system that are already understood and, therefore, by 
implication, knowingly predictable and acceptable based on that knowledge.  
Significantly, the lack of resentment makes inferable the absence of a moral breach 
for Aaron, while the aggression tied to the perception of ‘injustice’ is produced as a 
moral complaint.  The contrast makes available the inference that ‘injustice’ = a 
morally sanctionable departure from what is known and predictable, and where there 
is an acceptance of the sanctions associated with a breach of what is known and 
predictable.  Notice that the emphasis on him, and by inference, not others, followed 
by the ‘holy hell’ in line 651, makes a special case for an extreme moral breach 
associated with a singling out of Aaron, that is, a departure from what is previously 
known and consequentially acceptable that specifically targets Aaron.  Consequently 
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the meaning of ‘injustice’ is also hearably associated with a sense of treating Aaron in 
a way that is unequal to others.   
 
What is apparent from both Aaron’s avowal and George’s ascription is a 
categorisation of Aaron that makes available the same moral reasoning that references 
an obligation to accept sanctions to school ‘system’ breaches, as long as the sanction 
does not constitute an ‘injustice’, that is, the school rule is previously known + Aaron 
is treated the same as everyone else.  Importantly, the sanction of being sent from the 
room with his friends in the instance of ‘slackn off’ met these two conditions and was 
oriented to by Aaron as such.  This suggests that this obligation was unimpedingly in 
play during being sent from the room and this obligation at least partly explains the 
compliance embedded in the ambiguity of ‘kinda sent’.    
 
Of course, in describing the moral obligations tied to compliance we need to not lose 
sight of the moral rights associated with the other pole in Aaron’s ambiguous position 
taking at the end of  ‘slackn off’.  Indeed it is entirely possible to speculate that 
Aaron’s displayed ambivalence to the directive made inferable by the ‘kinda’ not only 
references Aaron’s claim to symmetrical and autonomous relationships with 
‘teachers’ but simultaneously references the sets of rights and obligations in his 
relationships with friends and the goals of schooling.  In this sense, the directive 
represents a highly public and direct breach to Aaron’s own moral order that 
collectively violates his claimed rights and obligations surrounding bodily autonomy, 
his relationship to ‘friends’ and his situated relationship to the goals of school.   Under 
these circumstances it is not surprising that Aaron followed the direction ‘physically’ 
and not ‘mentally’.  Furthermore, while it is not clear from either Aaron or George’s 
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accounts if Aaron’s ‘verbal abuse’ occurred while he was leaving or after he left such 
a response would be in keeping with ‘being honest’ as a morally prescribed response 
to this kind of threat to his moral order.   
 
The relationships between the different elements of Aaron’s moral reasoning in situ 
draw attention to three critical observations.  First, that Aaron’s practical solutions to 
the problem-raising situations presented by the classroom setting, switching and 
ambiguity, are clearly and evidently not divorced from either the requirements of the 
context or the requirements of a ‘smartarse’.  Instead they represent highly occasioned 
solutions that are predictably tied to different distinguishable elements of Aaron’s 
moral reasoning, made relevant by situationally occasioned elements of the context.   
 
The second point is that while we have previously dissected the moral reasoning 
underpinning Aaron’s set of relationships to friends, teachers and the goals of 
schooling in a way that abstractly isolates them while simultaneously demonstrating 
an overall systemic confluence between them, in practice this confluence is not as 
clear cut.  Different elements, such as his relationship to friends and his relationship to 
school work, can work against bodily autonomy moral reasoning to moderate the right 
to absolutely refuse teacher directives with ‘get fucked do it yourself’.  They can 
situationally modify the primary tension between the requirements of position and the 
requirements of a ‘smartarse’ embedded in power relations.   
 
This suggests the third point, that the application of the system of relationships 
between the distinguishable elements of Aaron’s moral order in situ, in dynamic 
relationship with situated elements of the context, make possible, on different 
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occasions, different degrees of practical and moral convergence and divergence with 
the requirements of the context.  Thus, prior to recess, there appears to be a 
convergence of the system of moral requirements of the smartarse orienting to agreed 
work goals and the relative absence of moral relationships to friends and the moral 
requirements of the classroom setting.  Under these circumstances it is possible to 
speculate that the bodily autonomy disposition lies dormant in the background given 
the situated mutual orientation to work goals and the relative absence of the 
obligations in relation to friends.  Post recess, however, there is an increasing 
divergence between the moral requirements of the smartarse and the setting, as the 
moral relationship to friends and the street come into play and the moral relationship 
to work goals diminish.  Moreover, at the end of the scene, the moral requirement of 
bodily autonomy is pushed into the foreground as a result of being ‘kinda sent’, even 
while it is moderated by the obligation to comply with previously known system 
sanctions.   
 
Cumulatively, these observations point to a predictable vulnerability of the full set of 
unfolding relationships between Aaron and the setting to repeatedly collapse into 
interactional discord.  This is because Aaron’s ambiguous and ambivalent position 
taking solutions can only objectively amount to a relatively weak concord with the 
primary asymmetrical requirements of the setting.  To put this another way, position 
taking that involves autonomous switching and/or an ambiguity to asymmetrical 
power relations is inevitably incongruent with the primary set of expectations of 
teacher/student rights and obligations within the classroom setting.  These latter 
obligations do not ambiguously, or ambivalently, shift from occasion to occasion.   
Consequently, Aaron’s situated solution, displayed within ‘slackn off’, does not, and 
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cannot, endlessly extinguish the contradictory moral tensions between the moral 
requirements of the smartarse and the moral requirements of the classroom setting.  
This is because these solutions themselves incite the problematic.  They inevitably 
provoke a morally obliged response from George and other staff, prescribed by 
breaches to their asymmetrical moral order in the explicit form of ‘telling me what to 
do’, as it does here in being sent from the room.  The ‘telling me what to do’ then 
brings into play, even if ambivalently, Aaron’s primary claim to symmetrical power 
relations, which if further incited would subsequently increase the likelihood of 
further instability. Consequently, the manner in which Aaron attaches his dispositions 
to this setting ensures that Aaron’s position taking is highly precarious and inherently 
unstable.  This will ensure that their interactions remain highly vulnerable to 
interactional discord and conflict despite situated attempts to manage or negotiate 
those contradictions.   
 
6.3.3 Summarising the First Movement 
The examination of George and Aaron’s accounts of the events leading up to ‘blowing 
up’ point to an inherent interactional instability that is a product of the tensions 
produced between disjunctive sets of rights and obligations.  The epicentre of this 
instability is located in the primary disjunction between Aaron’s bodily autonomy 
moral reasoning and George’s claim to asymmetrical ‘teacher’/‘student’ power 
relations.  The analysis also points to an understanding of the degree of instability in 
terms of the degree of situational divergence and convergence between the moral 
requirements of a ‘smartarse’ and the moral requirements of the classroom setting.  
The interactional instability displayed in this first scene establishes the grounds for 
further discord in the scenes that follow, as the contradictions between the moral 
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requirements build on the convergent tension produced by the prescribed sanction of 
being told to leave the room.   
 
The next two movements will demonstrate that the rest of the episode of ‘blowing up’ 
can be analytically described in terms of the incremental unravelling of these tensions, 
as the unfolding relationship between Aaron and the local context produces a vast 
divergence between school and smartarse requirements.   
 
6.4 The Second Movement 
This section describes the unravelling of the interactional discordance between Aaron 
and the classroom setting.  In addition, this section will show that this unravelling 
precisely follows the practical moral requirements prescribed by threats to Aaron’s 
and George’s moral orders,  where each breach incites a prescribed response in a 
prescribed manner, which constitutes a breach to the moral order of the other 
interactional partner that, in turn, incites a prescribed response in a prescribed manner.  
In this way, Aaron’s practice throughout the rest of the episode can be abstractly 
described as a prescribed series of moral moves aimed at repairing situated breaches 
arising from increasingly divergent moral requirements, where the primary orientation 
is to position taking in power relations.   
 
6.4.1 Moral Requirements of the Classroom: George’s Account of Signatures 
The following extract occurred as a result of questions seeking clarification on 
whether George followed Aaron into the other room after being separated from his 
‘friends’: 
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Extract 6.10 
727. R: And did To- did you leave? [Like did you follow him? (.) Right ok ] 
728. G:                            [Yeh-yeh (.) yeh basically] I said y’know  
729. we- come in here we'll put down here you got to sit here sit down and  
730. do (  ) work with Tony? [um:m] 
731. R:                      [mm] 
732. G: And he said well I'm not y’know f-ing doing anything y’know and its 
733. like well you know you wont earn your signatures? (0.2) I dont f-ing  
734. ca:re 
735. (0.5) 
736. R: mm-mm= 
737. G: =Aaron you can't y’know that's inappropriate language mate you can't  
738. do that.  
739. (0.2) 
740. R: mm  
741. (1.0) 
742. G: More verbal (.) um:m so then it was like "well if that's the case  
743. then you will hav- you will lose some of your signatures?  
744. R: Yep-yep 
745. G: Um:m and he was like yeh well so so f-ing what.  Show me .() do it  
746. then do it do it-do it-do it so ah:h having said that (0.5) I felt well  
747. (0.5) I now need to follow (0.2) through? [with] 
748. R:                                [mm] 
749. G: that so I did I removed some signatures from Aaron and he was  
750. like I don't f-ing care. I said alright well maybe you just need to sit 
751. there. 
 
Quite clearly George organises this scenic description around breaches to 
asymmetrical rights and obligations tied to power relationships in the 
‘teacher’/‘student’ pair.  So, in the sequence, the right to ‘tell students what to do’ is 
made inferable in the five directives concerned with physical movement and verbal 
expression.  This starts with his utterance in line 729-730: ‘we- come in here we'll put 
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down here you got to sit here sit down and do (  ) work with Tony [um:m]’ and then 
his complaint in line 737 – 738 ‘Aaron you can't-yknow that's inappropriate language 
mate you can't do that’ and then finally his directive in line 750-751 ‘alright well 
maybe you just need to sit there.  Notice also that George makes relevant the need to 
‘follow through’ with the sanction or ‘consequence’ in line 746-747. George 
elsewhere explained that ‘following through’, that is, voicing and then implementing 
consequences, is a constitutive category predicate for ‘teacher’ that confirms category 
boundaries in the ‘teacher’/‘student’ pair to do with asymmetrical power relations.   
 
Notice too that George once again makes relevant the moral requirement to do the 
work as well as the moral requirement to use ‘appropriate language’, that is, to mask 
antagonism, but then settles for physical compliance in line 749-751.   This makes 
inferable the primary importance of power relations.  Physical compliance can be 
heard as the most important gesture of compliance, confirming the right to 
asymmetrical power relations.  Physical compliance is established here, by George, as 
enough to meet the moral requirements of the rights and obligations surrounding 
asymmetries in the ‘teacher’/‘student’ pair.  This is the case even though 
‘inappropriate language’ and ‘not doing the work’ have provided the grounds for 
recognisable moral breaches and further sanctions.   
 
This draws attention to the observation that George continues to work up an account 
of the ‘good alternative teacher’, in this sequence and throughout the second 
movement, in highly occasioned ways.  The inference is made available through the 
appeal as a complaint, in line 737–738, followed by a consequence of removing 
signatures, which is not ‘booting them out’ for rule breaking.  This is hearable as 
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using ‘alternative methods’. It is also made relevant by the way he works up the 
contrast between Aaron’s first person use of ‘fucking’ and his first person use of calm 
non-abusive language, which is hearable as ‘not reacting’.   
 
However George’s performance as a ‘good alternative teacher’ is somewhat 
compromised in the sequence.  He orients to this in the following sequence when he 
offers what amounts to a ‘scapegoating excuse’, in Lyman and Scott’s terms, for 
departure from ‘good practice’.  That is, where the practice is admitted as bad but 
responsibility is attributed to Aaron (1970: 116-119). This sequence occurred after I 
sought clarification about the signatures: 
  
Extract 6.11 
775. G: [y’know tray] with their work in it? and I just basically took his  
776. folder out and said alright you'll have to- you know you'll have to  
777. lose (0.5) blahblahblahblahblah. Thinking back.(1.0) That was probably  
778. the wrong. Again it was- y’know I- I- I fell into the trap of power-  
779. y’know little power play? 
780. R: mm= 
781. G: =You know the confrontation? 
782. R: mm 
783. G: Umm:m (0.5) and (0.8) you know all- all the (0.2) all the research  
784. says and everything like that once (0.2) its better to once kids have 
785. earnt something (.) is not take it off them (0.8) which is a bit of  
786. negative? 
787. R: mm= 
788. G: =So::o (.) in that sense I probably- that was something that I- I  
789. probably could have done better? (.) I think? 
 
In lines 777-78& 783-86, George makes relevant that the practice was hearably 
wrong, that is, it was a departure from ‘good alternative teacher’ practice. He ties this 
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to ‘I fell into the trap of power –yknow little power play’ in lines 777-78.  Notice that 
George is making available a switching of power relationship when he falls victim to 
Aaron’s ‘trap’, and refers to it is a ‘little’ power ‘play’, referencing the kinds of 
‘games’ that ‘children’ or ‘kids’ ‘play’.  In so doing, he is orienting to a breach of a 
normative moral order, associated with a stage of life MCD, where the breach is 
defined by adults who are teachers falling into line with ‘kids’ games and ‘kids’ who 
are ‘students’ overpowering ‘adults’. What is important about this shift is that this 
kind of falling into these little power plays is worked up in George’s talk as being tied 
to ‘mainstream’ teacher practices.  This is a kind of ‘reacting’ typical of a 
‘mainstream’ stance.  This point seems further reinforced by George’s admission later 
in the same sequence that the removal of signatures was not standard policy for the 
alternative setting, where ‘teachers’ try to ‘reward positive behaviours’ and ‘ignore 
negative behaviours’.  Again this kind of ‘not ignoring’ is more consistent with 
‘mainstream practice’.  The significant upshot is that by removing signatures George 
seems to be partly shifting stances from ‘flexible’ to ‘mainstream’.  Nevertheless it 
remains an ambiguous shift because after all ‘removing signatures’ is not ‘booting 
them out’ or wholly typical of the ‘mainstream teacher’ category activities that 
George previously worked up in response to ‘behaviour kid’ ‘manipulative 
behaviour’.  
 
What this sequence amounts to is a growing ambiguity in George’s stance and a 
growing destabilisation of the interactive order. This destabilisation arises as George 
imposes a moral order that strongly orients to asymmetrical rights and obligations 
with the relationship and that responds to further breaches to that moral order with a 
further sanction ‘losing your signatures’.  George’s response to further breaches is 
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predictably consistent with his self-avowed categorisation of ‘alternative teacher’ = 
‘flexible response’.  Furthermore, ‘alternative teacher’ incumbency includes a 
prescriptive moral obligation to incrementally increase ‘consequences’ along a 
hierarchy of possible consequences.  In this case, ‘losing signatures’ is hearable as 
marking an escalation in consequences.  However, as we have already witnessed from 
Aaron’s previous accounts, this consequence of losing signatures becomes critical to 
further destabilisation because, as George also admits, losing signatures has never 
occurred within the school and is not a part of expectable sanctions to rule-breaking.   
Finally, it is important to notice that space and the body are the central terrain on 
which the struggle for asymmetrical power relations takes place – a physical struggle 
that has specific implications for what’s at stake for Aaron.  The analysis now turns to 
Aaron’s account of the second movement. 
 
6.4.2 Attaching Aaron’s Moral Requirements: ‘I wouldn’t sit on my fuckn seat’ 
The following extract occurs after I confirm with Aaron that George followed him 
into the room:  
 
Extract 6.12 
161. A: And I went. S-so I’m come from out here?  
162. R: mm 
163. A: In here.  
164. R: mm= 
165. A: =Said I’m wipin’ out your signatures. I went rahrah-yeah keep goin’  
166. I didn’t tell you to stop he goes tell me when to stop.  I’m not  
167. telling you when to stop. huh(0.8) Do what ever you want. 
168. R: What as he was wiping out your signatures? (.) Was- (1.0) 
169. A: And then he’s um.  
170. R: Was that punishment for not doing [your] 
171. A:                                   [yeh]  
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172. R: work or somethin’  
173. A: N rahrahrah cause I wouldn’t sit on me seat sit [on my] 
174. R:                                                 [Oh you] were  
175. supposed to [sit] 
176. A: [yeh] 
177. R: on your seat here (.) and do work 
178. A: Ah no? 
179. R: Just sit in your seat.= 
180. A: =Yeh sit in my seat I wouldn’t sit in my fuckin’ seat. 
181. R: huhhuhhuh[huh] 
182. A:          [Said] I like the fuckin’ floor better. huh 
183. R: huh oh right huh is that what you said to him= 
184. A: =Ye:ah. (1.0) Anyway (0.8) he’s rubbed out my signa:tures.  
185. R: mm= 
 
It is interesting to observe that, unlike in George’s account, Aaron only makes an 
indirect reference to verbal abuse in line 180.  We could speculate endlessly about this 
difference, but such speculation would only detract from the principle observation that 
Aaron clearly switches from an ambiguous position taking in relation to setting-
relevant obligations in his ‘kinda’ being sent to what is evidently a far less ambiguous 
position taking stance.  Thus Aaron now stridently rejects any subsequent obligations 
to do the work or sit on the seat arising from asymmetrical moral requirements of the 
setting.  It is as if physically leaving the room was as far as his rights to autonomy 
could be stretched under these specific circumstances.  Whether he did, ‘being honest’ 
or not is relatively inconsequential to the analytical description of this switch because 
both the switch and the verbal abuse reference an identical moral logic of autonomy.  
In fact, a failure to ‘be honest’ would be more perplexing because it would be 
inconsistent with Aaron’s self-avowed moral rights and obligations to ‘be honest’ in 
antagonistic power relations.   
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Putting this issue to one side, what is clearly evident is that Aaron arranges his scenic 
description as a lengthy moral complaint that strongly orients to his set of rights and 
obligations in the ‘smartarse’/‘teacher’ symmetrical pair.  For example, in the 
exchange running from line 173 Aaron works up a laughing at George that, like his 
joke about doing the work or not, turns on the normatively unexpectable exposure of 
an alternative to the directive of sitting on the seat.  He sits on the floor because ‘I like 
the fuckin floor better’, which draws attention to the right to autonomously choose, 
based on his own preferences.  Notice too that Aaron’s counter-assertion in line 173 
that the loss of signatures was only in response to not sitting on his seat rather than 
anything to do with work strips any legitimacy that may arise from Aaron’s own 
occasioned orientation to school goals while reducing the interaction to the solitary 
threat to his right to bodily autonomy.   
 
Similarly, in lines 165-67, Aaron works up a scenic account that undermines the 
authoritative force of the removal of signatures as a sanction by directing George to 
keep on going.  In this way Aaron exposes the necessary requirement that a sanction 
can only be considered a sanction once there is interactional agreement that the 
sanction has some harmful impact on the recipient.  By encouraging George to keep 
on going Aaron steps away from interactional agreement and simultaneously steps 
outside of the asymmetrical moral requirement associated with asymmetrical power 
relations that teachers have the right to impose sanctions and ‘students’ are obliged to 
suffer sanctions, or even that George has the power to harm Aaron in some way.  He 
achieves this by invalidating the meaning of losing signatures as a sanction.  Aaron 
immediately reinforces his claim to autonomy by then refusing to follow George’s 
direction to ‘tell him when to stop’.  Significantly, Aaron’s declaration at the end of 
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the utterance ‘do whatever you want’ strongly resonates with the ‘smartarse’ moral 
principle of symmetrical ‘teacher’/‘student’ power relations ‘you do what you want 
and I do what I want’, thus again making available the ‘smartarse’ moral logic of 
autonomy.   
 
In addition, the ‘do whatever you want’ coupled with a previously expressed 
disparaging stance in relation to ‘signatures’ as a reward system = ‘shit like that’ 
makes inferable the ‘don’t care what happens’ condition for autonomous action.  The 
moral logic of ‘don’t care what happens’, referenced by ‘do whatever you want’, has a 
specific local force here because it contradicts and disqualifies the implied moral 
requirement of individuated ‘future thinking’ embedded in a signature reward system.  
In situ, then, ‘don’t care what happens’, referenced by the ‘do whatever you want’, 
has immediate practical upshots for bodily autonomy because it deconstructs and 
eliminates the practical persuasive force of ‘consequences-that-occur-in-the-future’ as 
sanctions for breaches to the kinds of asymmetrical power relations required by the 
setting.  Thus Aaron’s announcement, ‘do whatever you want’, demonstrably 
foregrounds a rhetorically heroic ‘smartarse’ assertion of valour and autonomy in the 
face of contradictory assertions of subjugation. 
 
Despite this foregrounding of autonomy, what is incredibly interesting about the 
scenario up until this point is that Aaron remains in the room.  So, despite his strong 
shift towards the moral requirements of ‘smartarse’ logic of autonomy, there remains 
a degree of orientation to the moral requirements of the classroom because he is still 
complying with the initial directive in being sent from the room.  Therefore, based on 
both George and Aaron’s accounts, it is possible to argue that right up until this point 
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Aaron is still attempting to resolve the problem-raising situation of the classroom 
through ambiguous position taking, even though this ambiguity is much more strongly 
orientating to the moral requirements of the smartarse.  However, as we have already 
witnessed, the imposition of the signatures as an illegitimate sanction removes the 
moral grounds for any further compliance with the moral requirements of the setting.  
So that when George reduces the practical and moral contest to sitting in the room, 
Aaron predictably does what is prescriptively required by a perceived threat to his 
autonomy, now no longer restrained by a moral consideration of following legitimate 
sanctions – he leaves the room: 
 
Extract 6.13 
184. A: =Ye:ah. (1.0) Anyway (0.8) he’s rubbed out my signa:tures.  
185. R: mm= 
186. A: =I went into he- I went to Pat and said oh look cunt rubbed out my 
187. signatures. Y’know went to Stevie cunt wiped out my signatures. Dude  
188. th- (0.5) cunt th’was- rubbed out my signatures (.) was (1.0) was um 
189. (1.0) was::s aa:aa (0.5) was the (.) the dude that rubbed out my  
190. signatures was in there? With Stevie? That's- n I went into Stevie and  
191. he was sittin’ in there (.) and I went Oh look this cunt here just  
192. rubbed out my signatures[   ] 
193. R:                      [Did] he follow you around or somethin’? 
194. A: Nah (0.5) but (0.5) what he did he was in here? cunt rubbed out my  
195. signatures and then went in there? with Stevie? 
196. R: Oh right yeh-yeh.  
197. A: And then um I've walked in there went Pat he rubbed out my  
198. signatures walked in there and he was in there too?  
199. R: mm-mm 
200. A: and I went this cunt has just rubbed out my [signatures] 
201. R:                                             [signatures] yeh 
202. A: he goes oh rahrahrah (0.5) I went ah Aaron can you please leave the  
203. room like get fucked cunt I'll smash ya. 
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204. R: mm-mm 
205. A: Walked out walked in to here (1.0) he wouldn't let me out of this 
206. room? 
 
But Aaron doesn’t just leave the room.  In a way that is largely predicated by the set 
of relationships between ‘friends’ and a safe defence of bodily autonomy, he makes 
repeatedly relevant a joining with all his ‘friends’ to make the assertic moral 
complaint ‘this cunt has rubbed out my signatures’.   Additionally, if his prior 
ambiguous compliance with being sent ran the arguable risk of compromising a 
proper performance of ‘smartarse’, to the extent of its ambiguity, then this entirely 
unambiguous scenic performance fully readdresses the grounds for smartarse category 
incumbency.  In which case, publicly categorising George as a ‘cunt’ not only 
represents a face-to-face ritual profanation of proper deference required by the setting 
but it also, in doing so, confirms Aaron’s category incumbency and, hence, his rights 
to mutual support among his ‘friends’.  What this points to is an occasioned moral 
logic that is entirely oriented towards Aaron’s rights to symmetrical power relations.   
 
Notice too the category shift to ‘cunt’ exactly conforms to the morally prescribed 
escalation of ‘being honest’ from ‘get fucked’, in situations where a directive is given 
by ‘someone who thinks they can tell me what to do’.  That is, there is a re-
categorisation of the antagonistic protagonist as a ‘cunt’, whenever there is a 
perceived attempt by ‘people who think they can tell me what to do’ to impose or 
threaten to impose an illegitimate sanction.  The voiced threat in line 203 ‘get fucked 
cunt I’ll smash ya’ is likewise fully consistent with the same set of moral prescriptions 
surrounding ‘being honest’ and ‘tell it to their face’, occasioned by morally proscribed 
explicit or implicit threats to physically impose illegitimate sanctions, in this case, the 
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implicit threat that he has to leave the room.   In this sense, the ‘I’ll smash ya’ is not 
made relevant by Aaron as a statement of immediate substantiative intent but, rather, 
as a prescribed overtly verbal expressive sanction in response to the oriented to threat 
of a physical restraint lying behind the direction or request to leave the room.  In 
Aaron’s moral order, physical violence in antagonistic relationships with ‘people who 
think they can tell me what to do’ who are ‘teachers’ is occasioned only in response to 
some physical threat.   
 
Lines 202-03 are particularly interesting in regard to the contrasting moral 
requirements of the setting and smartarse in relation to ‘polite’ and ‘overt’ verbal 
expression.   Aaron begins the utterance with a now familiarly dismissive fast-
forwarding in relation to George’s announcement ‘he goes oh rahrharah.’  He then 
makes a correction to the ‘I went’ that inferably underlines the importance of a part 
of the announcement that is sequentially recovered from the fast-forwarding ‘ah 
Aaron can you please leave the room’.   He then immediately contrasts this first part 
of the utterance with a list-like second part ‘like get fucked cunt I’ll smash ya’.  The 
organisation of this turn invokes the same kind of moral logic of overt expression 
seen everywhere else in Aaron’s talk.  Firstly, the list-like construction of the 
utterance makes available the inference that the highly antagonistic second part is 
morally prescribed complaint occasioned by the first part.  Secondly, the category 
bound complaint itself makes available the inference that the first part is heard as a 
moral breach to a smartarse’s right to autonomy, that is, the first part is heard as a 
‘telling me what to do’ regardless of the way he has worked up the first part as a 
normatively hearable polite request.  This makes available the inference that the first 
part constitutes a covertly disguised ‘telling me what to do’.  Thirdly, the working up 
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of the first and second part as a contrastive pair, which specifically contrasts the 
manner of expression between the scenic protagonists, as a vehicle for making 
inferable a serious moral breach, ensures that the complaint is hearable as targeting 
both the substantiative threat to his moral autonomy as well as the covertly disguised 
manner of that threat.  Quite clearly Aaron’s heroic moral tale of ‘get fucked cunt I’ll 
smash ya’ invokes the same kind of consistently referenced moral logic witnessed 
throughout his talk of oppositional relations with ‘teachers’ that denounces polite 
demeanour as a disguised and untrustworthy attempt to gain power over him in the 
‘teacher’/‘smartarse’ relationship pair.   
 
6.4.3 Summarising the Second Movement 
One way of reconstructing the sequence of moral moves and counter moves that 
come into play over the course of the first and second movements would be as 
follows.  It is as if in ‘slackn off’ Aaron switches post recess to smartarse activities 
by privileging obligations tied to ‘friends’ over obligations tied to the school setting.  
George responds to the oriented threat to the moral requirements of the setting by 
imposing a sanction of sending the ‘students’ into separate rooms. This constitutes a 
breach to Aaron’s moral order.  Aaron consequently takes up a position that 
ambiguously orients to both the moral requirement of the setting to follow previously 
known ‘consequences’ and to the rights of a smartarse to refuse directives from 
‘teachers’, possibly accompanied by the obligation of ‘being honest’.  Once in the 
room, however, Aaron refuses to comply with any further requests, reasserting the 
moral requirements associated with rights to bodily autonomy in a manner obligated 
by the moral logic of overt expression – though he still partly and ambiguously 
appears to be orienting to the moral requirements of the setting by remaining in the 
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room.  George responds to the continued and new breaches to the moral requirements 
of the setting associated with deference and demeanour with a morally prescribed 
second consequence.  This consequence violates the conditions that establish and 
enable the obligation of a smartarse to comply with the moral requirements of the 
setting.  Under these circumstances Aaron’s next moral move is also morally 
prescribed.  He responds to the explicit threat of his right to bodily autonomy to ‘just 
sit there’ by refusing the directive and leaves the room.  Consistent with the set of 
rights and obligations tied to ‘friends’ Aaron then returns to his friends for mutual 
support in the face of a locally antagonistic and contradictory power relations.    This 
is accompanied by a categorisation of George as a ‘cunt’, which exactly follows a 
moral schemata prescribed by ‘telling them to their face’ and an escalation in the 
threat to bodily autonomy.  
 
What is clearly evident, then, is that the interactional tensions evident in the first 
movement demonstrably begin to discordantly unravel in the second movement.  
This unravelling occurs under the pressure of an increasing situated divergence 
between the set of occasioned moral requirements of a ‘smartarse’, particularly in 
relation to bodily autonomy, friends and overt expression, and the occasioned moral 
requirements of the setting, particularly in relation to ‘doing the work’, the right to 
‘make students do what teachers what them to do’ and ‘covert expression’.  The 
increasing moral distance between Aaron’s situated position taking and the positions 
being made available in the setting is precipitated by morally prescribed breaches to 
contradictory moral orders.  It is as if the accumulated effect of the sum of these 
breaches increasingly activates and foregrounds the previously dormant yet primary 
disjunction between opposing claims to symmetrical and asymmetrical power 
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relations within ‘teacher’/‘smartarse’ and ‘teacher’/‘student’ as George and other 
staff members attempt to forcibly impose, through sanctions, the moral requirements 
of the setting at the expense of any occasioned moral requirements privileged by 
Aaron.    Similarly, Aaron initially attempts to negotiate these increasing 
contradictions through a highly ambivalent stance that becomes increasingly less 
viable.  As the breaches to his primary disposition of bodily autonomy continue, 
incited by isolation from the mutual support of his friends and public compromises to 
his identity as a smartarse resulting from ‘kinda sent’,  he switches from ambiguous 
position taking, which is no longer viable, to unambiguously take up a viable 
‘smartarse’ prise de positions following the signatures.  Practically, this represents an 
imposition of smartarse moral requirements over the moral requirements of the 
classroom, evoking a collision no longer buffered by situated convergence or 
ambiguous position taking.   
 
What the episode amounts to thus far is a series of highly predictable and occasioned 
moral moves and moral counter moves that precisely follow a moral map, marking 
out social action according to proscribed breaches and prescribed sanctions that 
match the degree of threat to the moral order.  Aaron’s move in leaving the room sets 
up the next interactional movement previewed by his last turn: ‘he wouldn’t let me 
out of this room?’ 
 
6.5 The Third Movement 
This section will describe the final part of the episode of ‘blowing up’ representing a 
complete collapse of the interactive order under the pressure of escalating and 
reciprocated threats to Aaron’s moral order and the moral order of the classroom, 
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which have previously been set in motion by the series of moral exchanges occurring 
in the second movement.   
 
6.5.1 The Moral Requirements of the Classroom: ‘Settle Down, Calm Down’ 
George offered the following account about what happened after the signatures, 
which notably differs from Aaron’s account:  
 
Extract 6.14 
74. G: Ah:h anyway then (0.5) then I went out into the kitchen. (0.5) To  
75. talk to the girl about (.) what had been happening and things like that  
76. (0.5) u:mm (0.5) then Aaron came out (0.2) opened the door came out  
77. into the kitchen? 
78. R: mm-mm 
79. G: I I held his or put my hand on his elbow  
80. (0.2) 
81. R: mm 
82. G: n just said no-no-no you're not required out here Aaron you need to  
83. go back in n-n guided him back through the door.  
84. R: mm 
85. G: Closed the door.  
86. R: mm (1.3) 
87. G: Now according to staff reports? (0.5) He:e (0.2) basically then went  
88. back into the- y'know into the learning (.) area? 
89. R: mm= 
90. G: an:d started to get very agitated very angry with (0.5) you know  
91. George touched me he's got no right to touch me (0.2)you know I'm 
92. gonna- I'm gonna do this I'm gonna do that (.) u:m physical threats  
93. towards me things like that< (0.5) ah:h the-the staff (.) u::m (0.4)  
94. the two male staff that were in there basically sort of said "calm down 
95. calm down (0.4)and Aaron tried to come. Saying he was coming into the  
96. kitchen to get me? 
97. R: mm-mm= 
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98. G:=For touching him and things like that? 
99. R: mm-mm 
100. G: and um (.) they basically (1.2) physically stood in his way and said  
101. no no no you're not doing that. (0.5) U:mm (0.2) the:n Aaron was  
102. supposedly jumped over the:e um:m (0.5) the table? To get to the door?  
103. And that's when I heard (0.2) what was going on now as-as ah Aaron went  
104. to get (0.2) through the door again to supposedly get-get me? 
105. R: mm 
106. G: Ah:h staff went and grabbed Aaron and said no.  
 
So, unlike George’s account, Aaron does not provide any scenic description of 
George ‘guiding’ him out of the room after he has ‘put’ his hand on his elbow.  Nor 
does Aaron make this relevant in his account of ‘staff’ grabbing him after he has 
jumped the table.  Again we could endlessly speculate about the rhetorical grounds 
for this difference in an attempt to objectively capture the exact details of ‘what 
really happened’, but to do so runs the risk of becoming epistemologically confused 
by what amounts to differences in moral tales.  Rather than being distracted by a 
hypothetical attempt to ascribe motivation, what is analytically significant about the 
difference is what it tells us about the tension between the moral reasoning in use.   
 
Therefore, like every other substantiative difference between their moral tales, this 
difference does not disrupt the moral integrity of either account or the practical 
upshots of their inter-relationship. That is, the relationship between inferable moral 
reasoning and context and reported social action remains constant and the discordant 
dynamics of their reconstructed interaction continues to decay according to the same 
set of contradictory moral relationships. Thus it makes little difference whether the 
primary moral breach occurring in the third movement was the result of George 
physically guiding Aaron from the room or the staff ‘grabbing’ him.  Both of these 
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retellings amount to an oriented to escalation and breach of Aaron’s primary moral 
code – ‘you don’t grab me’.   
 
Moreover, if we examine George’s account above, what is displayed is the same 
kinds of moral reasonings affirming asymmetrical rights to give directives and 
consequences, the denunciation of physical violence, the privileging of individual as 
opposed to the collective and the positive attribution of a polite demeanour.  What is 
particularly noticeable is the moral sensitivity to physical violence and the working 
up of a moral justification for physical restraint as a consequence to Aaron’s serious 
breach in attempting to physically harm George.  For example, beginning in line 79, 
George makes the self-correction ‘I I held his or put my hand on his elbow’, which is 
hearably a shift from a more aggressive to a more passive account.  Similarly, the 
lexical choice of ‘guided him back through the door’ in line 83 implies a level of 
passive physical benevolence invoked by the activity ‘guided’ that also resonates 
strongly with George’s working up of the asymmetrical rights of ‘teachers’ 
throughout his talk as having the right to give directives to ‘guide’ ‘students’.  Notice 
also that the making relevant of ‘staff reports’ in line 87 marks an orientation to the 
institutional setting, provides an example of covert institutional hedging while 
simultaneously making relevant an institutional procedure to authorise the account’s 
legitimacy.  
 
These same moral requirements are then produced and played out in the physical 
struggle that follows: 
 
Extract 6.15 
105. G: Ah:h staff member grabbed Aaron and said no.  
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106. (0.2) 
107. R: mm-mm 
108. G: Um:m and that's when (0.2) u:m (.) he was holding Aaron and had to 
109. be- held Aaron around the shoulder area  
110. (0.2) 
111. R: [mm] 
112. G: [that's] when the other boy jumped on the staff member's back? 
113. R: mm-mm 
114. G: Um::m I heard this that's when I came out? 
115. R: mm-mm  
116. (1.0) 
117. G: The other boy was taken off (1.0) off (.) Phil the staff member? by  
118. a (.) teacher's aide? (0.5) and then (0.5) u:m Phil had Aaron in a head  
119. lock  
120. (0.2) 
121. R: mm= 
122. G: =an:d he was swinging his arms and things so I grabbed (0.2) Aaron's  
123. arms? 
124. R: mm-mm 
125. G: An:d basically we told the other boys settle down calm down don't go 
126. near him get out into the kitchen area? [he] 
127. R:                                      [mm] 
128. G: did he complied? 
129. R: mm-mm 
130. G: The door was shut. (0.5) And then Aaron proceeded basically to (.)  
131. to wrestle and yell and threaten and all this so we had to- and we- so  
132. we had to restrain him so three-three of the staff members restrained  
133. him? 
134. R: mm 
135. G: u::m. (0.8) He:e constantly made threats of if you let me go I'm  
136. going to smash yous I'm gonna do this I'm gonna do this? 
137. R: mm= 
138. G: =Um:m so the coordinator at the time (.) was asked to phone (.) the 
139. police? 
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140. R: mm-mm 
141. G: Um and also::o Aaron's carer? (.) was phoned? to let her know what  
142. was happening? (0.8) Ah:h the police arrived u:m so we had been  
143. restraining Aaron for about twenty minutes or so (0.2) um:m. (1.0) At 
144. times (1.0) like Phil had him in a headlock and Tony and I had one arm  
145. each.  
 
The moral collision between rights and obligations ultimately, then, becomes a 
physical collision between bodies, where the body becomes the terrain on which the 
moral struggle is contiguously played out.  Hence, in this scene, George repeatedly 
makes relevant the body – it is the bodies of Aaron’s friends that need to be kept 
apart, that need to ‘calm down’.  It is Aaron’s body that needs to be restrained, that is 
held in headlocks, across the shoulders, whose arms swing.  ‘Teachers’ have the right 
to restrain bodies when they ‘wrestle and yell and threaten’.  In addition the making 
relevant of ‘calm down’ in the above sequence and repeatedly elsewhere in the 
account as the grounds for continued restraint, draws attention to the way in which 
the escalating moral struggle invested in asymmetrical power relations becomes 
reduced to an appropriate performance of the body through moral requirements 
associated with physical demeanour or manner.  For example, in a clarification 
sequence that follows shortly after the above sequence George provides the following 
account: 
 
Extract 6.16 
155. G: But um:m I don't- and we just kept saying (0.2) well are you- are  
156. you calm can we let you up? 
157. R: mm= 
158. G: =An::d couple of responses was one was (0.3) you know I'm calm let  
159. me up and I'm gonna kill yous I'm gonna smash yous [I'm gonna stab  
160. yous] 
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161. R:                                              [huhhuhhuh] 
162. G: I'm gonna do this.  Or it was (.) No:o I'm not f-ing calm (mimicked  
163. angry voice)) and y’know verbal abuse so we-we felt we had to keep him 
164. restrained? 
 
Similarly, what is made inferable is the serious moral breach arising from an 
inappropriate performance of manner, producing a threat to the physical safety of the 
‘teachers’ bodies – ‘I’m gonna kill yous I’m gonna smash yous I’m gonna stab yous’.  
Furthermore, this ‘sudden’ performance of ‘violence’, as a threat to body, is such a 
serious moral breach that it inferably provides the grounds, firstly, for the ascription 
of ‘psychiatric illness’ and, secondly, provides the grounds for a category 
transformation from ‘student’ to ‘criminal’, as well as providing the warrant for an 
extraordinary ‘consequence’ beyond the situated moral order of the classroom.  The 
following sequence, which captures these elements, was provided as review of the 
intervention by the ‘cops’: 
 
Extract 6.17 
1115. G: =So (0.5) very good job. Um:m (0.8) basically I think the staff and 
1116. I wanted to know (.) well (0.5) why didn't you handcuff him and why 
1117. didn't you arrest him and he said well what has he done. (1.0) He said 
1118. has he assaulted anyone and I said well no not really. (0.5) He said  
1119. well what has he done he's thirteen. (0.5) Can't- if I put the  
1120. handcuffs on him that means I've arrested him. (0.4) So (0.2) y’know  
1121. so-what do you want me to do I can't do anything.  
1122. (0.2) 
1123. R: mm 
1124. G: That was it- an-I- I was quite- I was quite surprised actually-I  
1125. mean I've  (0.2) I realised that I sort of went yeh well (0.2) I guess  
1126. what- what can- what-what could you do. You-know= 
1127. R:=mm= 
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1128. G: =um:m but it was just again it was a bit sort of like well (0.5) 
1129. jeez where are we (0.2) when (0.2) a kid get that violent and  
1130. aggressive (0.5) and there's no consequences in terms of legal stuff  
1131. or anything like that and the- the- the police officer basically just  
1132. said "yeh this is what happens all the time like(0.2) what can they  
1133. do?  
  
Accompanying this series of moral breaches is a shift that occurs in George’s stance 
as the crisis deepens.  Arguably, George still fulfils category incumbency for ‘good 
alternative teacher’, given the occasioned condition that ‘extreme’ behaviours 
necessitate the moral requirement for enforcement of ‘negative’ consequences, 
including suspension.  Nevertheless, this amounts to an abandonment of alternative 
methods, which is to say, a ‘flexible’ stance, in favour of a stance that converges with 
orthodox ‘mainstream’ practices.   Thus, in the third movement there is a consistently 
strong orientation to orthodox institutional procedures of restraint and reporting, 
including calling the Principal, the police and the carers, and, quintessentially, the 
resorting to institutional exclusion, that is, ‘booting him out’.  Ultimately, then, the 
ambiguity in the position taking stance that first surfaces in the second movement 
seems to fully take shape in the third movement as George shifts from a ‘flexible’ to 
a ‘mainstream’ position taking stance. 
 
As has been demonstrated, this shift in position taking stance is associated with the 
translation of a moral struggle into a physical struggle centred on restraining Aaron’s 
body.  The crisis constituted by physical restraint becomes a living metaphor for the 
omnirelevant moral and institutional requirement of physical compliance, body 
safety and asymmetrical power relations.   Not surprisingly, this presents an 
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impossible problem-raising situation to Aaron and his own primary claim to bodily 
autonomy.  
 
6.5.2 Attaching Aaron’s Moral Reasoning to the Setting:  ‘Schizing Out’ 
After the collapse of an ambiguous position taking following the signature sanction, 
Aaron’s practice has traced a prescribed smartarse moral map where directives are 
met with ‘being honest’ and refusal, and threats of bodily sanctions are met with 
‘being honest’ and counter threats of physical violence.  Now, in a highly predictable 
way, being ‘grabbed’ precipitates an immediate physical reaction in local 
circumstances that precisely provide the conditions necessary for physical resistance 
to ‘power over’.  So, picking up where we left off, Aaron provided the following 
description about ‘what happened’:  
 
Extract 6.18 
202. A: he goes oh rahrahrah (0.5) I went ah Aaron can you please leave the  
203. room like get fucked cunt I'll smash ya. 
204. R: mm-mm 
205. A: Walked out walked in to here (1.0) he wouldn't let me out of this 
206. room? 
207. R: This room he:re. 
208. A: Yeh wouldn’t let me out? 
209. R: mm-mm 
210. A: Like this (       ) I said fucking move cunt before I move ya and 
211. um. ((drinks coffee)) (7.0) Anyway (.) he wouldn’t move. ((drinks  
212. coffee)) (4.0) He’s a big- he’s a fuckin’ solid dude he’s a (        ) 
213. he used to be a bikie. 
214. R: What did he say? when you wh-what did he say when you said fuckin’  
215. cunt move(.)  what did he say? 
216. A: He said nah I can’t do it I said fuckin’ move cunt I’m gonna move  
217. you if you don’t move.  
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218. R: Yeh-yeh 
219. A: Fuckin’ push he w-wouldn’t move. (.) Fuckin’ jumped over the table.  
220. ((drinks coffee))(0.5) and um (.) Phil went like this grab. Fuck off  
221. you don’t grab me you cunt straight away the aggression came out  
222. because (.) mum used to grab me and my dad used to grab me straight  
223. away anyone grabs me I’ve told them before I told em I said look. (2.0)  
224. If anyone wants to grab me (0.5) they’re gonna get swung up st:raight  
225. away I’m gonna sm:ash em. ((drinks coffee) (6.0) And um:m  
226. R: Can-you- (0.5) see that- where was the table that you jumped over.  
227. A: That’s the table here.  
228. R: Ohh so your trying to get into this room.  
229. A: Ye:h.  
230. R: Oh sorry were you (0.5) here? in this room? 
231. A: Um. (1.0) No. (0.2) Like I was in this room [and he] 
232. R:                                             [Yeh-yeh] 
233. A: said get fucked get out and I went I’ll fuckin’ smash you went into 
234. this room.  
235. R: Yeh-yeh. 
236. A: And then the teachers here goin’ ((drinks coffee))(3.0) no your not  
237. goin’ anywhere rahrahrah [rahrahrah.] 
238. R:                      [ah::h ok] 
239. A: n I went here HAH HAH jump huhhuh= 
240. R: =O[h::h] 
241. A:   [(   )] here. 
242. R: Ye::h 
243. A: And this cunt here  
244. R: mm= 
245. A: =went (.) nah stop and I went (3.0) I went nah keep goin’ get fucked 
246. I’m not doin’ that sm:ashed him into the wall.  
 
There are several smartarse moral requirements referenced in this sequence that are 
central to the classificatory moral reasoning that Aaron brings into play in the third 
movement.   The first thing to notice is that the entire sequence is organised as a 
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rhetorical defence of the right to bodily autonomy.  Accordingly, Aaron’s described 
actions are unquestioningly justified on the grounds of serious moral breaches to that 
primary right.  He therefore provides an account, not of ‘violence’ but of a heroic 
fight for implicitly reasonable rights.  The fight is morally necessitated by an 
escalation in illegitimate attempts to physically impose ‘power over’ his body – where 
it is located in space and how it performs.    This forced escalation of the defence of 
bodily autonomy proceeds according to a familiar moral formula of prescribed 
responses to proscribed degrees of threat.   Thus Aaron firstly describes a threat of 
physical restraint, producing the prescribed counter threat in line 216 ‘fuckin’ move 
cunt I’m gonna move you if you don’t move’ and a ‘telling me what to do’, in line 
236-37, producing the dismissive laughing at and jumping the table in line 239.  
Aaron then describes a physical grabbing, producing physical resistance or ‘sm:ashed 
him into the wall’, in line 246.   
 
In defending his right to bodily autonomy Aaron orients strongly to notions of heroic 
valour by making relevant physical prowess and fearlessness.  He makes this relevant 
through the reflexive categorisation of himself as the kind of person that would 
antagonistically command the protagonist, Phil, and ‘tell him to his face’.  Phil is 
categorised as a big + solid + dude who was a bikie, which in the context of big and 
solid makes available a normatively available category attribute of bikies = violent 
and physically intimidating. Nevertheless, Aaron ‘smashes’ him into the wall. 
Aaron’s celebration of heroic valour and physical prowess displayed here continues 
throughout his description.  For example, later in his account he draws attention to 
his martial arts skills in Aikido to defeat the attempts of five teachers to physically 
control him. Similarly, in describing the upshot of his struggle with Phil, after his 
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friend Pat comes to his assistance, Aaron works up a description of a physical contest 
where he emerges victorious or, in Aaron’s words: “we had it all over him until about 
five other teachers come in”.  The celebration of the defence of his right to bodily 
autonomy through a reflexive identity of physical valour exemplifies the sharp 
contrast between Aaron’s account and George’s account of psychiatrically ill, violent 
threats to personal safety.   
 
Furthermore, in Aaron’s account of the third movement, the fear and fearlessness 
contrast becomes coupled to a third self avowed feature: ‘aggression’. He first 
describes ‘aggression’ in line 221 as being the involuntary product of ‘grabbing’, that 
is, ‘straight away the aggression came out’.  Interestingly, the making relevant of an 
account of ‘aggression’ as a product of a history of ‘mum and dad grab me’ 
constitutes a sad tale that is congruent with George’s categorisation of ‘behaviour 
kids’ = involuntary reactions arising from dysfunctional family histories.  However, 
the moral and practical footing for Aaron’s sad tale differs markedly from George’s. 
In George’s accounts, these kinds of sad tales associated with ‘behaviour kids’ 
recognises the behaviour as immoral, but offers an excuse through victimhood.  
Moreover, the sad tale provides the moral grounds for asymmetrical 
‘teacher’/‘student’ power relations because the involuntary reactions of ‘behaviour 
kids’ breach morally proscribed activities bound to both ‘teacher’/‘student’ SRP and 
the Stage of Life MCD.  Aaron, by contrast, deploys the sad tale as a justification 
rather than as an excuse. There is no evidence of Aaron conceding that his actions 
were anything other than heroic in the face of significant moral breaches on the part 
of the ‘staff’.  The involuntary ‘aggression’ is not described as ‘inappropriate’ or 
‘dysfunctional’ in any sense.  On the contrary, ‘aggression’, which later comes to be 
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described in terms of the category activity ‘schizing out’, serves as a highly reasoned 
and valued ally to redress the balance of physically performed ‘power over’ 
constituting an extreme threat to bodily autonomy.  As Aaron explains in the 
following sequence, ‘aggression’ and ‘schizing out’ enable maintaining ‘control’ and 
defending his right to bodily autonomy, while at the same time reducing the practical 
capacity of protagonists to defeat this right because of fear: 
 
Extract 6.19 
390. A: [Like I had] it all- I had it all in control but they couldn’t 
391. control [me] 
392. R:      [Control] me ye:ah right mm= 
393. A: =Control was fuckin’ I was goin’ ape like (0.5) straight away I was  
394. just fuckin’ I could do whatever I want like kind of thing like 
395. fuckin’ sma- I was- I was just goin’ fuckin’ ape like (0.5) its not  
396. one of those things you know like I get into a fight with one of my 
397. friends and I’m over there n I’m sittin’ there you know I go sma:sh. 
398. (0.8) Like I put ’em on their arse I’d- I just went fuckin’ (        ) 
399. I wasn’t tryin’ to smash ’em I was just tryin’ to (like) (.) stay the 
400. fuck away from me I will kill you I was-I was waitin’- if I got one of  
401. them tra- I-I wouldn’t have stopped choking ’em I would have fuck’n  
402. (0.8) like I was(.) sch:ized out like I-I schized out straight away  
403. like (.) when my mum used to grab me and shit like that straight away  
404. its fuck no don’t grab me cunt. 
405. R: uh:h-uh 
406. A: So they’ve asked me oh yeah (.) can you move downsta:irs well 
407. you’ve gotta go downstairs and I‘ve just looked at ’em and went (.)  
408. who’s the motherfucker that’s gonna try and move me.  
409. (0.8) 
410. R: mm= 
411. A: =Noone would come and move me know what I [mean]? 
412. R:                                           [yep] 
413. A: like there’s doors like that and there like sta- (.) big steel (.) 
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414. wooden doors and rahrahrah n ( just) see me when I get stressed out  
415. when they piss me off I just go up to ’em and jus’ (.) all my anger  
416. into the door you know? And it doesn’t hurt me just walk away (.)(   ) 
417. go what the fuck (     ) what happens if that’s one of us?  
 
There are a few fascinating aspects of Aaron’s moral reasoning invoked in this 
sequence. Firstly, Aaron displays a moral reasoning that binds the contrasting 
predicates of ‘anger’ and ‘schizn out’ and fearlessness (‘it doesn’t hurt me just walk 
away) to fearful ‘teachers’, scenically announcing ‘what the fuck what happens if 
that’s one of us’ and the scenic upshot of a failed attempt to impose asymmetrical 
power relations.  Secondly, it is interesting to note the distinction that Aaron makes 
between ‘fighting’ with friends and what occurs here, which is oriented to as a 
struggle for control or power over his body. Thirdly, consistent with the moral 
reasoning of bodily autonomy, Aaron’s ‘in control’ refers to being in control of his 
body and out of the control of ‘teachers’ rather than any taken for granted sense of 
being in control of internally hypothesised emotions.  Hence, in line 393, he 
juxtaposes control with ‘going ape’, which later in the sequence he explicates as 
‘schizn out’ and ‘I was just fuckin’ I could do whatever I want like kind of thing’.   
Aaron’s making relevant of the right to control his body mirrors George’s focus on 
the control of his body as the terrain in which their contradictory logics are played 
out.   
 
Later in the account, when his ability to control his grosser movements becomes 
increasingly limited by the adult males holding him down, the moral reasoning of 
bodily autonomy becomes reduced to the infinitely small freedom of bodily 
movement coupled with resistance through overt verbal expression: 
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Extract 6.20 
527. A: its fuckin’ you know (.) move around and see what I can do n then  
528. they grab me again. 
529. R: Yeh-yeh. 
530. A: See- oh what am I gonna do now? 
531. R: Ye:h 
532. A: You know. And move my foot like (.) you know? 
533. R: I wonder if they can tell (1.5) when you’re in control and not in 
534. control of yourself. 
535. A: Maybe. 
536.  (2.0)  
537. R: [(I wonder)] 
538. A: [I mean] (3.0) all the fuckin’ locks they tried on me (.) they had-  
539. they had my arm up here like (.) 
540. R: Yeh-yeh= 
541. A: =touchin’ my neck you know what I mean? [like] 
542. R:                                         [Yeh-yeh] 
543. A: that’s a deadly (huh) move you can break your arm. And I was still 
544. just goin’ smash smash like chuckin’ my arm (       ) like I- I didn’t 
545. care.  
546. R: Yeh 
547. A: Like they- they had me like this. Arms be- I was- I- I- they were 
548. holdin’ me up by the- [by] 
549. R: [mm] = 
550. A: = the moves they were doin’ n I was jus still chuckin’ em.  
551. R: yuh-yuh= 
552. A:=You know what I mean? like you want me to sit down I’m not fuckin’  
553. sittin’ down you cunts. 
554. R: yuh-yuh 
555. A: Not-not- not makin’ me do what- what you want me to do. Kn[ow ] 
556. R:                                                           [yeh] 
557. A: what I mean?= 
558. R: =yeh-yeh 
559. A: like I was in control?  
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560. R: yeh [yeh yeh] 
561. A:     [Like] they wanted to put me on the ground I said no you’re not 
562. puttin’ me nowhere n fuckin’ stood my ground?  
 
Aaron’s utterance in lines 552-53 forcibly brings home the point that it is exactly the 
same moral reasoning operating in an acute form here as was previously brought into 
play in the second movement: ‘I’m not fuckin’ sittin’ down you cunts’.  But, apart 
from the expression of autonomy through overt expression and an acute struggle for 
control of his limbs, what is also interesting about this sequence is the way that Aaron 
explicitly makes relevant the condition for ‘smartarse’ category bound activities, ‘I- I 
didn’t care’ in lines 544-45.   Of course, elsewhere this moral reasoning is repeatedly 
and consistently made inferable by the described contrasts between situated dangers, 
which normatively evoke protective activities and Aaron’s scenically described 
smartarse fearlessness that contradict those expectations.   We have already witnessed 
one example of this in his account of Phil the bikie, but we will see another clear 
example later in his account of the interaction with the ‘cop’.   
 
Yet if Aaron references the first condition for bodily autonomy, he also strongly 
orients to the second by making relevant the mutual support of his friends:  
 
Extract 6.21 
 
608. R: A:::h (3.0) what do you think your friends? would have thought about  
609. what happened.  
610. (1.0) 
611. A: All my frie:nds. 
612. R: Yeah whilst this is all goin’ on what do you think they would have  
613. been think-ing.  
614. (2.2) 
615. A: Whats (huhuh) Aaron doin’ to the teachers. 
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616. R: Right ok= 
617. A: =Like they- they straight away they- (.) Stevie’s  tryin’ to get in  
618. to see what’s happenin’ like (2.0) my next door neighbour ((referring  
619. to a passerby)) 
620. R: Oh right. 
621. A: Um (1.0) She tried to get in:n like she tried to get in like (0.4) 
622. Aaron come here like what are you doin’ man she like straight away  
623. would have calmed me down. (0.8) Straight away there’s no doubt about  
624. it.  
625. R: Oh she would have. 
626. A: She would have calmed me down she was sayin’ to the teachers look I  
627. can calm Aaron down just let me in. 
628. R: Is that what she was sayin? 
629. A: Yep Mrs Seaton goin’ no no we’ve got to get out rahrahrah she:sh-  
630. she just went (.) get fucked let me in the fuckin’ door to see fuckin’  
631. Aaron. (   ) N like (1.0) I mean fuck (.) Pat straight away was on the  
632. ground like they had him in a nutshell. (0.5) Like Pat’s no match for  
633. me like (.) we’re good friends n all but (0.5) you know? (0.5) fuckn’  
634. like I’d have it over him like (.) he’d still be there no matter how  
635. big the dude was. Like Phil’s a pretty chunk dude n he jus (said) nah 
636. I’m r- like Aaron would do this for me I’m doin’ it for Aaron. Bang 
637. he’s in there.  
638. (0.5)  
639. R: [mm:m] 
640. A: [Straight] away. Within two seconds he grabbed me (0.2) Pat was  
641. don’t touch him motherfucker jump up. (1.0) Soon as I knew that support  
642. was there I was its all on (.) no one’s goin’ to stop me now.  
643. R: Oh ok. (0.5) So do you think you still would have acted like that if  
644. you’d- (.) hadn’t of known that support was there?  
645. A: Ye::ah yeah-’n-no. (2.0) Um:m (3.0) um:m (0.5) yeh probably (0.4)  
646. like you don’t grab me.  
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There are a number of things that are incredibly significant about this sequence.  Not 
the least being that Stevie and Pat were the two other friends that we first encountered 
in ‘slackn off’.  Aaron’s tale of mutual support contrasts strongly with George’s tale 
of individual gender-based competition.   Firstly, in line 615, Aaron makes inferable 
his moral requirements in relation to the correct and collectively enjoyed performance 
of a ‘smartarse’.  Next, beginning from line 621, Aaron references the obligation of 
friends to mutual support in antagonistic situated relations.  Hence, Pat ‘within two 
seconds’, which is an extreme case formulation, declared his overtly oppositional 
relationship with ‘don’t touch him motherfucker’ and jumped up.  Significantly, 
Aaron orients to the second condition with his utterance in the adjacent line ‘soon as I 
knew his support was there it was all on’.  The atypically highly troubled response in 
line 645 repeats the same pattern associated with an inferable moral dilemma between 
the condition of mutual support versus the obligation to resist when grabbed.  
 
Aaron’s talk in this sequence also exemplifies and draws our attention towards an 
incredibly intriguing second aspect of the moral reasoning underpinning his 
relationship to friends.  That is, he repeatedly makes relevant the set of relationships 
between trust, power, bodily autonomy and the obligations of friends to not only 
physically support him as a condition for the defence of bodily autonomy but also to 
support him by listening and ‘calming him down’ as a constraint and implicit 
conditional moderator of ‘schizing out’.    He works this into his justification of 
‘schizing out’ through the organisation of a complaint in lines 629-31 ‘Yep Mrs 
Seaton goin’ no no we’ve got to get out rahrahrah she:sh- she just went (.) get fucked 
let me in the fuckin’ door to see fuckin’ Aaron.’  According to Aaron, the absence of 
‘friends’ directly contributes to the perpetuation of ‘schizing out’, which represents a 
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complete contradiction of George’s reported practice of separating the ‘students’, 
referencing an oriented to institutional concern with safety reinforced by a moral logic 
of the individual.   
 
The preceding analysis raises the question: under these conditions, how can the 
escalating exchange of moral breaches that collectively accumulate to produce the 
crisis of blowing up deescalate?  The answer lies in a realignment of moral 
requirements that occurs when the ‘cop’ comes.  More specifically, it lies in Aaron’s 
orientation to the actions of the ‘cop’ as firstly reintroducing a condition for viable 
position taking in the classroom, the recognition of his right to negotiate agreement 
with sanctions, and, secondly, by decreasing the conditional influence of ‘I don’t care 
what happens’.  The former is displayed in the following sequence: 
 
Extract 6.22 
24. A: Fucking I was still gettin' rammed into the walls the cop come. [The  
25.    cop] 
26. R:                                                                 [The 
27.   cops] come? 
28. A: yeah the cops come. [Called] 
29. R:                     [mm] 
30. A: the cops. (0.5) The cops go like what are you gonna do if I let you 
31. up I’m gonna fucking swing at you you dumb cunt 
32. R: mm= 
33. A: = you fat fucking pig rahrahrah (0.5) n I went well(.) I’m gonna  
34. have to use pepper spray.  
35. R: Thanks mate ((to waiter)) thankyou. 
36. A: Cheers mate. 
37. R: Thanks for the water. 
38. A: Yeh cheers yeh he goes I’m gonna have to use pepper spray get fucked 
39. (0.2) jumped up (.) I said mate can I if you don’t touch me I’ll jump  
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40. up and walk straight out of here and he goes yep. (0.5)  Jumped up  
41. straight away he fuckin’ grabbed me I just went sm:mash straight into  
42. the computer desk (0.5) pig’s straight into the computers- I (hate) 
43. fuckn pigs. (0.8) He goes oh that’s good don’t try to headbutt me or 
44. nothn alright n I went bang ((miming doing a headbutt)) huhhuhhuh could  
45. if I wanted to:o (0.2) fuck anyway he lets me- he fuckin’ let go of me  
46. walked out (.) that was the end of it 
 
First, Aaron makes inferable the moral principle of valour and bodily autonomy 
through fearlessness, invoked by the normatively unexpectable response in lines 30-
31 and 43-44.  But then he immediately makes inferable a moral reasoning aligned to 
his right to negotiate sanctions, which is scenically agreed to, thus re-establishing a 
right to symmetrical relations.  Interestingly, while his next description differs from 
George’s, in that George makes no mention of the incident of smashing the copper, 
the inferable reasoning remains congruent with a breach to his right to negotiate and 
his right to bodily autonomy, coupled with the making inferable of heroic valour.  In 
addition, the agreement between George and Aaron that Aaron mimicked head-
butting, in the absence of a sanction, constitutes an inferable orientation to the re-
establishment and affirmation of his right to both negotiate sanctions and his right to 
bodily autonomy.  Furthermore, notice how Aaron orients to a redress of the power 
imbalance through a scenic report of Aaron giving directives and the cop making 
requests.  The upshot of this scenic description is, therefore, to establish realignment 
with the moral requirements of the smartarse, despite the strange contradiction of the 
introduction of the ‘cop’.   
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The evidence for the moderation of ‘I don’t care’ is somewhat confused by Aaron’s 
own differing tale of ‘smashing’ the cop into the computers, but is present in the 
following sequence where Aaron recounts his exit from the school:   
 
Extract 6.23 
317. A: I went grabbed my shit (0.5) walked out(0.5) you know how you see  
318. on those- see on TV. (2.2) That mesh stuff? (0.5)(     ) screen doors  
319. where they got that fuckin’ piece of wood and hittin’ it?  
320. (0.5) 
321. R: [m:m} 
322. A: [And] it won’t come through? yeh 
323. R: mm= 
324. A: they’ve got that all round the school so (.) noone can break in  
325. noone can break out? 
326. R: Yeh-yeh-yeh 
327. A: Fuckin’ just just walked over and just went fuckin’ s::mash on the  
328. front- (.) front thing (1.0) front um (.) door (.) (      ) mesh stuff  
329. front door just sprung open walked out n I went goodbye. (1.0) And um  
330. (.) copper came out an yeh keep walking said get fucked = 
331. R:=is that what he said to you?= 
332. A: =yeh = 
333. R: =keep walkin’ yeh alright  
334. A: get fucked you fuckin cunt (   ) you fuckin’ pig fucked your mum  
335. somethin’ like that. (1.0) Walked down. (2.0) and um:m (1.0) I was 
336. (huh) gonna spit on the cop car and thought (huh) nah he’d come after  
337. me he’d charge me with somethin’  (1.0) Um (2.0) walked over (0.4) 
338. like walkin’- walkin’ w’ my friend my friend w-wagged for me. 
 
What is particularly interesting about this sequence is in line 334 onwards, where he 
firstly displays being honest and telling it to his face but then, for the first time in the 
account, orients to ‘what happens’.  Arguably, this constitutes an occasioned concern 
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with ‘caring about what happens’ that is tied to the categorisation of a cop = charges 
people and, therefore, also makes available other constitutive category predicates for 
cop, including imprisons offenders.  It has already been noted that Aaron’s only 
admission of fear is a fear of incarceration.  What this suggests is that under these 
specific circumstances Aaron’s fear of incarceration constitutes a caring about what 
happens, associated with both restraint here but also with his preceding moderation of 
smartarse overt physical expression.   His rhetorical claim to pushing the cop muddies 
the water of this proposition but in the very least ‘caring what happens’ represents a 
candidate moderating influence contributing to a de-escalation of overt physical 
expression.   
 
The final, and also significant, thing to notice with the de-escalation is a resumption 
of ambiguity in Aaron’s position taking.  Aaron’s talk in this sequence is organised as 
if he is orienting to two contradictory moral requirements.  For example, he complies 
with the instruction to stand up and not assault anyone, but mimics head-butting; he 
expresses refusal to the direction to ‘keep walking’, but provides a description of 
keeping on walking; and he follows the instruction to leave, but smashes the door on 
the way out.   
 
6.6 Conclusion 
An interrogation of the similarities and differences between Aaron and George’s 
accounts has produced an analytical description of ‘blowing up’ as a coproduction 
resulting from an interactional collision that occurs as Aaron attempts to apply his 
moral dispositions to the moral space of the classroom.  ‘Blowing up’ can’ therefore’ 
be understood as the accumulation of a series of contradictions between the moral 
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requirements of Aaron’s identity as a ‘smartarse’ and the institutional moral 
requirements of the classroom’ discursively invoked by George.  These contradictions 
establish a series of moral tensions that converge on contradictory rights and 
obligations to symmetrical and asymmetrical power relationships.  It is the 
interactional unravelling of these tensions that produces ‘blowing up’.   
 
This unravelling occurs, however, according to precise prescriptions provided by the 
normative moral orders of the protagonists.  As has been demonstrated, the 
coproduction of ‘blowing up’ predictably and precisely follows a moral map of 
prescribed sanctions to proscribed moral breaches.  The unravelling of interactional 
consensus represented by ‘blowing up’ consequently follows a moral course of  
reciprocated breaches provoking escalating morally prescribed sanctions, which 
constitute reciprocated and escalating threats to the moral order of the interactional 
protagonists.    
  
This chapter has also shown that Aaron attempts to occupy a problem-solving stance 
in relation to the contradictory moral requirements of the classroom that is practically 
enacted through an extraordinary ambivalence in practice through switching between 
the moral requirements and through an ambiguous practical relationship to the moral 
requirements.  Thus, while Aaron’s set of dispositions surrounding bodily autonomy 
appear to be deep-seated and transferable from one context to another, it is not the 
case that this disposition leads to an automatic lashing out wherever asymmetrical 
power relations occur, but rather that the disposition is empirically expressed on a 
situation to situation basis. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the viability of this stance 
is highly contingent on the local convergence of Aaron’s moral requirements with the 
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moral requirements of the setting.  Increasing divergence ensures the inviability of the 
stance, which is associated with the taking up of a fully unambiguous ‘smartarse’ 
identity that ultimately results in physical exclusion.  These findings are summarised 
in Table 6.2 below.  
 
A description of blowing up in these terms makes salient an understanding of 
Aaron’s logic of practice in terms of a highly predictable culmination of 
contradictory moral requirements driving an escalating series of mutually 
reciprocated moral breaches that inevitably reach an interactional impasse.  This 
impasse was marked by a complete breakdown in the interaction order, 
substantiatively represented by a physical struggle for control over the young 
person’s body, which then comes to be categorised as ‘blowing up’ or ‘schizing out’.  
A description of ‘blowing up’ in these terms provides an account of the logic of 
practice of ‘blowing up’ not simply as a psychological problem but as a social 
configuration problem suggestive of relationships of profound moral collision and 
imposition.   
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Table 6.2. Aaron’s Logic of Practice in Blowing Up 
Movement Aaron’s Moral 
Requirements in Play 
Classroom Moral 
Requirements in Play 
Aaron’s Position Taking 
Stance 
Prequel: Before Recess Schoolsmart Schoolwork 
Individualism 
Convergence of Moral 
Requirements: Switching 
First Movement: 
‘Slackn Off’ & ‘I’m 
Moving You All’ 
 
Bodily Autonomy 
moderated by obligation 
to comply with legitimate 
sanctions  
Collective 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Bodily Authority 
 
 
Individualism 
Polite Demeanour 
Increasing Divergence of 
Moral Requirements: 
Ambiguity 
Second Movement: 
 
Bodily Autonomy  
Collective 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Don’t Care What Happens 
Bodily Authority 
Individualism 
Polite Demeanour 
Future Thinking 
Increasing Divergence: 
Unambiguous Smartarse 
Third Reciprocated 
Breach 
Bodily Autonomy 
Fearlessness 
Collective 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Overt Physical Expression 
Bodily Authority 
Safety 
Individualism 
Polite Demeanour 
Antipathy to Violence 
Moderated by threat 
Extreme Divergence: 
Unambiguous Smartarse 
Postscript: Police 
Intervention 
Bodily Autonomy 
moderated by obligation 
to follow legitimate 
sanctions 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Overt Physical Expression 
Fearlessness 
Cares What Happens 
Bodily Authority 
 
 
Polite Demeanour 
Antipathy to Violence 
Safety 
Decreasing Divergence: 
Ambiguity 
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What is incredibly striking about this collision is that at no point does George make 
relevant or legitimise Aaron’s logic of practice.  Instead, he persistently appears to 
impose institutional relevancies as if this were the only way of understanding 
Aaron’s practices.  As has been demonstrated, this imposition ensures a collision of 
normative orders that produces a ‘blowing up’ resulting in school exclusion.  This 
begs an extraordinary question: how is it that, despite all good intentions and the 
flexibilities afforded by the alternative setting itself, the teacher failed to make 
relevant a practical understanding of the young person’s practice?  The next chapter 
aims to answer this question and, in so doing, identify the local conditions that pose 
obstacles to understanding and the related interaction order practices that make this 
possible.  
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Chapter 7 
The Triumph of Misrecognition 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an account of ‘blowing up’ in terms of interactional 
relationships of moral collision, imposition and exclusion.  Significantly, that chapter 
demonstrated that the moral collision, imposition and exclusion occurred in the 
absence of any knowledge construction and application practices that make relevant 
the nature and/or legitimacy of the young person’s logic of practice. The aim of this 
chapter is to explain this paradox.  How does exclusion and the imposition of the 
teacher’s moral order occur, despite the teacher’s best intentions to ‘understand where 
these kids are coming from’ and ‘be flexible’ despite the opportunities for 
accommodating, reflexive practice afforded by the alternative setting?  In so doing the 
chapter will conceptualise the local institutional conditions and related knowledge 
construction and application practices necessary for breakdowns in practical 
understanding.  The chapter will also conceptualise the relationship between these 
local knowledge construction and application practices and exclusion in everyday 
practice.  
 
In order to do this the chapter will turn to Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of 
‘misrecognition’.  To recap, Bourdieu theorises misrecognition as mistakenly and 
non-consciously accepting the objectively arbitrary limits in thinking and being 
associated with the set of dispositions of the habitus, as being non-arbitrary.  This is 
the same as saying ‘misrecognition’ constitutes ‘misrecognition’ of the imminent 
moral, intellectual and, ultimately, epistemological limitations of a particular habitus. 
In this sense ‘misrecognition’ results from a kind of ‘genesis amnesia’ or ‘forgetting’ 
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of the historical production of the habitus, which is, in effect, a ‘forgetting’ of  the 
history of objective structures giving rise to the habitus. As a consequence, agents 
have a ‘doxic’ relationship to the familiar world whereby the ordering of the social 
world tends to be falsely perceived as non-arbitrary, universally valid, self-evident 
and natural.  Importantly, for Bourdieu, the production and reproduction of 
misrecognition is in response to, or an outcome of, contingent social relationships, 
particularly symbolic power relations. Consequently, misrecognition is a response to 
sets of contingent social relations whereby cultural arbitraries that serve arbitrary 
power relationships come to be recognised as non-arbitrary.  Therefore, for Bourdieu, 
misrecognition is not so much an individuated psychological act as a sociological 
outcome.  
 
This chapter will locate the insights provided by the data from the previous two 
chapters into an analysis of the broader set of social relations suggested by Bourdieu’s 
theorising of misrecognition and genesis amnesia. This synthesis occurs in two 
analytical steps. The first section of the chapter is devoted to the initial step of 
analysing the collision in terms of the broader set of social relations offered by 
Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of habitus, logic of practice and position taking 
within the field.  This will allow for an understanding of how the collision unfolds in 
terms of the relationship between the contradictory symbolic orders in play in the 
classroom, recognition in the field and the protagonist’s practice. The first analytical 
step sets the stage for the second.  This section seeks to explain why these 
contradictory symbolic orders are played out so as to end in collision and exclusion, 
despite the best intentions of the teacher and the opportunities provided by the 
alternative setting.    
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7.2 When Worlds Collide: Blowing Up as Symbolic Struggle  
The previous chapter showed that ‘blowing up’ and exclusion occurred not, as is 
commonsensically assumed, despite understanding in the face of an extreme 
psychological outburst, but in the situated absence of understanding despite all good 
intentions.  What this underscores is the possibility of some broader set of relations or 
social mechanism operating in these circumstances that play havoc with good 
intentions and local reflexive knowledge construction and application practices.  But 
what social mechanism could be at play so that everything that is supposed to work 
towards local understanding and inclusion under these circumstances fails to work?   
 
In order to expose and analyse this social mechanism at the level of the interaction 
order it is first necessary to locate the set of interactional relationships unfolding 
throughout the course of ‘blowing up’ within the broader set of contingent social 
relationships in the field.  This requires a reconceptualisation of the collision into the 
broader terms of habitus, logic of practice and position taking.  Table 9.1 below 
provides a summary of ‘blowing up’ in these terms:  
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Table 7.1 A Conceptualisation of Blowing Up in Terms of Habitus, Logic of Practice and Position Taking 
 Account MCD 
Relevancies 
Colliding Dispositions 
of Habitus in Play 
Logic of Practice Position 
Taking 
 FIRST MOVEMENT     
A
ar
on
 
‘Slackn off’, not ‘doing the work’ after recess 
‘Just chattn’  
‘Kinda sent’ from the room and ‘we were all 
separated’.   
 
Smartarse/ 
PWTMWTD 
Friends/Cunts 
Streetsmart/ 
Schoolsmart 
Bodily Autonomy  
Collective 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Strong orientation to 
street setting  
Orient to bodily autonomy vs requirement to 
work in ‘slackn off’ 
Orient to collective & streetsmart in ‘just 
chattn’  
Orient to legitimate sanctions vs bodily 
autonomy in ‘kinda sent’.  
Divergence of 
Moral 
Requirements: 
Ambiguous 
Smartarse 
G
eo
rg
e 
Aaron and his friends engaging in ‘inappropriate 
conversation’ about ‘drugs and what's happening on 
the weekend’ immediately prior to school end.   
The way ‘they spoke to teachers like refusal to do 
things the laughing at teacher directions and things like 
that.’   
The ‘sexual tension’ between the two ‘boys’ and ‘girl’ 
The inexperienced and untrained teacher was ‘on 
class’ who ‘wasn’t aware’ of ‘what could happen’.   
Directing the ‘students’ to ‘move’ to separate rooms in 
the setting.   
While the three ‘students’ physically followed the 
direction that ‘mentally’ they didn’t as Aaron was 
‘verbally abusive’ and the girl ‘whinged and whined’.   
 
 
Teacher/Student 
Adult/Child 
Experienced 
Teacher/ 
Inexperienced 
Teacher 
Mainstream/ 
Alternative 
Teacher 
School setting 
Bodily Authority  
Individualism 
Covert Verbal Expression 
Strong orientation to 
school setting 
Safety 
Orient to school setting & bodily authority in 
‘inappropriate talk’ 
Orient to logic of individualism and Stage of 
Life in assessment of ‘sexual tension’ 
Orient to Safety in ‘what could happen’ 
Orient to bodily authority and teacher 
competency to assess and impose ‘flexible’ 
‘consequences’ in moving ‘students’ 
Orient to bodily authority, covert verbal 
expression & teacher competency to be 
‘flexible’ in complaint that Aaron was 
‘verbally aggressive’ but privileged bodily 
compliance.  
 
Divergence of 
Moral 
Requirements: 
Flexible 
Teacher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Account MCD 
Relevancies 
Colliding Dispositions 
of Habitus in Play 
Logic of Practice Position 
Taking 
 SECOND MOVEMENT     
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A
ar
on
 
Refusal to do the work and ‘I wouldn’t sit in my 
fucking seat’. 
‘Losing signatures’: ‘I didn’t tell you to stop’  
‘Nobody else’ lost their signatures and ‘nobody else 
had ever lost their signatures before’.   
Going to Pat and Stevie announcing ‘this cunt wiped 
out my signatures’.   
In the kitchen with Stevie George asked him ‘please 
leave the room’:  ‘Get fucked cunt I'll smash ya’.   
Aaron leaves the room but when he walked out into the 
other room with Pat ‘he (Phil, a teacher’s aide) 
wouldn’t let me out of this room.’  
 
Smartarse/ 
PWTMWTD 
Friends/Cunts 
Streetsmart/ 
Schoolsmart 
Bodily Autonomy 
Collective 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Don’t Care What 
Happens 
Streetsmart 
Orient to legitimate sanction of ‘kinda sent’ 
vs bodily autonomy in not sitting in the seat 
or doing the work but staying in the room 
Orient to bodily autonomy & streetsmart vs 
illegitimate sanctions in ‘I didn’t tell you to 
stop’ 
Orient to bodily autonomy and illegitimate 
sanction in nobody else lost their signatures 
Orient to bodily autonomy, collective, overt 
verbal expression, don’t care what happens, 
streetsmart & smartarse competency in ‘this 
cunt wiped out my signatures’, ‘get fucked 
cunt I’ll smash ya’ and ‘wouldn’t let me out 
of the room’.  
Increasing 
Divergence: 
Ambiguous to 
Unambiguous 
Smartarse 
G
eo
rg
e 
Aaron not doing the work and using ‘inappropriate 
language’ despite directives to do so.   
The losing of the signatures as a consequence to 
Aaron’s continued refusal to follow these directives.   
George responds to Aaron’s ‘I don’t care’ at the loss of 
the signatures with the further directive ‘alright well 
maybe you just need to sit there’.   
George leaves the room & goes to the kitchen.  
The right to ‘guide’ ‘student’s out by the elbow 
 
 
Teacher/Student 
Experienced 
Teacher/ 
Inexperienced 
Teacher 
Mainstream/ 
Alternative 
Teacher 
School setting 
Bodily Authority 
Individualism 
Covert Verbal Expression 
Future Thinking 
Strong orientation to 
school setting 
Orient to bodily authority, covert verbal 
expression & school setting in ‘not doing the 
work’ 
Orient to bodily authority, individualism, 
future thinking, school setting & teacher 
competency to ‘give consequences’ in losing 
of signatures 
Orient to bodily authority, individualism, 
school setting & teacher competency to ‘not 
react’ in leaving the room.  
Orient to bodily authority, school setting and 
teacher competency to ‘control’ ‘students’ in 
‘guiding’ by elbow. 
Increasing 
Divergence: 
Flexible to 
Mainstream  
Teacher 
 Account MCD 
Relevancies 
Colliding Dispositions 
of Habitus in Play 
Logic of Practice Position 
Taking 
 THIRD MOVEMENT   
 
  
 “Fucking move cunt before I move ya”, pushing Phil 
and jumping over the table.   
Smartarse/ 
PWTMWTD 
Bodily Autonomy Orient to bodily autonomy, fearlessness, 
overt verbal expression, overt physical 
Extreme 
Divergence: 
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 ‘fuck off you don’t grab me you cunt”’ &  ‘smashed 
him into the wall’  
‘Within two seconds’ Pat, comes to his aid & soon as 
he knew Pat’s support was there it was ‘all on’.  
A physical struggle ensues where the teachers could 
not control him totally because he was ‘schizing out’. 
 
Friends/Cunts 
Streetsmart/ 
Schoolsmart 
Fearlessness 
Collective 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Overt Physical 
Expression 
Don’t Care What 
Happens 
expression, don’t care what happens and 
smartarse competency in ‘pushing Phil, 
jumping over the table, smashed him into the 
wall’.  
Orient to bodily autonomy, fearlessness, 
overt physical expression, don’t care what 
happens, collective and smartarse 
competency in ‘he knew Pat’s support was 
there it was all on’. 
Orient to bodily autonomy, fearlessness, 
overt verbal expression, overt physical 
expression, don’t care what happens, 
collective and smartarse competency in 
‘schizing out’. 
 
Unambiguous 
Smartarse 
 
 The teacher attempts to stop Aaron from returning to 
the kitchen because Aaron was making physical threats 
to harm George.  
Three teachers physically restraining Aaron  
Making relevant a set of institutional procedures for 
restraint.   
 
Teacher/Student 
School setting 
Victimhood 
 
Bodily Authority 
Safety 
Individualism 
Polite Demeanour 
 
Orient to bodily authority, individualism, 
covert expression, victimhood, safety, 
antipathy to physical violence moderated by 
threat of extreme violence, and teacher 
competency to ‘control’ ‘violent’ ‘students’ 
in ‘stop Aaron returning to kitchen and 
physical restraint’. 
 
Extreme 
Divergence: 
Unambiguous 
Mainstream 
Teacher 
 
 
 Account MCD 
Relevancies 
Colliding Dispositions 
of Habitus in Play 
Logic of Practice Position 
Taking 
 POSTSCRIPT     
 Negotiating with the cop ‘if you don’t touch me I’ll 
jump up and walk straight out of here’.   
Aaron then leaves with Pat threatening the cop and 
smashing the door behind him. 
 
Smartarse/ 
PWTMWTD 
Friends/Cunts 
Streetsmart/ 
Bodily Autonomy 
Fearlessness 
Collective 
Overt Verbal Expression 
Orient to bodily autonomy, fearlessness, 
overt verbal expression and ‘don’t care what 
happens’ vs care what happens in 
‘negotiating with cop’. 
Bodily autonomy, fearlessness, overt verbal 
Decreasing 
Divergence: 
Unambiguous 
Smartarse to 
Ambiguous 
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Schoolsmart Overt Physical 
Expression 
Don’t Care What Happens 
expression, overt physical expression, 
collective and don’t care what happens vs 
care what happens in leaving with Pat and 
smashing door.  
Smartarse.  
 Calling the police. 
The police officer threatens Aaron with capsicum 
spray and detention if he attempts to harm anyone 
when they released him.   
Aaron then left with Pat.  
Nobody was hurt & complaint no judicial punishment 
Teacher/Student 
School setting 
Victimhood 
 
Bodily Authority 
Safety 
Individualism 
Covert Expression 
 
Orient to bodily authority, safety, 
individualism, covert expression & teacher 
competency to ‘control’ ‘violent’ students in 
calling the cops.  
Orient to bodily authority, safety, 
individualism, covert expression & victim 
rights in ‘threatening Aaron with capsicum 
spray and detention and complaint that no 
judicial punishment.  
 
Extreme 
Divergence: 
Unambiguous 
Mainstream 
Teacher.  
 327 
An examination of the dispositions column in the above table makes it evident that the 
teacher and the young person are orienting to completely incongruent sets of 
dispositions. These incongruent sets of dispositions serve as position taking models 
for practices that contradict and breach the moral requirements of the other 
protagonist’s habitus.  ‘Blowing up’ can, therefore, be ultimately seen as the situated 
manifestation of interactional instabilities endogenously tied to contradictory systems 
of classificatory schemes or, in other words, contradictory moral or symbolic orders.   
 
However, as Bourdieu points out, habitus is not created or expressed in a social 
vacuum but reflects the ongoing social circumstances of its production and 
reproduction in particular fields.  Accordingly, when the analysis of the collision is 
taken beyond individual symbolic orders it becomes strikingly evident that the 
systems of classificatory schemes that are in play for the teacher in ‘blowing up’ are 
at base wholly congruent with orthodox ‘mainstream’ institutional classificatory 
judgements.  In this case, it is the set of dispositions referenced by the rights, 
obligations, competencies and predicates tied to the normative and orthodox 
‘teacher’/’student’ SRP, the stage of life MCD and the gender MCD.  Thus the 
classificatory schemes in play during the collapse of the interaction order, including 
bodily authority, covert expression, the individual self and physical safety, perfectly 
mirror orthodox ‘mainstream’ models for practice. This means that ‘blowing up’ in 
broader social terms can be understood as the situated manifestation of instabilities 
tied to the contradiction between ‘smartarse’ and ‘mainstream’ institutional symbolic 
orders.  Therefore, despite any possible differences between ‘alternative teacher’ and 
‘mainstream teacher’ positions and position taking what is fundamentally in play in 
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‘blowing up’ is a collision of ‘smartarse’ and ‘mainstream’ or orthodox institutional 
symbolic orders.   
 
However this is a latent interactional instability, in the sense that it clearly does not 
translate into interactional breakdown on every occasion. A second look at the 
position taking column in the above table shows that the manifestation of this latent 
instability seems contingent on the collapse of the protagonist’s problem solving 
stances.    This has been shown to be true for the young person in the previous 
chapter, but it also holds true for the teacher.  Like the young person, the teacher can 
be seen as taking up problem-solving stances in ‘blowing up’.  In the teacher’s case it 
is the ‘flexible’ stance.  This stance can be understood as a response to the problem 
presented by the attempt to meet the moral requirements of his dispositions, which are 
aligned with the moral requirements of the legitimised position ‘experienced teacher’, 
in the face of the moral requirements of the illegitimate positions being made by the 
young person in the interaction.  Thus a ‘flexible’ stance solves the problem of 
occupying a position ‘good teacher’ in a problematic context where the constitutive 
ability to ‘manipulate’ the ‘behaviour kids’ to follow teacher directions is confronted 
by ‘behaviour kids’ and ‘smartarses’ constitutively defined as refusing teacher 
directions.  Thus for both the young person and the teacher these problem-solving 
stances ‘manage’ the latent interactional instability because they manage to solve the 
problem of disposition and position. 
 
In a sense, then, what the problem-solving stance manages is the problem of 
occupying a recognised ‘smartarse’ position or an orthodox ‘teacher’ position in a 
highly problematic context.   So, really, what the problem-solving stance ‘solves’ is 
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the problem of category membership, or competency, in a context that perpetually 
threatens the recognition of that competency.  Furthermore, because ‘teacher’ and 
‘smartarse’ competency is constitutively convergent on contradictory asymmetrical 
and symmetrical power relations it is possible to argue that the problem-solving 
stances definitively solve the problem of competency, because they solve the problem 
presented by contradictory claims regarding power relations.   
 
The ‘alternative’ setting aids and abets this solution by allowing for flexibility in 
officially legitimised positions.  Consequently ‘students’ can be legitimately 
accommodated as ‘behaviour kids’ and authorised to take up ‘ambiguous smartarse’ 
stances and ‘teachers’ are accommodated as ‘good alternative teachers’ and 
authorised to occupy ‘flexible teacher’ stances.  But this is the same as saying that the 
‘alternative’ school allows for some flexibility in the defence of asymmetrical power 
relations as long as this occurs in strictly limited ways that still defend the 
fundamentals of the moral order.  This is evident in such stances as a heightened 
tolerance of ‘abuse’ through flexible sanctions or the use of first names of ‘teachers’ 
by ‘behaviour kids’ as long as fundamental asymmetrical rights and obligations are 
complied with, such as the right to direct students to leave the room.    
 
‘Blowing up’ occurred, however, when the efficacy of these problem-solving stances 
collapsed; that is, when they no longer managed to solve the problem of competing 
competencies tied to contradictory power relations.  This made way for the full force 
of the contradiction between their normative orders to collide, in practice precipitating 
a crisis of interaction.  This collapse of problem-solving stances was contingent on 
elements of the context coalescing to threaten competency, that is, to threaten 
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recognition of the ‘smartarse’ and ‘experienced teacher’ position and ultimately to 
threaten power relations.  This happened when there was an increasing divergence 
between, on the one hand, the system of moral requirements of disposition made 
relevant and oriented to by the protagonists in response to the local context, and, on 
the other, the moral requirements of the positions made relevant by the position taking 
stance of the other protagonist.   
 
Consequently there are two distinguishable features of the local interactional context 
that contribute to divergence and/or convergence and ultimately contribute to the 
collapse of problem solving stances.  This includes: (i) circumstances tied to aspects 
of the protagonists’ dispositions.  For the young person this included such features as 
whether he was doing the work individually or as part of a group, whether it was 
before or after recess, close to the weekend and whether his friend ‘jumped straight 
in’.  For the teacher this would include features such as the presence of 
‘inexperienced’ teachers, ‘unstructured’ origami group activities and whether it was 
after recess and before end of school; and (ii) the position taking stances of the other 
protagonist.    Thus, prior to recess the position taking stance of the young person 
‘doing the work’ was convergent with the moral requirements of ‘good alternative 
teacher’.  This is because ‘good alternative teacher’ is constitutively defined by the 
competency ‘get the young person to do what I want them to do’. Similarly, the 
position taking stance of the young person complying with being sent from the room 
remains convergent with moral requirements of ‘good alternative teacher’.  However, 
the position taking stance of the young person as ‘unambiguous smartarse’ in the third 
movement calls for moral requirements that completely break with that of ‘good 
alternative teacher’ altogether.  Conversely, the moral requirements of a flexible 
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stance in the first movement remains convergent with the moral requirements of 
‘smartarse’, moderated by the requirement to follow legitimate school sanctions.  
However, the position taking stance of ‘mainstream teacher’ tied to removing 
signatures (negative punishment + self-avowed ‘reaction’ to ‘student’ practice 
constitutive of ‘mainstream teacher’ in mainstream/alternative teacher SRP) presents 
an unsolvable problem because its arbitrariness completely breaks with the moral 
requirements of ‘smartarse’ altogether.  This problem is further compounded by the 
‘grabbing’.   
 
Thus the problem-solving stances of the protagonists collapse when they are no longer 
able to solve the problem of balancing the moral requirements of certain dispositions 
made relevant by the local context and the moral requirements made relevant by the 
position making of the other.  This adds up to a threat to the competency or category 
membership of the primary identity of each protagonist measured in terms of power 
relations.  That is, problem-solving stances collapse when they no longer guard 
against a threat to category membership of either ‘smartarse’ or ‘good alternative 
teacher’, or, in other words, a threat to their ability to occupy that position because 
they threaten presumed power relations.  Therefore it can also be said that problem-
solving stances collapse when they can no longer protect what is ultimately at stake in 
the taking up of those positions, including recognition based on the maintenance of 
those power relations and bodily safety.   
 
Understanding ‘blowing up’ as contingent on divergence also underscores the point 
that this increasing divergence is the product of a number of different elements in the 
context converging in a particular order. Hence the chain of events involved a 
 332 
transitional late on Friday afternoon context, a group activity with ‘friends’, an 
activity itself not previously oriented to by the young person as a legitimate school 
activity, the separation, an unprecedented removal of signatures, possibly the touching 
of an elbow, the jumping the table, the grabbing and finally the ‘friend’ who ‘jumped 
straight in’.   Thus blowing up is contingent on an accumulation of circumstances that 
increasingly make problem-solving stances impossible.  The very nature of ‘blowing 
up’ is that it represents an escalation of a latent crisis.  Moreover, a constitutive part of 
the circumstances that contribute to the escalation of impossibility is the formulaic 
way that: (i) each of the protagonists responds within each movement according to a 
script strictly and exclusively provided by moral standards prescribed by their 
position; and (ii) each of the protagonist’s prescribed practical responses to breaches 
represents a proscribed breach for the other requiring a prescribed escalated response.  
 
What eventuates is that each protagonist resorts to a position taking stance that is 
increasingly unambiguous.  As the problem-solving stance becomes increasingly 
unviable, in the sense that it no longer solves the problem of competency or 
recognition, it is abandoned in favour of unmodified position taking practices.  These 
are position taking practices that are unambiguously congruent with primary 
dispositions associated with asymmetrical and symmetrical power relations.  Thus the 
young person takes up an unambiguously ‘smartarse’ stance that unambiguously and 
constitutively makes claims for asymmetrical power relations and the teacher takes up 
an unambiguously ‘mainstream’ teacher stance that unambiguously and constitutively 
makes claims for symmetrical power relations. In the teacher’s case this means that he 
increasingly abandons ‘flexible’ strategies for orthodox ‘mainstream’ institutional 
strategies based on asymmetrical power relations such as ‘removing signatures’, 
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following institutional procedures of restraint, calling the cops and resorting to 
institutional exclusion, or the ‘mainstream’ response of ‘booting him out’.   Their 
response to an increasing divergence and the collapse of problem-solving stances is to 
resort to symmetrical ‘smartarse’ or asymmetrical ‘mainstream’ models of practice, 
hand in hand with ‘smartarse’ accountabilities and ‘mainstream’ institutional 
accountabilities.   
 
Notably, in the case of the ‘teacher’, this resorting to institutional accountabilities 
occurs at the expense of any making relevant situated reciprocity. This goes hand in 
hand with the uninterrupted, making relevant of abstract institutional classificatory 
schema oriented to teacher rights to impose consequences and student obligations to 
follow directives. This is entirely unlike other accounts provided by the teacher where 
‘flexible’ behaviour teacher stances were successful in ‘managing’ ‘behaviour kids’.  
That is, accounts where the teacher was successful in maintaining asymmetrical 
power relations in the face of ‘behaviour kid’ practice that threatened those power 
relations.  This kind of ‘good teacher’/‘behaviour kid’ relations, as opposed to 
‘teacher’/‘student’ relations, were, without exception, oriented to a position taking 
and position making that self-consciously attempted to distance itself from a non-
reflective acceptance of orthodox ‘mainstream’ institutional models for practice.  
Thus his account on this occasion of ‘blowing up’ stands in contrast to his avowals 
consistently repeated elsewhere in ‘mainstream’/‘alternative’ school talk.  In that talk 
he makes relevant a standing obligation for reciprocity, that is, to ‘understand where 
these kids are coming from’, to ‘be able to listen to the kids’ , ‘to be in tune with kids’ 
and to appreciate, to some extent, the legitimacy of ‘behaviour kids’ symmetrical 
position taking in the face of institutional authoritative compliance.  This difference 
 334 
can also be described as the difference between an account in ‘blowing up’ of 
‘teachers’ and ‘student’ that makes relevant ‘explanation by abstract category’ as 
opposed to other accounts of ‘explanation by situated reason’.  It would seem that 
threats to competency precipitated a turning to mainstream institutional abstract 
accountabilities that precluded the making relevant of situated reciprocity.   
 
However, having said this, it also needs to be pointed out that while there is an 
increasing turn to mainstream institutional accountabilities in ‘blowing up’, seemingly 
at the expense of reciprocity, that this simply represents the unambiguous reassertion 
of underlying classificatory judgments that are entirely congruent with mainstream 
symbolic order.  Thus while it is evident that in ‘blowing up’ there is an abandonment 
of any orientation to making relevant reciprocity, under the weight of the imposition 
of mainstream institutional accountabilities, that the making relevant of reciprocity 
elsewhere always occurred through the lens of the teacher’s own classificatory 
schema.  In this sense, ‘understanding where the ‘kid’ was coming from’ was always 
undertaken within the set of mainstream classificatory judgments orienting to 
asymmetrical power relationships such as ‘adult’/’child’ relationships and orienting to 
mainstream prenotions concerning individualism, time and so on.  In addition, 
‘understanding where the ‘kid’ was coming from’ is uninterruptedly tied to 
asymmetrical rights to knowledge construction and comprises a key ‘good alternative 
teacher’ competency.  More specifically, the ability to authoritatively and decisively 
decree the meaning of ‘student’ practice is made relevant by the teacher as a part and 
parcel of the official category competency for ‘good or experienced teacher’. 
Differences between ‘flexible’ approaches drawing on minor acts of exclusion and 
oriented to an obligation to ‘understand where the ‘behaviour kid’ was coming from’ 
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and ‘mainstream’ institutional approaches of ‘booting them out’ only serve to disguise 
the underlying similarities in asymmetrical classificatory judgements and subsequent 
sanctions.  It is these underlying classificatory judgements that provide the 
fundamental basis of a latent crisis that erupts when problem-solving stances fail.  
Thus the differences between ‘flexible behaviour teacher’ stance and a ‘mainstream 
institutional stance’ is simply a difference in mode of imposition of the dominant 
symbolic order.    
 
Consequently, ‘blowing up’ is best understood as the manifestation of a symbolic 
struggle converging on smartarse and institutionally recognised power relations.  Or, 
perhaps even more accurately, ‘blowing up’ can be said to be a symbolic struggle that 
erupts through the surface of position taking stances aimed at managing the ever-
present problem of these contradictory symbolic power relations. Power relations that 
take shape in a collision of clashing points of view manifest in colliding visions and 
divisions of contradictory ‘smartarse’ and orthodox institutional classificatory 
judgements.   
 
Not surprisingly, then, ‘blowing up’ is very much a war of words, of classifications of 
‘cunts’ and ‘students’ of ‘being honest’ and ‘psychiatrically disordered’ of ‘friends’ 
and ‘individuals’. But this war of words or classificatory judgements symbolically 
underpin and authorise position taking practices where what is at stake is power and 
control over the young person’s body and what this means for both bodily safety and 
recognition of position.  This symbolic struggle is not only replete with mutual and 
escalating attempts of semantic censoring but is stripped down to what at base defines 
those power relations: a physical struggle for the right to control the young person’s 
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body.   The collapse of the interaction order in ‘blowing up’ can be understood as a 
revelation where what is revealed is what’s at stake in the ‘war of words’ or colliding 
symbolic orders. What’s immediately at stake is control over the body of the young 
person and bodily safety.  But this has particular meaning for a broader set of social 
relations, to do with competency or recognition in the field, given that recognition is 
constitutively tied to competencies that converge on contradictory rights to control the 
body of the young person.  What this means is that what is fundamentally at stake in 
the collision is competency, or recognition, of position and the legitimacy of the 
colliding symbolic orders that underpin the legitimacy of those positions. 
 
Ultimately, the ‘war of words’ and the breakdown in the interaction order, constitute a 
symbolic struggle tied to contradictory claims as to the legitimacy of positions and 
position takings.  In this sense, ‘blowing up’ gives concrete expression to Bourdieu’s 
assertion that what is at stake in a symbolic struggle is the right to define what counts 
in terms of legitimate claims to positions and competency in the field. The collision 
that takes place in ‘blowing up’ is essentially a collision of different claims of 
‘worldmaking’, of the divisions and visions that comprise the perception and 
organisation of the social world (1990a: 137).  On the one side of the collision is the 
set of orthodox classificatory judgements of the teacher, representing an assertion of 
the institutionally legitimate social ordering of positions and position takings in the 
setting, which reflect the orthodox and dominate legitimate social ordering of the 
field. On the other side is the ‘smartarse’ worldmaking concerned with reordering that 
social order.  
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‘Blowing up’ can, therefore, be understood as fundamentally representing a crisis at 
the level of the symbolic order played out through language and the body.  It is a 
symbolic crisis precipitated at the level of the interaction order by situated and 
occasioned interactional threats to competency, which can no longer be managed by 
problem-solving stances aimed at resolving contradictions between smartarse and 
orthodox symbolic orders.   Because competency is directly tied to the imposition of 
power relations that are reducible to the power over bodies, ‘blowing up’ constitutes a 
‘perfect storm’ where the symbolic struggle converges and perfectly maps onto a 
physical struggle for control of the body.  In the end this provides meaning to the 
young person’s claims of ‘I was in control they weren’t in control’ because despite 
extreme physical restraint he was able to symbolically resist the control of his body 
and, perhaps even more importantly, symbolically contest the terrain of language.   
7.3 The Triumph of Misrecognition 
The question remains, however, why do these differences in symbolic orders lead to 
not making relevant the young person’s point of view and, ultimately, to breakdown 
and exclusion?  Is there a social mechanism operating to determine this outcome 
against all best wishes and against the flexibility afforded by the alternative setting?  
Furthermore, what are the knowledge construction and application practices 
associated with this social mechanism? These are critical questions for the theorising 
of practical understanding and systemic exclusion.  If it is possible to show that a 
social mechanism is operating in this case study that interferes with reflexive 
knowledge construction and application, then it is arguable that this same social 
mechanism, which presumably operates at the structural level, operates to 
systematically contribute to the wider pattern of school exclusion.   
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Bourdieu’s theorising of misrecognition and genesis amnesia helps to explain why 
this collision of symbolic orders is systematically associated with the not making 
relevant of the young person’s point of view at the level of the interaction order, and 
why this produces systemic patterns of exclusion.  It achieves this by drawing 
attention to the relationship between symbolic power relations in the classroom 
setting and relationships between symbolic power relations in the field and social 
space that amount to relationships of symbolic violence.  What will be argued is that 
misrecognition through ‘genesis amnesia’ solves the problem that symbolic violence 
presents to individual good intentions to understand ‘where the kids are coming from’ 
by ensuring that the symbolic violence itself is misrecognised as ‘understanding’.  In 
order to achieve this, it is necessary to firstly demonstrate how the interaction order 
relationships that occur in ‘blowing up’ can be understood as relationships of 
symbolic violence and how these relationships are conditional on relationships of 
misrecognition.  These relationships of symbolic violence and misrecognition will 
then be explained in terms of the broader set of institutional conditions demonstrably 
operating in this setting.   
 
7.3.1 Relationships of Symbolic Violence 
Bourdieu points out that in any field the struggle for symbolic power is not ultimately 
an equal struggle of all against all.  This is because different agents have different 
symbolic capital.  In this setting, too, there are clear differences between the symbolic 
capital of the two protagonists.  That is, there are clear differences in their power to 
impose an officially recognised version of events.   Hence the symbolic power of the 
teacher, as the officially nominated representative of the dominant orthodox symbolic 
order, far outstrips that of the young person.  This is because the teacher’s symbolic 
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power is underwritten by the pedagogic authority incumbent in their position, to the 
exact extent that the teacher’s position taking practices can be reconciled with the 
officially recognised taken-for-granted symbolic order of the dominant group or class 
(Bourdieu, 1990a: 135-37).  Thus the teacher’s position affords them a position of 
symbolic domination.  As Hanks (2005) explains, this allows him to impose on the 
young person, and any holder of non-standard versions of reality embedded in non-
standard languages, an officially legitimised standard language representing an 
officially legitimised orthodox and taken-for-granted point of view (75).  Along with 
this legitimacy is the authoritative force of legitimate sanctions that ultimately reflect 
the power relations that give rise to them.  After all, the ‘cops’ are called to sanction 
the young person not the teacher, and it is the young person that is officially excluded 
and not the teacher.   
This imposition amounts to a case of symbolic violence, that is, the imposition of a 
cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power, whose details are discoverable in the 
colliding sets of dispositions.  Or, more accurately, symbolic violence in ‘blowing up’ 
is locally constituted by situated acts of teacher knowledge construction and 
application that can be objectively understood as the imposition of a system of 
mainstream orthodox classificatory schema over ‘smartarse’ classificatory schema.   
This comprises the imposition of classificatory judgements that orients to 
asymmetrical adult/child and teacher/student relations, covert expression, bodily 
safety, notions of future time, the individual and the construction of the school setting 
while simultaneously excluding and imposing on a point of view to do with 
symmetrical ‘smartarse’/‘PWTMWTD’ relations, overt expression, physical valour, 
notions of ‘don’t care what happens’, the collective and the construction of street 
settings.   
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The end result is a failure to reinsert the young person’s own logic of practice back 
into representations of that practice.  Hence the young person’s point of view and the 
local contextualised meaning of his actions is substituted for the teachers’ point of 
view. Consequently the symbolic violence that occurs in ‘blowing up’ can be seen as 
the antithesis of the kinds of reflexive knowledge construction associated with 
inclusion.  That kind of knowledge construction and application seems to strive for an 
understanding of the local contextual relationships giving rise to particular in situ 
practices.  However, in ‘blowing up’, occasioned by threats to competency, the 
opposite is demonstrated.  Objectively the kinds of symbolic violence occurring in 
‘blowing up’ would seem to be highly contradictory and problematic for any claims 
for reflexive ‘understanding’.   
What is particularly telling, in terms of grasping an understanding of this 
contradiction, is that the contradiction itself remains completely unaccounted for in 
the teacher’s talk despite persistent claims to practice based on ‘understanding where 
these kids are coming from’.  This is highly suggestive of what Bourdieu refers to as 
the two-fold misrecognition that defines all symbolic violence.  In this case, it is 
misrecognition of the arbitrariness of the orthodox mainstream classificatory schema 
and misrecognition of the arbitrariness of ‘adult’/‘child’, ‘teacher’/‘student’, or 
‘behaviour teacher’/‘behaviour kid’ power relations.  The next section will 
demonstrate how the relationships of symbolic violence that take place in blowing up 
are made possible by relationships of misrecognition as a result of ‘genesis amnesia’. 
 
7.3.2 Relationships of Misrecognition  
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A closer inspection of the teacher’s accounts reveals that the imposition of an 
orthodox mainstream classificatory schema is legitimised in practice by a way the 
teacher has of treating his own classificatory judgements as the only ones possible 
under these circumstances.  That is, he treats them as having a non-arbitrary universal 
truth value.  This is evidenced by the way he rhetorically justifies his own practices 
and evaluates the young person’s practices by making available the inference that his 
interpretations legitimately represent the ‘way things are’ in terms of certain 
fundamental taken-for-granted categorisations of ‘Stage of Life’, ‘Gender’ and 
‘Teacher’/’Student’ relationships.   Indeed, the illocutionary force of this talk in 
simultaneously legitimising his practices within asymmetrical power relations and 
reflexively positioning the teacher as  a ‘good teacher’ can only work because it relies 
on the presupposition that the moral logic made inferable by these classifications 
common-sensically goes without saying.  That is, the moral logic of asymmetrical 
power relations, individualism, politeness, time and school setting go without saying 
as naturally and absolutely the way things are under all circumstances for everyone. 
 
In addition, the treatment of these classificatory judgements in taken for granted ways 
as being universal and non-arbitrary is highly suggestive of a non-conscious 
relationship to the epistemological constraints of the teacher’s own habitus congruent 
with these elements of the orthodox institutional point of view.  Thus there is no 
account in his interpretations of the young person’s practices for the validity of 
imposing an institutional point of view – it just ‘goes without saying’.  This absence 
of a substantiation for the use of ‘Stage of Life’ or ‘Teacher’/‘Student’ or ‘Gender’ 
relationships is even more striking when juxtaposed against the many instances of 
institutional ‘epistemological cautiousness’ in the teacher’s talk, where he avoids an 
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official commitment to a firm point of view (Heritage, 1984: 178).  This only serves 
to highlight the absence of any similar cautiousness concerning inferences about his 
taken-for-granted moral standards, which, in turn is, strongly suggestive of a non-
conscious relationship to the epistemological constraints of his own habitus congruent 
with institutional classificatory judgements.   
 
These pedagogic knowledge construction and application practices can be defined in 
terms of a relationship of two-fold misrecognition, in Bourdieu’s terms.  That is, they 
constitute knowledge construction and application practices that objectively represent 
a non-conscious imposition of a misrecognised system of classificatory schema or 
cultural arbitrary and misrecognised arbitrary power relations.  In Bourdieu’s terms, 
this represents non-reflexive practices of knowledge construction that ignores the 
intellectual, moral and epistemological constraints of the teacher’s own habitus. Thus 
the triumph of misrecognition that occurs in ‘blowing up’ represents a triumph of 
misrecognition of the arbitrariness and epistemological constraints of the teacher’s 
point of view.   
 
As Bourdieu points out, this misrecognition necessarily involves a kind of genesis 
amnesia where what is ‘forgotten’ are the social conditions giving rise to the 
production and reproduction of the habitus.  In the first instance, this involves a 
‘forgetting’ of the history of disposition such that the teacher’s point of view is taken 
for granted as natural and universal.  In addition, the fundamental congruency 
between the pedagogic disposition and the dominant orthodox symbolic order in the 
field means that a ‘forgetting’ of the history of disposition goes hand in hand with a 
‘forgetting’ of the history of position.  Or, more broadly, a forgetting of the social 
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conditions that give rise to the symbolic order determining positions within the field.  
As a consequence, the legitimacy of this orthodox mainstream symbolic order goes 
without saying and is what is called on and reasserted in completely unanalysed ways 
to legitimise the teacher’s position taking stances once a crisis of competency in 
‘blowing up’ occurs. 
 
Ultimately, then, this means that the triumph of misrecognition that occurs in 
‘blowing up’ structurally represents a triumph of misrecognition of the arbitrariness 
and epistemological constraints of the dominant, orthodox point of view of the field.  
In Bourdieu’s terms, this represents relationships of misrecognition where the doxa 
and illusio of the field are presumed to be natural and universal.  It can therefore be 
said that the triumph of misrecognition that takes place in ‘blowing up’ is, at base, a 
triumph of the doxa and illusio of the field.  Specifically, it represents a triumph of the 
unthought aggregate of self-evident presuppositions that comprise the mainstream 
institutional symbolic order, related to power relations, individualism, covert 
expression, time and the non-arbitrariness of the school setting.   
 
While there is clearly a triumph of misrecognition in ‘blowing up’, the triumph does 
not occur at the point of ‘blowing up’.  This would somehow suggest that 
misrecognition occurs in ‘blowing up’ but not elsewhere.  This is clearly not the case.  
As was previously demonstrated, the same taken-for-granted symbolic order 
underpins the logic of practice of ‘flexible’ alternative approaches as well as 
‘mainstream’ institutional approaches.  The thing that differs is the problem-solving 
stance itself.  In this sense, the making relevant of ‘understanding’ or the use of first 
names for teachers, which occur when claims to competency tied to the maintenance 
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of asymmetrical power relations are successfully achieved, simply masks the 
continuous truth of misrecognition.   
 
If we say that ‘blowing up’ represents a triumph of misrecognition, it is more accurate 
to say that the triumph has already taken place and that it simply becomes more 
obvious and it rises to the surface unmediated by stances aimed at solving the problem 
of contradictory symbolic power relations.  These stances can also be said to solve the 
problem presented by omnipresent symbolic violence in an alternative context that is 
concerned with ‘understanding’ and ‘non-violence’.  Misrecognition of the objective 
nature of these stances, as being entirely congruent with a misrecognised dominant 
orthodox symbolic order, allows for a perpetuation of symbolic violence simply 
because they are non-consciously misrecognised as more ‘understanding’ and, hence, 
‘alternative’ to mainstream, which is not as ‘understanding’ or ‘flexible’.  
Misrecognition on all counts and under all circumstances is a solution for the problem 
that the imposition of power relations through symbolic violence creates in a context 
presumptively underpinned by reciprocity and flexibility.  
 
Taken together, these observations suggest a complete and utter triumph of 
misrecognition, where the doxa and illusio of the field succeeds in coming over the 
top of any hypothetically possible ‘alternative to mainstream’ position taking stance 
associated with a truly reflexive ‘understanding’.  That is, an understanding defined 
by an objective grasp of the full context of social relations, particularly of arbitrary 
power relations, giving rise to the young person’s in situ practice.  This represents an 
understanding of social relations that does not epistemologically fall victim to the 
fundamental objectifying prenotions of the dominant symbolic order.  As Bourdieu 
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emphasises, this kind of reflexivity requires, above all else, an ability to objectify the 
objectifying relationship and the social conditions that make it possible.  The triumph 
of misrecognition is epistemologically a triumph of a set of social conditions that 
prevent the objectification of the objectifying relationship.  The question now 
becomes what are the pertinent social conditions operating at the level of the 
interaction order that produce these epistemological obstacles so as to result in the 
triumph of misrecognition against all good intentions to the contrary?  
 
7.3.3 Institutional Conditions for a Triumph of Misrecognition 
The relationship between genesis amnesia and misrecognition suggests that the secret 
of the triumph of misrecognition lies with the set of social relations that produce 
genesis amnesia at the interaction order level, despite all efforts at reflexive practice.  
What follows is a bringing to bear of Bourdieu’s theorising about power relations to 
explain the social mechanisms that play havoc with reflexive practice at the level of 
the interaction order.  This section begins by firstly recapping the broad social power 
relations that produce the necessity for doxa and illusio before turning to specific 
institutional mechanisms in play in ‘blowing up’ that produce and reproduce 
misrecognition at the level of the interaction, thus ensuring the triumph of recognition 
despite good intentions.   
 
As previously discussed, Bourdieu argues that everything in the field works to foster a 
non-reflexive non-conscious belief in the doxa and illusio of the field.  Within a social 
space defined by power relations this serves the interests of the dominant groups in 
that configuration of power relations.  This is because the doxa and illusio of fields 
tends to match the dominant symbolic order.  This is the result of the virtual 
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monopoly that the dominant classes have of symbolic violence, via economic and 
political power, over institutions that are instruments of symbolic reproduction, like 
the education system, cultural institutions and the State (Bourdieu, 1990a: 135; & 
Wacquant, 1998: x).  Teacher practices that are complicit with the doxa and illusio of 
the education field unthinkingly impose and inculcate the dominant symbolic order 
through symbolic violence, thereby serving a reproductive function.   This is because 
the imposition of the dominant symbolic order as the dominant symbolic order, in a 
system of power relations between classes or groups, also tends to reproduce the 
objective conditions that provide the basis of those sets of power relations (Bourdieu, 
1990a: 138; & Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 1-15). As Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) 
explain, this is the direct result of the fact that the dominant cultural arbitrary is ‘the 
one which most fully, though always indirectly, expresses the objective interest 
(material and symbolic) of the dominant groups or classes’ (9). 
 
Symbolic violence is therefore socio-logistically necessary for the untroubled 
reproduction of a configuration of power relations between groups and classes in 
social space. Moreover, as Bourdieu and Passeron also argue, the success of symbolic 
violence in producing and reproducing an arbitrary configuration of power relations 
lies in the way that the configuration of power relations is largely legitimised as being 
natural and non-arbitrary – a representation of an inherent and legitimate meritocracy.  
This success is conditional on the two-fold misrecognition of the imposition of 
cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power (1990: xxi & 5).  This is perhaps nowhere 
more valid than in institutions that are instruments of symbolic reproduction because 
of the critical role that these institutions play in the production and reproduction of the 
monopoly of symbolic violence and symbolic capital.  Thus the stakes for 
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misrecognition are most likely to be at their highest in these institutions.  This 
includes ’mainstream’ and also ‘alternative’ education institutions.  It is not surprising 
that particular sets of specific social relations referred to by Bourdieu should have 
effects at the level of interaction order in pedagogic settings to foster an endless 
triumph of misrecognition.  While Bourdieu has identified a range of different social 
relations that produce misrecognition there are two that are particularly relevant to the 
findings of this study at the level of the interaction order.  These misrecognition 
effects arise from the dominant power relations determining teacher competencies and 
the institutional effects arising from the intersection of overlapping fields of 
knowledge and the relationships between them. 
 
7.3.3.1 Pedagogic Competency and Misrecognition 
Bourdieu has shown that serious obstacles to reflexivity lie in a more or less 
homology between teacher disposition and position that represents the required ‘entry 
fee’ into the game.  Thus the objectified history of requirements of position for 
specific kinds of capital, tastes and practices tends to ensure that only those with a 
pre-reflexive acknowledgement and recognition of the doxa and illusio of the field 
can access legitimate positions in that field.  In being ‘possessed’ by the doxa and 
illusio of the field the agent is able to take possession of positions in the field.  This 
would tend to ensure that the primary dispositions of teachers in fields of education 
are more or less congruent with the dominant symbolic order.  In practice, this 
selective homology would construct an endless hall of epistemological mirrors 
constituted by the prenotional ‘common’ sense of that dominant symbolic order.   
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The fact that the mode of imposition for alternative settings would tend to require 
agents with dispositions and capital more or less aligned to ‘soft’ approaches does not, 
as is evident in this case study, automatically lead to dis-illusionment, because of the 
underlying adherence to the dominant symbolic order.  This is despite the fact that the 
habitus of the teacher may predispose them to be situationally critical of the exercise 
of ‘authoritarian’ strong-arm power relations in ‘mainstream’ teacher practice, 
particularly practices of exclusion.  Similarly, this is despite the fact that the 
dispositions of teachers may predispose them to situationally make relevant 
‘understanding where the kids are coming from’, which at least is suggestive of 
reciprocity.   
 
Nevertheless, these requirements of position for somewhat heretical dispositions in 
alternative settings would seem to provide the grounds for at least the possibility of 
seeing through the limits of thought foreclosed within hierarchical institutional points 
of view.  Hypothetically, this could tend towards dis-illusionment and thus pose a 
potential threat to misrecognition. This is particularly the case because these teachers 
are ceaselessly exposed, at least objectively, to alternative ‘smartarse’ systems of 
schemes of thought, action, appreciation and evaluation.   This is unlike the in situ 
experience of teachers in mainstream institutions, where systematic segregation still 
provides a defence of the habitus by limiting exposure to alternative points of view.  
For teachers in alternative settings, completely immersed in an alternative world of 
schemes of thought, outside of non-conscious limits of non-reproductive thought, this 
primary defence of the habitus, avoiding exposure to other, no longer holds.  In a 
sense, this constitutes an entirely unholy and unnatural circumstance that has the 
objectively dangerous potential to pull the veil aside simply because misrecognition, 
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and, hence, the success of symbolic violence, is so entirely conditional on the non-
conscious recognition of a particular taken-for-granted point of view as being 
universal and, therefore, without any ‘other’.   
 
Nevertheless in the case study, misrecognition triumphed despite any potential 
objective threat posed by heretical tendencies or unholy circumstances.   What this 
suggests is that, quite apart from any entry fee, there are ongoing conditions within 
these settings that ensure the reproduction of the triumph of misrecognition.  As 
Bourdieu has shown, these conditions are partly provided for by the ongoing struggle 
for recognition and position in the field.  At the level of the interaction order, 
recognition in the field is determined by the performance of legitimised competency.  
The teacher’s accounts of ‘blowing up’ suggest three specific ways that the sets of 
dominant power relations determining what counts as legitimate teacher competency 
foster misrecognition.  The first of these has to do with teacher competencies, tied to 
what counts as knowledge construction or ‘understanding’.  The second has to do with 
the privileging of teacher competency in terms of the imposition of power relations.  
Tied to the first two is the third, which arises from the effect of overlapping fields of 
knowledge. 
 
Teacher Competency and Misrecognition  
In order to grasp the way that institutional recognition for what counts as 
‘understanding’ produces misrecognition it is first necessary to examine the precise 
nature of the local knowledge construction practices that shore up misrecognition at 
the level of the interaction order.  Rawls’ and Sacks’ theorisation of how local mutual 
intelligibility is achieved at the level of the interaction order provides an explanation 
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of how this works.  As Rawls suggests, an unremitting imposition of institutional 
accountability comes at the expense of reciprocity of meaning at the level of the 
interaction order.  This is because reciprocity of meaning in face-to-face interaction 
requires that specific sets of institutionalised values be at least partially set aside in 
order to focus on the ongoing, local, context-sensitive, sequential implicativeness of 
the talk, which is the constitutive level of meaning (Rawls, 1989: 166). In this regard, 
Sacks (1995) emphasised that the contribution of the inference-making machine to 
ongoing mutual intelligibility was bound to the way in which MCDs are strictly 
indexical expressions whose meaning is situated, contingent and contextually 
embedded in the ongoing talk (V1:113-124).   
 
Thus mutual intelligibility is only made possible through highly local context-
sensitive readings of ongoing categorisation talk.  However, what is evident from the 
teacher’s representations of the young person’s practice is that in turning to 
institutional accountabilities the teacher exclusively relies on highly abstracted 
‘context-free’ categorisation practices that effectively rupture this underlying 
requirement of the inference-making machine to manufacture mutual intelligibility.  It 
is these ‘context-free’ categorisation practices that underpin the imposition of 
orthodox classificatory judgements completely divorced from ‘where the kid is 
coming from’. 
 
The most notable among these is the unwarranted invocation and imposition of 
pedagogic classificatory judgements.  That is, the imposition of ready made abstract 
categories that are not warranted by the classificatory judgements that the young 
person demonstrably orients to throughout his accounts, and presumably that he 
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oriented to in the interaction talk in ‘blowing up’.  Instead, what occurs is the 
‘promiscuous’ introduction of the teacher’s own categorisations such as Gender, 
Stage of Life, Mental Disorder, which are completely abstracted and divorced from 
the ‘indigenous-to-the-interaction’ status of the young person’s situated category 
devices (Schegloff, 2002: 308-9 & 2006: 475-6). That is, they are completely 
divorced from the young person’s situated practice generating metaphors. This 
ensures that the representation of the young person’s practices is grounded in the 
teacher’s classificatory schema, not in the young person’s.     
 
Allied to the imposition of unwarranted categorisations is the teacher’s practice of 
routinely employing the imposed categories as explanatory resources rather than 
making relevant any explanatory inferences made available in the young person’s 
category talk.  Essentially, this is a commonsense and prenotional interpretative 
practice that echoes Sacks’ observation that categories are routinely employed as a 
resource in everyday explanatory work.  So that where: ‘…you’ve got a category-
bound activity and the category for that applied to some scene, why the thing 
happened is not a question. That it happened is explained by the very characterization’ 
(Sacks, 1995, V1: 588-9).  The interpretation of practices is cut short because 
explanation is sought not in the inferences made available in young person’s 
representations but via category incumbency, where the category is in the very first 
instance prenotionally imposed.  For example, the young person is abusive because he 
is ‘mentally disturbed’ or the young person is ‘testing the boundaries’ because he is a 
‘behaviour kid’.  Thus there is no need to orient to the young person’s own accounts 
for his practice because the explanation is ready made in category incumbency, 
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whereby the action is engaged in for itself and is tied to the allocated category 
membership.   
 
These same procedures ensure that the highly situated and occasioned categories and 
category predicates made relevant by the young person would not be made relevant 
by the teacher.  Consequently the inferable meanings of categories in use, meanings 
that are only graspable by attending to the kinds of contextualising questions 
Moerman (1965) raised, such as when is a ‘smartarse’, and not just what are the 
attributes of a smartarse, or, similarly, when is a ‘cunt’ or a ‘dickhead’, not just what 
is a ‘cunt’ or a ‘dickhead’, are not made relevant.  As we have seen, it is these kinds 
of misreadings that are central to the breakdown of the interaction order in blowing 
up.   
 
The same goes for the occasioned relevance of particular categorisations.  This 
problem can become even more complex when the teacher and young person makes 
relevant the same lexical terms for a category, but that either the hierarchy of 
relevance for category predicates within a particular context is different, or that the 
inferable meaning of the categorisation itself is unwarranted or not made 
consequential by the young person to the young person’s practice.    Essentially, this 
represents a particular problem of nominalism, where an object stands in relation to 
two similar but divergent metaphors. For example, both protagonists make relevant a 
moral logic of ‘friends’ in their accounts of ‘blowing up’.  However, as previously 
noticed, there is a failure to make relevant the young person’s orientation to ‘friends’ 
in ‘blowing up’ that hinges on the difference between the moral requirements of ‘we-
individuals’ and those of the ‘collective’.  Again what is evident here is a substitution 
 353 
of the young person’s classificatory schema according to the teacher’s own 
relevancies, made possible by context-free categorisations. 
 
These interpretative practices collectively shore up misrecognition by stripping the 
local meanings of practice from their context, thus preventing exposure to the logic of 
models of practice outside of the pedagogic point of view by ensuring a misreading of 
the meaning of those models of practice.  In this way, the non-conscious faith in the 
universality of the doxic point of view is defended by a set of interactional 
interpretative methods that, in rupturing local reciprocity, maintains the illusion of 
omnirelevant doxic experience.  These interpretative methods represent an in situ 
defence of the orthodox habitus, even in the face of unholy circumstances, by 
defending against the intrusion of recognition of alternative practice generating 
metaphors outside of the scope of the presupposed universal practice generating 
metaphor.  In other words, they constitute methods that defend against recognition of 
the situated meaning-making of the other.   
 
By shoring up misrecognition, these practices also provide the local epistemological 
conditions for symbolic violence.  This is because these practices ensure that there is 
no relationship possible between what is made relevant to the interaction by the 
protagonists.  This, in turn, expedites the imposition of an orthodox mainstream 
symbolic order epistemologically untroubled by the local import or legitimacy of 
what the young person makes relevant.  In other words, these knowledge construction 
and application practices provide the epistemological conditions for symbolic 
violence to occur unfettered by any reflexive understanding of the logic of the young 
person’s practice.   
 354 
 
These epistemological practices are not the independent conscious invention of a 
single agent. As Sacks (1995) has demonstrated, they represent commonsense taken-
for-granted member’s methods; in Bourdieu’s terms, these commonsense methods 
represent a part of the non-conscious doxa of the field.  Nor are they independently 
and consciously sustained.  As the data has shown, these practices represent teacher 
competencies that are recognised and authorised by the field.  That is, recognition for 
‘good teacher’ competencies related to ‘knowing what is really going on’ read in 
terms of the imposition of orthodox mainstream classificatory judgements that fail to 
make relevant the logic of practice of the young person. This brings to the foreground 
that reflexive knowledge construction is made highly unlikely whenever what 
legitimately counts as ‘understanding’ shores up misrecognition and is subsequently 
captured by relationships of symbolic violence.  Or to put it another way, non-
reflexive ‘understanding’ and symbolic violence is the likely outcome of recognition 
in the field for the kind of knowledge construction and application practices identified 
above.   
 
Hence institutionally recognised teacher competencies tied to the performance of 
these knowledge construction and application practices underwrite and ensure the 
triumph of misrecognition.  This is because what is recognised and legitimised is the 
epistemologically problematic practice of an unexamined objectification that: (i) only 
‘grasps practices from the outside as a fait accompli instead of constructing their 
generative principle by situating itself within the very movement of their 
accomplishment’ (Bourdieu, 1981: 87); and (ii) simultaneously fails to objectify that 
objectifying relationship, thus facilitating misrecognition.  At the level of interaction 
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this problem can be understood in terms of the epistemological mistake that is made 
when unexamined abstract categorisations such as ‘disordered’ or ‘behaviour kid’ are 
employed as explanatory resources to understand an a priori perceived disagreement 
with the pedagogic agent’s practice-generating metaphors, rather than seeking to 
understand the situated practice-generating metaphors of the young person in the first 
place.  Consequently, what becomes impossible to grasp is both the situated 
constraints of the young person’s practice and the constraints of the pedagogic agent’s 
point of view.  Institutional recognition for these knowledge construction 
competencies objectively amounts to the authorisation and legitimisation of the 
epistemology shoring up of misrecognition by ensuring that such practices ‘go 
without saying’.   
 
Teacher Competency and Power Relations 
The second structuring effect related to competency has to do with the way in which 
‘teacher’ competency is directly tied to the imposition of power relations.  It was 
previously demonstrated that the unambiguous reassertion of institutional 
accountabilities was precipitated by a threat to ‘good alternative teacher’ competency 
tied to successful performances of asymmetrical power relations.  The making 
relevant of reciprocity was abandoned under those circumstances.  What this suggests 
is that the binding of competency to the performance of power relations provides 
contingent conditions for misrecognition by posing obstacles to any possibility of 
reciprocity in practice.  The structuring of competency in this way appears to 
represent a local level social mechanism producing an in situ regularity in the field 
whose outcome is the delimiting of non-reproductive thought or misrecognition.   
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It is the constant immersion in this kind of regularity that Bourdieu argues ensures 
that the doxic relationship to the game not only produces commonsense knowledge of 
the 'vision and division' of the world but also produces an ongoing (tacit) self 
interested ignorance (Schirato & Webb, 2003:542).  Thus in tying competency 
directly to the performance of power relations any practical assertion of a contrary 
alternative symbolic order converging on different sets of power relations will 
automatically tend to provoke a defence of the dominant symbolic order rather than 
reciprocity.  This is because the threat to power relations automatically and directly 
becomes a local and imminent threat to position and, therefore, a direct threat in the 
local struggle for recognition, capital and identity.  As a consequence, the local threat 
to power relations becomes an immediate threat of falling into the abyss – the fate of 
all those that give up the struggle to conserve or increase recognition and capital 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 311 & Bourdieu, 1998: 261-336).  This means that the coupling of 
competency to the performance of power relations structures provides an imperative 
for misrecognition, given that it is misrecognition that provides the grounds for the 
untroubled imposition of power relations.  Under these circumstances any 
hypothetically possible attempt to recognise the assertion of a contradictory symbolic 
order converging on a contradictory set of power relations would be tantamount to 
threatening the entire grounds for position and all of its accoutrements.   Thus the link 
between competency and power provides the second set of local institutional 
conditions for a tacit self-interest in ignorance and misrecognition.  
 
Overlapping Fields and the Determination of Misrecognition 
The constraints on local reflexivity posed by the set of power relations producing 
legitimised competencies do not seem to rely solely on recognition sourced from 
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within the field of education itself.  Instead, other overlapping fields of knowledge, 
and particularly the field of psychiatric knowledge, seem to bring into play at the local 
level an official ‘scientific’ recognition for those competencies.  
 
In situ this appears to work through a particular use of official psychiatric language in 
representations of the young person’s practice.  Such language occurs periodically in 
the teacher’s representations, and on each occasion it serves as an explanatory 
resource for initial classificatory judgements of the young person’s practice in terms 
of extreme departures from the moral standard allowed for by the institutional 
symbolic order.  For example, in the previous chapter we saw how the teacher 
explains the young person’s ‘violent’ behaviour in terms of ‘psychiatric disorders or 
psychiatric mental health problems’. Thus the psychiatric language can be heard as an 
official explanation for the ‘violent’ behaviour.  However, the epistemological error 
here precedes the explanation in the talk because the error lies in the initial 
unexamined classificatory judgement of the young person’s practice as ‘violent’ 
rather than, say, ‘valorous’.  Objectively, this constitutes a prenotional imposition of 
institutional relevancies, but one that is disguised by the immediate juxtaposition of 
scientific psychiatric language.  In Bourdieu’s terms, this represents a ‘pseudo-
scientific’ account of the young person’s logic of practice solely in terms of an official 
prenotional moral standard without recourse to the young person’s own system of 
classificatory schema.   
 
Consequently, the strategic use of psychiatric categories in representations of the 
young person operates in exactly the same way as other official language categories 
such as ‘adult’, ‘kid’ and ‘behaviour kid’.  That is, they officially authorise and 
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legitimise the prenotional imposition of unwarranted classificatory judgements by 
authoritatively legitimising the ‘mainstream’ symbolic standard as universal and 
objectively the ‘way things are’.  However, in the case of psychiatric language the 
illocutionary force of such use rests on its appeal to an official scientific expertise 
and, hence, implicitly scientifically ‘objective’ knowledge.  Objectively, this 
represents a case of different fields of power-knowledge overlapping in a matrix of 
interdependent symbolic power relations.  In this case, the ‘legitimate’ authority of the 
field of Psychiatry lends itself to the delegated substantiation of the official language 
of education and alternative education.   
 
What is particularly remarkable about the use of psychiatric classifications is the way 
in which they appear to so easily and convincingly slip into the talk to shore up 
prenotional classificatory judgements at the expense of reflexive understanding.  
Arguably this is dependent on not just the authoritative voice of psychiatry, but more 
profoundly on two other non-reflexive operations.  First, it depends on ‘the 
extraordinary harmony’ between underlying non-conscious sets of ‘individualistic’ or 
humanistic presuppositions to do with the self, body and time held by pedagogic 
agents inculcated into the dominant habitus and the same presuppositions 
underpinning psychiatric discourse.  As Bourdieu, Passeron and Chamboredon 
suggest, psychiatric classifications in use here tend to fulfil: 
…the naïve wish of every social subject.  Seeking to remain the master 
and possessor of himself and of his own truth, wishing to know no 
other determinism than that of his own determinations (even if he 
grants them unconsciousness), the naïve humanist who lurks inside 
every man resents as “sociologistic” or “materialist” reduction every 
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attempt to establish that the meaning of the most personal and 
“transparent”  actions does not belong to the subject who performs 
them but to the complete system of relations in which and through 
which they are enacted (1991: 17).  
 
Second, it relies on the extraordinary congruence between psychiatric doxicologies 
and commonsense methodologies employed in this setting, in what Bourdieu refers to 
as pre-logical logic of commonsense ‘thinking in couples’, which:  
…leaves indeterminate the principles of its distinctions or assimilations 
and never specifies in what respect the things it contrasts or assembles 
in fact contrast or resemble each other.  It can be seen that in many of 
its operations, guided by a simple 'sense of the opposite', ordinary 
thought, like all 'pre-logical' (or practical) thought proceeds by 
oppositions, an elementary form of specification that leads it, for 
example, to give the same term as many opposites as there are practical 
relations it can entertain with what is not itself.  This discovery was a 
concrete demonstration that the reification of the object of science in 
the essential otherness of a 'mentality' presupposes triumphant 
adherence to a non-objectified subject (Bourdieu 1990b:20). 
 
What this suggests is that the imposition of psychiatric classifications, just like the use 
of other unwarranted impositions in this case, such as ‘child/adult’ etc, amounts to an 
unexamined objectified othering.  Furthermore, as many authors have argued, this 
objectification and othering is likewise a function of prenotional lumping and splitting 
according to the non-conscious principles provided by the dominant moral standard 
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(e.g. Bogardus, 1997; Cosgrove, 2005; Danforth & Navarro, 2001; Gaines, 1992;  
Gleeson, 1992; Harwood, 2000; Holstein, 2002; Laws & Davies, 2000; Potter & 
Wetherall, 1987,  Slee & Cook, 1999; & Tait, 2001).  The doxa-cology can, therefore, 
only exist as such because the notion of ‘subject’ is not objectified, or, rather, the act 
of objectification is not objectified.  The end result is that as a discursive practice this 
‘objectifying’ body of knowledge inherently runs the risk of stripping the local 
context of meaning for the objects of representation using the same kind of 
interpretative methods displayed in this study e.g. explanation by category, 
unwarranted category use and so on.  The upshot is that the practice of orienting to 
‘being honest’ as ‘abuse’ or ‘physical valour’ as ‘violence’ or ‘schizing out’ as a 
‘mentally disordered episode’ is comfortably expedited by similar psychiatric 
knowledge construction practices that also fail to objectify the objectifying 
relationship.  
 
It is as if the fundamental obstacle to reflexive understanding posed by the use of 
official psychiatric language lies as much in the way that psychiatry authoritatively 
reaffirms a non-conscious doxic symbolic order underpinned by beliefs in the 
universal non-arbitrary individual self, as it does in the way that the authoritative 
scientific voice afforded by psychiatry tends to legitimise and mirror knowledge 
construction practices involving the imposition of abstracted taken-for-granted 
classificatory judgements.  Not coincidentally the authority provided to pedagogic 
agents as a result of this discourse simply reaffixes the symbolic order underpinning 
power relationships in the field.  In which case the ‘symbols and ceremonies’ of 
institutional exclusion are made justifiable because of official judgements that the 
young person is ‘too disturbed’.   
 361 
 
The above analysis with regards to the specific effects of the overlapping field of 
Psychiatry can be more broadly theorised in terms of the intersections of other fields 
operating in similar ways.  Thus it could be expected that the total effect of a series of 
knowledge fields, including for example Psychiatry, Developmental Psychology and 
Disability, could similarly work in concert to exactly produce misrecognition and 
symbolic violence associated with exclusion. This would occur wherever they operate 
to confirm taken-for-granted, commonsense meanings and to epistemologically 
legitimise knowledge construction and application practices fostering misrecognition 
and underpinning symbolic violence.   
.   
An understanding of misrecognition relationships and the obstacles to reflexivity 
posed above also allows for an understanding of the association between exclusion 
and misrecognition at the level of the interaction order.  This chapter will close on an 
analysis of those relationships.  
7.4 Relationships of Exclusion 
The cost of symbolic violence and misrecognition under these circumstances of 
symbolic collision is reciprocity.  But reciprocity is the condition for the maintenance 
of the interaction order.  In the absence of reciprocity the interaction order inevitably 
breaks down.  This means the cost of symbolic violence and misrecognition under 
these circumstances of divergence is an unstable interaction order.  As has been 
shown, this instability is routinely managed through problem-solving stances that 
manage the symbolic violence.  However, under circumstances where the habitus of 
the young person manifestly contradicts the requirement for asymmetrical power 
relations these problem-solving stances will inevitably fail.  Exclusion provides a 
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means of systematically addressing this instability whenever problem-solving stances 
fail to manage the problem that symbolic violence poses to interaction order stability.  
Exclusion, then, provides a solution to the long-term intolerability of contradictory 
symbolic orders where that contradiction converges on power relations.  Of course the 
other solution is inculcation.  But in circumstances where the habitus of the young 
person is entirely resistant to subjugation exclusion provides the only solution to 
inherent instability.   
 
In addition, exclusion, which is misrecognised in the sense that it is misrecognised as 
the outcome of symbolic violence, also serves to reinforce the two-fold 
misrecognition of symbolic violence.  This works because exclusion is misrecognised 
as the inevitable and natural consequence of intolerable breaches to a natural and 
universal symbolic order.   Therefore, if it can be said that misrecognition through 
genesis amnesia provides a solution for symbolic violence in order to reproduce 
power relations then it can also be said that exclusion provides a solution for the 
instability generated by symbolic violence in these settings.  Thus school exclusion is 
systematically produced through institutional misrecognition relationships 
legitimising local knowledge construction and application practices bound to 
symbolic violence.  
 
This, in turn, draws attention to the operations of exclusion at the level of the 
interaction order and the relationship between these operations and misrecognition. 
This relationship can be understood in terms of the outcomes of misrecognition 
relationships being a form of possession.  Thus, in being possessed by the field, the 
pedagogic agent acts as one possessed, despite good intentions to the contrary.  That 
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is, in non-consciously embodying the doxa and illusio of the field and constructing 
knowledge according to its epistemological constraints, the pedagogic agent non-
reflexively applies the official moral prescriptions in interaction, all the while 
systematically co-producing unviable positions due to of the misrecognised and 
contradictory relationship between position and disposition.  The result is that at the 
level of interaction, symbolic violence and exclusion is likely to systematically occur 
whenever there are misrecognised contradictory moral orders in play, despite, as 
Bourdieu observed, the best intentions of the pedagogic agent (Bourdieu in Hanks, 
2005: 78).   
 
An appreciation of exclusion in these terms underscores the point that ‘context’ 
‘exclusive pedagogic practice’ and ‘exclusion’, in terms of incidents of ‘blowing up’, 
have particular meaning at the level of interaction order.  Thus at the level of 
interaction, pedagogic insensitivity to ‘context’, leading to the kinds of knowledge 
construction associated with school exclusion, specifically becomes a ‘context-free’ 
orientation to the situated, occasioned and indexical meaning of categorisation talk of 
the young person.  Similarly, ‘exclusive pedagogic practice’ is redefined not just in 
terms of Bourdieu’s more abstract relationship of symbolic violence, but, more 
practically and concretely, as acts of symbolic violence at the level of interaction, on 
those occasions where there is a non-conscious imposition of contradictory official 
pedagogic classificatory judgements to construct an understanding of the young 
person.  That is, wherever and whenever representations of the young person’s 
practice involve the imposition of institutional classificatory judgements that, in the 
absence of appreciation, amount to an ‘othering’.  In these terms, institutional 
exclusion resulting from incidents of ‘blowing up’ can be understood as the final 
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destination for interactional practices of misrecognition – the product of 
misrecognition relationships in the field. These interpretative practices of situated 
imposed classificatory judgement thereby define in situ ‘excluding’ practice, or the 
‘doing of exclusion’.   
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the fundamental function of the field of education 
to reproduce the dominant symbolic order and, hence, the dominant set of power 
relations completely overwhelms any local good intentions to ‘understand where these 
kids are coming from’ or any opportunities for accommodating, reflexive practice 
afforded by the alternative setting.    On the contrary, what has been shown is that 
local practices of ‘flexibility’ amount to an ‘alternative’ problem-solving stance that 
only serves to disguise a fundamental congruence between ‘alternative’ and 
‘mainstream’ symbolic orders converging on asymmetrical ‘teacher’/‘student’ power 
relations. The failure of these problem-solving stances to manage the problem of 
occasioned contested symbolic orders underpinning contradictory power relations 
precipitates an undisguised reassertion of the ‘mainstream’ symbolic order converging 
on asymmetrical power relations.   
 
This amounts to endemic relationships of symbolic violence within these settings 
involving the endless imposition of disguised ‘mainstream’ institutional meanings and 
accountabilities.  At the level of the interaction order this is enacted through the 
uninterrupted imposition of orthodox mainstream classificatory judgements in teacher 
knowledge construction and application within local teacher-student relationships.  
This imposition occurs via situated and occasioned teacher classificatory judgements 
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that draw on context-free, rather than context-sensitive, interaction order 
interpretative practices.  These practices ensure that ‘understanding where the kids are 
coming from’ is in fact endemically caught up in symbolic violence.  As a 
consequence, the symbolic violence enacted in practice through these classificatory 
judgements produces a condition of perpetual instability in the interaction order that 
inevitably erupts into episodes of ‘blowing up’ whenever there is a collision of 
normative symbolic orders converging on contested power relations.   
 
Symbolic violence, while structurally necessary for the reproduction of power 
relations, poses an ongoing problem within a setting that is ostensibly and 
purposefully aimed at ‘reciprocity’ and ‘understanding’.  This problem was shown to 
be resolved by misrecognition associated with genesis amnesia where the teacher’s 
system of classificatory models or practice-generating metaphors are presumptively 
made relevant as universal, even in the face of the young person’s classificatory 
schema lying outside of those classificatory models.  This is made possible through 
the knowledge construction and application practices at the level of interaction 
involving the imposition of context free, rather than context sensitive, classificatory 
judgements.  In effect these practices defend the non-conscious presumption of 
universality central to genesis amnesia underpinning the misrecognition necessary for 
a non-conscious symbolic violence in the face of good intentions to ‘understand’ and 
be ‘flexible’.  It is, therefore, these same context-free interaction order practices that 
ultimately define the nature of knowledge construction and application associated 
with exclusion.   
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The chapter has demonstrated that the triumph of misrecognition was conditional on 
particular structural relationships in the field operating within the institutional setting, 
tying requirements of recognised teacher position to the successful assertion of 
asymmetrical power relations and to knowledge construction and application practices 
that lead to symbolic violence. The epistemological legitimisation of these practices 
was shown to be further endorsed by the authoritative voice of overlapping fields of 
power-knowledge, particularly the field of Psychiatry.   The sum of these institutional 
conditions defines the institutional obstacles and limits to reflexive knowledge 
construction and application associated with practical understanding at the level of the 
interaction order.   
 
Finally, the chapter showed that ‘exclusion’ needs to be understood at the level of 
practice in terms of these same interaction order practices involving the non-reflexive 
imposition of context-free classificatory judgements.  In other words, these 
knowledge construction and application practices define the ‘doing’ of exclusion at 
the local interactional level.  It was also shown that institutional ‘school exclusion’ 
provides a solution to the intolerable instabilities produced by relationships of 
misrecognition and symbolic violence within these settings. School exclusion also 
reinforces and confirms misrecognition. In which case it was argued that if 
misrecognition provides a solution to symbolic violence in these settings then 
exclusion provides a solution for misrecognition.  As a consequence, systematic 
exclusion of this group of young people can be understood as the inevitable product of 
structural relationships of misrecognition providing the epistemological legitimacy for 
local ‘context-free’ knowledge construction and application practices leading to 
symbolic violence.    
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has sought to build a renewed conceptual understanding of the set of 
institutional relations that limit reflexive knowledge construction and application 
associated with inclusive teacher interactions with ‘students’ diagnosed with a ‘mental 
disorder’.  The approach adopted in the thesis is consistent with Bourdieu’s idea of 
constructing an object of inquiry in order to undertake conceptual work based on 
empirical exploration for the foundation of new theory.  In this case the 'object' 
constructed concerned the institutional limits to reflexive understanding within 
teacher-student interactions. This approach opened up the question of ‘understanding’ 
and reflexivity in student-teacher interactions and prompted an investigation into the 
limits of these practices where inclusiveness was a central concern.  This chapter will 
review these limits and explore the possibility of reflexive understanding.  The 
chapter will then review the knowledge contribution of this study, outline its 
limitations and suggest future research directions. 
 
8.2 The Limits to Reflexive Understanding 
This study began by identifying the relations of reflexivity at stake in inclusive 
teacher-student relationships through a review of educational, psychological and 
psychiatric research. The study then outlined a theoretical framework suited to a 
problematisation of the relationships underpinning reflexive understanding of 
interactive practice.  An interaction order approach was then employed that allowed 
for a rigorously intensive analysis of the set of contingent relations between 
dispositions, positions and position taking in settings where the requirement for 
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reflexivity is crucial for inclusion.  This approach was applied to a critical case study 
of an episode of teacher-student relationship breakdown associated with school 
exclusion. 
 
Drawing on the findings presented in the data chapters, the previous chapter showed 
that the nature of the knowledge construction and application practices that were 
associated with breaks in practical understanding can be defined in terms of local 
relationships of symbolic violence.  This symbolic violence occurs at the level of the 
interaction order through the non-conscious imposition of legitimised ‘mainstream’ 
orthodox classificatory judgements as explanatory resources.  As a consequence the 
endemic symbolic violence enacted through the imposition of orthodox classificatory 
judgements appears to produce a condition of perpetual instability in the interaction 
order arising from an ongoing symbolic struggle.  In terms of the afore-mentioned 
case study, this symbolic struggle involved a collision between contradictory bodily 
authority versus bodily autonomy, covert versus overt expression, individualism 
versus collectivity, future thinking versus  ‘don’t care what happens’ and strong 
orientation versus weak orientation to the school setting.  This amounted to a 
symbolic struggle between the young person’s ‘smartarse’ and the teacher’s 
‘mainstream’ orientations converging on contested asymmetrical and symmetrical 
power relations.  The instability generated by this symbolic struggle appeared to 
inevitably erupt into episodes of severe interaction order breakdown under locally 
contingent circumstances that threatened the protagonists’ normative order.  This 
occurred despite attempts by the young person and the teacher to adopt 
‘ambiguous/switching’ and ‘flexible/alternative’ problem solving stances 
respectively, each aimed at locally managing these contradictions. 
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The study then demonstrated that successful imposition of orthodox classificatory 
judgements was conditional on misrecognition. Misrecognition was shown to be 
shored up at the level of interaction order by institutionally authorised knowledge 
construction and application practices that privileged context-free institutional 
accountabilities rather than context-sensitive reciprocity.  In shoring up 
misrecognition these knowledge construction and application practices provided the 
local epistemological conditions for relationships of symbolic violence that led to 
exclusion.  The examination of these practices shows how institutionally recognised 
and imposed ‘understanding’ can thus become caught up in interaction order practices 
constituting symbolic violence. 
 
The triumph of misrecognition over local good intentions was shown to be the 
outcome of structural relationships operating within the institutional setting that tied 
the requirements of recognised teacher positions to the successful assertion of 
asymmetrical power relations and to the exercise of knowledge construction and 
application practices that led to symbolic violence. The legitimisation of these 
relationships of misrecognition and symbolic violence was shown to be further 
endorsed by the authoritative voice of overlapping fields of knowledge, particularly 
the field of psychiatry.  The sum of these institutional conditions and the knowledge 
construction and application practices associated with them defines the institutional 
obstacles and limits to reflexive understanding associated with inclusion at the level 
of the interaction order. 
8.3 The Possibility of Reflexive Understanding 
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This study has opened an analytical space to speculate about the possibility of 
reflexive knowledge construction and application practices at the level of the 
interaction order and likely implications for inclusive teacher-student relationships. 
The first optimistic observation is that even though the study plotted out a landscape 
of symbolic collision and conflict, the protagonists nevertheless demonstrated the 
possibility of softening their orthodox ‘mainstream’ and ‘smartarse’ stances in 
relation to one another.  In terms of this study this observation can be understood as 
suggesting the possibility of negotiating meaning and identity more locally.  The 
question then becomes: what conditions and practices associated with such a 
negotiation are likely to make it possible systematically? 
 
Unfortunately it seems from this study that the triumph of misrecognition occurs 
regardless of the best of individual intentions.  This is because structural conditions 
operating within the institutional context tend to overwhelm both the good intentions 
of individual agents and the flexibilities afforded by particular settings.  This finding 
is consistent with Bourdieu’s argument that reflexive knowledge construction ‘cannot 
be built on the shaky foundations of the objectivity of scientists.  The gains from 
epistemological reflection cannot be really embodied in practice until the social 
conditions are established for epistemological control’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and 
Passeron, 1991:74). 
 
This outlook presupposes that practical understanding associated with inclusive 
teacher-student relationships can only be systematically achieved if the institutional 
obstacles to reflexive knowledge construction and application that foster 
misrecognition relationships are at least to some extent overcome.  The findings of 
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this study illuminate some of the institutional conditions that would foster reflexivity.  
These conditions are implicit in the way that the requirements of legitimate teacher 
positions pose obstacles to reflexivity through the production of relationships of 
misrecognition derived from legitimising flawed knowledge construction and 
application practices and the maintenance of privileged, asymmetrical power 
relationships. 
 
This finding in turn makes salient Bourdieu’s (1975) analysis of reflexive fields where 
the conditions for reflexivity lie in the degree of autonomy from dominant power 
relationships and the need for the institutionalisation of a reflexive disposition as well 
as the establishment of institutional mechanisms that support reflexive knowledge 
construction (31-41).  The findings of this study suggest that a necessary feature of 
this institutionalisation of reflexivity is the privileging of reflexive knowledge 
construction – rather than the successful imposition of the dominant symbolic order – 
in the production and recognition of teacher position requirements.  The findings also 
underscore the need for an institutional model that operates safeguards against bias, 
including bias associated with the sovereign gaze of the teacher as an objectifier, such 
that there is ‘an interest in truth’ rather than a ‘truth that suits interest’ (Bourdieu, 
1975: 31).  Needless to say the special relationship that the field of Education has with 
the reproduction of the dominant set of power relations poses a significant obstacle to 
this eventuality. 
 
Nevertheless the possibility of institutional conditions for reflexivity opens up a real 
hope for local knowledge construction and application practices leading to practical 
understanding.  The nature of these practices is presumably the inverse of those 
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associated with breakdowns in practical understanding and exclusion.  That is, the 
necessary feature of reflexive knowledge construction and application in practice, as 
suggested by the findings, is a sensitivity to the local interactional context and, in 
particular, to the identities that are presented and negotiated in this interaction.  Above 
all, the crucial principle of knowledge construction and application in interaction 
becomes an orientation toward the reciprocity of meaning rather than toward 
institutional accountabilities. 
 
In practical terms this constitutes knowledge construction and application practices 
that seek to avoid the imposition of explanatory institutional categories and remain 
committed instead to an interrogation of the young person’s situated categories such 
as ‘cunt’ or ‘dickhead’ and the interrogation of situated category descriptors such as 
‘control’ or ‘abuse’. This requires an understanding of various categories' relevancies, 
their relationships and their indexical and occasioned nature.  However the problem of 
the non-conscious is likely to remain in this exercise because of the way that non-
conscious presuppositions make unthinkable the questioning of particular lexical 
terms such as ‘school’ or ‘being in control’.  Thus in addition to the above what is 
also required is a finely tuned orientation to particular local features of interactional 
talk that may flag troubles for reciprocity.  Thus disavowals, complaints, disclaimers, 
dispreferred responses, departures from conditioned relevance, interruptions, 
overlapping turns and other conversational troubles, along with the finer interaction 
tools of category deletions and accretions, hesitations, repairs, gists and upshots and 
so on, all provide inferential tools to help the task of reciprocity.  But this approach 
requires a bracketing of moral institutional accountabilities and inferences, such as 
‘interrupting’ a ‘teacher’ at ‘school’, in order to focus on the way that various features 
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of the dialogue can serve as signposts to breaks in mutual understanding.  Thus by 
flagging departures from reciprocity, these features are likely to also flag that which is 
non-consciously being imposed: namely, the unthought categories of thought. In this 
way the full schemata of the architecture of intersubjectivity aids and abets the task of 
reflexivity when turned on the pedagogic agents themselves as they struggle to 
reflexively understand the classificatory schema of the other. 
 
What this focus allows for is an identification of the non-conscious situated 
imposition of classificatory schema, which in turn provides an opportunity to break 
with the stranglehold prescribed by the harmonious relationship between the teacher’s 
disposition and legitimate teacher positions.  In a way analogous to Bachelard’s cycle 
of scientific discovery, this opens up the possibility of asking the iconoclastic 
question: ‘What if this relevance does not hold in this situation for the young person?’ 
This is the same question as asking what lies outside of the previously presumed 
universal relevance, thus exposing the limits of the pedagogic point of view. The 
question of what relevance particular classifications hold for the young person 
precipitates a cycle of self discovery because the pedagogic agent’s point of view is 
subsequently brought into sharp focus as it is contrasted with an alternative point of 
view.  This in turn precipitates a cycle of discovering the relationship between aspects 
of the teacher's and young person’s symbolic orders.  Apart from opening up the 
possibility of reflexive knowledge construction and application this also provides the 
practical means to dissolve otherness by dissolving the hold of the orthodox 
classificatory model that constitutes otherness. 
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What this development represents is a practical response to Bourdieu’s call for a 
democratisation of the hermeneutic (Fowler, 1996:14-15). In this way it makes 
practical sense of the extensive body of research pointing to the critical role of 
‘listening’ in inclusive relationships.  Moreover, what a conscious grasp of the 
practice of privileging reciprocity above institutional accountability in knowledge 
construction achieves at the level of the interaction order is a conscious control over 
the techniques of ‘listening’.  In this sense it constitutes a practical means to achieve a 
truly reflexive listening, exposing the doxic unthought categories of thought that 
would otherwise non-consciously slip by, regardless of any subjective faith in the 
good intentions of the pedagogic agent in either their ‘listening’ skills or 
‘understanding where the kids are coming from’. 
 
However the tools provided by the architecture of intelligibility and the inference-
making machine, while opening up the possibility of reflexive understanding of the 
young person’s logic of practice, only provide the first step. This is because of the 
separate need to understand the twofold nature of habitus – that is, schemes of thought 
and appreciation.  The problem in this sense is that reflexive understanding requires 
an understanding not just of the classificatory schema and its practical value, but also 
of the young person’s scheme of appreciation.  This is partly achieved by the 
dissolving of mainstream taken-for-granted dualisms following a reflexive 
understanding of the young person’s classificatory schema.  However an 
understanding of the value of models of appreciation is only likely to be fully 
achieved through aspects of shared lived experience.  This necessarily follows from 
Bourdieu’s observation that it is impossible to enter the ‘magic circle’ of the 
relationship between disposition and position except through birth or the ‘second 
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birth’ of initiation, which amounts to lived experience (1990b: 68).  What this logic 
suggests is that the nature of reflexive knowledge construction and application lies not 
just in the identification or understanding of the structure of classificatory schemes 
but in a searching for similarities within the schemes of appreciation.  It also suggests 
that this search is achievable through a deliberate and conscious decision to find areas 
of similarity in the pedagogic agent’s own experience regardless of whether the young 
person’s situated moral order prenotionally contradicts that of the pedagogic agent.  It 
is through this search for similarity in appreciation via a search through parallel 
experiences that opens the door to a fuller understanding of the young person’s 
schemes of appreciation. 
 
The combined understanding of the young person's schemes of thought and schemes 
of appreciation makes possible an understanding of their system of schemes of 
thought and appreciation.  This suggests a pragmatic shift at the level of interaction. It 
is a shift that incorporates Bourdieu’s practical instruction that reflexive knowledge 
distinguishes what is normally confused (classificatory schema) and brings together 
what is normally separated (appreciation). This reflexive knowledge subsequently 
allows for an understanding of the constraints that the young person’s habitus imposes 
on any position taking in the field. Accordingly it allows for a recognition of what is 
at stake in any interactional occasion, and ultimately an understanding of the logic of 
the young person’s local practice.  This approach is quite opposed to the kinds of 
hierarchical moral assessments arising from doxic classificatory judgements and the 
imposition of the institutional symbolic order.  As a whole it prompts the realisation 
that moral classificatory judgements, regardless of being dressed up in erudite 
psychiatric language, represent obstacles to understanding rather than paths toward it. 
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Put simply, the task of reflexive understanding necessitates appreciation rather than 
classificatory judgement. 
 
8.3 The Contributions and Limitations of the Study 
This study has made a direct contribution to the theorisation of the set of relations that 
produce non-reflexive breaks in understanding in teacher-student relationships that 
lead to school exclusion.  This contribution has been based on:  (i) the identification 
of obstacles to reflexive understanding presented by the institutional context at the 
level of the interaction order; and (ii) the conceptualisation of linguistic knowledge 
construction and application practices at the level of the interaction order that are 
associated with non-reflexive understanding leading to school exclusion. The 
theorisation of these conditions and practices also suggests a conceptual outline of the 
conditions and practices that may make reflexive understanding associated with 
inclusive teacher-student relations possible. 
 
In so doing, the study contributes to a substantiative body of knowledge surrounding 
inclusive schooling and young people with ‘mental disorders’.  Similarly by selecting 
a critical case study set in an alternative educational setting this study makes a 
contribution to the body of knowledge surrounding special education in relation to 
school inclusion and exclusion.  In addition, given the demonstrated association 
between school and social inclusion, this study contributes to the understanding of 
social outcomes for this group of young people. 
 
In turning to sociological theory this thesis makes a specific contribution to 
Bourdieu’s theorising of relationships of misrecognition and exclusion. This 
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contribution was made by conceptualising symbolic violence, misrecognition and 
exclusion as operating at the level of the interaction order through everyday language-
based categorisation practices. 
 
It also needs to be recognised that this study's theoretical findings are not limited to 
the particular kind of pedagogic relationships to be found in schools.  Because this 
contribution centres on reflexive knowledge construction associated with exclusion 
and inclusion it is equally relevant to other kinds of pedagogic relationships outside of 
school settings such as those between young people in residential care arrangements 
and their carers or young people in juvenile detention centres. 
 
In addition to the above substantiative and conceptual contributions the thesis also 
makes a particular methodological contribution.  The engagement with epistemology 
and reflexivity to guard against the smuggling in of an analyst’s taken-for-granted 
prenotions goes some way toward addressing the problem of representation associated 
with conducting and analysing interviews.  The practical and systematic solutions 
drawn from applied ethnomethodology mean that the study makes a direct 
contribution to methodological knowledge addressing the epistemological challenges 
presented by qualitative interview data. 
 
The merits of this study are undoubtedly founded on the empirical strengths 
attributable to the intensity of the linguistic data analysis. However these strengths 
also impose strict limitations on the generalisability of the findings.  As a result the 
theoretical generalisability of the research findings and claims needs to be qualified 
and tested with more extensive studies across a range of different sites and different 
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demographics.  For example, this could include an investigation of different 
institutional arrangements that possibly produce different knowledge construction and 
application practices.  It could also include studies of if and how reflexive 
understanding survives despite obstacles posed by institutional conditions.  Finally it 
could include studies that move beyond the examination of linguistic practice to 
explore the details of interactional talk and action in the classroom. 
 
The theoretical conceptualisation of the institutional limits to practical understanding, 
in the current study, also stops short of detailing the implications for policy making 
and institutional practice.  This would require the application of a similarly careful 
forensic research approach so as to avoid the temptation to leap to implied solutions in 
the absence of adequate scientific description.  While this was beyond the scope of 
this thesis, such an investigation would be likely to constitute a valuable extension to 
the theoretical work undertaken here. 
 
The limitations to this study do not however detract from its strengths. This study's 
combination of material from Bourdieu and the interaction order theorists has 
provided a theoretical bridge to reflexively drill right down into the logics in use in 
teacher-student interactions in classroom settings.  By applying these conceptual 
instruments to an episode of ‘mental disorder’ leading to school exclusion this 
research has intensively explored and mapped the limits to, and possibility of, 
reflexive understanding within these interactions.  In this regard the study has 
undertaken the ‘serious cultural work and epistemological business of inclusion’ 
towards highly pragmatic ends (Slee, 2006:117).  The result is a rigorous 
identification of conditions and practices that play havoc with reflexive understanding 
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in teacher-student interactions.  Identifying these obstacles also helps illuminate 
conditions and practices that may lead to reflexive understanding and inclusion for 
this group of young people.  Ultimately this outcome has been achieved by focusing 
on the conditions for and practical nature of the linguistic production of ‘para-doxal’ 
thought that breaks with both commonsense and good intentions.  The practical 
upshot would appear to be the possibility of systematically understanding and 
appreciating ‘mentally disordered’ practice associated with inclusive teacher-student 
relationships. 
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Appendix A: Definitions 
The following represent some commonly encountered definitions in Australian and 
International research.   
 
Mental Disorder 
‘…a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs 
in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g. a painful symptom) or 
disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a 
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of 
freedom.  In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and 
culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved 
one.  Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered a manifestation of a 
behavioral, psychological or biological dysfunction in the individual.  Neither deviant 
behaviour (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between 
the individual and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a 
symptom of a dysfunction in the individual, as described above.’ (American 
Psychiatric Association (APA), 2000). 
 
Emotional or Psychiatric Disability 
According to the Commonwealth Disability Standards for Education 2005 a disability 
includes ‘a disorder, illness or disease that affects a person’s thought processes, 
perception of reality, emotions or judgement or that results in disturbed behaviour’  
 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006: 1 (1.4): 8).   
Emotional Disturbance or Disorder 
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An ‘Emotional Disturbance’ describes ‘an assessed diagnosis which relates to 
difficulties with behaviour and mental heath and which seriously affects 
educational functioning and emotional well-being.’ (DET, 2006a).    
 
Behavioural Disorder or Difficulties 
Students with ‘Behaviour Disorders’ or ‘Behaviour Difficulties’ are those 
students who ‘present as a management problem in their school and their 
behaviour is often unacceptable in the classroom and/or playground.  
Inappropriate behaviour frequently interferes with their learning and safety and 
the learning and safety of other students and staff’ (DET, 2002: 6).   The 
distinction between behaviours that represent a ‘behavioural disorder’ and 
‘emotional disturbance’ remains elusive in the DET definition other than that 
‘emotional disturbance’ is tagged by ‘an assessed diagnosis’, which presumably 
confirms ‘psychological impairment’ and ‘mental health’ problems. 
 
Severe Emotional Disturbance 
Young people ‘….exhibiting behavior disorders over a long period of time which 
adversely affect educational performance.  These include an inability to learn that 
cannot be explained by intellectual , sensory, or health factors; an inability to build or 
maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers; 
inappropriate types of behaviors or feelings under normal circumstances; a general 
pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; and/or a tendency to develop physical 
symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems’ (U.S. Public Law 94-
142, 1975 in Mason, Chapman and Scott, 1999: 358).  
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Conduct Disorder 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) DSM-IV-TR describes the diagnostic 
criteria for ‘Conduct Disorder’ in the following terms:  
•  ‘A repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of others 
or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated, as manifested by the 
presence of three (or more) of the following criteria in the past 12 months, with at 
least one criterion present in the past 6 months:  
o Aggression to people and animals  
o (1) often bullies, threatens, or intimidates others 
o (2) often initiates physical fights 
o (3) has used a weapon that can cause serious physical harm to others (e.g., 
a bat, brick, broken bottle, knife, gun) 
o (4) has been physically cruel to people 
o (5) has been physically cruel to animals 
o (6) has stolen while confronting a victim (e.g., mugging, purse snatching, 
extortion, armed robbery) 
o (7) has forced someone into sexual activity 
o Destruction of property  
o (8) has deliberately engaged in fire setting with the intention of causing 
serious damage 
o (9) has deliberately destroyed others' property (other than by fire setting) 
o Deceitfulness or theft  
o (10) has broken into someone else's house, building, or car 
o (11) often lies to obtain goods or favors or to avoid obligations (i.e., "cons" 
others) 
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o (12) has stolen items of nontrivial value without confronting a victim (e.g., 
shoplifting, but without breaking and entering; forgery) 
o Serious violations of rules  
o (13) often stays out at night despite parental prohibitions, beginning before 
age 13 years 
o (14) has run away from home overnight at least twice while living in 
parental or parental surrogate home (or once without returning for a 
lengthy period) 
o (15) is often truant from school, beginning before age 13 years 
• The disturbance in behavior causes clinically significant impairment in social, 
academic, or occupational functioning. 
• If the individual is age 18 years or older, criteria are not met for Antisocial 
Personality Disorder. 
Specify severity: 
• Mild:  few if any conduct problems in excess of those required to make the 
diagnosis and  conduct problems cause only minor harm to others 
• Moderate:  number of conduct problems and effect on others intermediate 
between "mild" and "severe" 
• Severe:  many conduct problems in excess of those required to make the 
diagnosis or  conduct problems cause considerable harm to others’ (original 
emphasis, APA, 2000) 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
 
The DSM-IV-TR describes the diagnostic criteria for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder in the following terms:  
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A. ‘Either (1) or (2):  
1. six (or more) of the following symptoms of inattention  have persisted for 
at least 6 months to a degree that is maladaptive and inconsistent with 
developmental level: Inattention   
a. often fails to give close attention to details or makes careless 
mistakes in schoolwork, work, or other activities 
b. often has difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or play activities 
c. often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly 
d. often does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish 
schoolwork, chores, or duties in the workplace (not due to 
oppositional behavior or failure to understand instructions) 
e. often has difficulty organizing tasks and activities 
f. often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require 
sustained mental effort (such as schoolwork or homework) 
g. often loses things necessary for tasks or activities (e.g., toys, school 
assignments, pencils, books, or tools) 
h. is often easily distracted by extraneous stimuli 
i. is often forgetful in daily activities 
2. six (or more) of the following symptoms of hyperactivity-impulsivity  
have persisted for at least 6 months to a degree that is maladaptive and 
inconsistent with developmental level: Hyperactivity   
a. often fidgets with hands or feet or squirms in seat 
b. often leaves seat in classroom or in other situations in which 
remaining seated is expected 
 407 
c. often runs about or climbs excessively in situations in which it is 
inappropriate (in adolescents or adults, may be limited to subjective 
feelings of restlessness) 
d. often has difficulty playing or engaging in leisure activities quietly 
e. is often "on the go" or often acts as if "driven by a motor" 
f. often talks excessively 
Impulsivity   
g. often blurts out answers before questions have been completed 
h. often has difficulty awaiting turn 
i. often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g., butts into conversations 
or games) 
B. Some hyperactive-impulsive or inattentive symptoms that caused impairment 
were present before age 7 years. 
C. Some impairment from the symptoms is present in two or more settings (e.g., at 
school [or work] and at home). 
D. There must be clear evidence of clinically significant impairment in social, 
academic, or occupational functioning. 
E. The symptoms do not occur exclusively during the course of a Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder, Schizophrenia, or other Psychotic Disorder and are not 
better accounted for by another mental disorder (e.g., Mood Disorder, Anxiety 
Disorder, Dissociative Disorder, or a Personality Disorder). 
Code based on type: 
• 314.01 Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Combined Type:  if both 
Criteria A1 and A2 are met for the past 6 months 
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• 314.00 Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Predominantly 
Inattentive Type:  if Criterion A1 is met but Criterion A2 is not met for the 
past 6 months 
• 314.01 Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Predominantly 
Hyperactive-Impulsive Type:  if Criterion A2 is met but Criterion A1 is not 
met for the past 6 months’ (APA, 2000).  
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Appendix B: Individual and Environmental Historical Relationships Giving Rise 
to ‘Disordered’ Practices 
Bio-Genetic Factors 
From an orthodox perspective a range of individual personal ‘deficits’ are associated 
with ‘mentally disordered’ practice.  This includes poor moral development, lack of 
empathetic behaviour, remorselessness, deficits in rule governed behaviour and self-
management skills (Gelfland, Jenson & Drew, 1997: 123; Murray & Farrington, 2010: 
635; & Muris 2006: 4); and also social skills deficits including poor self regulation 
capacity, peer adjustment capacity, poor problem solving skills and social cue 
processing (Bradley, Henderson & Monfore, 2004: 218; Center & Kemp, 2003: 77; 
Gable et al, 2002: 462; Hemphill & Littlefield, 2001: 824; Lane et al, 2006: 113; 
Murray 2002; 286; Murray & Farrington, 2010: 635; Robinson, Smith & Miller, 
2002: 257 & 266-267; Wagner et al, 2005: 80-87). 
In seeking to understand the causes of these personal ‘deficits’ a second body of 
orthodox research has attempted to ground these discoveries in biological causes 
including: genetic profiling of various mental disorders (Hudziak et al, 2007: S18; 
Center & Kemp, 2003: 78-79; Dick et al, 2004; Dick et al, 2005; Efron, 2006: 549; 
Kauffman, 2005: 166-189; Muris 2006: 3-4; & Salmelainen, 2002: 10); a set of 
neurobiological problems including brain dysfunctions, brain trauma and dysfunctions 
in the autonomous nervous system (Center & Kemp 2003: 77; Dery et al, 1999: 225-
226; Kauffman, 2005: 169-172; Mattison, Hooper & Carson 2006; van Bokhoven et 
al, 2005: 153); innate cognitive distortions (Barriga et al 2000; Gable et al 2002: 462; 
& Hemphill & Littlefield, 2001: 824); deficits in social information processing 
including exaggerated attribution of hostile intent to others and heightened reactive 
aggression (Hartman & Stage, 2000); poor language ability leading to poor social 
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competence (Hill & Coufal, 2005); & negative innate temperaments including 
temperaments that are abnormally reactive, fearful and aggressive or temperaments 
marked by excessive emotionality and high levels of risk taking (Center & Kemp, 
2003; Kauffman, 2005: 174-177; & Muris 2006: 3-4).  
Environmental Factors 
Whilst a small number of orthodox researchers have attempted to locate the causes of 
‘mentally disordered’ practice solely in biological or genetic abnormalities, the great 
majority have accepted that other historical relations significantly contribute to the 
manifestation of ‘disordered’ practice.  These researchers argue that ‘disordered’ 
practice is a complex product of the interaction between biological and environmental 
relations (Kauffman, 2005: 165).   
The Dysfunctional Family 
Foremost amongst these environmental relations is the ‘dysfunctional’ family, that is, 
the abusive family where childhood abuse or victimisation becomes an explanatory 
precursor for ‘mental disorder’ (Guerra, Boxer & Kim, 2005: 277-280; Kauffman, 
2005: 195-197; Kenny et al, 2006: 25-30; Morton, Clark & Pead, 1999: 1-54; 
Malmgren & Meisal, 2004; Murray & Farrington, 2010: 636-637; Muris, 2006: 4-5; 
and Walrath et al, 2006). According to this causal logic dysfunctional and abusive 
parenting either produces or exacerbates the set of individual deficits previously 
identified.  Conversely positive parenting is seen to act as a buffering or protective 
factor (Bradshaw et al, 2002: 247; Garnefski & Doets, 2000: 760; & Smart et al 2005: 
xv-xvi.).  
The relationship between dysfunctional parenting and ‘mental disorder’ may also help 
to explain a set of other identified correlations between family demographics and 
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‘mental disorder’ such as the correlation between ‘mental disorder’ in children and 
young people and low maternal education, unmarried parents, mother less than 18, 
single parents and family instability (Bradshaw et al 2006: 247; Kauffman, 2005: 189-
190; Kortering, Braziel & Tompkins, 2002: 151; Mason, Chapman & Scott, 1999: 
375-380; Murray & Farrington, 2010: 636-637; Sawyer et al, 2000: 11; Wagner, 
2005: 84; & Woolfenden, Williams & Peat, 2001: 3).  These family characteristics 
can be seen to act as ‘stressors’ on families exacerbating or triggering dysfunctional 
parenting (Kauffman, 2005: 189 & Kortering, Braziel & Tompkins 2002: 151). 
Socio-Economic Background 
Low ‘Socio-Economic Status’ (SES) variously defined as low family income, 
employment rates and educational levels, is a second environmental factor that is 
strongly correlated with incidence of ‘mental disorder’ (Achenbach & Rescorla 2007: 
96-104; Conway, 2006: 17; Coutinho et al 2002: 120; Kortering, Braziel & Tompkins, 
2002: 151;  McLaughlin et al, 2011; Malmgren & Meisel., 2004: 186; Salmelainen, 
2002: 11; Sawyer et al, 2000: 21; Sawyer, Miller-Lewis & Clark, 2007:188; NSW 
Teacher’s Federation & Federation of P&C Associations of NSW, 2002: 12; & 
Wagner et al, 2005: 84).  In the orthodox literature low SES in itself is not seen as a 
causal factor.  Rather the poverty associated with low SES is understood as a 
significant stressor that fosters the conditions for individual biological deficits and/or 
family dysfunction, abuse and poor ‘attachments’ (Efron, 2006: 549; & Kauffman, 
2005:250).   
 
In contradistinction to orthodox psychological and psychiatric literature there runs a 
rich tradition of critical research that points to the construction of individual frames of 
reference arising from class cultural differences (e.g. Bourdieu, 1990b; Corrigan, 
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1979; Gleeson, 1992; & Willis, 1977).  On the one hand these class cultural 
subjectivities have been argued as lending themselves to diagnoses of mental disorder 
because of dominant class bias inherent in assessments of ‘disorder’ (Bogardus, 1997: 
58-87; Cosgrove, 2005: 283-288; Harwood, 2000: 9-32 & 137-161; Laws, 2001:43-76 
& Laws & Davies, 2000: 213).  On the other they may lend themselves to 
oppositional and disruptive practices in relation to dominant school norms and values 
(Corrigan, 1979: 20-71; Furlong & Morrison, 2000: 8-12; & Gleeson, 1992: 453-454) 
– practices that may then be seen as indicative of externalising mental disorders. 
Irrespective of disagreements between dominant or critical perspectives there remains 
a consensus that understanding the socio-economic backgrounds of young people 
diagnosed with mental disorders is exceptionally important in understanding their 
practices in schools.  This is partly because of the way that class background can 
come into play in ‘disordered’ practice as described above, partly because of the way 
that class background mediates interventions (Urbis, 2011: 45 & 113; Wilson & 
Lipsey, 2007: 458-459) and partly because class background appears to underpin 
other sets of historical relations giving rise to subjectivities that are also associated 
with ‘mental disorder’.   These other relations include the relationship between 
poverty and ‘family dysfunction’ and also the relationship with neighbourhood factors 
and cultural background. 
 
Neighbourhood 
Seemingly related to poverty and yet having a distinctive separate effect is ‘low socio-
economic neighbourhood’.  Therefore whilst SES measured in terms of family income 
is strongly correlated with incidence of ‘mental disorder’, living in an economically 
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deprived neighbourhood has also been found to be associated with increased levels of 
‘mental disorder’ regardless of the individual-level SES (Kalff et al, 2001; and 
Sellstrom & Bremberg, 2006).  
 
The association between ‘mental disorder’ and ‘low socio-economic neighbourhoods’ 
is however not equally relevant for all ‘mental disorders’.  As Loeber & Stouthamer-
Loeber discovered it is only ‘externalising problems’ rather than ‘internalising 
problems’ that are associated with ‘neighbourhood’ effects (in Kauffman, 2005: 248).  
Once again, in the orthodox literature, the causal link between impoverished 
neighbourhood and individual mental disorder is understood in terms of the enhancing 
effect upon latent dysfunctional attributes of families and/or individuals.  Thus low 
socio-economic neighbourhoods are seen to be associated with a range of causal 
factors that contribute to the incidence and maintenance of externalising mental 
disorders including: the negative effect of neighbourhood violence on functional 
parenting practices (Bradshaw et al, 2006: 257); the establishment of violent norms of 
behaviour (Kauffman, 2005: 248); the traumatic effects of neighbourhood violence 
upon children and young people (Bradshaw et al, 2006: 247); ‘peer contagion’ 
(Guerra, Boxer & Kim, 2005: 281); and community disorganisation that establishes 
obstacles to successful service delivery (Kauffman, 2005: 248; and Sprague & 
Walker, 2000: 371-372). 
Cultural Background  
A long history of research has also demonstrated that children and young people from 
particular marginalised cultural backgrounds are strongly over-represented in both the 
incidence of ‘mental disorder’ in the general population and the incidence of students 
with ‘mental disorders’  (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2007: 96-104; Jordan & Branch, 
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2001: 53; Bradley, Henderson & Monfore, 2004: 212-213; Coutinho et al, 2002; 
McDowell, 2001; Malmgren & Meisel, 2004: 178; Mattison, Hooper & Carlson, 
2006: 177; Serpell et al, 2009: 321 & Wagner et al, 2005: 84).  The relationship 
between ‘marginalised cultural background’ and ‘mental disorder’ is however much 
more complex than the simple correlation presented above.  For example Hispanic 
children and young people, who belong to another marginalised cultural population in 
the USA, appear to be under-represented in the data (Bradley, Henderson and 
Monfore, 2004: 213). Consequently the causal relationship between ‘marginalised 
cultural background’ and ‘mental disorder’ has been difficult to determine. 
In attempting to unravel some of the complexities surrounding ‘cultural background’ 
some researchers have argued that ‘cultural background’ correlations are partly if not 
largely disguised ‘economic disadvantage’ (Achenbach & Edelbrock in Coutinho et al 
2002: 110).  Thus cultural factors are at least partly read as SES stressors producing 
individual dysfunction via dysfunctional families (Coutinho et al 2002: 111; 
Jacobson, 2000: 32; & Malmgren & Meisal, 2004: 186).   However cultural factors 
cannot be completely understood as ‘economic disadvantage’ because of 
inconsistencies such as those noted with the Hispanic population in the U.S.   
 
Peers 
Peers are seen to have both a historical and circumstantial role particularly in the 
development of anti-social externalising ‘mental disorders’.  To begin with children 
and young people with ‘mentally disordered’ antisocial behaviours such as aggression 
and violence orient to peer groups comprised of other young people with chronic anti-
social behaviours including violence and substance abuse (Cullingford & Morrison, 
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1997: 62-78;  Farmer, Farmer & Gut 1999: 131; & Smart et al, 2005: xiii). In terms of 
causal effects and as previously noted, violent peers are seen to enhance individual 
and family deficits through neighbourhood effects whereby chronic exposure to 
violent peer groups exacerbate individual and family dysfunction (Guerra, Boxer & 
Kim, 2005: 281).  In addition ‘dysfunctional’ and anti-social peer groups have a 
mediating effect in that they serve to maintain and reinforce anti-social behaviours.  
Peer rejection by pro-social peers without ‘mental disorders’ is also seen to contribute 
to the further development of anti-social ‘mentally disordered’ behaviours and peer 
rejection is identified as both a precursor to the drift towards ‘anti-social’ peer groups 
and as having a distinct contribution to chronic anti-social aggressive development 
(Ladd, 2006).   
Gender 
Gender appears to come into play geno-biologically, environmentally and also 
institutionally in the production of practices that are identified as mentally disordered.  
The upshot is that there are significant differences between male and female 
prevalence rates of different kinds of disorders (Hartung & Widiger, 1998; Sawyer et 
al, 2000: 20, Seedat et al, 2009; Urbis, 2011: 51; & WHO, 2002).  These differences 
also vary across age groups.  The most significant of these differences are those 
related to ‘internalising’ and ‘externalising’ ‘mental disorders’. This relationship is 
significant because of the previously noted relationship between school exclusion and 
‘externalising’ behaviours.  Studies repeatedly report a higher prevalence of 
externalising disorders amongst young men than with young women.  Alternatively 
internalising disorders are reported more amongst young women than young men 
(Hartung & Widiger, 1998; Seedat et al, 2009; Urbis, 2011: 51; & WHO, 2002).   
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Setting aside methodological bias and diagnostic bias, these differences in prevalence 
are understood to be tied to different socialised responses to environmental stressors 
arising from gender roles and also gender based violence (Roehling, Koelbel & 
Rutgers, 1996; Kann & Hanna, 2000: 270; & WHO, 2002).  For example socialised 
coping responses to family trauma or violence has been reported as reflecting 
stereotypically masculine and feminine characteristics in the presentation of 
internalising responses, such as co-dependence or ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ in 
young women and ‘delinquency’ or ‘conduct disorder’ in young men (Roehling, 
Koelbel & Rutgers, 1996: 615; & Zina et al, 2001).   
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Appendix C: Interview Questions 
 
1.  Young People Diagnosed with Mental Disorders 
Field Example Questions4 
• To initiate the interview in a non-threatening way 
• To incite comparative description of positive and 
negative characteristics of schooling 
• To incite description of current schooling   
I’d like to hear about your experiences of school.  Can you start by drawing a line and marking on 
that line all the schools that you’ve been to?  How would you describe the different schools that 
you’ve been to? Can you mark on the line times that you’ve been suspended or expelled or been on 
in-school suspension? How would you describe a typical day at school now? How would you 
describe the good things about school?   
 
• To incite descriptions of event associated with 
‘mental disorder’ 
• To incite descriptions of conflict  
• To explore young person’s logic of behaviour 
Can you tell me about a time recently at school that you got into trouble?  What happened?  If I 
were to ask the other people involved what would they say about what happened?  What do you 
think about that? 
• To explore position taking and position making of 
‘normal’ young people 
• To explore disposition of young person 
 
There are some young people at this school who do not seem to get into as much trouble.  What 
differences do you see between those young people and yourself? Can you tell me about a time 
when you could see the differences between them and you?  What would you have to change about 
yourself to act more like them?   If I asked them the same questions of them what do you think 
they would say?  If I asked your teachers what do you think they’d say? 
• To explore position taking and position making of 
teachers 
• To explore disposition of young people 
 
How would you describe your teachers at school? Can you tell me about what differences you see 
between the teachers at your school and yourself? Can you tell me about a time when you could 
see the differences between them and you?  What would you have to change about yourself to get 
along better with those teachers you don’t get along with?  If I asked those teachers the same 
questions what do you think they’d say? 
• To incite descriptions of truancy 
• To explore logic of young person’s behaviour 
Have there been times at school recently when you were away from school without permission?  
Can you tell me what happened?   
• To incite descriptions of a more inclusive school What would you change about your school to make it a better place for you to learn?  What do 
you think your teachers would say if I asked them about that?  What do you think young people 
who don’t get into as much trouble would say about that? 
                                                 
4 These are example questions only as the wording and choice of the questions was dependent upon the wording and terminology and contexts provided by the 
participants.  
 418 
  
2.  Teachers   
Aim Question 
• To initiate the interview in a non-threatening way 
• To incite comparative description of positive and 
negative characteristics of schooling 
• To incite description of current teaching practice   
I’d like to hear about your experiences working in schools with young people who are seen to have 
emotional or behavioural disturbances. Can you start by drawing a line and marking on the line 
all the different schools that you’ve taught young people with mental disorders?  How would you 
describe these schools?  How would you describe the way that they worked with young people with 
mental disorders?  How would you describe the way that you currently work with these young 
people? 
 
 
• To incite descriptions of an event associated with 
mental disorder. 
• To incite descriptions of conflict  
• To explore young person’s logic of behaviour 
These young people often seem to get into trouble at school.  Can you tell me about a time that you 
were teaching ‘X’ and they ended up getting into trouble? What happened?  If I were to ask the 
other people involved what would they say about what happened?  What do you think about that? 
• To incite descriptions of  There are some young people at this school who do not seem to get into as much trouble.  What 
differences do you see between those young people and young people diagnosed with a mental 
disorder?  
What similarities do you see between these young people?   
• To explore position taking and position making of 
‘normal’ young people 
• To explore disposition of young person 
 
What differences do you see between young people with ED/BD and yourself?  What would you 
have to change about yourself to act more like them? Can you tell me about a time that 
demonstrates the differences between them and you?  What would you have to change about 
yourself to act more like them?  If I asked them the same questions of them what do you think they 
would say? 
• To incite descriptions of a more inclusive school What would you change about your school to make it a better place for young people with EB/BD 
to learn?  What do you think ‘X’ would say if I asked them about that?  What do you think young 
people who don’t get into as much trouble would say about that? 
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Appendix D: Index to Transcript Notation 
=  Utterances which quickly follow the last one 
it is  Underlining indicates emphasis 
WORK Capitals indicate very loud utterances 
(       )  Inaudible utterances 
(yeah)  Barely audible utterances 
((drinks)) Researcher’s description of action 
(.)  Very small gaps or pauses 
(0.2) A pause for the duration of fraction of second  
(1.0)  A pause for the duration of one second 
:::  Prolonged sound 
?  Upward inflection 
.  Downward inflection 
Huhuh  Laughter 
Y(huh)es Incipient laughter 
Th-  Utterance with sharp cut off 
[but]  Overlapping utterance 
[Ah] 
